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The examination of the topic of market risk management in Islamic finance is a 
complex endeavour.  At a basic level, the subject matter, being multifarious in a 
manner that mixes religion and economics, requires the conjoining of religious faith 
with scientific objectivity in order to ascertain the truth contained in the scripture as 
it pertains to the Mua’amalat (dealings between individuals) matter of entering into 
financial contracts with others to manage market risk exposures.  
 
Moreover, the complexity is compounded due to the need to disentangle the 
ambiguity that has beset the discourse on the topic due to historically being mostly 
legal-centric with a focus on debating the contractual elements rather than attempting 
to comprehensively address the myriad issues that relate to market risk management 
in contemporary contexts. These issues, for the most part, revolve around the reliance 
on market risk transfer as a strategy and derivative contracts, with monetary 
underlying variables, as tools to implement that strategy.  
 
Thus, the journey of investigating the rationale, permissibility, and usage of 
derivative hedging instruments for market risk management in Islamic finance is, 
essentially, an undertaking that seeks to engage in a wide-ranging and multi-layered 
examination of the subject matter as well as the exploration of new areas of relative 
significance. This, in turn, and subsequent to the analysis of data generated from 
documentary sources and forty-one interviews which were collected from numerous 
sources within four locations, led to the elaboration of the contention that market risk 
management through derivative instruments for legitimate hedging purposes should 
not be prohibited in the Shari’a, albeit with certain conditions that limit unproductive 
behaviour.  
 
The basis for the aforementioned contention is built on the fact that market risk 
management has undergone a paradigm shift in how exposures are identified and 




ability to address the opportunities and challenges facing institutions that provide 
value to society (i.e., the real sector). Moreover, there is little substantive evidence 
that proves that the utilization of derivative instruments for hedging purposes leads 
its users to partaking in transactions that circumvent the prohibition of Riba (usury), 
Gharar (excessive uncertainty), and Maysir (gambling).  
 
In effect, the derivative instruments used for the management of market risks are not 
only disassociated from usurious debt transactions, they are also transacted in the 
financial markets in a manner that is transparent to all the parties involved. Along the 
same lines, the prohibition of Maysir, which is apparently an overarching concern, 
should be conceptualized with the focus on the proscription of the act of gambling, 
not necessarily the instruments (e.g., derivatives) and/or any particular framework 
(e.g., zero-sum arrangements).  
 
Ultimately, one should be cognizant of the fact that the true intentions of Islamic 
jurisprudence in Mua’amalat (as a manifestation of divine guidance) always centre 
on human well-being. Accordingly, the religious prohibitions are, in essence, within 
the realm of acts that adversely affect human well-being.  This is a constant theme 
that is present throughout the thesis; and is one that exists at the heart of a wider 
aspiration of its adoption to a greater extent than is currently present in the Islamic 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
The twentieth century has certainly been an interesting period in human history in 
terms of opportunities and challenges in the economic and financial realms. The 
advent of globalization and the continued formation of new structures of the 
international financial architecture (e.g., rise and fall of the Bretton Woods system, 
Washington Consensus, etc.) along with the concomitant revolution in information 
technology have contributed to not only increasing the profit potential for businesses 
around the world, but also to augmenting the complexity and uncertainty that they 
have to contend with in search for that profit.  
 
The past century also saw the (re)introduction of Islamic finance as defined by the 
economic doctrine of the Shari’a with its three pillars of the prohibition of Riba 
(usury), Gharar (excessive uncertainty), and Maysir (gambling). For Riba, the 
fundamental basis for its proscription can broadly be related to the elimination of the 
injustices linked to the financial slavery of individuals by opportunist money lenders 
who strive to benefit from the sanctity of debt repayment obligations in Islam 
without any of the commensurate risks that exist in the world of commerce.   
 
The prohibition of Gharar is focused on the increase of the certainty of commercial 
transactions by reducing the information asymmetry as well as the elimination of the 
malicious devouring of the property of others by dishonesty, deception, or taking 
advantage of informational ignorance. As for Maysir, the objective of Islamic 
jurisprudence is the promotion of a productive work ethic that increases well-fare 
(both at the individual level and to society) as opposed to concentrating on the 
unearned gains of gambling with all its associated anti-social behaviour.
1
    
 
Notably, within its relatively short history, modern Islamic finance, which is built on 
the Islamic theory of Qiyas (analogical reasoning) that is centred on linking modern-
day financial transactions to the commercial practices of the early Muslim 
community in the seventh century, has had the challenging task of attempting to 
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provide a sustainable alternative to an advanced “conventional” financial system that 
is by no means static in nature in that it continues to evolve to address, and arguably 
also introduce, new issues in the global financial markets.  
 
At the heart of the dynamism of conventional finance are theories built mainly on 
neoclassical economic foundations that, with the assistance of mathematical 
computing advances, have been significant in shaping the discourse in the domain of 
risk and return.  Consequently, conventional finance has had the unique advantage of 
a fairly well-developed universe of processes as well as instruments that identify, 
measure, and manage the various risk exposures facing investors (especially entities 
in the real sector2).  
 
In contrast, when one examines the theory and practice of risk management in 
Islamic finance, it can be discerned that the Islamic finance industry has been in the 
difficult position of endeavouring to reconcile the real risk management demands by 
business entities in the global Islamic community with the challenges posed by the 
seemingly rigid stances of some of the Shari’a scholars. Accordingly, in the realm of 
the management of market risks (particularly interest/profit rates, currency, and 
commodity risks), these restrictive stances have, in effect, resulted in the proscription 
in the usage of the majority of hedging instruments, which have derivative-like 
features, even if they are utilized with a legitimate commercial rationale.  
 
The ensuing problem, of course, in undertaking appropriate market risk management 
becomes endogenous to an Islamic finance industry that, in modern form, has grown 
tremendously from its humble beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s with the mutual 
banking experiments in Pakistan, Egypt, and Malaysia that were followed by 
institutionalized banking practices in the 1970s in Dubai, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait 
(El-Gamal, 2006, p. 163). More specifically, the Islamic finance industry has grown 
to an estimated size of US$ 1.1 trillion by the end of 2012; and in the Middle East 
and North Africa region (including Turkey) the industry has recorded a CAGR of 
twenty per cent in the five years ending 2010 vis-à-vis nine per cent by the leading 
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conventional banks (E&Y, 2011).
3
 This, it should be pointed out, comes mainly from 
countries that are endowed with large natural resources and are experiencing high 
population growth rates in addition to harbouring a desire of seeking to positively 
interact with an increasingly globalized setting of commercial and financial practices.  
 
Effectively, the aforementioned growth, which can be observed to exist at multiple 
levels in the Islamic finance industry, inevitably transposes the nature of inherent 
market risks in Islamic finance from a sedentary role to a position of dominance in 
the elaboration and implementation of corporate strategies not only for the 
competitiveness of enterprises seeking to operate within the confines of the economic 
doctrine of the Shari’a, but also even for their survival in the international market 
place. In fact, it has been widely acknowledged by many observers that the Islamic 
finance industry will not be able to sustainably continue on this growth trajectory, 
and may even regress, without a proper market risk management framework that can 
effectively deal with the complex risks that exist in today‟s globalized economy 
(Chapra & Khan, 2000; Moody's, 2010 ).   
 
Subsequent to the foregoing background, it may be stated that the present research is 
formulated with the objective of advancing knowledge on the topics of market risk 
management and derivative hedging instruments in the Islamic finance industry by 
way of a comprehensive and multi-layered examination of the juridical and economic 
discourse on the subject matter in addition to the exploration of new areas of relevant 
significance in order to arrive at proper understanding.  This objective, in turn, is 
translated into two research aims: Firstly, the research seeks to inject economic-
centred theories, along with a wider elaboration of the modus operandi of the 
financial markets, into the Islamic finance discourse on the subject matter. Secondly, 
it will attempt to examine the rationale for the various stances on the permissibility 
(both in favour and against) of derivatives hedging instruments in a manner that not 
only accounts for the numerous instruments currently existing in the financial 
markets, but also some of the proposed solutions in the Islamic finance space.  
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The research questions that will be explored in the thesis, for their part, are: 1) What 
is the basis for the proscriptions of the usage of derivative hedging instruments for 
market risk management in the Islamic finance industry, and 2) What is the basis for 
allowing derivative hedging instruments for market risk management in the Islamic 
finance industry? 
 
In essence, the attainment of the research aims and the responses to the research 
questions are expected to assist in the overcoming of what can arguably be described 
as an incomplete appreciation by some of the participants in the Islamic finance 
industry of the economic and financial principles that underlie what is inherently an 
economic subject matter.  This, it will be shown, can be evident by the nature of the 
current commentary in the Islamic finance industry that regularly places paramount 
importance on the form of the contracts and instruments rather than the religious 
substance (which has economic rationales) that regulate its existence.  
 
Consequently, more often than not, the end result observed is a mixture of macro-
level (e.g., eliminate all derivative hedging instruments from society) and micro-level 
(e.g., Arabic-named byzantine transactions) recommendations with little insight on 
how these recommendations relate to existing economic theories, introduce new 
theories than can better explain the economic behaviour of individuals, or even how 
they are meant to be implemented in a dynamic and interconnected globalized setting 
along with the externalities (both positive and negative) that can result in the course 
of that implementation.  
 
Thus, the thesis will elaborate a multidimensional perspective of the subject matter of 
the research in the most wide-ranging manner possible through the examination of all 
the pertinent angles, including the investigation into areas that have hitherto been 
relatively unexplored in the Islamic finance industry. The aspired outcome, it should 
be asserted in this introduction chapter, is not so much the simple focus on espousing 
a position on the permissibility of derivative hedging instruments, as it is on seeking 




market risk exposures are managed in the most effective and efficient manner 
possible.  
 
With that, apart from this introduction (chapter one) and conclusion (chapter nine), 
the research aims and questions have propelled the thesis to be divided into three 
broad parts comprising seven substantive chapters. The first part contains two 
chapters that can be thought of as the foundation of the research that is contained in 
the thesis. Specifically, chapter two delves into the conceptualization of truth in 
Islamic thought, which is deemed to be pertinent in a discussion that relates to 
religious injunctions that were elaborated by Shari’a scholars with a belief in the 
injunctions‟ inherent legitimacy due to the perception of a superior proximity to the 
truth contained in the Islamic scripture (i.e., Quran and Ahadith). Chapter three 
outlines the research design of the thesis in terms of the deductive research strategy 
employed in addition to the research methods that entail the collection and analysis 
of documentary resources (fundamental and derived) as well as interviews with 
respondents in four distinct groups of stakeholders in the Islamic finance industry.  
 
The second part, in turn, includes three chapters that concentrate on the aspects in the 
discourse that are associated with the topics of market risk management and 
derivative instruments. In essence, the fourth chapter of the thesis commences the 
substantive discussion with a wide view on the identification and measurement of 
market risks as well as the strategies (and their rationales) that are used in dealing 
with them. The fifth chapter attempts to add depth to the discussion by probing the 
economic aspects of derivative instruments along with an undertaking of instrument-
specific analysis, both of which are often overlooked in the descriptive-natured 
commentary on the subject matter in the Islamic finance literature. As for the sixth 
chapter, which is a key chapter in the thesis, it endeavours to examine, in detail, the 
discourse on derivatives in Islamic finance through the analysis of the juridical, 
academic, and practitioner perspectives, including a scrutiny of the design of 





The third part of the thesis, for its part, seeks to add new facets to the consideration 
of market risk management and derivatives that were, despite its relative neglect in 
the literature on the subject matter, deemed by the researcher to be important to 
understanding due to their existence in the commentary imparted by the respondents 
in the course of the interviews. This includes the seventh chapter that centres on the 
unease of Shari’a scholars in condoning the permissibility of financial instruments 
that have monetary benchmarks, such as interest rate and foreign exchange, as 
underlying variables. The unease, in turn, can be discerned to have resulted in a 
systemic avoidance of an effective debate on the recognition of these contracts (or 
even their “Islamic” equivalents) on the financial statements of the entities that use 
them in the Islamic finance industry. The eighth chapter, as the final substantive 
chapter of the thesis, concerns the constant perception of a static association between 
the prohibition of Maysir (gambling) and derivative instruments, which was a 













The resurgence of Islamic thought in the latter half of the 20
th
 century has provided a 
basis for unity among the world‟s Muslim population.  This unity served as a call to 
action that demanded the adherents of the religion to work together to supplant the 
western-dominated culture in Muslim countries with one that is truly Islamic.  In 
fact, it could be argued that the root of the most organized opposition movements 
during that period in predominately Muslim countries has been the aspiration of 
political, social, and economic reforms that follow true Islamic law. 
 
Beyond the euphoria of latest successes of political Islam, this transformation poses 
challenges in the discernment of whether the unity for Muslims is based on a real, 
and shared, understanding of Islam that is based on the constant mediation between 
written text that includes the Quran and Ahadith
4
, the scientific interpretation of that 
text, and contemporary understanding that is implicitly based on the various theories 
of truth as well as the theoretical perspectives that frame its existence.  
 
This chapter will seek to address that ambiguity by delving into the relevant theories 
of truth from western and Islamic viewpoints, which include the correspondence, 
consensus, and pragmatic theories of truth, as well as the critical rationalism and 
hermeneutical (interpretivism and historical) theoretical perspectives. These theories 
and theoretical perspectives will, in turn, be linked to Islamic theories that include 
Maslaha (public interest), Qiyas (analogical reasoning), and Igma’a (consensus) in 
order to develop a wider and more comprehensive answer to the question of “What is 
truth in Islamic thought?”  
 
As a basis for the attempted response that will be elaborated to the aforementioned 
question, one may conjecture that while the truth in many facets of the Islamic faith 
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religious texts include the work of Muslim jurist that include, but are not limited, to the founders of 




can be considered static in time and space (Al-Thawabit), especially in acts of Ibadah 
(worship), it is acknowledged that Islam allows for change and dynamism (Al-
Mutaghayarat) through intellect and reasoning in the context of Mua’amalat 
(dealings between individuals).
5
 This reality, in turn, has implications in how we 
define truth in Islam and what that means in terms of enforcement. 
 
Section I: Theories of Truth: Perspectives of Islam 
 
Truth, however it is constructed, does have particular ontological assumptions about 
the nature of reality (Blaikie, 2000) as well as some theoretical perspectives that 
shape the logic in the construction of that reality (Crotty, 1998). More specifically, 
Crotty states that “ontology is the study of being. It is concerned with „what is‟, with 
the nature of existence, with the structure of reality as such” (Crotty, 1998). With that 
definition, one can observe that in Islam, ontology is mainly realist in nature in that it 
views reality as existing independently of our senses, ideation, and volition (Bunge, 
1993).  In other words, God, the divine guidance manifested by the scripture, among 
other fundamental themes in Islam exist outside of the human mind despite the fact 
that they are central objectives of human intellectual comprehension of universal 
existence.   
 
Further granularity to the ontological assumptions behind the Islamic faith can be 
obtained through an examination of the relevant theories of truth, particularly the 
correspondence theory of truth.  This theory, which originated during the time of the 




 proposes that truth naturally 
corresponds to a particular object and reality.  The theory was further elaborated by 
Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) in his Metaphysics contribution as part of The Healing volumes 
and was later refined by Thomas Aquinas in the 14
th
 century through an in-depth 
evaluation, as part of his Quodlibeta, of the theories advocated by Aristotle and 
Avicenna. 
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and mua’amalat (Al-Shatibi, 2004, p. 6).  
6
 In his work in Metaphysic, Categories, and De Interpretatione. 
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In the context of Islamic thought, the philosophy of Avicenna is particularly pertinent 
as it is unique in that it merges the correspondence theory of truth, as elaborated by 
his philosophical predecessors, with the Islamic tradition. For Avicenna, truth can be 
defined as: 
“„Truth‟ is also said of the veridical belief in the existence [of something]. Hence 
nothing is more worthy of this reality than [the object] of veridical belief who, in 
addition to [being the object of] the veridical [belief], has permanence – with His 
permanence being due to Himself, not to another…Hence, He is the most entitled to 
be [the] Truth‟” (Avicenna & Marmura, 2005)  
 
Avicenna‟s definition of truth is interpreted by Thomas Aquinas as: “the truth in each 
thing...is nothing else than the property of its being which has been established in it” 
(Aertsen, 1988, p. 152). Aertsen further elaborates on the philosophies of Avicenna 
and the interpretation of Aquinas by asserting that a being is “a true thing insofar as 
it has the form proper to its nature, its specific essence” (Aertsen, 1988, p. 152)  
 
Interestingly, Aquinas also introduces the importance of the mind in the formulation 
of the truth in that he states that “„truth is the equation of thing and intellect‟, which 
he restates as: „a judgement is said to be true when it conforms to the external 
reality‟” (Stanford, 2002) This statement in Aertsen‟s view considers that truth is the 
correspondence (or coming together) of the movements of thought and the dynamics 
of being (Aertsen, 1988).   
 
The consolidation of the aforementioned perspectives, therefore, propose that the 
correspondence theory of truth advances the position that: Firstly, truth (in a form 
proper to its nature, being, or essence) exists and it does so independently of the 
human mind. Secondly, the use of words denoting cognition, thought, and intellect 
by the various philosophers indicates that human beings will ultimately seek to 
reasonably ascertain the truth and its agreement with reality.  
 
Notably and as highlighted previously, Avicenna‟s view on the theory of truth has a 
strong religious orientation. Avicenna, as is customary in Islam, believes that truth 




In fact, the Quran is replete with indications of the truth being God and/or emanating 
from divine will.
8
 Thus, the truth in Islam is, in effect, anything that can get us closer 
to Him. This view of the truth can be further refined by stating that Him can also be 
used to mean His commands as given in the Quran and through his messengers, 
especially Muhammad (PBUH
9
) through the various Ahadith. In fact, God has 
repeatedly indicated that the chief purpose of the human mind is to rationally reflect 




Within the realm of the theories of truth, two other theories have relevance to Islamic 
though. These theories are the consensus theory of truth and the pragmatic theory of 
truth. Although, within the context of Islamic thought, for a more holistic 
understanding, these theories should be examined as theories that are complementary 
to the correspondence theory of truth, which is fundamental to Islam rather than 
substitutes. 
 
The consensus theory of truth is best presented through the work of Jürgen Habermas 
and Charles Sanders Peirce.
11
 For Habermas, the realist ontology of having reality 
and truth existing independently of our senses is inadequate. This is because it does 
not take into account what he calls communicative knowledge (i.e., discourse) and 
because it does not allow for self-reflection in that it does not apply itself to itself 
(Hesse, 1978).    
 
Habermas, therefore, attempts to dissociate truth from correspondence to an 
objective reality and locate it within the realm of consensus in what he calls the 
“Theory of Communicative Competence,” which refers to our ability to argue the 
validity of what has been unreflectively formulated by the scientists (Hesse, 1978).  
Thus, the objective experience by scientists, including intellectualization and 
reasoning, is a necessary condition for truth but does not produce truth, as such.  It is 
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9
 Peace Be Upon Him 
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 Quran, 2:219; 6:65, 6:97, 6:98; 30:58; 39:27 
11
 Pierce‟s views on truth lend themselves to the range of the consensus theory of truth rather than his 
own classification of is work into pragmatic theory of truth.  For more on that see Richard 




in the discourse and sharing of communicative knowledge that the statements made 
by scientists, through observations and analyses, are made into truths through 
argumentative reasoning.     
 
According to Habermas, if the formulation of truth was not through argumentative 
reasoning and relied instead on experience alone, then ultimate truth would have to 
depend on the production of new experiences as opposed to reinterpreting old 
experiences (Hesse, 1978). This observation, and its consequences, is quite relevant 
to the Islamic thought since there will be no other versions of the Quran and there 




Further, this discourse as part of the reinterpretation of old experiences becomes 
necessary “when beliefs lose their unproblematic status as the result of practical 
difficulties, or when novel circumstances pose questions about the natural world” 
rather than an environment when experiences by scientists are viewed as 
unproblematic in the course of the daily practical engagement with reality (Stanford, 
2007). 
 
As opposed to Habermas‟ notion of the superiority of consensus over 
correspondence, Charles Sanders Peirce advances the opinion that both are important  
in the search for truth as well as reality.  Reality, Peirce says, “is that mode of being 
by virtue of which the real thing is as it is, irrespectively of what any mind or any 
definite collection of minds may represent it to be” (Peirce, 1934, p. 395).  Science, 
for its part, has the objective of the investigation of the truth, which when carried out 
endlessly leads to scientific belief (Peirce, 1934).   
 
For Peirce, truth and falsity, however, are “characters confined to propositions.  A 
proposition is a sign which separately indicates its object” (Peirce, 1934, p. 397).  He 
goes on to say that when “a proposition is true is to say that every interpretation of it 
is true…and we speak of believing in a proposition, having in mind an entire 
collection of equivalent propositions with their partial interpretants….the 
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interpretation of a proposition is itself a proposition.  Any necessary inference from a 
proposition is an interpretation of it.  When we speak of truth and falsity, we refer to 
the possibility of the proposition being refuted” (Peirce, 1934, p. 397). 
 
The notions of propositions and interpretations, consequently, lead to the concept of 
consensus on truth.  Thus for Peirce, the real “is that which, sooner or later, 
information and reasoning would finally result in”(Peirce, 1934, p. 186; emphasis 
added).  This concept of reality “essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY 
[sic], without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in 
knowledge.”(Peirce, 1934, p. 186). 
 
Interestingly, the above views demonstrate the belief by Peirce that scientific 
investigation and rational reasoning toward consensus will lead to a “foreordained 
goal” of the inability of man to escape the “predestinate opinion” toward truth. This, 
for him, is the great law of the truth (Peirce, 1934, p. 268).  However, he recognizes 
that prior to reaching the predestinate opinion toward truth there will be falsity along 
the way in that a proposition and an interpretation may be refuted as untrue, which, 
in essence, implies that true propositions and interpretations (in an absolute sense) 
must transcend across space and time. Further, Peirce noted that when a falsity is not 
discovered and the error of which is unrecognizable, it continues to be perceived as 
having no error (Peirce, 1934), which decrees that it is tentatively accepted as true. 
 
This last point is also shared by Habermas in that he states that to say something is 
true (through consensus) is to indefinitely extend it throughout time and space 
(Hesse, 1978, p. 381) and that this becomes problematic when it confronts practical 
difficulties (Stanford, 2007) which question its veracity.   
 
Therefore, one can conclude that science and consensus, when analysed together, 
merely lead to temporary truths that can be refuted across time and space through 
information and reasoning (i.e. propositions and interpretations) in the quest for the 
ultimate truth that exists independently of our senses.  This view shall be elaborated 




below as well as shall form a contemporary philosophical basis for the Islamic theory 
of Igma’a (consensus) in the Islamic Thought section that will follow.   
 
The pragmatic theory of truth, or more precisely its instrumentalist branch as 
promoted by William James
13
, adds yet another angle to the examination of the truth 
in Islam, especially in relation to truth and falsity in the Shari’a treatment of 
contemporary issues. As a background, in a fashion similar to the correspondence 
theory of truth, James believed that reality, as a test of truth, depends on the mind 
(Kirkham, 1992).  “An experience, perceptual or conceptual, must conform to reality 
in order to be true,” he exclaimed in his writings on the matter (James, 1909, p. 59).  
 
However, it is in the definition of reality that pragmatism emerges from the shadow 
of correspondence.  In essence, pragmatism, as advocated by James, can provide a 
basis for a reality, and consequently truth, if it proves useful to those who believe 
that it is, including religious beliefs (James & Kuklick, 1981). This is exemplified by 
his quote that “any idea that helps us to deal [sic], whether practically or 
intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that does not entangle our 
progress in frustrations, that fits [sic], in fact and adapts our life to the reality‟s whole 
setting…will hold true for that reality” (James, 1907, p. 102). 
 
Thus, truth, for James, is not so much related to an objective entity or reality as in the 
correspondence theory of truth or through discourse as in the consensus theory of 
truth, it is concerned with the mind and its perception of utility. The shape of that 
perception is a factor of the usefulness of whatever the mind confirms as being the 
truth.  
 
James, however, further articulates his opinion with an explicit view that satisfaction 
(i.e., utility) is derived from the usefulness of an idea if it is in fact comprehensive 
and covers the long run (James, 1907; Kirkham, 1992). However, since the 
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comprehensiveness of an idea, especially in elements of faith, and the duration of its 
applicability are unknown, even with these two criteria as central objectives, one can 
assume, once more, that utility (and therefore truth) is tentative. 
 
The pragmatic theory of truth is interesting in the exploration of truth in Islam in that 
it resembles some Islamic concepts, such as Qiyas (analogical reasoning) and 
Maslaha (public interest), which will be explored in the coming sections, as well as 
provides a much needed relief to the complexity posed by the amalgamation in 
Islamic thought of the correspondence and consensus theories of truth.  This is 
especially relevant as one explores the difficulties arising in the truth formation 
process due to critical rationalism and hermeneutics as outlined in the next section.  
Section II: Theoretical Perspectives on the Path to the Truth 
 
The examination of contemporary economic issues, as in the current thesis, within 
the context of Islamic thought straddles many theoretical perspectives, which as 
stated earlier can be conceptualized as a process of logic in the construction of 
reality. Effectively, Critical Rationalism (also known as Post-Positivism), as 
developed by Karl Popper in the 1930s, and Hermeneutics (Interpretivism and 
Historical Hermeneutics) are important links to the ontological assumption of realism 
in Islam, especially when viewed from a complex integrated approach that includes a 
melange of elements of the correspondence, consensus, and pragmatic theories of 
truth. 
 
As a background, positivism, which was founded by Auguste Comte in the early 19
th
 
century, advances the position that only objective observation and analysis through 
the senses can viewed as real and worthy of the attention of science (Blaikie, 2000). 
Critical rationalism, for its part, while sharing positivism‟s ontological assumption of 
realism does not believe that experimentation and senses lead to outright 
undisputable knowledge of reality. This is because critical rationalism does not 
distinguish between observational data and theoretical statements since all 





More specifically to critical rationalism, in his Conjectures and Refutations: The 
Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Popper does not believe that scientists generate new 
knowledge through observation and experimentation alone, but rather by way of 
engaging in a continual process of conjecture and falsification (Popper, 1969).  
Essentially, in critical rationalism, there is an emphasis on logic and a critical 
scientific process that seeks to continuously generate and falsify theories to move 
ever closer to truth, which will, theoretically, never be achieved.  In effect, Popper 
believes that “every scientific statement must remain tentative for ever [sic]” 
(Popper, 1959, p. 280) until it is refuted.  This is because the search for truth, which 
does exist, is elusive because we will never know when we have arrived at it 
(Blaikie, 2000).   
 
Popper then concludes by saying that “science never pursues the illusory aim of 
making its answers final, or even probable.  Its advance is, rather, towards the 
infinite yet attainable aim of ever discovering new, deeper, and more general 
problems, and of subjecting its ever tentative answers to ever renewed and ever more 
rigorous tests” (Popper, 1959, p. 281). However, instead of rendering science as an 
irrelevant self-indulging process, he maintains that that striving for knowledge and 
searching for the truth are the strongest motives for scientific discovery.   
 
Notably, the aforementioned “infinite yet attainable aim” of discovery need not 
assume an incremental approach of conjectures and refutations.  This was the chief 
message contained in Thomas Kuhn‟s ground breaking book: The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, wherein he challenged the view that scientific progress can 
only be achieved by way of incremental increases in knowledge within certain 
parameters as defined by existing paradigms. Instead, he proposed the concept of 
scientific revolutions that espoused the view that there are times in human history 
when a particular paradigm proves inadequate in explaining new findings, challenges 
and contradictions thereby ushering in a “Paradigm Shift” in scientific thought that 
reshapes the discourse on a particular subject matter. In making his argument, Kuhn 




astronomical beliefs within the newly formed theories in the 17th century that 
supported the Copernican sun-centred view (Kuhn, 1970).   
 
Returning to Popper‟s views on critical rationalism, one may find that his 
introduction of the concept of belief into the realm of critical rationalism is quite 
interesting, especially in matters of science, in that he advances the position that 
scientific motives are guided by unscientific faith in the truth.  In particular, he states 
that “only in our subjective experiences of conviction, in our subjective faith, can we 
be „absolutely certain‟” (Popper, 1959, p. 280).   
 
The views of critical rationalism, especially the last point, were predated, in a sense, 
by the concept of “necessary truths” as elaborated by Imam Al-Ghazali in the 11
th
 
century.  Specifically, during his quest for certain knowledge, Imam Al-Ghazali, 
never himself a partisan of philosophical thought as evidenced by his book: 
Incoherence of the Philosophers (1997), became acutely aware (to the point of a two 
month illness) that the human mind cannot entertain the possibility of infallible and 
error-free knowledge.  Eventually, the relief for him was his belief that the necessary 
truths in the universe do not depend upon strict and infinitely enduring proof, but 
rather rests upon the mercy of God (Al-Ghazali & Watt, 1953). 
 
Thus, critical rationalism can be related to Islamic thought in that it not only 
introduces a faith element to the scientific process, which the field of religious 
studies (especially the observation and analysis of the scripture) is considered to be a 
beneficiary of, but also relates to the theories of Igma’a (consensus) and Qiyas 
(analogical reasoning) in Islam, which together provide a foundation for the infinite 
search for truth.  
 
In fact, the Quran explicitly expresses the reality that human knowledge is finite and 
incomplete
14
 and the inclusion of this divine message within this latter part of the 
Quran may indicate that humans should endlessly continue to strive for true 
knowledge and should not assume that their knowledge of Islam is omnipotent.  For 
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if this were the case, Islamic research institutions (e.g., Al-Azhar) would cease to 
exist since their role would be no longer needed due to the human attainment of all-
inclusive knowledge of the truth. 
 
The second theoretical perspective of relevance in the exploration of truth in Islam is 
hermeneutics with its interpretivism and historical branches. The term 
„hermeneutics‟ itself came into modern use in the seventeenth century and is 
considered the science of biblical interpretation (Crotty, 1998).  In particular, 
Kearney states that interpretivism in hermeneutics can be defined as: “a method for 
deciphering indirect meaning, a reflective practice of unmasking hidden meanings 
beneath apparent ones.  While this method had originally been used by theologians to 
investigate the inner meanings of sacred texts, it was radically redeployed by modern 
thinkers like Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur to embrace man‟s general 
being in the world as an agent of language” (Kearney, 1991, p. 277). 
 
Essentially, interpretivism hermeneutics views texts as means for transmitting 
meaning, beliefs, and values from one time to another.  It, therefore, seeks to become 
not only concerned with searching for meaning in religious texts (as in the case of 
religious hermeneutics), but to also partake in an expanded role of inquiry of how 
texts can and should be applied (Crotty, 1998).   
 
With that, Ricoeur, while adhering to Dilthey‟s differentiation between interpretation 
(Auslegung) and understanding/comprehension (Verstehen), states that hermeneutics 
concerns the rules required for the interpretation of written documents (Ricoeur, 
1973, p. 91).  The indicated difference between interpretation and understanding is 
quite important in the hermeneutical process according to this branch of thought.  For 
while these two concepts can be considered two sides to the same coin, they are quite 
distinct on many levels, not the least of which is language, temporal distance, and 
analysis.   
 
The rules of interpretation that are referred to by Ricoeur could, from a structural 




in his Cour de Linguistique Générale. Essentially, de Saussure develops a system of 
linguistics that contains institutional elements called la langue as well as 
innovational aspects that he labelled as la parole which together make up le langage 
(Saussure et al., 1986).   
 
The work of de Saussure is further illuminated by Rulon Wells (1958) who, for his 
part, asserts that language, as a system, can be examined through its highly 
formulized rules.  Within this system, la langue is the official and traditional stock of 
signs (including grammatical rules) that promote comprehension between individuals 
from the same speech-community.  La parole, in contrast, is both active and 
individual in that it is often associated with the innovational use of language through 
words whereby new definitions and meanings are constantly being developed (Wells, 
1958).  
 
Therefore, from the writings of de Saussure and the perspectives of Ricoeur (and 
Dilthey), one can imagine language as a system that contains various building blocks 
and processes (i.e., rules) such as words that build sentences bound together by 
grammar that produce meaning which ultimately lead to interpretation that direct to 
understanding.     
 
Notwithstanding the above, Ricoeur appears to have been cognizant of the challenges 
facing this version of interpretational hermeneutics that is based primarily on words 
and linguistics for understanding in that he also cautions the readers by stating the 
proposition that any text is not a mere sequence of sentences that are all equal and 
separately understandable (Ricoeur, 1973).  In effect, he advises that there needs to 
be a certain element of judgment in recognizing the circularity of understanding from 
construing the whole based on the parts (i.e., words and sentences) and 
comprehending the parts based on the character of the whole. 
 
Furthermore, it is perhaps necessary to note that the meaning elucidated by a word in 
relation to an object can be interpreted, and therefore, understood on different, and 




matter and the distinct theoretical positions of the interpreter.  These theoretical 
positions which centre on words as a fundamental criteria for understanding the truth, 
in turn, could be perceived as emanating from the ancient debate between 
„conventionalism‟ to „naturalism‟ as illuminated in Plato‟s Cratylus.  Effectively, the 
contradictions between these views have made the relationship between word and 
meaning, the subject and object, truth and falsity in the context of linguistics, which 
is central to all religions, become subjective and quite complex.  
 
Within contemporary Islamic thought, the complexity of the interpretation and 
proper understanding of seemingly common words such as Shoura (i.e., opinion of 
the cognitive elites vs. binding will of the people), Dinar (unit of account vs. an 
asset), Riba (any return in percentage terms vs. an usurious increase in indebtedness 
of individuals),  Iqamit Al Hadd (absolute code for punishment vs. adaptable rules 
for the enforcement of moral conduct), Quama (male dominance of women vs. rules 
of behaviour between the sexes) among others provide but a few distinguished 
examples. 
 
More specifically, linguistic conventionalism advances the position that the 
association between word and object is determined by a consensus within a speech-
community that determines the appropriate convention which applies to a particular 
word.  In contrast, naturalism believes that there is a natural bond between an object 
and its name that is independent of convention and therefore cannot be arbitrarily 
changed.  
 
Needless to say, there are limits and challenges that face each theory taken 
individually.  To commence with, a language, as a formalized system of 
communication that transcends time and space, even with its innovative components, 
can‟t arbitrarily change the association between word and object simply by 
convention. Conversely, a language system, as a precursor and a product of 
discourse, does, for myriad reasons, evolve under different temporal and spatial 
conditions, which defies the static nature of a word belonging naturally to its object.  




further complicates the challenges of a language system and its relation to an object 
in the context of understanding and truth.   
 
The key to overcoming the challenges faced by Ricoeur‟s of placing words and 
linguistics at the heart of understanding and truth, according to Gamader, in his 
seminal work Truth and Method, is the acknowledgement that “no truth can be 
attained in language” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 407).  Thus, while there is no such thing as 
knowledge without language, the object, particularly in the realm of religious 
scriptures, does not necessarily acquire the distinction of being true as the result of 
linguistics. Rather, on the contrary, the adequacy of the word, within language, is a 
function of the multifarious epistemology that is independent of the object that it 
attempts to embody as it confers a finite set of meanings to an infinite range of 
possibilities.     
 
In theology, the case of the divine word in the religious scripture, as communicated 
by God, is a case in point as it produces a special component of complication to 
linguistics within the sphere of religion. For as asserted by Gadamer: “[I]f the whole 
of the divine mind is expressed in the divine word, then the processual element in 
this word signifies something for which we basically have no analogy.  Insofar as in 
knowing itself, the divine mind likewise knows all beings, the word of God is the 
word of the Spirit that knows and creates everything in one intuition” (Gadamer, 




Therefore, there is an element of incompleteness to human words within the realm of 
theology that affects understanding when one examines subjects that are related to 
religion.  This is because human words (whether in Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, or 
Arabic) are not only finite verbally, but also not as perfect (or true) as the words of 
God in the mind of the Divine.  Consequently, humans, unlike God, are not only 
incapable of expressing their minds completely with one word (i.e., we require 
multiple words as linguistic intermediaries to knowledge), but also traditionally 
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human minds exhibit temporal and contextual finitude that limit the universality of 
language.    
 
In the face of the aforementioned challenges, Gadamer illuminates a path to truth 
formation by way of linguistics in that he states that “agreeing about a language is 
not a paradigmatic case but rather a special case – agreeing about an instrument, a 
system of signs, that does not have its being in dialogue but serves rather to convey 
information” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 444). Furthermore, due to the numerous languages 
on earth, one has to acknowledge that while there can be a general congruence of the 
various language systems regarding a particular concept, topic, or subject matter that 
there will likely not be perfect equivalence.  This is particularly relevant in language 
systems with inter-temporal and spatial differences that rest on their unique version 
of the world. 
 
Moreover, as in the critical rationalist tradition, these linguistic characterizations 
shall not exist undisputed for eternity, since they may prove false in the future as our 
knowledge of the universe expands to new and previously unattainable levels.  For 
this, Gadamer teaches us that “there is not possible consciousness, however infinite, 
in which any traditionary „subject matter‟ would appear in the light of eternity.  
Every appropriation of tradition is historically different; which does not mean that 
each one represents only an imperfect understanding of it.  Rather, each is the 
experience of an „aspect‟ of the thing itself.  The paradox that is true of all 
traditionary material, namely of being one and the same and yet of being different 
proves that all interpretations is, in fact, speculative” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 468). 
 
It could, therefore, be conceivable that that the definitions and meanings given to the 
myriad concepts in Islamic jurisprudence are susceptible to re-interpretation and re-
examination from a linguistic and conceptual viewpoints due to the changing nature 
of things.  This was best stated by Gadamer, in his review of the writings of Nicholas 
of Cusa, in that he says: 
“In a certain sense, all actual designations are arbitrary, and yet they have a 
necessary connection with the natural expression (nomen naturale) that corresponds 
to the thing itself (forma). Every expression is fitting (congruum), but not everyone 




(formae) to which the words are attached belong to a pre-established order of 
original models that human knowledge is gradually approaching, but that this order 
is created by differentiation and combination out of the given nature of things…For 
in this case, it is not a question of variation in expression but of variation in the 
perception of things and of the formation of the concepts that follow it” (Gadamer, 
1989, p. 435) 
 
That said, the message of God in the Quran is stern for those who wish to proceed to 
falsehood by changing the true meaning of the words of God through re-
interpretation and re-examination that is intentionally incorrect
16
 and overlooking the 
proper message (e.g., ideality in the subject matter). In fact, God is explicit in stating 
that no one can alter his words, which are the ultimate truth.
17
  Specifically, God 
stated: “Have you not considered how Allah presents an example, [making] a good 
word like a good tree, whose root is firmly fixed and its branches [high] in the sky? It 
produces its fruit all the time, by permission of its Lord. And Allah presents 




The views of Gadamer are quite interesting, particularly in the field of religious 
studies in that, as opposed to Dilthey and Ricoeur, Gadamer does not draw a strong 
distinction between interpretation and understanding in a framework that is based on 
linguistics.  In fact, for Gadamer interpretation is understanding, whereby he states 
that “understanding and interpretation are indissolubly bound together” (Gadamer, 
1989, p. 399) because “language occurs in interpreting [sic]” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 
386).  Thus, it is not so much the mastery of language, with all its rules, as suggested 
by Ricoeur, that is important in hermeneutics (especially in relation to deciphering 
religious scripture) as much as it is primacy of conceptual articulation, through the 
medium of language, of the subject matter itself.   
 
The last point is perhaps where the interpretivism branch of hermeneutics as viewed 
by Gadamer and Ricoeur can come together.  Conceptual articulation (especially in 
matters of religion) through discourse of an objective reality is where the truth 
resides, not in the individual words, not even in all the stock of words of a particular 
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language, no matter how perfect it is perceived (Cooke, 1984).  This was well 
verbalized by Gadamer in that he stated that “it is not the word (anoma) but the logos 
[i.e., discourse] that is the bearer of truth.  From this, it necessarily follows that being 
expressed, and thus being bound to language, is quite secondary to the system of 
relations within which the logos articulates and interprets” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 412).  
 
The case of written text, as a form of discourse, is particularly important, especially 
in religious subject matter that has a large historical orientation.  In effect, instead of 
having religious texts addressed to only one reader (which it does at any one time), it 
is addressed to an audience that the writing itself creates with an almost universal 
range.  The counterpart of the author of the text is, in essence, anyone who knows 
how to read (or listen to someone who reads).   
 
In addition, there is also a unique sense of duality in any particular text. This duality 
starts at the basic character of texts themselves in that on the one hand, texts, as 
mentioned by Droysen, are an “enduringly fixed expressions of life” (Droysen & 
Hübner, 1937) that provide a window to the past; yet on the other hand, texts are an 
ensemble of references of the world, past and present, that lights up our own 
situation (Ricoeur, 1973).    
 
The aforementioned duality does have implications on meaning and understanding, 
which were best recognized by Gadamer (Gadamer, 1989).  On the positive end, as 
opposed to speech, the meaning of what is written exists purely for itself in the 
abstract ideality of language in a manner that is identifiable and repeatable.  
However, the paramount weakness of texts, which was demonstrated by Plato, is that 
the author can no longer come to the aid of written word if it falls victim to 
misunderstanding, either intentional or unintentional (Plato Seventh Letter).  As a 
result, “the meaning of what has been said is to be stated anew, simply on the basis 
of the words passed on by the means of written signs” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 395).  In 
religious texts, such as the Quran, neither the author of the text nor his messengers 




discourse based on intellect and reason along with faith that can ultimately lead to 
the truth. 
 
In other words, it is a matter of judgment through reason and faith of the reader that 
serve to bridge the gap between the spirit of the original words, through discourse, 
within the context of the subject matter and their contemporary interpretation.  
However, as with the critical rationalism theoretical perspective, the gap can never 
be completely closed due to many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that 
every interpretation has to adapt itself to the particular language structure and 
hermeneutical situation, which is partly dependent on the tradition to which it 
belongs.   
 
With that, it is important to acknowledge that the dependence of the interpretation on 
the structure and hermeneutical situation does not change the character of the text 
itself. This can be evident in that the form of text, however ancient, is continuously 
contemporaneous due to a unique co-existence of past and present whereby a 
genuine opportunity to change and widen the horizon presents itself and provides a 
real possibility to enrich the world by a new and deeper dimension of understanding 
(Gadamer, 1989, p. 391)  
 
The understanding is not arrived at solely by reasoning one‟s way back to the past, 
but also by having a present involvement, in a manner that is common to present life, 
of what is being communicated through the discourse of the text.  Further, the 
understanding is augmented with the realization that even though we may have more 
than one interpretation, that it is the same text that is presenting itself in each one of 
those interpretations even if they are oriented by the reader‟s own linguistic 
orientation of the world (Gadamer, 1989). 
 
Essentially, the multiple interpretations is the result of the text forcing us to make 
interpretive conjectures, as a result of the language structure and hermeneutical 
situation, that can be tested, criticized, and falsified, which in turn lead to the true 




interpretation, the conjectures and falsifications can be thought of as products of the 
logic of qualitative probability that, due to the inherent subjective uncertainty that 
rest on faith, lead to validation rather than the empirical verification of scientific 
laws (Ricoeur, 1973).   
 
Effectively, an interpretation must not only be probable, but more probable than 
another in light of the language system, what is perceived of the past, known of the 
present, and within the realm of theology, the signs of God that illuminate faith.
19
  
However, it is the distinction between validation and verification that is valuable in 
that regard because it allows the interpreter to move between the limits of dogmatism 
and scepticism and all the probable interpretations in between to seek an agreement, 
even if this agreement based on the most probable interpretation.   
 
Historical hermeneutics, for its part, as the second branch of hermeneutics of 
relevance to the elaboration of truth in Islam, was predominantly elucidated by 
Gadamer as being not so much a subjective act than a complex process of 
transmission in which the past (the strange) and the present (the familiar) are being 
constantly mediated.  In doing so, historical hermeneutics adds another layer to 
hermeneutics, alongside interpretivism, in that it advances the importance of 
appreciating the significance of temporal distance and its effects on understanding 
due to the prejudices and preconceptions of the interpreter‟s consciousness 
(Gadamer, 1989).   
 
As part of the historical mediation in the quest for greater understanding, Gadamer 
states that it is important to realize that “every age has to understand a transmitted 
text in its own way, for the text belongs to the whole tradition whose content 
interests the age and in which it seeks to understand itself” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 296). 
Thus, in the case of Shari’a, one can observe that Muslims today try to understand 
the Quran and Ahadith through a constant mediation between three forces: the Quran 
and Ahadith as they are written during the time of the Prophet (PBUH), as they are 
interpreted (and re-interpreted) through time, especially during the time of the Imams 
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of the four main “Madhahibs” or “Ways/Schools” in Islam (i.e., Maliki, Shafi‟i, 
Hanbali, and Hanafi), and finally as they can be understood in modern times.  The 
first force was acknowledged in the Quran as a means for remembrance
20
 while the 
other forces are products of the theories of Qiyas (analogical reasoning), Igma’a 
(consensus), and Maslaha (public interest) that will be elaborated below. 
 
Historical hermeneutics, therefore, complements the interpretivism branch of 
hermeneutics, with its focus on the subjectiveness of linguistics in the process of 
truth formation, in that it seeks to actively include the historical consciousness 
perspective, with all its prejudices and preconceptions, to the fore of understanding. 
In addition, historical hermeneutics seeks to also actively demonstrate the powerful 
effect of the reality and efficacy of history within the perception of truth itself.  This 
last point is labelled the “history of effect” (Gadamer, 1989). 
 
The history of effect is a crucial concept to consider in the evaluation of Shari’a 
directives in relation to some contemporary issues.  The concept, essentially, 
proposes the need to appreciate the unrecognized and unregulated force of historical 
consciousness that affects our understanding of text (in this case religious text), 
especially when historical objectivism is assumed to operate in an elevated position 
within the process of critical scientific inquiry (Gadamer, 1989). In effect, while truth 
and reality are objective, as in the realist ontology behind Islamic thought, our 
understanding, due to temporal distance, may not be endowed with the same degree 
of objectivity causing an ultimate deformation in knowledge. 
 
In particular, one of the negative effects of temporal distance is the introduction of 
the notions of culture and custom („Adah) within the interpretation of a religious text 
that places layers of assumptions that can affect the understanding of concepts and 
events in a different time, place, and condition. This is what Gadamer calls the 
“hermeneutical situation.” The awareness of a situation itself, however, is a task of 
particular difficulty because “the very idea of a situation means that we are not 
standing outside of it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it” 
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(Gadamer, 1989, p. 301). Therefore, one can observe a noticeable medley between 
what the truth is in religious scripture and what can be considered to be the work of 
custom due to the powerful effect of the temporal and contextual distance on 
interpretation and understanding overall.   
 
The solution to the impasse of mediating the past (tradition through historically 
effected consciousness) with the present, in Gadamer‟s view, is to bring together the 
horizon of the past and the horizon of the present in a merged horizon whereby the 
concepts of the historical past are regained in a wide-ranging way that includes a 
wider comprehension of them. One may venture to assume that within Islamic 
thought that Qiyas (analogical reasoning) and Igma’a (consensus) are tools for that 
purpose.  
 
The overall objective of the fusion of horizons ultimately leads to Dorysen‟s and 
Gadamer‟s “hermeneutic rule,” which states that we must strive to “understand the 
whole in terms of detail and the detail in terms of the whole” (Droysen & Hübner, 
1937, p. 10; Gadamer, 1989, p. 291) in harmonious circular process as a way to 
expand the unity of the understood meaning centrifugally. The failure to achieve this 
harmony means that understanding has failed.   
 
In spite of its negatives, temporal distance does, however, have important positive 
effects on our understanding of an object because it allows the true meaning of an 
object to emerge fully.  According to Gadamer:  
“[T]he discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never 
finished; it is in fact an infinite process.  Not only are fresh sources of error 
constantly excluded, so that all kinds of things are filtered out that obscure 
the true meaning; but new sources of understanding are continually emerging 
that reveal unsuspected elements of meaning.  The temporal distance that 
performs the filtering process is not fixed, but is itself undergoing constant 
movement and extension.  And along with the negative side of the filtering 
process brought about by temporal distance there is also the positive side, 
namely the value it has for understanding” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 298).    
 
The aforementioned view on the positive effects of the temporal distance can be 




is because historical hermeneutics serves in the role of the link of the finitude of the 
historical experience with the contemporary environment in the wider process of 
scientific inquiry that deals with propositions, interpretations, and refutations that are 
central to the search of truth and the acknowledgement of reality (Crotty, 1998).   
 
At the heart of the role of historical hermeneutics as the aforementioned link is 
ceaseless research with all its qualitative infiniteness (Droysen & Hübner, 1937, p. 
316; Gadamer, 1989).  For in contrast to research in the natural sciences where the 
tentative results and understanding are more apparent to the senses through 
experimentation, the results of research into historical subject matter (i.e., 
understanding the past), even though a science according to Dilthey (Dilthey, 
Makkreel, & Rodi, 1989), can never come into view.  This was best stated by 
Gadamer in that he says “historical research does not seek knowledge of laws and 
cannot appeal to the decisiveness of experiment.  For the historian is separated from 
his object by the infinite mediation of tradition” (Gadamer, 1989, pp. 212-213). 
 
Thus, within the domain of history, as in linguistics, it can be construed that truth 
resides in the realm of validation through probability by way of the use of unlimited 
research and scientific analysis (hence we need Islamic research institutions and the 
Islamic academic discipline after all) that rest on elements of intellect, reason, and 
faith rather than through a verification of an undisputed version of comprehension 
based on language and history that confirms or negates the basis of a certain event, 
practice, and/or directive.  Interestingly, this, within Islamic thought, was best 
illustrated by Imam Al Shatibi in that he teaches that the universal sources of the 
Shari’a (e.g., the mind of the Divine) is true, whereas the particulars of the 
interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, within certain limits, are in the realm of the 
probable in that they are subject to change (Amanat & Griffel, 2007).   
 
Section III: Islamic Thought on the Conceptualization of the Truth 
 
Within the context of Islam, the theories of Maslaha (public interest), Qiyas 




process of reason within the established theories of truth in that they can produce a 
unity in Islamic thought, even if these theories are utilitarian in nature and their 
directives are not expected to extend to infinity.  This is because of the reality of 
religious commands, as per the Shari’a, which have been undergoing changes, 
through extension and/or adaptation, in the past and will probably continue to do so 
in the future with the advent of new propositions and interpretations that consider all 
the relevant factors in a context that is centred on obedience and submissiveness to 
the true will of God. 
 
Specifically, Ibn Khaldun details four sources of legal evidence in Islam in that he 
states: 
“The basic sources of legal evidence [in Islam] are the Qur‟an and, then, the 
traditions [Ahadith] which clarify the Qur‟an.  Then, general consensus 
[Igma’a] took its place next to the Qur‟an and the traditions (Sunnah). Now 
many of the things that happened after the Prophet are not included in the 
established texts.  Therefore, they compared and combined them with the 
established evidence that is found in the texts, (and drew their conclusions 
from analogy [Qiyas]) according to certain rules that governed their 
combinations. This assured the soundness of their comparison of two similar 
(cases), so that it could be assumed that one and the same divine law covered 
both cases. This became (another kind of) legal evidence, because the early 
(Muslims) all agreed up on it. This is analogy, the fourth kind of evidence” 
(Ibn Khaldun, Rosenthal, & Dawood, 1969, p. 347).  
 
The foundation, or more appropriately the rationale, of the third and fourth source of 
legal evidence in Islam, namely Igma’a and Qiyas, is the theory of Maslaha.  
Maslaha translates literally into interest (or benefit); however, in its usage in Islam it 
tends to be generally associated with the many rather than the few (or individual) in 
how it deals with religious directives.  Thus, Maslaha can be thought of as the ethical 
end of increasing the piety of Muslims in addition to the well-being of mankind (i.e., 
public interest) by legitimizing rulings based on the concepts of Igma’a and Qiyas, 
which, in turn, depend on either specific references in the scripture and/or Maqasid 
Al Shari’a (i.e., objectives of Islamic law).  The opposite of Maslaha, in contrast, is 
Mafsada (i.e., public harm).   Therefore, according to the theory of Maslaha, Islamic 





The development of the theory of Maslaha effectively commenced in the 11
th
 
century through the writings of the Shafi‟i jurists Al-Ghazali and Al-Razi; it was 
later developed by Al-Maliki jurists Al-Qarafi and Al-Shatibi as well as the Hanbali 
jurist Al-Tufi (Opwis, 2007). In effect, since its establishment, Maslaha, as a theory 
of utility (or reduction of hardship), has been used to extend and adapt the Shari’a to 
not only matters that are derivations of the rulings that existed at the time of the 
Prophet (PBUH) (e.g., inheritance, guardianship, etc.) but also to the changing 
circumstances and specific issues facing Muslims in different times and geographies.   
 
Needless to say, the challenge of Maslaha, and the source of hesitancy of jurists in 
the history of Islamic though of elaborating it, is that it may be a source of opening 
the gates of falsity, doubt, and illegitimacy in Islam due to the prospective insertion 
of subjectivity and arbitrariness in the formulation of Islamic law. This hesitancy can 
be made more apparent in the distinction of the extension vis-à-vis the adaptation of 
Shari’a in that while the extension, even if speculative, of the Shari’a can be 
construed as an extension of the truth, the adaptation can be particularly problematic 
because it may imply that what was long held as true may be false or at least partly 
true.   
 
For example, the objective of prohibition of Riba (usury) is focused on limiting the 
financial slavery of individuals by opportunist money lenders, but the restrictions 
placed on central banking, asset pricing, and risk management (including insurance) 
may only be partly true and require a broader conceptualization of the truth in that 
particular subject matter (i.e., it is not the colour of the wine that makes it prohibited 
in Islam, but rather it is its intoxicating effect).   
 
It can also be evident that, in a fashion similar to critical rationalism, a particular 
truth can be re-defined by other truths that emerge in time and space.  Thus, the 
religious command of fasting during the month of Ramadan for Muslims is clear on 
its directive of Fajr (dawn) to Maghrib (sunset) absentness, which is a form of truth.  
However, the divine creation of the earth, its rotation around the sun, and its slight 




midnight sun in the summer.  The second truth clearly affects the adherence to the 
first truth, due to hardship
21
 which, in turn, ultimately requires the use of intellect, 
reason, and faith. 
  
With that challenge in mind, Muslim thinkers have worked to devise a framework 
through Qiyas and Igma’a that limits the scope of the use of Maslaha as well as 
developed a set of procedural criteria that seek to objectively elaborate the truth of 
the divine will that revolved around the concepts of consensus and pragmatism, 
major elements of which were discussed in the previous sections.   
 
In terms of the scope for Maslaha, Al-Ghazali in his Al-Mustafa Min Ilm Al-Usul 
limited the use of Maslaha to five essential elements (i.e., Al-Durariyat Al-Khamsa) 
for the well-being of Muslims; these are: religion, life, intellect, offspring, and 
wealth (Al-Ghazali, 1993a).  Although, Al-Ghazali, perhaps in a search for greater 
assurance, was also specific in that he stated that Maslaha is limited to areas that are 
known with certainty (Qati’i) and are universal (Kulli) in nature.  Consequently, for 
him, Maslaha is a way to extend (not adapt) the Shari’a based on the truth of the 
religious scripture as commonly understood and practiced. 
 
Other prominent Muslim thinkers sought to increase the scope of Maslaha, as 
elucidated by Al-Ghazali, in an effort to expand the sphere of truth-seeking in Islam.  
Notably, Al-Razi (1988) argued that the Shari’a should also seek truth in the domain 
of high probability (i.e., considerable certainty) rather than be bounded by the 
requirement of absolute certainty, which may never be achieved.  Moreover, Al-Razi 
felt that application of Maslaha to the five essential elements, while important, is 
unnecessarily restrictive; accordingly, he proposed the inclusion of the concepts of 
need (Haja) and improvement (Tahsin) in the sphere of Maslaha (Al-Razi, 1988). 
 
Al-Shatibi (2004), for his part, complements the thinking of Al-Razi in that his 
writings demonstrate that absolute certainty is characteristic of only the source of 
Shari’a (i.e., the mind of the Divine). In particular, he states that while the Quran and 
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Ahadith were certain in their validity, some areas of understanding can be considered 
probable and required a modification of practice depending on the place, time, and 
person (Al-Shatibi, 2004). However, Al-Shatibi was clear in that Maslaha does not 
pertain to the issues of Ibadah (worship), acts that happened or could have happened 
during the time of the Prophet (PBUH), and the continuous practice of the early 
Islamic community (Al-Shatibi, 2004; Opwis, 2007). 
 
Apart from the aforementioned restrictions, Al-Shatibi (2004) also introduces the 
concept of relativity in that he felt that the actual intended (and potential) outcome of 
a particular Shari’a ruling should be taken into consideration.  Specifically, he 
advances the proposition that while any outcome will undoubtedly have positive and 
negative consequences that the judgment of a Shari’a ruling should also weight the 
positive in respect to the negative consequences of its intended application (Al-
Shatibi, 2004).   
 
Notably, the aforementioned writings of Al-Razi and Al-Shatibi are particularly 
interesting in that they anticipate the work, from a conceptual perspective, of some of 
the aforementioned contemporary western philosophers (e.g., Popper, Ricoeur, 
Gadamer, etc.) in the religious realm.  Specifically, the challenges posed by 
linguistics as well as the temporal and contextual distance, along with the associated 
uncertainty, are implicitly acknowledged by these Muslim thinkers in their work, 
which, in turn, undoubtedly shaped the next generations of Muslim jurists‟ 
conception of truth in Islam. 
 
Thus, the truth in the context of Maslaha assumes a mixture between the idealism of 
the correspondence theory of truth with the usefulness of the pragmatic theory of 
truth.  In essence, truth, in the belief and practice of Muslims, corresponds to the true 
directives of God that exist independently of the mind; while in a pragmatic fashion, 
the Muslim jurists included whatever protects the five essentials, and arguably also 





With that, within the framework of Qiyas, the Maslaha operates through the conduit 
of intellect in perceiving the origin (Asl) of the Shari’a in the scripture, while reason 
works to identify the effective causes of things (‘Illah) and attempt link them to a 
particular issue (Far’) to pronounce a ruling (Hukm) that can be deemed as the truth 
(Al-Ghazali, 1993b). Throughout the process, the objectives of the religion (Maqasid 
Al Shari’a) are normatively elaborated and communicated in a manner that is in 
harmony with the scripture and agreed to in a process of Igma’a.  
 
However, Maslaha should not be perceived to be exclusively limited to the domain 
of Qiyas, as is often done, for example, in the Islamic finance industry, since the 
situations that existed during the time of the Prophet (PBUH) were not all-inclusive 
and infinite in that they can be expected to provide guidance for analogical reasoning 
through time and space. Put differently, Maslaha can depend on Qiyas where 
appropriate but should not be shackled by the forcing of analogical reasoning in 
every matter that concerns the Muslim world. 
 
Moreover, in an attempt to address the concerns of the advent of falsity in the rulings 
of the Islamic jurists, the scholarly community, since the days of Al-Ghazali, have 
developed a set of highly formalized and intricate set of rules that are vigorously 
applied to the Qiyas process (Kamali, 2003) within the framework of Igma’a based 
on the scripture and Maqasid Al Shari’a. This attempt of identifying the truth can 
only be described as an effort to add substantive rationality to a process that is 
inherently speculative and probable in relation to the will of the Divine. 
 
That is to say, the rules of Qiyas, while important from a procedural sense much like 
seemingly objective scientific processes, cannot be perceived as an independent 
grantor of truth as such simply because they are human instruments rather than 
Godly instructions of reason. Specifically, in agreement with critical rationalism, the 
truth, as formulated by intellect and reasoning, may in fact be useful in alleviating 




corresponds to God himself. This is confirmed in the Quran whereby God states that 




The theory of Igma’a, for its part, serves an important role in the development of 
Islamic jurisprudence in that it confirms the conjectures developed through Ijtihad by 
jurists, whether by interpretation or Qiyas, as truth and consequently require 
adherence to in belief and practice.  The basis of this theory, and the perception 
surrounding its existence, is perhaps the fact that it is the most referred to theory 




  Further, it is arguably 
among the most commonly referred to theories in the Islamic religion in matters that 
relate to the truth of divine revelations.     
 
Specifically, even though Igma’a does not partake in divine revelations, as such, it is 
given a special status within Islam due to the confidence of God in the faith of the 
Muslim community (Ummah) and their ardour in upholding the integrity of the 
Shari’a through unity in thought and practice.  In fact, Al-Ghazali believed so 
strongly in Igma’a that he maintained that a united Muslim community is as close as 
one could get to being infallible and immune from error (Al-Ghazali, 1993a; Kamali, 
2003). 
 
The way to achieve the Igma’a, and truth by virtue of its theory, is, of course, a 
different matter as it transcends the world of idealism to the realm of practical 
application.  First, the actual participants of consensus have to be defined.  For this, it 
became accepted that the process of truth seeking within Islam should be reserved for 
those with enough intellect and reason (Ula Al-Albab) to appreciate the scripture and 




While the rationale for such interpretation of Ula Al-Albab is theoretically sound, it 
should also be acknowledged that the lack of universal participation in the forming of 
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consensus does limit the scope of the truth of the Islamic jurisprudence.  In essence, 
the learned jurists that partake in the Igma’a are limited in their knowledge to what 
they actually perceive by their senses as well as their state of intellect as opposed to 
the universal discernment by the populace; even they harbour a lower level of 
sophistication.   
 
Second, the term “Igma’a” itself needs to be defined for the theory of consensus to 
operate properly as a conduit to the truth contained in divine revelations.  For while 
the term in the Arabic language may be translated to consensus in a unanimous 
fashion, its adoption by some jurists in this manner does, in effect, condemn this vital 
theory in Islam as inconsequential.  This is because not only is the notion of 
unanimity in an absolute sense not supported in the scripture
26
, but also even as an 
aspiration, although ideal, may never be attained.  This is because the interpretation 
and understanding of the divine revelations through human perceptions are not static 
in all temporal and spatial conditions and will always be subject, by virtue of human 
intellect and reason (as demonstrated with the theoretical perspectives above), to 
error and falsity.   
 
Thus, for all intents and purposes, consensus, within the theory of Igma’a, can very 
well be considered in the broad (e.g., 2/3, 3/4, 4/5, etc.) rather than in a unanimity 
(100 per cent) sense at any given time simply because Maslaha itself, and our 
interpretation and understanding of the scripture, changes over time.  The strength of 
the truth in this framework is a product of the degree of consensus through discourse 
that is undertaken in regards to particular topics mainly by the Islamic jurists, as Ula 
Al-Albab, but also by the members of the various Muslim populaces. 
 
Once more, the last point regarding the inclusivity of the discourse cannot be over 
emphasized, even if one acknowledges that the consensus generation is, and has been 
for centuries, being exclusively held within the realm of the religious scholarly 
community.  In essence, it cannot be expected that the Islamic jurists be cognizant of 
the myriad multivariate complexities, along with the various interactions, that 
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surround all topics that deal with the Muslim faith whose truth is viewed by Muslims 
more as a way of life than simply a collective set of religious directives.  For that, the 
inclusion of the various epistemic communities (economists, lawyers, social 
scientists, natural scientists, politicians, ordinary citizens, etc.) in the discourse as 
active participants in a dynamic process that may include differences in particular 
scientific conjectures should provide invaluable insight that ensures a greater 
correspondence to the truth both in an objective sense as well as in relativity to 
Maslaha.  
 
Thus, it can be stated in summary that within Islamic thought, truth is always striving 
to correspond to the true words of God, as revealed in the scripture and the spirit of 
his will upon mankind that lead to salvation and bliss.  With that overarching 
realization, it should be notable that the interpretation and understanding of Muslims 
of their religion is never complete, certain, or even static in time and space as was 
elucidated through the hermeneutical theoretical perspective.  They are always 
evolving, perhaps through the involvement of critical rationalism, moving to an ever 
higher degree of discernment of the truth.   
 
The theories of Maslaha (as an intermediary objective), Qiyas (as a tool), and Igma’a 
(as a validator through discourse) can, and should, extend and adapt the law as 
instruments of truth.  However, it should be also realized that these theories, as with 
any other theory, are merely instruments that assist in understanding.  They are a 
means to acquire proximity to the truth but are not endowers of complete and certain 




The discussion into the formation of truth in Islam has thus far touched upon many 
theories of truth along with the various relevant theoretical perspectives. Specifically, 
within the framework of an amalgamated theory of truth that includes 
correspondence, consensus, and pragmatism, the inclusion of the critical rationalism 
and hermeneutical theoretical perspectives can be conceived as offering an important 





In effect, the nature of scientific research, including those in the sphere of religious 
studies, requires a firm belief in that truth in religion exists independently from our 
senses.  Further, the challenges posed by the nature of religion - namely temporal, 
linguistic, and contextual detachments – require the use of objective and critical 
scientific processes to attempt to get closer to the truth and reality of all that is 
associated with divine guidance.   
 
Needless to say, the constant and ceaseless search for the truth does require a certain 
sense of freedom from religious dogmatism and a renewed confidence in intellect 
and reason in a framework governed by faith in that the will of God ultimately seeks 
salvation and bliss for mankind.  This freedom, while an important key to unlocking 
the truth in religious revelations, is bounded by the wider theological structure that is 
built on concepts, theories, and convictions. For as stated by Gadamer “what comes 
into being is free, but the freedom from which it comes is always limited by what has 
come into being – i.e., by the situation in which it comes” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 203).  
 
That said, it is to be acknowledged that in Islam expressions of opinions that are 
divergent from the norm have become more and more uncommon throughout its 
history.  In particular, the concept of Ijtihad has been continuously on the decline 
since the 10
th
 century, especially after the criticism by Imam Al-Ghazali in his 
Tahafut al-Falasifa of the Avicennian School of Islamic philosophy (Al-Ghazali & 
Marmura, 1997). In essence, the widely held belief that no one has the qualifications 
and foresight to independently reason religious law has been firmly established in 
Islamic scholarly circles.  
 
With that, it became accepted that the interpretation and understanding of the 
scripture in Islam was to be mainly achieved through the doctrines that have been 
laid by the four Mazahib (Schools) in Islam that were deemed to have settled all open 
questions, even if in board terms, about the religion (Schacht, 1964, pp. 70-71), 
despite the fact that these Mazahib are themselves forms of Ijtihad by Islamic jurists 




place, and finite language but also have by no means possessed the true and complete 
knowledge that exists in the mind of God.   
 
Needless to say, this belief, while arguably offering to increase the potential of unity 
of Muslims by limiting the diversity in the interpretation of the religious scripture to 
four main conduits, may have also contributed to constraining not only the 
intellectual advancement of Islamic thought but also inhibiting the social, economic, 
and political development of Muslims under the guise of traditionalism.  In fact, a 
counter argument has also been made by some Muslim scholars (e.g., Jamal Al-Din 
Al-Qasimi and Rashid Rida) that the dogmatic nature of the traditional belief in the 
Mazahib may have actually reduced the potential for unity among Muslims (Opwis, 
2007). 
 
Perhaps in the face of the various challenges facing Muslims in the past few 
centuries and the impracticality of applying myriad situations facing Muslims in a 
constantly changing world to seemingly fixed doctrines of the four Islamic schools of 
thought that have existed more than one thousand years ago that the theories of 
Maslaha, Qiyas, and Igma’a have taken hold to a greater extent in recent decades. 
Nonetheless, it can be widely observed that the ability of Islamic thought to 
transgress convention, even with Igma’a at its base, has been limited.  Arguably, 
there can be room for Ikhtilaf (differences of opinion), even if deemed 
unconventional by some Islamic jurists, within a wider process of reaching 
consensus that contributes to a greater proximity to the truth in Islam.    
 
With that, it should be stated that the inability by some Islamic jurists to accept that 
the truth, corresponding to the will of God and based on broad consensus, is partly 
pragmatic in a utilitarian sense has been, and will continue to be, a self-inflicted 
limiting factor in the Muslim world with far reaching consequences.  This is despite 
the fact that the Quran and Ahadith are replete with examples and indications of the 






In effect, one can never know, no matter how learned they may be, unequivocally the 
causes and objectives, as in the mind of the Divine, of a particular religious directive 
let alone completely transcend the linguistic difficulties and the historically affected 
consciousness in formulating proper understanding of the scripture, especially as 
they pertain to new and changed circumstances. 
 
This shortcoming can be even more pronounced with the fact that the majority of 
religious directives in Islam are based on the Ahadith, which can be contextual and 
subject to varying degrees of strength (e.g., solitary hadith, one without consensus as 
proof, etc.), rather than universal and substantive directives from the Quran itself. 
Along the same lines, the apparent incapacity of Muslims scholars to overcome 
falsity in properly interpreting and understanding the word Dahaha in the Quran
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(i.e., the earlier conceptualization of a flat earth) over a millennia ago should all but 
serve as a humbling reminder of our own intellectual and logical short-comings in 
the even most specific of scriptures – The Quran. 
 
Effectively, it can be argued by some contemporary reformers that the scripture, if 
followed in elements of practice as are dogmatically interpreted, communicated, and 
understood in the period after the passing of the Prophet (PBUH), effectively limits 
the ability of Muslims to adapt to numerous contemporary practices that are 
important to the economic, social, and political development of the Ummah.   
 
That being said, and with the objective of preparing for the discussion that will 
ensue, it may be appropriate at this juncture to note that the philosophical and 
religious concepts and theories that were elaborated in this chapter are anticipatory of 
the economic concepts and theories that will be outlined in the coming chapters of 
the thesis. For it would be impractical to debate over the technicalities of certain 
beliefs and practices if, in fact, one cannot agree on the basic principle that, while 
truth and reality in Islam do exist independently of our senses, intellect and 
reasoning can, and should, lead to viable propositions and interpretations that lead 
to greater understanding of the tentative truths that become apparent in the inclusive 
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discourse among Muslims.  With that, one may now turn to the research design of the 









The design of the research project is considered the single most important factor in 
producing quality research that is, in turn, instrumental in generating meaningful and 
pertinent information that advances knowledge in the chosen topic of the thesis. For 
this, it will be made apparent in this chapter that the research, which is considered 
explanatory with some elements of descriptive and exploratory research, will employ 
the deductive research strategy due to its appropriateness to the nature and 
complexity of the subject matter.  The building blocks of the aforementioned 
deductive research strategy are multiple categories that comprise the relevant 
theories, propositions, concepts, which, in turn, are ultimately used to answer the 
research questions.   
 
In terms of research methods for data collection and analysis, the thesis focuses on 
qualitative research methods, rather than quantitative techniques, which is due to the 
subject matter of the research that can be described as ill-defined or not well-
understood, deeply rooted, and complex in that it mixes Islamic jurisprudence and 
economics along with the myriad opinions, that have evolved over time, of many 
commentators as will be shown throughout the thesis.   
 
As for the type of information that is generated by the research methods, these are a 
mix between primary and secondary information.  More specifically, the thesis 
focuses on the collection and analysis of documentary resources (fundamental and 
derived) and interviews.    This was done not only at the central location for the 
research at the University of Edinburgh, but also at took place at four locations that 
were considered by the researcher for multiple reasons (see below) to be policy and 
practitioner hubs in the Islamic finance industry, namely: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; 
Manama, Bahrain; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
 
As will be shown in this chapter, the material itself, irrespective of its source 




ensure its quality, which, in turn, is expected to have significant implications on the 
value of knowledge generated by the thesis.  These criteria include: authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness, and meaning. 
 
Finally, it will be shown that the research sought to uphold the high ethical standards 
that are expected of it and the researcher in the utilization of the research 
methodology that will be described below, especially in relation to data collection 
and analysis, in addition to striving for complete transparency with research 
participants (i.e., interviewees).   
Section I: Research Strategy 
 
Before detailing the research strategy, one should first declare the research objective; 
the objective of the research contained in the thesis is to advance knowledge on the 
topic of market risk management, in general, and derivatives, in particular, in the 
Islamic finance industry by way of a comprehensive and multi-layered examination 
of the juridical and economic discourse on the subject matter as well as the 
exploration of new areas of relevant significance in order to attain proper 
understanding. The aims of the research undertaking, for their part, are two-fold: 
Firstly, the research seeks to inject economic-centred theories, along with a wider 
elaboration of the modus operandi of the financial markets, into the Islamic finance 
discourse on the subject matter. Secondly, it will attempt to examine the rationales 
for the various stances on the permissibility (both in favour and against) of 
derivatives hedging instruments in a manner that not only accounts for the numerous 
instruments currently existing in the financial markets, but also some of the proposed 
solutions in the Islamic finance space.  
 
Subsequent to the articulation of the research objective, it is perhaps also necessary 
to state that the thesis will seek to respond to two fundamental and interrelated 
research questions, namely: 1) What is the basis for the proscriptions of the usage of 
derivative hedging instruments for market risk management in the Islamic finance 
industry, and 2) What is the basis for allowing derivative hedging instruments for 





With that, the research strategy that is used in the research into market risk 
management and the usage of derivative hedging instruments in the Islamic finance 
industry, with the closest association to the research philosophy (i.e. realist ontology 
and objectivist epistemology) and theoretical perspectives (i.e. critical rationalism 
and hermeneutics), is the deductive research strategy. The appropriateness of the 
choice of this strategy is affirmed by Blaikie in that he states that the deductive 
research strategy is traditionally realist in nature and that its adherents are usually 
concerned with producing universal truths or trying to at least get as close as possible 
to them (Blaikie, 2000).   
 
Apart from the deductive nature of the research design, the thesis itself can be 
considered as being explanatory with some elements of descriptive research and 
exploratory research.  Description, to begin with, is valuable in that it seeks to 
present an accurate and comprehensive account of a phenomenon, in this case market 
risk management and derivative instruments in Islamic finance, in detail in order to 
provide a sufficient basis for understanding for what will be undertaken in the 
explanatory and exploratory research processes that are the focus of the research 
(Bailey, 1994; Blaikie, 2000).   
 
Exploration, on the other hand, as defined by Blumer is: “a flexible procedure in 
which the scholar shifts from one line of inquiry to another, adopts new points of 
observation as his study progresses, moves in new directions previously unthought 
of, and changes his recognition of what are relevant data as he acquires more 
information and better understanding” (Blumer, 1969, p. 40).   
 
For the explanatory research, which is the core of the thesis, an explanation can be 
defined as making matters plain or intelligible by removing impediments in 
intellectual understanding (Brown, 1963, p. 41).  In addition, explanatory research, in 
the context of the thesis, can be further classified as being functionalist in nature.  
Bailey in his detailed review of explanatory research states that: “functionalism 




larger system of which it is a part.  The basic tenet of functionalism is that 
phenomena exist in the system only because, and only so long, as they are needed 
and perform a useful function.  Phenomena that are dysfunctional, or impair the 
system, will either disappear or be altered until they become functional” (Bailey, 
1994, p. 501)   
 
Further, functionalism is best suited for explaining changes in a phenomenon (and 
the linkages it has with other phenomena) that provides a particular function for a 
society in an inadequate fashion.  Functionalism, in this case, would predict that the 
phenomenon would be transformed in a way that allows it to fulfil its core function 
again (Bailey, 1994).  These views can be thought of as being related to James‟ 
instrumentalist pragmatic theory of truth as elaborated earlier in the Research 
Philosophy Chapter (Chapter 2). 
 
With that background it may be stated that this thesis seeks to delve into: 1) The 
theory and practice of market risk management; 2) The economics and use of 
derivative hedging instruments; and 3) The Shari’a economic doctrine and Islamic 
finance (e.g., its components, processes, objectives, injunctions, etc.), especially in 
relation to market risk management (and related topics) within the Islamic finance 
industry through “Islamic” hedging instruments.  
 
In terms of the theoretical framework, as outlined in the Research Philosophy 
Chapter (Chapter 2), and its relation to the various concepts, theories, and categories 
of the thesis, the general theoretical framework is that, while truth and reality in 
Islam do exist independently of our senses, information and reasoning can, and 
should, lead to viable propositions and interpretations that may differ from current 
ones.  This general theoretical framework, in turn, produces various definitions, 
concepts, and categories that will build the foundations of other complementary 
concepts that are integral to the research (e.g., Riba, Gharar, Maysir, LIBOR, 
Currency, etc.).  In effect, the wide array of concepts and definitions are employed in 




the discourse over derivative hedging instruments in Islamic finance from “what is” 
to “what should be.”  
 
The concepts and definitions also, through deductive reasoning of their integrated 
relationships, shall form the basis for the theories of the research (Blaikie, 2000; 
Brodbeck, 1968; Selltiz, 1976; Turner, 1991; Weiss, 1978; Willer, 1967).  In 
particular, the theories, themselves, are organized in a propositional format, which 
specifies the connection between concepts (Turner, 1991). This propositional format 
varies primarily in its level of abstraction and the way the propositions themselves 
are organized through various “propositional schemes.”  It is to be noted that some 
propositional schemes are woven together by explicit rules while others are merely 
based on the sum of propositions, whatever similarity they may bear (Turner, 1991).   
 
For the thesis, the axiomatic propositional scheme is to be pursued, which is 
elaborated by Turner as follows: 
“First, it contains a set of concepts.  Some of the concepts are highly abstract; 
others, more concrete.  Second, there is always a set of existence statements 
[which] make up what are usually called the scope conditions [sic] of the 
theory.  Third – and most nearly unique to the axiomatic format – 
propositional statements are stated in a hierarchical order.  At the top of the 
hierarchy are axioms [sic], or highly abstract statements, from which all other 
[sic] theoretical statements are logically derived. These later statements are 
usually called theorems [sic] and are logically derived in accordance with 
varying rules from the more abstract axioms.  The selection of axioms is, in 
reality, a somewhat arbitrary matter, but usually they are selected with several 
criteria in mind. The axioms should be consistent with one another, although 
they do not have to be logically interrelated” (Turner, 1991, p. 12). 
 
Section II: Research Methods 
 
As mentioned above, the research methods that are employed in the thesis are 
qualitative in nature.  It is perhaps best to start with a definition of qualitative 
research by stating what it is not.  Qualitative research, as defined by Strauss and 
Corbin, is: “any type of research that produces finding not arrived at by statistical 





The use of qualitative methods are traditionally directed at research that seeks to 
explain or understand complex phenomena as well as studying processes that occur 
over time (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  Specifically, Ritchie and Lewis (2003) detail 
some of the main functions of qualitative research that relate to the overall genre and 
character of the thesis.  These are: contextual research, explanatory research, and 
generative research.    
 
In the realm of qualitative methods, contextual research, which relates, to a certain 
extent, to descriptive and exploratory research, focuses on “unpacking” issues in 
order to explore how they are understood by those connected to them.  Explanatory 
research concentrates on an in-depth examination of subjects so that a deeper 
understanding of them emerges.  Generative research, for its part, is concerned with 
producing new thoughts and ideas that are creative and original (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003).  Thus, it can be construed that the functions of qualitative research centre on 
knowledge, rationality, and understanding. 
 
Further, Ritchie and Lewis (2003) provide some features that promote the use of 
qualitative research methods as an independent mode of research inquiry.  These 
features are mainly concerned with research concepts that are ill-defined or not well 
understood, deeply rooted issues, and complex subjects.    
 
Therefore, the focus of the thesis combined with the research philosophy and 
research strategy have all led to a decision to use qualitative research methods.  In 
fact, the recommendation of the use of qualitative methods for some types of 
research (i.e. contextual, exploratory, and generative) is very similar to the types of 
research that were elaborated earlier as forming the thesis itself (as elucidated by 
Bailey [1994] and Blaikie [2000]).  
 
Specifically, the flexibility offered by the qualitative research methods is ideal for the 
complex subject matter of the thesis that mixes finance and economics with religion.  
For as stated eloquently by Blaikie:   
“Qualitative researchers have a very limited idea of where they should start, 




accept opportunities when they open up and they will want to follow leads as 
they occur.  They see research as a learning process and themselves as the 
measuring (data-absorbing) instrument. They will want to allow concepts, 
ideas and theories to evolve and they will resist imposing both preconceived 
ideas on everyday reality and closure on the emerging understanding.  
Qualitative data gathering is messy and unpredictable and seems to require 
researchers who can tolerate ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty and lack of 
control” (Blaikie, 2000, p. 243).           
 
However, there are some critics of this method who believe that knowledge 
generation can only be achieved through quantitative research means that produce 
“information” and “evidence” in numbers that may be generalized (Bailey, 1994; 
Brannen, 2005; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  Further, it could be argued that qualitative 
research methods are less objective and may be prone to biases than their quantitative 
counterparts, especially in the collection, interpretation, and presentation of data. 
 
In response to this criticism, it may be simply stated not all research subjects are 
ideally situated in the quantitative realm either on a temporary or on a permanent 
basis.  To be sure, some subjects may remain indefinitely in the domain of qualitative 
research methods, while others may utilize qualitative research methods for the 
exploratory and explanatory research functions and eventually shift to the 
quantitative sphere after development of a quantitatively testable theory.   
 
Essentially, a forced utilization of quantitative theory testing in the search of truth 
and legitimacy without merit would be ill-advised in some types of research, 
including the present thesis with its specific focus that is dependent on the current 
state of discourse in the Islamic finance industry that is almost exclusively based on 
juridical and legal principles.  For as pointed out by Mills in his own critique of 
Abstracted Empiricists for their unitary focus on the Statistical Ritual: “I wonder 
how much exactitude, or even pseudo-precision, is…confused with „truth‟; and how 
much abstracted empiricism is taken as the only „empirical‟ manner of work”  (Mills, 
1959, pp. 71-72). 
 
Once more, in the case of the research on market risk management in Islamic finance 




to emerge on a complex topic that marries religion with finance, especially when 
seeking the involvement of many unique actors with diverse roles, competencies, and 
perspectives. Future research on the subject matter of derivative hedging instruments 
in Islamic finance will hopefully follow this thesis and may explore the utilization of 
its findings to test quantitative hypotheses once the data is made available by the 
appropriate organisms.  In the meantime, it is important to recognize the significance 
of the objectivity of data collection and analysis as integral parts of the overall 
research methodology that espouses qualitative methods.   
 
In terms of the type of information that will be generated by the research methods, 
these are a mix between primary and secondary information.  Primary information is 
information collected by the researcher directly, which were interviews with 
respondents; while secondary information consists of information collected or 
authored by others and archived in some manner (Bailey, 1994; Blaikie, 2000; 
Stewart & Kamins, 1993).  For the secondary information, these included 
fundamental documents (e.g., Quran and Ahadith) and derived documents that 
include the work of a multitude of writers with commentary that was deemed 
relevant to the thesis by the researcher. 
 
However, perhaps it is important to also initially examine the types of evidence that 
are available as source material for data construction from primary and secondary 
information.  These types of evidence, which can be classified as either “Proximate” 
(i.e., direct) or “Mediate” (i.e., indirect), are based on two contrasting relationships 
between the observer and observed (Scott, 1990). In the proximate relationship, 
access by the observer exists whereby the observer and the source material exist 
contemporaneously, while in the mediate type, access is present where past 
behaviour must be inferred from material derived from a different time and space 
(Scott, 1990). 
 
An example of the proximate access is using interviewing in an interactional stance, 
whereby the observer (i.e. interviewer) questions interviewees (i.e. respondents) in 




market risk management in Islamic finance, for example).  Mediate access, on the 
other hand, can be related to documentary analysis in that the evidence has already 
become fixed in the documentary material form.  The observer, in the mediate access 
case, has no direct access to the situation in the past when the information was 
produced, which makes documentary analysis, even if it involves conjectures in 
interpretation, preferable in these circumstances.   
 
The material itself, irrespective of its source (primary or secondary) or its 
relationship to the observer, was subject to a certain set of criteria that sought to 
ensure its quality, which, in turn, is expected to positively contribute to the value of 
knowledge generated by the thesis. To that end, Scott has rightly pointed to the fact 
that “the foundations of scientific research is the quality of the evidence for analysis” 
(Scott, 1990, p. 6) and has named four criteria that should be applied to ensure the 
quality of research materials. These include: authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness, and meaning (Scott, 1990) and shall be discussed specifically for 
documentary analysis and interviews below. 
 
As mentioned earlier, documentary analysis, whether for fundamental or derived 
documents, is one of two methods used in the research process, with the other being 
interviews.  The reason for the interest in documentary analysis is the utilization of 
documents as resources because the researcher was interested in the information the 
various documents contain in regards to the particular phenomena, concepts, 
theories, and issues that were not only present in the mind of the researcher at the 
onset of the research project, but also emerged as the data collection process evolved.  
 
Prior to delving into the use of documentary analysis as a research method, it may be 
useful to define what a document is.  A document can be defined as an artefact that 
has its central feature an inscribed text that contains information to a phenomena that 
is the focus of a particular study (Bailey, 1994; Scott, 1990). Langlois and Seignobos 
add a historical angle to this definition (particularly for derived documents), which is 
relevant in the overall context of the thesis, by stating that documents are: “traces 




Seignobos, & Berry, 1898, p. 17), and they contend that it is only through these 
traces that one can make account of and comprehend history.   
 
Documentary analysis, as a practice, for its part, involves the examination of relevant 
and available documents in order to understand their substantive content and to 
illuminate their deeper meanings (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).  This is achieved through 
the analysis of the documents by means of some set of interpretative categories that 
are based on a theory that explains and reconstructs material (Cicourel, 1964).  
Further, it is crucial to undertake the handling of documents in a scientific manner 
that also considers the peculiarities of this type of research method (see section on 
data analysis techniques).         
 
In terms of the criteria of quality in the context of documentary analysis, the thesis 
seeks to ensure that the four quality criteria are adhered to as recommended by Scott 
(1990) as well as Macdonald and Tipton (1993).  First, authenticity is ascertained by 
verifying the soundness and authorship to determine how genuine a document is.  
This was done through the use of library and publishing house resources. Second, 
credibility is achieved by checking for sincerity and accuracy of the information 
contained in the respective documents, including any references associated with the 
imparted perspective, which is especially important in historical documentary 
analysis due to the significance of the temporal distance.  Notably, in the realm of 
credibility, it is declared that the research follows Craig‟s assumption of: “all men 
have an equal right to be believed, unless the contrary has been established from 
elsewhere” (Craig, 1964, p. 5) rather than the “methodological distrust” approach as 
advocated by Langlois and Seignobos (1898) whereby the researcher is expected to 
distrust everything found in documents unless there is a good reason to believe them.      
 
Third, representativeness is determined through the use of judgment in the use of 
documents with consideration to the representation of the available documents 
(especially in regards to diversity of opinions) in relation the totality of relevant 
documents.  Finally, meaning of the documents is established by way of literal 




interpretivism in hermeneutics as discussed in the Research Philosophy Chapter 
(Chapter 2).   
 
The literal meaning, particularly, is relatively challenging due to the need to decipher 
some of the documents (e.g., scripture) in their current linguistic form (i.e., Arabic) 
and religious character to a language that is familiar to the research community and 
eventual audience of the thesis.  The interpretative understanding, for its part, as 
defined by Scott, is:  
“[T]he end-product of a hermeneutic process in which the researcher relates 
the literal meanings to the contexts in which they were produced in order to 
assess the meaning of the text as a whole…At its simplest, interpretation 
requires an understanding of the particular definitions and recording practices 
adopted and of the genre and stylisation employed in the text.  The particular 
way in which a concept was defined and applied in practice changes over 
time and from place to place, and the researcher must discover as much as 
possible about these changes” (Scott, 1990, p. 30). 
  
This interpretative understanding, in a related fashion to the research philosophy, is 
therefore to be considered as a tentative and provisional judgment that may be 
constantly in need for revision and re-interpretation in light of new information, 
discoveries, or problems that may force the researcher to (re)appraise evidence 
(Cicourel, 1964; Scott, 1990).  Further, the challenges posed by the literal and 
interpretative understanding also place limitation on the ability of the researcher to 
make inferences from the documents about matters which they do not directly 
describe or discuss in detail (Platt, 1981).  
 
To reduce the effects of these challenges (which is also relevant to the interviewing 
method), the methodology employed in the research follows Denzin‟s propositions of 
the three triangulations: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, and theory 
triangulation (Denzin, 1970). First, data triangulation refers to the use of data 
collected in a variety of locations as well as from different persons and collectivities.  
Second, investigator triangulation consists of the use of multiple, rather than single 
observers (i.e., respondent groups), of the same object.  Third, theory triangulation is 
the use of multiple approaches or theories to generate categories for analysis in order 





Perhaps it may be appropriate prior to discussing the research method of 
interviewing in the thesis to highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of 
documentary analysis as a method, which were elaborated by Bailey (1994).  The 
strengths of documentary analysis, as discussed earlier in the mediate type evidence, 
are that it allows research into inaccessible subjects.  Other strengths include its 
relatively low cost (if the material is geographically or electronically accessible) and 
higher quality if it meets the quality criteria. Weaknesses of documentary analysis, in 
contrast, include: potential biases in the way documents were written, 
incompleteness, unavailability, lack of standard format, and coding difficulties (more 
on that below in the data analysis section).   
 
The second research method utilized in the thesis is interviewing, which can be 
defined as a process of social interaction between two, or more, people (Bailey, 
1994; Cicourel, 1964).  Interviewing is a useful method for the generation of primary 
information from respondents in that it elicits their views, thoughts, and beliefs 
regarding a particular subject matter.   
 
Specifically, Ritchie and Lewis (2003) describe interviewing in a manner that is 
particularly amenable to the thesis‟ focus by stating that interviews:  
“[P]rovide an opportunity for detailed investigation of people‟s personal 
perspectives, for in-depth understanding of the personal context within which 
the research phenomena are located, and for very detailed subject coverage. 
They are also particularly well suited to research that requires an 
understanding of deeply rooted or delicate phenomena or responses to 
complex systems, processes or experiences because of the depth of focus and 
the opportunity they offer for clarification and detailed understanding” 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 36). 
 
As for the quality criteria for the interviewing method, the interviewer, as opposed to 
a documentary researcher, has the capacity to increase the quality of the data 
generated from the interviews.  This can be achieved by directly ascertaining the 
degree of authenticity and credibility of the interviewees and their statements as well 
as clarifying any literal and interpretative meanings.  However, on the reverse side, it 




biases, inconsistencies, inaccuracies, errors, and the social-desirability effect in the 
interviewer-interviewee relationship (Bailey, 1994; Hyman, 1954). 
 
In addition to the issues discussed in the quality criteria for interviewing, it is also 
worthy to state some of the strengths and weaknesses of interviewing as a research 
method.  For strengths, the flexibility and increased control provide the interviewer 
with an ability to achieve a higher response rate and greater completeness in addition 
to receiving responses to complex subjects (Bailey, 1994).  Weaknesses, conversely, 
include increased costs (especially in geographically disbursed locations) and time as 
well as less anonymity of interviewees (to the interviewer), which may impact their 
responses (Bailey, 1994).         
 
In terms of the collection and timing of data, following the recommendations by 
Gadamer (1989) in the Research Philosophy Chapter (Chapter 2), the thesis seeks to 
connect the past with the present (i.e., “fusion of horizons”), which are important in 
the topic of Islamic finance that should arguably combine contemporary economic 
theories and practices, the economic doctrine of the Shari’a, and pre-modern 
commercial practices that were influenced by religious convictions.  This is 
articulated, in general terms, by Blaikie in that he states that: “when a researcher‟s 
concerns are essentially in the present, it is usually necessary or desirable to locate 
the experiences of contemporary individuals, and social events and processes, in 
some kind of historical context.  Therefore, research in the present may need to be 
linked to the past” (Blaikie, 2000, p. 230).   
 
Blaikie‟s (2000) views were also echoed by Mills in that he declared that without 
history, one cannot ask pertinent research questions let alone answer them (Mills, 
1959).  Specifically, he (Mills) believes that: “if we do not take into account the 
range [of past and present]…our statements cannot be empirically 
adequate…historical types, in short, are a very important part of what we are 
studying, they are also indispensable to our explanation of it”(Mills, 1959, p. 163).  
The “range” for Mills is quite important to avoid “shallow and misleading results” 




important to avoid its portrayal as an autonomous creation and strive to link it to the 
past so as to understand how smaller units and larger structures interact (Mills, 
1959).  
 
For this, the research relies on “Objectified Communications” as defined by 
Goldthrope, which are: “communications in some written form and, especially, 
'documents' [emphasis added] of all kinds. Whatever their nature, it is these relics, 
and only these relics, that are the source of our knowledge about the past.  Statements 
about the past - historical „facts‟ - are inferences from the relics, and can have no 
other basis” (Goldthorpe, 1991, p. 213).  However, in addition to their ability to 
provide historical facts, documents can also provide a view of contemporary 
knowledge on the subjects that relate to hedging by derivative instruments, in 
particular, and market risk management, in general, and are thus used in that regard 
in the thesis.  
 
Therefore, in order to provide an economic and juridical basis for the research, an in-
depth analysis of documentary resources was undertaken not only through the 
resources existing at the University of Edinburgh, but also in documentary 
knowledge centres such as the Library at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia and the Knowledge Management Centre at INCEIF (The Global 
University in Islamic Finance) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (see references at the end 
of the thesis).  
 
Data collection through the interviewing method, for its part, focused on gathering 
information about the present, as well as views and beliefs about the past, from four 
sets of groups that were thought by the researcher to largely define and shape the 
Islamic finance industry through forty-one different interviews lasting approximately 
one hour with fifty-two individuals with notable roles in the Islamic finance industry 
and/or distinguished contribution on the topic market risk management and 
derivatives in Islamic finance (see appendix at the end of thesis with details on the 
respondents, locations, etc.).
28
  The respondents in the four groups were short-listed 
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based on their presence in the four locations that were chosen for data collection (see 
below) and were subsequently approached through a request for interview primarily 
through e-mail followed by a telephone conversation in case of a long delay in 
response. 
 
More specifically, the respondents comprised the following groups: 1) Practitioners 
(e.g., treasurers, risk managers, finance managers, rating agency staff, derivative 
exchange staff, etc.) who either implement or facilitate/encourage the 
implementation of market risk management policies; 2) Shari’a scholars, academics, 
and legal experts
29
 who drive the policy formation in the Islamic finance industry; 3) 
Regulators (central bankers and standard-setting body staff) who instigate, modify, 
and oversee policies, in coordination with the second group, that affect the health of 
Islamic finance industry; and 4) Management consultants (particularly in the Islamic 
finance practice group) who support knowledge generation and utilization in the 
Islamic finance industry.   
 
The choice of these groups emanates from the desire, as stated earlier, to complement 
documentary research with data, investigator, and theory triangulation in order to 
arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter of the research as 
well as link the documentary resources to real world perspectives (including new 
and/or rarely discussed topics). More specifically, it was important to get evidence 
from a diverse set of groups who may hold different perspectives on the 
opportunities and challenges of the Islamic finance industry as well as unique views 
on the best manner to undertake market risk management by enterprises.  
 
Interestingly, it should be mentioned that the views of the respondents have also 
broadened the scope of the research to include topics such as: interest rates and 
currency benchmarks (Chapter 7), accounting treatment (Chapter 7), and differences 
between speculation and gambling (Chapter 8), among others, that have hereto been 
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unattended to in the research on the subject matter of market risk management and 
derivative hedging instruments in Islamic finance.   
 
Notably, this approach follows the argumentation for a wider participation in the 
generation of Igma’a (consensus) within the Islamic finance industry in order to 
pursue policies that promote Maslaha (public interest) as was outlined in the 
previous chapter. For this, efforts were exerted in respondent selection to ensure not 
only diversity in background and roles in the Islamic finance industry (limited by the 
geographical locations as outlined below), but also opinions regarding market risk 
management, in general, and derivatives, in particular. 
 
In terms of locations, the interviews were undertaken at major Islamic financial 
services hubs such as: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Manama, Bahrain; Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates; and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The choice of those locations is a product of 
the recognition of their distinguished status by the researcher in the sphere of 
knowledge generation and policy making (e.g., academic and standard-setting 
institutions focusing on Islamic finance) as well as the depth of the Islamic finance 
sector within their respective jurisdictions for practical implementation of the 
relevant policies.  
 
More specifically, for Jeddah, the presence of the Islamic Development Bank, the 
Islamic Research and Training Institute, Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy 
and the Makkah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy, and King Abdul Aziz University 
(which has a renowned Islamic Economics Research Centre) within its vicinity 
demonstrated the need to include it as a location not only for interviews with experts 
on the subject matter of the research, but also as stated earlier as a location with an 
ample documentary research opportunity.  
 
Bahrain, in turn, hosts the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the International Islamic Financial Market 
(IIFM) which, along with the IFSB below, have played central roles in the 




finance. Furthermore, the Central Bank of Bahrain is one of two main central banks 
(the other being Bank Negara Malaysia) which is recognized to drive the shaping of 
monetary regulation in the Islamic finance industry. Moreover, Ernst and Young as 
well as Deloitte have set up the headquarters for their Islamic finance practice in 
Bahrain; this is in addition to the industry‟s only dedicated rating agency (IIRA). In 
addition, Bahrain has a sizable Islamic banking practice, especially in the retail 
sphere and exchange related products (BMB, 2010). 
 
As for Dubai, it, as opposed to Bahrain which tends to host regional and dedicated 
Islamic financial institutions, is known to host the Islamic banking windows of 
international banking institutions (Standard Chartered, HSBC, Barclays, Deutsche 
Bank, etc.) along with the a plethora of firms specializing in Islamic finance support 
services, especially in the legal and Islamic jurisprudence support spheres. Moreover, 
KPMG has placed its global Islamic finance practice group in Dubai.  
 
Finally, for the choice of Malaysia, it hosts the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) and the Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia), both of which are 
instrumental to the generation and supervision of policies in the Islamic finance 
industry. It is also home to key educational institutions, such as INCEIF and the 
International Islamic University of Malaysia, that contribute a wealth of knowledge 
to the field of Islamic finance both in terms of documentary research and academic 
expertise. Furthermore, Malaysia, in addition to having a large and diverse Islamic 
banking industry, is recognized as the global centre of the Islamic capital markets 
(BMB, 2010).
30
 Notably, the undertaking of research activities in these four locations 
is not intended to provide research that is cross-sectional in nature. Rather, as 
mentioned earlier, it is done with the objective of eliciting wider and more diverse 
data (documentary as well as interviews
31
).   
 
In terms of interviews, which were semi-structured in nature that were designed 
based on topics that were deemed important by the researcher from the documentary 
analysis, the techniques used comprised the following: 1) open-ended questions; 2) 
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probing, including neutral probes, in order to get respondents to answer more fully 
and accurately; and 3) focused questions, which provide flexibility and allow for 
unanticipated answers (Bailey, 1994, p. 189). Furthermore, a model interview 
procedure was undertaken that mirrors that advocated by Hyman (1954), which 
attempt to strike a balance between validity and reliability.  Essentially, while 
standardization promotes reliability of the interviews, they may negatively affect 
their validity which depends on greater freedom in interviewing. 
 
As for the data analysis techniques for the qualitative research similar to the type 
contained in the thesis, particularly the derivation of comprehension of the 
information contained in documents and interviews, it is acknowledged that there are 
a few methods that are available to researchers such as analytic induction and 
grounded theory (Blaikie, 2000, pp. 236-241), with various software packages to aid 
in the process including: NVivo, Xsight, ATLAS.ti, and others.  
 
With that, it was decided to adopt the grounded theory methodology for data analysis 
since it was deemed to be more appropriate for the following reasons: Firstly, the 
scope of the subject matter of the research, especially in its interweaving of religious 
and economic concepts with temporal contextualization required that the data “speak 
first” and that the conceptualization and theorization follow to put the data into 
perspective.  Secondly, the nature of the data collected whether in terms of 
interviews with predominately Muslim respondents or documentary resources 
(particularly the Quran and Ahadith) required that the listening to the data occur 
without, as much as possible, any pre-conceived notions.   
 
The appropriateness of the grounded research methodology for some types of 
research is corroborated by the writing of many of its advocates (Dey, 1993; Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967; Turner, 1981). In particular, Glaser and Strauss state: 
“Generating a theory from data means that most hypotheses and concepts not only 
come from the data, but are systematically worked out in relation to the data during 
the course of the research. Generating a theory involves a process of research [sic]. 
By contrast, the source [sic] of certain ideas, or even „models,‟ can come from 
sources other than the data…But the generation of theory from such insights much 
then be brought into relation to the data, or there is great danger that theory and 





In terms of implementing the grounded theory methodology, Turner (1981), has 
systemized grounded theory into a research process containing nine stages that 
commences with the collection of data and moves on to developing categories that 
become saturated with specific knowledge. In due course, deep theoretical reflection 
is attained thereby further refining the categories and leading to the emergence of 
relationships between the categories. A general theoretical framework is eventually 
developed along with perhaps an appropriate hypothesis. Finally, the developed 
theoretical framework is contextualized with the other relevant theoretical 
frameworks on the subject matter with possibly some tests of validity being 
undertaken to ascertain the appropriateness of the grounded theory (Blaikie, 2000, 
pp. 238-239; Bryman, 1988, pp. 83-84; Turner, 1981).   
 
With that, it may be stated at this stage that the data analysis within the structure of 
grounded theory utilized in the research entailed coding and classification. Coding 
involved the use of a collection of data points as concepts that were created in the 
course of the research to build categories; this was done in two stages that followed 
the approach elaborated by Blaikie (2000) and Dey (1993).  The first stage, known as 
open coding, concentrated on breaking the data down into categories and sub-
categories; in the second stage, known as axial coding, relationships (regularities, 
variations, and singularities) between the concepts were sought in a manner that 
brings a fuller understanding of the subject matter (Blaikie, 2000, p. 239; Dey, 1993, 
pp. 44-45).  
 
More specifically, in the course of the research, core themes were established, in the 
form of chapters broadly being: philosophy of truth (Chapter 2), market risk 
management (Chapter 4), nature and economics of conventional derivatives (Chapter 
5), conceptualization of derivatives in Islamic finance (Chapter 6), issues with 
monetary underlying variables (Chapter 7), and gambling (Chapter 8).  The 
aforementioned chapter groupings were a product of coding and classification of data 
along with a descriptive narrative constructed about it that included sub-categories in 




resolutions by Standard-setting bodies, interest rate benchmarks, zero-sum 
prohibitions, etc.). That is, particular groups of codes with similar classification traits 
were organized and amalgamated with the argumentation by the researcher in order 
to enlighten the discourse on the subject matter. 
 
In terms of the actual undertaking of the coding and classification, this is usually 
done, as Bailey stated, through one of two main means: the relatively unstructured 
approach and the structured content analysis approach that produces quantitative data 
from documents (Bailey, 1994). In effect, the unstructured approach allows the 
researcher to delineate their points through examples and rational argumentation that 
are chosen to illustrate the different types of taxonomies or some theoretical points 
(Bailey, 1994, p. 301).   
 
Content analysis, for its part, is a highly structured technique that takes verbal, non-
quantitative documents and transforms them, with the assistance of the some of the 
aforementioned software packages, into quantitative data that is usually presented in 
a format that examines relationships (Bailey, 1994, p. 304).   Eventually, and with 
whichever approach utilized, the categories are classified by not only creating new 
categories, but also assigning categories to data as well as merging and splitting 
categories (Blaikie, 2000; Dey, 1993). 
 
Notably, in the course of the research undertaking, the nature of the data and 
evidence to be collected, which are mainly through documentary analysis and 
interviews, were inclined to impress the usage of the unstructured data analysis 
approach rather than the structured content-analysis.  This was due to the following 
reasons: Firstly, content analysis in religious matters requires a special level of 
awareness of the information that the respondent (in the case of interviews) is trying 
to communicate. For as elaborated by Berelson: “content analysis is ordinarily 
limited to the manifest content of the communication and is not normally done 
directly in terms of the latent intentions which the content may express nor the latent 




of what-is-said, and not in terms of why-the-content-is-like-that (e.g., „motives‟) or 
how-people-react (e.g., „appeals‟ or „responses‟)”(Berelson, 1952, p. 16).  
 
The above statement by Berelson was actually self-evident in how some of the 
respondents in the interviews communicated their thoughts.
32
  For on the one hand, 
some of the respondents were aware of the restrictions placed on the usage of 
derivative hedging instruments and were cognizant of constantly-communicated 
associations between those restrictions and the actual prohibitions in the scripture.  
However, on the other hand, some of the same respondents were aware of the 
legitimacy of the needs by the hedging community. Consequently, there was a 
needed contextualization of the various opinions in the interviews (and to a certain 
extent in the literature) within the situation in which they belong.   
 
Secondly, in the cases of the utilization of documentary analysis and interviews in 
the thesis as research methods, which contain not an insignificant amount of data in 
the Arabic language, content analysis did pose many challenges.  This was 
recognized by Bailey when he noted that coding in content analysis can be made 
difficult due to: “differences in purposes for which the documents were written, 
differences in content or subject matter, lack of standardization, and differences in 
length and format” (Bailey, 1994, p. 296).   
 
In particular, within the interviewing data collection methodology, especially in the 
context of the interviewing tools intended to be used in the research process, content 
analysis, it has been argued, produces information that lacks reliability and validity 
because of the traditional rules of interpretation that are practiced by the interviewer 
(Cicourel, 1964).  Further, the researcher was aware of the difficulty of assuming that 
they will have identical interviews with identical questions and responses, especially 
when the subject matter involves religious beliefs that are centred on the 
interpretation of the scripture.   
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Section III: Ethics 
 
Ethics are an important part of any research and can take many forms.  These range 
from issues of “ethical neutrality” in the utilization and analysis of research methods 
to how researchers deal with research participants and finally to the quality of the 
research itself.   
 
To begin with, it is understood that the researcher is expected to display ethical 
neutrality throughout the research process in that they display objectivity in data 
collection and analysis regardless of personal feelings and beliefs, especially in 
relation to social sciences (Bailey, 1994).  For as stated by Bierstedt, it is a 
“categorical [sic], not a normative [sic], discipline; that is, it confines itself to 
statements about what is, not should be or ought to be” (Bierstedt, 1957, p. 11).   
 
With the foregoing, it is affirmed that the research strategy along with the utilization 
of research methods were undertaken in an ethical manner.  In particular, the use of 
documents and interviews was done in a manner that seeks to limit any potential 
biases, inaccuracies, and errors (deliberate or otherwise).  These may take the form 
of presenting incomplete facts or stating them in a setting that is out of context, 
falsifying findings, and offering misleading presentations (Bailey, 1994).   
 
In dealing directly with research participants, such as during interviews as part of the 
research, the researcher conducted themselves in an honest, sensitive, and 
responsible manner as they set out to undertake information gathering.  Furthermore, 
transparency with the participants, as a key part of the research process, was 
considered instrumental and was consequently a central piece of the discussion.  For 
as stated by Dale: “both qualitative and quantitative commentators identify 
transparency as fundamental to good research practice and, without this, further 
quality assessment cannot take place” (Dale, 2006, p. 79).   
 
Transparency, which establishes a more equal relationship between the researcher 
and the research participants, included: 1) A presentation of the researcher and his 




explanation, in a form that is manageable and meaningful to the participants, of the 
purposes of the research and its potential benefit to the Islamic finance industry; 3) 
An assurance that any information received from the participant shall be handled in a 
manner that conserves the anonymity and privacy of the research participant, unless 
given explicit consent to be identified;
33
  4) An offer that the researcher will be 
available to answer any questions at any time (even after the interview); and 5) An 
agreement that the participant may withdraw from the interview at any time at his/her 
discretion (Bailey, 1994; Crow et al., 2006; Haggerty, 2004).   
 
Finally, in terms of the ethical consideration that relate to the quality of research, 
Gorard advances the proposition that: “poor research leading to indefinite answers 
tends to be unethical in nature, while good trustworthy research tends to be more 
ethical.  Poor research wastes time, at the least, of the participants, but perhaps 
particularly unethical from the point of view of those outside the research situation” 




The success of any research endeavour rests upon the proper planning and execution 
of the research design and methodology.  Building on the Research Philosophy 
Chapter (Chapter 2), this chapter outlined the kind of research (explanatory with 
elements of descriptiveness and exploration) that was undertaken and the deductive 
research strategy that was employed.   
 
It also outlined the reasoning behind the choice of the qualitative nature of the 
chosen research methods (i.e., documentary research and interviews), the actual 
undertaking of the data collection, and the type of information that was generated.  
Furthermore, this chapter also detailed the criteria that were adhered to in order to 
ensure that the information generated is of superior quality and derived with high 
ethical standards.   
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The earlier chapter on the research philosophy (Chapter 2) presented detailed 
argumentation that delineated a position that one must be humble with their 
epistemological stances that emerge throughout the interpretation of the religious 
scripture (in this case Islamic scripture).  This, it has been shown, is due to the many 
difficulties that exist in developing a proper understanding of the objective truth (that 
does exist), not the least of which are linguistic, circumstantial, and temporal 
challenges. In fact, with particular reference to Islam, it can be contented that the 
advocated humility in interpreting the religious scripture is inherent in Islamic 
thought with its conjecture-related Islamic theories of Igma’a (consensus), Qiyas 
(analogical reasoning), and Maslaha (public interest). 
 
The commencement of the examination of the topic of market risk management and 
derivatives in Islamic finance will begin in this chapter and will continue in the 
coming ones. Specifically, this chapter will delve into the types of market risks faced 
by contemporary real sector entities (and the financial institutions that support their 
operations), the modern risk management framework, and the rationale behind the 
concept of hedging.   
 
Throughout the chapter, particular emphasis will be given to the conceptualization of 
risk and risk management practices from the prevalent economic and Islamic 
juridical viewpoints. These include the many propositions that often circulate in the 
Islamic finance discourse and those that have been communicated by the respondents 
during the interviews. Notably, the examination will be undertaken within the 
purview of some of the aforementioned Islamic theories, not least of which is the 
theory of Maslaha.  
 
The primary purpose of this examination can be thought of as being of three parts: 
Firstly, it seeks to contribute to the development of a broader understanding in 




should, in turn, instigate an enlargement of the current dialogue that is almost 
entirely centred in the legal sphere with a particular focus on contractual forms.  
Secondly, it strives to address the belief, which was shared by some of the 
respondents, that participants in the Islamic finance industry should accept that Islam 
is more tolerant of risks in order to get the benefit of full reward. Finally, it attempts 
to demonstrate that any gaps that may exist currently in the implementation of sound 
risk management policies is not due to the nature of how Islamic jurisprudence views 
risk management. 
 
The following chapters, for their part, will probe the derivative instruments and their 
markets from both the conventional and Islamic perspectives.  
 
Section I: Risk and Its Management  
 
Risk and its rationalization has been an integral part of human intellectual formation 
regarding the essence and prospect of existence on earth. In his seminal book on risk, 
Bernstein proclaimed that risk “touches the most profound aspects of psychology34, 
mathematics, statistics, and history” (Bernstein, 1996, p. ix). Thus, in order to 
appreciate risk and its deep effect on human behaviour, one would have to 
understand precisely the multifarious conceptualization of risk and how it is 
perceived by those who face it. 
 
One can start with the assertion that the substance of risk is the uncertainty about an 
exposure that is related to the nature, occurrence, and the extent of events that affect 
human beings in a future time period.  Notably, while it is acknowledged that risk is 
usually defined as a probability of loss and exposure is thought of as the possibility 
of loss (Horcher, 2005, pp. 1-2), the discussion in this and the coming chapters will 
use those two terms interchangeably. With that, the aforementioned uncertainty can, 
for the faithful, be perceived as belonging to the sphere of divine determinism or 
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human active engagement (or an integrated conceptualization of these factors), 
depending on the principles and beliefs of the potentially affected parties.
35
   
 
In Islam, the presence of uncertainty is fundamental to human existence as evidenced 
by the divine words in the Quran stating: “Indeed, Allah [alone] has knowledge of 
the Hour and sends down the rains and knows what is in the wombs. And no soul 
perceives what it will earn tomorrow, and no soul perceives in what land it will die. 
Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.” (Quran, 31:34)  In fact, for Muslims, the 
dependence on God for their daily personal and commercial affairs is so profound 
that it may be ostensible more often than not that any reference to the future is 
invariably associated with the term Inshallah (God willing) to demonstrate Tawakul 
(reliance on God).   
 
The importance of Tawakul itself in Islam is quite apparent with the multiple 
references about the concept in the Quran36 and Ahadith.37  However, with that in 
mind, there is also ample evidence in Islamic thought to support the distinction 
between lethargic passivity in the face of uncertainty regarding the future and the 
protection of wealth as part of the five essential elements (i.e., Al-Durariyat Al-
Khamsa) as advocated by Al-Ghazali (Al-Ghazali, 1993a).  Specifically, in Islam, it 
is pronounced that, in commercial settings, one should undertake the necessary 
means to protect their wealth from the various risks that may negatively affect it (El-
Gari, 1993).   
 
For this, Shari’a scholars have widely recognized, and have indeed promoted the 
proposition, that human welfare, in addition to being dependent on a faith in God in 
enabling the appropriate outcome38, is a product of a constructive work ethic, which 
includes proactive risk management, as part of the Islamic doctrine of Al-Akhdh Bel-
Asbab (i.e., pursuing the legitimate means to reach desired ends). Moreover, Islamic 
jurisprudence has advocated a risk-return economic rationality with the 
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institutionalization of the axiom Alghonom Bialghorom (“The gain is with the 
loss”)39 which, it has been contended, dictates the importance of the inseparability of 
risk and return for sustainable wealth generation (Al-Suwailem, 2006; Khan & 
Ahmed, 2001). In particular, it has been established in Islamic jurisprudence that any 
return without the assumption of risk is an illegitimate return (Al-Shubaili, 2012, p. 
40). 
 
Moving beyond Islamic thought, modern economic theory is particularly cognizant 
of the importance of risk and its management for economic progress.  Marshall, in 
his Principles of Economics, stated that “when a trader or a manufacturer buys 
anything to be used in production, or be sold again, his demand is based on his 
anticipations of the profits which he can derive from it.  These profits depend at any 
time on speculative risks and other causes” (Marshall, 1910, p. 92). Knight‟s ground-
breaking work Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit is dedicated to the exploration of the 
subject matter as given in the title (Knight, 1921).  Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, 
for his part, affirmed the significance of risk in that he stated that modern-day 
institutions are shaped by its existence, which within itself is a result of the search of 
profit (Arrow, 1951, p. 408).   
 
With that overview into the conceptualization of risk and risk management in Islamic 
jurisprudence and economic thought one could proceed to the specifics that surround 
its management, which can be discerned to depend largely on three core elements: 
identification, measurement, and strategy (Hopkin, 2012). Notably, the elaboration of 
these core elements of risk management is significant because it has been 
communicated by some of the respondents, especially in the consultants and 
practitioners group, that the implementation of the risk management best practices in 
the Islamic finance industry is not optimal. In particular, for some in the practitioners 
group, there was concern that the risk management objectives lack precision in terms 
of risk management strategies and the scope of tools to implement these strategies.  
This has been also confirmed in a recent survey by Deloitte that showed that 64 per 
cent of Islamic finance leaders surveyed agree that Islamic finance institutions are 
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lagging behind in the implementation of risk management systems (Deloitte, 2010, p. 
15). 
 
Section II: Risk Identification 
 
Identification, as the first element of risk management, concerns the formulation of 
the types of risks facing a particular organization, which can be classified as either 
core or noncore risks (Chance & Brooks, 2010; Culp, 2004; Emery, 1900; Gastineau, 
Smith, & Todd, 2001; Marshall, 1910). Specifically, Culp clarifies that classification 
by stating that: 
“The core risks facing a firm may be defined as those risks that the firm is in 
business to bear and manage so that it can earn excess economic profits. Noncore 
risks, by contrast, are risks to which a firm‟s primary business exposes it but that the 
firm does not necessarily need to retain in order to engage in its primary business 
line. The firm may well be exposed to noncore risks, but it may not wish to remain 
exposed to those risks. Core risks, by contrast, are those risks the firm is literally in 
business not to get rid of – at least not all of them.  The distinction between core and 
noncore risk is entirely subjective and varies firm by firm. What is core risk for one 
firm may not be for another one, even when the companies are in the same sector 
and industry. The classification of a risk as core by any given firm, moreover, 
depends not just on the quality of information the firm actually has, but also on the 





The classification of risks into core risks that are related to the main 
production/service, or simply the raison d'être, of an enterprise and others as non-
core is important because it is often contested, explicitly or implicitly, by some 
Shari’a scholars and commentators in the discourse on the topic of risk management 
in general and derivatives in particular, that the inseparability of risk and return 
signifies that those who are not willing to accept all risks (core and non-core) in the 
business world are not worthy of the profits generated.  This was also observed in the 
opinions of some of the respondents (particularly in the practitioner group as well as 
the academics, scholars, and legal experts group). 
 
Thus, in the realm of Islamic finance, Culp‟s differentiation between core and non-
core risk, and the earlier stated general conceptualization of risk, can be thought of as 
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going perhaps one step beyond Al-Suwailem‟s assertions that no economic growth 
can take place without taking risks (Al-Suwailem, 2006). In essence, in accepting 
that risk is both a precursor to and a product of economic progress, it could be 
logically argued that one can distinguish between the risks that are endogenous, and 
to a certain extent controllable, to the enterprise, in that they arise from the 
uncertainty of future income due to changing consumer tastes and market 
competition as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of profit/cost centres, and 
those uncontrollable exogenous risks that are purely within the realm of the 
randomness of the financial markets.  Furthermore, within the context of the 
distinction in the nature of risk, it is also crucial to take note of Culp‟s observation 
regarding the subjectivity in the classification of the risks existing in the global 
marketplace to the various enterprises exposed to them.   
 
To illustrate, an airline is in business of transporting people from one destination to 
another.  It has to consider its route network, airline fleet, quality of customer 
service, competition, partnerships/code shares, cost structure, among many other core 
business variables that fall largely under its control.  The volatility in the costs of fuel 
and exchange rates, which are mostly independent to its decision capability, can 
exert enormous pressures on profitability and in some cases may result in swift 
bankruptcies no matter how well it manages its core risks (e.g., Laker Airways and 
Continental Airlines) (Bernstein, 1996; Chance & Brooks, 2010).   
 
Similarly, a bank‟s, whether conventional or Islamic, existence is arguably a result of 
its focus on managing the credit risks associated with the extension of financing in 
order to ensure the soundness of its capital base to its depositors.  In undertaking that 
function, it is exposed to multiple mismatches between its assets and liabilities due to 
the different preferences (tenor, fixed/floating, currency, etc.) of depositors and 
borrowers41 (Heffernan, 1996). In the management of these mismatches, the 
exogenous market risks have been shown to have a severe impact on banking 
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institutions and if systemic can threaten an entire banking system (e.g., savings and 
loans crisis in the United States in the early 1980s) even if proper due diligence on 
the borrowers and their financing need is undertaken.    
 
Therefore, due to the significance of the market risks, as non-core risk exposures, on 
the financial health of companies in the real sector (and banking institutions that 
facilitate their existence), the remainder of the research will concentrate chiefly on 
them. With that focus in mind, it may be appropriate to start with the elaboration of 
the concept of market risk.   
 
Market risk can be thought of as being the potential loss arising from unexpected 
changes in market prices (e.g., commodities and equities) and market rates (e.g., 
interest and foreign exchange rates) (Dowd, 2005, p. 1).42  In the realm of Islamic 
finance, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) specifically defines market risk 
as:  
“[T]he risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions arising from movements 
in market prices  i.e. fluctuations in values in tradable, marketable or leaseable [sic] 
assets (including  sukūk)  and in off-balance sheet individual  portfolios (for example 
restricted investment  accounts).  The risks relate to the current and future volatility 
of market values of specific assets (for example, the commodity price of a Salam 
asset, the market value of a sukūk, the market value of Murābahah assets purchased 
to be delivered over a specific period) and of foreign exchange rates” (IFSB, 2005, 
p. 16). 
 
With that definition, it is perhaps important to provide some detail regarding the 
exogenous market risks that businesses, in hedging contexts, are endeavouring to 
pre-emptively avoid.
43
 The first market risk to be examined is interest rate risk, 
which can be defined as: “interest rate mismatches in both the volume and maturity 
of interest-sensitive assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet items” (Heffernan, 1996, 
p. 167).  This particular type of market risk has gained prominence in the period after 
the fall of the stable, yet economically unsustainable44, Bretton Woods monetary 
system in the 1970s due to the increased intensity of the inflation pressures and the 
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subsequent alterations in the monetary policies of central banks to contain it (Catania 
& Alonzi, 1997; Cox, Ingersoll, & Ross, 1980). Apart from inflation and monetary 
policies, the interest rate movements are also influenced by the general economic 
conditions, foreign exchange market activity, foreign investor demand for debt 
securities, levels of sovereign debt outstanding, and financial and political stability 
(Horcher, 2005, p. 8). 
 
Notably, while interest rate risk affects all institutions, it affects banking institutions 
the most due to the nature of their assets (loans, investments, etc.) and liabilities 
(deposits). Specifically, banks are influenced by interest rates (e.g., treasury rates and 
LIBOR) changes by virtue of: their exposure to variations in the pricing and 
valuation of their financial asset and liabilities, the consequences of their extension 
of financing, and their measurement of performance relative to a commonly 
understood benchmark. Interestingly, the influence of interest rates is equally 
powerful to the Islamic finance industry, as it was confirmed by some of the 
practitioners (e.g., accountants and treasurers) that not an insignificant portion of the 
assets on the balance sheets of Islamic banks are recorded on a mark-to-market basis 
that is derived from the usage of net present value (NPV) and the interest rate yield 
curve. 
 
All of these factors, in turn, influence the earnings and economic value of banking 
institutions (BIS, 2004) as well as the overall health of the real economy insofar as a 
major source of financing to companies in the real sector comes from banks.  That is 
to say, the importance of interest rate risk on the real economy is partly a factor of 
the reduction in the lending capacity by banking institutions to deserving borrowers 
due to the concern in the management of the exposure to this type of market risk 
which has become more volatile in the recent decades. 
 
Notably, as alluded to above, this type of risk exists in the Islamic banking sector 
despite the low level of acknowledgement of the dangers posed by interest rate 
movements by some of the respondents in the academics, Shari’a scholars and legal 




stated by them are: 1) The Islamic finance industry is different form the conventional 
finance industry in terms of interest rate exposure, 2) Islamic banks have sufficient 
reserves and liquidity to withstand losses, 3) Islamic banks have better matching 
abilities of assets and liability management, and 4) Stable interest rate environment 




Notwithstanding the aforementioned opinions by some of the respondents, Islamic 
banks, despite the prohibition on Riba (usury) on their financing operations, have not 
been immune to the influence of interest rates (aka “mark-up rates” or “benchmark 
rates”).  In fact, there are numerous notable writers, and many of the respondents 
across the four groups, who have demonstrated that the Islamic finance industry is 
affected by interest rate volatility and will undoubtedly be affected to a greater extent 
in the future as the industry expands in terms of product range and geographical 
reach (Dusuki, 2009).   
 
To illustrate, a study by Khan and Ahmed (2001) demonstrated that rate of return 
risk (i.e., interest rate risk) is the most critical risk facing Islamic financial 
institutions; this was confirmed in subsequent empirical examinations on the subject 
matter in the banking industry (Bacha, 2004a; Kasri & Kassim, 2009). In fact, the 
definition of market risk provided by the IFSB, as cited above, and the AAOIFI46 
Shari’a Standard No. 27 (AAOIFI, 2010), which accepts the usage of LIBOR as a 
benchmarking index, along with discourse on the topic in the Islamic economic 
literature (Chapra & Khan, 2000, p. 54; Khan & Ahmed, 2001, p. 145) is but a 
simple recognition of that reality.   
 
Indeed, characterizing Islamic banks as being more interest rate sensitive than their 
conventional counterparts may not be an inaccurate statement and has been 
increasingly supported in the Islamic finance literature (Bacha, 2004a; How, Karim, 
& Verhoeven, 2005; Rosly, 1999).  This is because the majority of the assets of 
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Islamic banks are fixed-rate in nature (BMB, 2010), such as the Murabaha 
(instalment sale) and Istisna’a (commission to manufacture) modes of financing, and 
extend traditionally to tenors that are on the longer-end of the maturity scale in order 
to suit borrowers in the real sector who, in turn, are seeking to structure their own 
liabilities with the commensurate cash flows that are expected to be derived from 
their operations.  Moreover, the inability of Islamic banks to impose prepayment 
penalties in periods of lower interest rates, despite being a competitive trait of fairer 
banking practices, further exacerbates their interest rate risk management challenges.   
 
On the other hand, the liabilities of Islamic banking institutions are mostly shorter-
term “investment accounts” (e.g., deposits) that must provide competitive, mostly 
variable, rates that are market sensitive to meet the expectations of their investment 
account holders or face what is called in the industry Displaced Commercial Risk 
(DCR). This particular type of risk is essentially the danger that the Islamic bank will 
have to forgo profit in order to ensure the payment of a competitive rate of return on 
its liabilities, mainly through a Profit Equalization Reserve (Archer & Karim, 2007; 
IFSB, 2005; Khan & Ahmed, 2001).  
 
In stressing the challenges posed by this liability structure, Moody‟s has cautioned 
that DCR should be properly considered by the Islamic banking industry since in the 
event that the payments to the investment account holders do not meet their 
expectations there is always the prospect of the withdrawal of investments which has 
the rather serious potential of affecting the bank‟s liquidity position and ultimately its 
solvency (Moody's, 2010 ). 
 
Thus, it appears that the arguments by some writers advocating the position that the 
lack of pre-agreed return on deposits in Islamic finance reduces exposure to interest 
rate risk may not be completely exact (Greuning & Iqbal, 2008, p. 159).  On the 
contrary, it may be estimated that the ambiguity imposed by the structure of the 
payoff to the investment accounts along with the presence of the DCR (and a finite 
profit equalization reserve) can cause a vague perception of the nature of risk-return 




optimistic expectations that if unmet can result in an increase in the DCR and, in 
extreme circumstances, ultimately lead to bank failures.47   
 
Interestingly, Khan and Ahmed (2001) also introduce a fiduciary risk element 
associated with the expectations of investment account holders in that the they may 
feel that the Islamic bank is mismanaging the funds under its control if the expected 
returns (however they are defined by the individual depositor/investor) are not 
attained (Khan & Ahmed, 2001, p. 55).  
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned viewpoints, it should be stated that the mostly 
juristic theoretical aspirations of having the Islamic banking assets in illiquid private 
equity-like, or even liquid mutual funds, Musharaka (profit sharing agreement) in 
addition to agency-type Wakala and Mudharaba financing arrangements along with 
units of these “investments” given to investors/depositors on the liability side in a bid 
to eliminate interest rates (and their exposure) from society are not realistic within 
the framework of current economic theories and does not propose new theories as 
such (Khan & Mirakhor, 1994).
48
   
 
This is simply because these ambitions do not appear to factor in the economic 
foundations behind the market segmentation theory, which is based on the liquidity 
and risk/return preferences of capital providers (i.e., depositors/investors).  The 
challenges posed by the presence of asymmetry of information, monitoring costs, and 
the principal-agent problems, especially in cross-border investments,49 only serve to 
further exacerbate the potential for the attainment of these aspirations. Similarly, it is 
not entirely understood how, from an economic sense, the DCR and the associated 
profit equalization reserve can be more efficient and value-creating, as advanced by 
                                                          
47
 An investor in a mutual fund or a private equity investment traditionally has higher return 
expectations that a regular depositor in a banking institution.  Also, the inclusion of equities to the mix 
of financing by Islamic banks is expected to contribute to the higher expectations due to the increased 
uncertainty regarding the payoff.   
48
 This also relates to a comment by one of the academics in the interviews that the problems of risk 
management in the Islamic finance industry are due to Islamic banks not following the Islamic finance 
theory in their practices.  
49
 Interestingly, the objective of many in the Islamic finance industry is the mobilization of resource 




some commentators, than the tiered capital in traditional banking institutions, which 
is affected by the interest rate exposures (Archer & Karim, 2006).  
 
The second type of market risk to be discussed is the foreign exchange risk. For this, 
it may be appropriate to start with a famous quote by John Stuart Mill, in reference to 
the subject of foreign exchange, whereby he stated: “so much barbarism, however, 
still remains in the transactions of most civilized nations, that almost all independent 
countries choose to assert their nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and 
that of their neighbours, a peculiar currency of their own” (Mill, 1848, p. 155). The 
“inconvenience” alluded to by Mill in the mid-nineteenth century, which did not 
exist under the relatively fixed bi-metallic monetary (gold and silver) system in 
seventh century Arabia50, has developed into a full-fledged hazard with the 
breakdown of the quasi-fixed exchange rate system under the Bretton Woods 
agreements in 1971, and later under limited float system of the transient Smithsonian 
accord (1971-1973), which ushered in the floating exchange rate regime and all 
associated uncertainties. 
 
In the real economic sectors, this threat is especially apparent in the modern era of 
globalization in which inputs, including labour for the service sector, are increasingly 
being sourced from international suppliers in an ever dynamic process of searching 
for improved quality and economies of scale.  Consequently, the inputs are then 
manufactured and then sold through an international sales network to customers 
around the world.   
 
To refer back to the core competency of enterprises outlined earlier, a particular 
company with enough foresight has a relatively high degree of control over its 
domain (suppliers, employees, production, R&D, innovation, etc.) in the whole input 
to production to sales process.  However, what it does not control is the expected 
covariance between its home currency and those multiple currencies that it must be 
exposed to in the discharge of that core competency.  Along the same lines, in the 
investment sphere, the exchange rate risk can prove to be an obstacle to cross-border 
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investments in that it can inhibit investments by regions with surplus funds (e.g., the 
GCC) to fund deficient regions (e.g., emerging markets) that may host superior 
investment potential (probably medium to long-term). 
 
In spite of the above, there does appear to be some underestimation of the foreign 
exchange risks by some of respondents in the practitioners and regulators group, 
mainly in the GCC, which can be conjectured to be due to the pegged value between 
the currencies in the GCC and the United States Dollar.
51
 Conversely, in Malaysia, 
there appears to be a wider recognition of the risk associated with foreign currency 
exposures by some of the practitioners and regulators group of respondents which is 
likely to be due to the experiencing of the high volatility of the Malaysian Ringgit 
during the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 and the recent appreciation in 
value in the years that followed the depegging of the Malaysian Ringgit from the 




Interestingly and in response to the incidence of the underestimation of currency 
risks in the GCC markets, Deloitte in a recent survey has found that nearly half of 
Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) hold investments in the GCC region between 
41% and 100% of their overall portfolio (Deloitte, 2010, p. 25). This, it could be 
argued, is partly a result of the perception of increased riskiness of investing in wider 
markets, which may not be mitigated in the current risk management policies in the 
Islamic finance industry. 
 
For the Islamic finance industry, the recognition of the reality imposed by the nature 
of the foreign exchange risks may have been a factor in the elaboration of the 
following statement by the IFSB in its Guiding Principles of Risk Management: 
“[Islamic financial institutions] are also exposed to foreign exchange fluctuations 
arising from general FX spot rate changes in both cross-border transactions and the 
resultant foreign currency receivables and payables.  These exposures may be hedged 
using Sharī`ah compliant methods” (IFSB, 2005, p. 16). 
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Having discussed the effects of foreign exchange rate volatility and prior to moving 
to commodity price risk, it is perhaps valuable to shed some light on the specifics 
that determine the foreign exchange rates in the financial markets, which should add 
further credence to the argument that this type of risk is non-core in nature and ought 
not, therefore, be forced upon companies operating in the real sector (in some sort of 
bid to comply with the rules of the Shari’a) unless they choose to do so based on 
detailed analysis as part of their risk management framework.   
 
Foreign exchange rates are determined by the various levels of supply and demand in 
the financial markets for currencies.  The supply and demand of currencies, in turn, 
are a function of the interest rate differentials between countries net of expected 
inflation, balance of payments as determined by international capital and trade flows, 
macro-economic fundamentals (e.g., GDP growth rates), investor sentiment, 
financial and political stability, monetary policies of the central bank, and debt levels 
(Horcher, 2005).  In effect, the foreign exchange rate at any given time is the 
equilibrium of the supply and demand forces as established by way of the analysis of 
the various economic and financial indicators outlined above by participants in the 
foreign exchange markets (Jacque, 1981).   
 
Commodity price risk, the final market risk to be examined, is of particular 
significance to an Islamic faith that places the creation of wealth as the result of the 
production of goods, including many commodities, in high regard.  Apart from the 
religious admiration, the importance of commodities, and their associated risks, in 
the economic and financial affairs of Muslims is quite enormous.  This is because: 1) 
The member-countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation provide a sizable 
amount of global commodities trade (petroleum, natural gas, wheat, palm oil, cereals, 
cocoa, etc.); and 2) As will be discussed in the Derivatives in Islamic Finance 
Chapter (Chapter 6), the current paradigm of Islamic finance is focused on the 
structuring of financial transactions around tradable commodities, even if unrelated 





Notwithstanding the above, in terms of pricing behaviour, in a manner similar to 
foreign exchange rate determination, the prices of commodities are also derived from 
the equilibrium between the forces of global supply and demand.  However, 
commodities markets are unique in that they factor in expectations regarding the 
effects of seasonal variations, weather and crop failures, labour disputes, expected 
levels of inflation and interest rates, general economic conditions, political stability, 
and availability of substitutes in the derivation of the equilibrium price (Horcher, 
2005).  
Section III: Risk Measurement 
 
Having discussed the identification of market risk factors, the next step in the risk 
management process is risk measurement, which includes a set of techniques to 
evaluate the exposure of an entity to market risks by way of sophisticated 
mathematical and computational tools. Specifically, market risk measurement, as a 
practice, is usually defined as the determination of the volatility of a particular 
variable, as quantified by the standard deviation of historic outcomes over a 
standardized period of time (Brown & Smith, 1995; Dowd, 2005; Jorion & Khoury, 
1996, p. 2).  
 
However, volatility, although an informative figure regarding the relative riskiness of 
a market variable, is quite meaningless to companies and banking institutions unless 
it is linked to an indicator that appropriately measures the consequence.  The 
indicators that serve that purpose range from specific risk measures that comprise 
gap and duration analysis (and the combination of both as in the duration-gap 
analysis) to a wider all-inclusive risk measurement framework such as Value at Risk 
(VaR). 
 
Gap analysis is a well-known balance sheet management technique for institutions 
that are interest-rate sensitive. The sensitivity, in turn, depends on the structure of the 
assets and liabilities. An entity, typically a banking institution, can be liability-
sensitive in that their interest-sensitive liabilities are affected to a greater degree due 




in which the opposite is true.  The “gap” is the difference, or mismatch, between 
interest-sensitive assets and liabilities for a given time frame (Heffernan, 1996, p. 
189). For this, the assets and liabilities are categorized into buckets according to their 
maturity (if fixed rate) or time remaining to their next repricing (if floating rate), 
which are then used to assess the interest rate sensitivity of earnings to changes in 
interest rates in the financial markets (Khan & Ahmed, 2001).  
 
Duration analysis, on the other hand, measures the impact of the variations in the 
interest rates on the economic values of balance sheet items (as opposed to only 
earnings).  It is also different from gap analysis in that it allows for the possibility 
that the average life (i.e., duration) of an asset or a liability, due to repayments and/or 
prepayments, differs from its stated maturities (Heffernan, 1996). 
 
In time, it was recognized that there is a need to account for both types of measures 
of interest rate risk that are included in the gap analysis and the duration analysis, 
which resulted in their amalgamation into a combined measure named the duration-
gap analysis.  This interest rate risk measure essentially includes the time and value 
weighted duration of the assets and liabilities by way of factoring-in all the cash 
inflows and outflows that relate to net worth, which is the ultimate absorber of 
shocks caused by adverse movements in interest rates (Brown & Smith, 1995). 
 
Thus, an institution can choose not to speculate on the expectations of interest rates 
levels by using the analysis provided in the duration-gap risk measure to “immunize” 
their balance sheet to obtain a fixed yield for a certain period of time because the 
duration of both sides of the balance sheet are matched (i.e., duration-gap of zero).  
With that, it should be noted that the balance sheet immunization in this context, 
although useful in partly mitigating interest rate risk, is not a perfect tool for three 
main reasons.   
 
First, the duration-gap analysis only focuses on interest rate risk and does not 
consider the other risks that can affect the balance sheet of an institution.  Second, 




consider the convexity of the relationship between the interest rates and economic 
values (i.e., the duration is not static in that it changes as the yields change).  Finally, 
the duration-gap analysis assumes that changes to the yield curve will be by the same 
amount across the maturity spectrum (i.e., parallel shifts) (Dowd, 2005; Heffernan, 
1996), which is not always the case because short-term rates exhibit more volatility 
than, and are thus not perfectly correlated with, long-term interest rates.  In fact, in 
some limited circumstances, the short- and long-term rates have been shown to move 
in opposite directions from one another (Hull, 2009, p. 142). 
 
It is in the recognition of the challenges to proper measurement of market risks that 
present themselves in the duration-gap analysis, that an arguably superior measure of 
market risk emerged, namely Value at Risk (VaR). VaR is a “dollar measure of the 
minimum loss that would be expected over a period of time with a given probability” 
(Chance & Brooks, 2010, p. 531).  For example, a VaR of US$ one million for one 
day at five per cent probability (e.g. ninety-five per cent confidence interval) means 
that the institution can expect to lose US$ one million in one day about five per cent 
of the time.  Notably, the potential losses examined in the VaR analysis are broader 
than those studied under the duration-gap analysis in that those losses include not 
only losses related to interest rate risk, but also those that relate foreign exchange and 
commodity price risks (among others).   
 
As for the choice of the variables that underlie the VaR analysis (i.e., amount of the 
minimum loss, confidence interval, and time span), it is dependent on the nature and 
the level of risk aversion limits desired by the particular business.  For instance, a 
US$ one million exposure can be considered substantial for a medium-sized 
enterprise and may therefore require a higher confidence interval of, say, 97.5 or 99 
per cent.  Similarly, the time span of a banking institution whose assets may be 
recorded on a mark-to-market basis, due to monetary regulations and accounting 
rules, will likely have a shorter-time frame for the VaR analysis than a traditional 





That said, it should also be stated that the accurateness of VaR and its flexible nature 
does come at a cost, namely the complicated calculations involved in order to 
produce meaningful results that rest on a large list of assumptions.  Specifically, in 
addition to the traditional statistical assumptions (Duffle & Pan, 1997), the VaR 
considers the following risk components of market risk: absolute price or rate change 
(delta), convexity (gamma), volatility (vega), time decay (theta), basis or correlation, 
and the discount rate (rho) (G30, 1993) along with multiple approaches to estimation 
(Boudoukh, Richardson, & Whitelaw, 1997).  
 
Moreover, there has been some evidence that the VaR calculation requires some 
adjustment to account for the statistical fat tails wherein there may be more chance of 
extremely high losses than a normal distribution would imply (Dowd, 1998). 
However, despite the many criticisms directed at the VaR‟s many assumptions and 
the complexity of calculation, it has been used extensively in the risk management 
domain by risk managers, regulators, and traders in financial and non-financial firms 
due to its comprehensive nature (Basak & Shapiro, 2001, p. 371).  
Section IV: Risk Strategy 
 
The third, and final, element of an organization‟s risk management framework is the 
risk strategy. It has been previously contended that market risks are inevitable in 
today‟s globalized market place; thus, after having properly identified and measured 
the relevant market risks, an organization is should endeavour to devise a detailed 
strategy to be able to deal with them. The significance of the formulation of the risk 
strategy and its subsequent implementation has been noted by some respondents, 
particularly in the practitioners and consultants groups.  For the consultants group, 
the majority expressed concern for the existing capacity for risk strategy formulation 
and implementation in the Islamic finance industry.  It can be conjectured that the 
ambiguity surrounding the discourse on market risk management in Islamic finance, 






In terms of the strategies for risk management, they traditionally involve: retention, 
reduction, consolidation, and risk transfer with specialization as a focus (Culp, 2004).  
In the retention risk management strategy, an enterprise perceives the potential for 
adverse outcomes but decides to not undertake any actions to mitigate these risks.  
This could be because its management and shareholders feel that these risks are a 
necessary component of the business of the enterprise and should, therefore, be borne 
in order to attain maximum profits (Culp, 2004).   
 
Accordingly, the pursuit of the retention strategy, and its ultimate success, depends 
on the judgment by management in running the day-to-day operation of the company 
and on what Hardy calls the “accumulation of reserves to provide for meeting the 
risks” (Hardy, 1999, p. 11).  The reserves can be accumulated as part of withholding 
free cash flows into a reserve account, investing additional funds by current 
shareholders, or by issuing new securities to the market (who may or may not choose 
to partake in the offering).   
 
In meeting the core risks of a business that are central to its function and relatively 
under its control (i.e., production, suppliers, sales and marketing, response to 
consumer tastes, etc.), the risk retention strategy is not only understandable but also 
forms a necessary pre-condition to the generation of profits.  In contrast, market risks 
are a different matter since, as stated previously, they are exogenous to the operations 
of any particular enterprise and are therefore not within the control of its 
management.  Effectively, as demonstrated by modern finance theories, any attempt 
to formulate expectations regarding the future movement of market rates or prices is 
quite simply within the realm of speculation.   
 
The acknowledgement of that reality has significant implications for businesses 
operating in the real sector in terms of the viability of the retention method in the 
management of their market risk exposures.  For it could be possible that the market 
risks identified and measured previously have loss provisions that could extend 
beyond the designated confidence interval in the statistical analysis used and 




additional financing (if it ever arrives) can be of assistance.  The aforementioned fat 
tails in the VaR analysis have been shown to exacerbate that predicament.  
 
Interestingly, the appearance of the term “speculation” in this circumstance, although 
appropriate, carries with it a unique sense of irony to the Islamic finance industry 
which actively seeks to avoid practices that can resemble Maysir (gambling). In 
essence, it could be argued that the acceptance of the non-core market risks as part of 
the core operations of the institutions that are seeking to comply with the economic 
doctrine of the Shari’a should not also prelude a decision to mitigate them as a way 
to avoid speculating on the movements of market prices.  
 
The second risk management strategy available to institutions is risk reduction 
whereby an organization, after having identified and measured the relevant risk 
exposures, decides that it would rather not be subjected to these risks, in whole or in 
part, and as a result proceeds to alter its operational and financial policies 
accordingly. One of the main schemes used in this particular type of strategy is the 
“natural hedging,” or internal hedging, concept, which is advocated by some in the 
Islamic finance industry, as well as some respondents particularly in the academics, 
Shari’a scholars, legal experts group, as a form of Shari’a-acceptable risk 
management methodology (Al-Rubaia, 1992; Al-Suwailem, 2006, pp. 114-115; 
2012, p. 9; Bacha, 2004b).  
 
Essentially, this form of hedging, as described by Gastineau et al, entails:  
“[A]sset liability selection – for instance, managing credit risk by setting exposure 
limits with specific customers and managing foreign exchange (FX) risk by raising 
funds in currencies for which the enterprise has net operating revenues. Another 
example of internal hedging is interest rate immunization, whereby the risk 
characteristics (i.e., the duration statistic) of assets and liabilities are intentionally 
matched. The underlying risk could be operational, rather than strictly financial. For 
instance, a firm could choose to diversify across production technologies or energy 
sources. The key feature is that internal hedging happens naturally in the course of 
making routine investment and financing decisions and often appears without 
comment in the financial statements” (Gastineau, Smith, & Todd, 2001, p. 4). 
 
It needs to be emphasized here, however, that the risk reduction strategy, within the 




than in real sector companies.  This is because these financial institutions have a 
greater ability to alter their balance sheet structure by currency, tenor, and financing 
terms (fixed vs. floating), which is a form of flexibility not enjoyed to the same 
extent by operating enterprises.  
 
To be certain, the aforementioned flexibility enjoyed by banking institutions is 
limited by the competitive pressures in the banking industry and the liquidity of the 
assets in their portfolios. In effect, more intense competitive pressures and lower 
asset liquidity levels demonstrate a reduced ability to engage in natural hedging. 
With that characterization, Islamic banking institutions, due to their portfolios 
consisting mainly of illiquid assets (particularly Murabaha financing) and strong 
competition emanating from both conventional and other Islamic banks, should not 
be expected to garner much success in marketing financial products to its depositors, 
investors, or borrowers if their preferences do not match those in the bank‟s risk 
reduction strategy. 
 
For companies in the real sector, on the other hand, the situation is much different. 
Essentially, as advocated by some, it is acknowledged that a particular company, in 
order to reduce risks, could technically decide to change its cost (e.g., choice of 
suppliers and materials), production (e.g., locations, vertical integration, etc.), and 
sales strategy (e.g., target regions) in addition to altering its financing structure (e.g., 
fixed vs. floating, multicurrency share capital, etc.) in order to meet the desired 
market risk exposure.  
 
In time, however, it will become apparent that although these measures can, and do, 
mitigate some of the exposures to market risks being faced by the company, they do 
have their costs.  For example, the cost of the operational and financial alterations 
may become evident in that they could provide for inputs that are not be ideal in 
terms of quality, actual net expense, and/or convenience. As for the focus on market 
risk friendly regions, as envisioned by some of the partisans of the risk reduction 
strategy, this policy may negatively affect sales, which in turn can impair the ability 




today‟s globalized world as a necessity for survival rather than a bonus of increased 
profits.  Finally, it is apparent in the financial markets that a firm‟s financing 
structure is not entirely decided by its management; the preferences by its 
shareholders and creditors play an integral part in shaping the ultimate financial 
policy. 
 
Thus, for all intents and purposes, the risk reduction strategy, although useful to 
some extent, cannot serve as the sole risk management strategy for an organization 
seeking to be competitive in the global marketplace. This observation is made even 
more apparent by the dynamic, complex, and uncertain character of the business and 
financial worlds where it is quite difficult to anticipate the exogenous factors that 
affect an organization‟s cash flows (Jacque, 1981).  
 
With that realization, the next two risk management strategies - consolidation and 
transfer - become fundamental complements to effective and efficient market risk 
management, especially when viewed from a portfolio perspective (i.e., not 
transactional-oriented risk management as is often advocated in Islamic finance), 
within an enterprise-wide risk management framework. It should be stated here that 
the importance of the portfolio approach to risk management was demonstrated by 
the opinions of some respondents in the practitioners and consultants groups in that it 
was regarded as conforming to best practices for managing enterprise-wide risks. 
 
The rationale behind the consolidation risk management strategy is two-fold: 
combination and diversification. For combination, Knight and Hardy were among the 
first economic thinkers who articulated the proposition that risk and uncertainty can 
be better managed by the improvement of predictions arising from the combinations 
of events (Hardy, 1999; Knight, 1921).  Essentially, firms have more confidence 
about their ability to manage a group of risks than in the management of individual 
risk components (Culp, 2004). Specifically, Hardy asserts that: 
“A single event defies prediction, but the mass remains always practically the same 
or varies in ways in which we can predict. It is obvious that any device by which we 
can base our business decisions on the average which we can predict, instead of on 




number of cases observed the less is the deviation of the results from those which a 
priori were most probable (Hardy, 1999, pp. 21-22).” 
 
Although many contemporary economists would rightly argue against Hardy‟s 
statement regarding the prospect of the “elimination of the risk” as a result of 
combination, the concept, nevertheless, is useful in the context of market risk 
management in light of the statistical scientific advancements in the modern era.  
Specifically, in statistics, the Central Limit Theorem states that the distribution of the 
average risk of a large group of independent and identically distributed random 
variables is approximately normally distributed, regardless of the shapes and 
properties of the individual risk distributions.53 Thus, the combination of market 
risks, while not reducing the maximum loss that an organization faces, should, 
nevertheless, increase its capacity to manage the consolidated exposure by improving 
the ability to measure and predict losses (Culp, 2004, pp. 54-55). 
 
The second rationale behind the consolidation risk management strategy is 
diversification. The benefits of diversification were first quantified in Markowitz‟s 
pioneering work on portfolio theory, where he demonstrated that if the volatility of 
the various financial positions in a portfolio is not perfectly correlated, the total risk 
will be less than the average volatility of its individual holdings (Markowitz, 1952, 
1959). Accordingly, after identifying and measuring its market risk exposures in an 
enterprise-wide portfolio context (i.e., not at the transactional-level), an institution 
will be pleased to discover that because of less than perfect correlation in their 
market risk exposures that statistics and modern finance theory have eliminated some 
of their risks for free.  Notably, as opposed to the pure risk reduction strategy, 
diversification within the consolidation framework does not require active alterations 
in the way an institution does business (financially and/or operationally). 
 
Risk transfer, as the last risk management strategy examined, can be defined as “the 
explicit process by which the adverse impacts of a risk are shifted from the 
shareholders of one firm to either one or more individuals or to the shareholders of 
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one or more firms” (Culp, 2004, p. 59). The economic rationale behind risk transfer 
centres on the increase in the efficiency of the allocation of resources across agents 
in an economy (Arrow, 1964; Debreu, 1959).  However, while these agents may 
exchange the risk exposures with one another as hedgers, the probability of finding a 
counterpart for a specific market risk exposure (and the cost of the associated search) 
make it an unlikely scenario.  Further, it has been reported that hedgers can exhibit 
similarity in behaviour in that there are situations where the hedging community 
wants to buy or sell an underlying asset at around the same time (Teweles, Jones, & 
Warwick, 1999). 
 
This structural difficulty in the hedging sphere has led to the introduction of financial 
intermediation as a facilitator for hedging transactions among economic agents. In 
essence, the financial intermediary, for a contractual spread, becomes the counterpart 
to every tailored market risk exposure of hedgers. In undertaking its role, the 
financial intermediary, in turn, utilizes the aforementioned benefits of combination 
(i.e., better statistical inferences in addition to the reduction in information costs due 
to economies of scale in gathering market intelligence and its analysis) and 
diversification (mismatches in the currency, tenor, fixed/floating, commodity, etc. as 
well as the spread of the counterparty risks), and then makes a decision as to whether 





At the heart of the risk transfer process are techniques that involve derivative 
hedging instruments, which entail the acquisition of a financial instrument that 
reduces variability of a firm‟s cash flows by generating a positive payoff in the same 
states of nature that a market risk exposure imposes a negative payoff on the firm‟s 
normal business operations (Culp, 2004; Horcher, 2005; Smith & Stulz, 1985). 
Specifically, subsequent to entering into a derivative hedging transaction, markets 
forces should ensure that the economic factors that contribute to the worsening of the 
balance sheet position of a hedger are largely offset by the rise in the value of the 
derivative instrument (Catania & Alonzi, 1997).  
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The cost of this practice (if forward-based instruments are used [see next chapter]), 
in addition to the fees paid for the financial instrument, is sacrificing any potential 
gain that could have occurred in an unhedged scenario.  However, many institutions 
are willing to accept that cost in return for avoiding the uncertainty (timing, 
magnitude, etc.) of the exposure to losses that can appear, with profound 
consequences, in the uncontrollable movements of rates and prices in the financial 
markets.   
 
With that understanding, it can be argued that the axiom of Alghonom Bialghorom 
mentioned earlier is especially relevant in this context. In essence, in a true hedging 
transaction55, the cost of the protection from a market risk exposure is the lost 
benefits that could have accrued if the exposure was unhedged.  Conversely, if the 
institution had chosen to speculate and keep the market risk exposures unhedged, 
then the losses (gains) garnered are a function of the gains (losses) that could have 
accrued had the market rates and/or prices moved in a favourable (unfavourable) 
manner. In other words, the risk and return are indeed inseparable as advocated in the 
Islamic finance literature; its level, however, is a matter of degree of risk-averse 
nature of the enterprise. 
 
The proposition that the Alghonom Bialghorom axiom is a relative concept rather 
than being absolute is of paramount importance to the progressive evolution of 
market risk management in Islamic finance. For it may be apparent subsequent to the 
foregoing illustration that the axiom indicates that the degree of gain (Alghonom) is a 
function of the degree of potential losses (Alghorom).   
 
Effectively, it is difficult to support the economic argument, as articulated by Hassan 
(and other commentators), that the “required” application of the Alghonom 
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Bialghorom axiom entails that an entrepreneur needs to accept all the risks 
associated with the undertaking of their operations (core and non-core) in order to 
legitimize returns (Hassan, 2012, p. 25), especially when viewed in the context of 
modern-day financial markets.  In fact, the likely outcome of that proposition is 
lower investment and overall economic underdevelopment, which is the case in 
many Muslim countries.  Interestingly, all the discussion about market risks thus far 
(identification, measurement, and strategy) were clear in that market risk 
management is a means to minimize and not eliminate the complexity and dynamism 
of market risk exposures. 
 
With that, it is to be noted that the acceptance of the relativity in the 
conceptualization of risk and return in Islamic finance should not only serve to 
reduce the dichotomy between contemporary economic thought and the seemingly 
rigid juridical stances by some Shari’a scholars, but should also be a source of pride 
for Muslim economists in that the economic substance of the Alghonom Bialghorom 
axiom was elaborated in the seventh century much earlier than its appearance in 
western economic-related literature.   
 
Besides the issue of the relativity of risk and return, one of the main challenges 
facing the risk transfer strategy in the Islamic finance industry is the unease in the 
acceptability of the concept of risk transfer itself by some Shari’a scholars.
56
  This 
unease, in turn, can be ascribed to two issues, which are inter-related.  The first issue 
is the concern regarding the introduction of Maysir (gambling) into the industry 
under the guise of hedging whereby instead of risk transfer there are the very real 
ingredients of adding risks to the financial system.57  The second is related to the role 
of the financial intermediary for its risk transfer services, which are deemed as 
improperly taking advantage of people‟s needs.58   
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Realizing the importance of risk transfer, there have been propositions circulating in 
the Islamic finance literature to alleviate these concerns; notably, some of these 
propositions were also communicated by some of the respondents across the four 
groups.  These centre on: a.) Altering the hedging contracts in a manner that 
promotes more risk sharing among the participants in the real sector (suppliers, 
producers, financiers, etc.) (Askari et al., 2012); and/or b.) Introducing “Islamic” 
derivative hedging instruments, which assume either a fee-less arrangement (at least 
explicitly) by financial intermediaries or some sort of a cooperative system for risk 
sharing among external parties. 
 
While the issue of Maysir and the role of the financial intermediary (and their fees) 
will be discussed at length in the coming chapters (especially the Hedging, Maysir, 
and Derivatives Chapter [Chapter 8]), it is perhaps necessary to address the 
propositions of risk sharing in the Islamic finance industry.  To begin with, and at a 
basic theoretical level, it should be noted that risk sharing is a form of risk transfer. 
One does not partake in a risk sharing scheme without participating in risk transfer 
process that ensues. In fact, in the realm of Islamic financial practices, the Takaful 
(i.e. cooperative) insurance model‟s much touted risk sharing structure is built on 
each policy holder transferring their risk of loss to the communal pool of financial 
resources to which they participate through the contribution of monthly premiums.  
 
Interestingly, in the hedging sphere, even the staunchest critics of “conventional” risk 
transfer, in general, and derivatives, in particular, seem to have espoused a more 
pragmatic, even if convoluted, position vis-à-vis “Islamic” risk transfer in recent 
years. This can become evident in that they argue that risk transfer is to be accepted 
if undertaken in some sort of cooperative insurance/hedging fund since it is not-for-
profit and consequently the rules on Gharar are “forgivable” (Al-Shubaili, 2012, p. 
48; Al-Suwailem, 2012, p. 10).  
 
Thus, for all intents and purposes, it should not be the concept of risk transfer that is 






 However, economics and statistics should, for their part, 
also remind commentators and participants in the Islamic finance industry that 
modalities, even if some elements of which are deemed forgivable by Islamic 
jurisprudence, do matter.   
 
Essentially, at the onset, the effectiveness of the proposed insurance/hedging fund 
depends primarily on its size vis-à-vis the prospective exposure, and to a certain 
extent on the effectiveness of its management. Further, while the prospect of 
hurricanes, fires, and car accidents affecting all policy holders in a traditional 
cooperative insurance scheme at once is an extremely improbable scenario, systemic 
economic events are not endowed with similar remoteness, especially in modern 
settings. Consequently, these often recurring suggestions for an “Islamic” 
cooperative insurance/hedging fund should exhibit a greater cognizance that they are, 
at best, long term recommendations that host myriad systemic stress eventualities, 
which one way or another would require backing by public funds. 
 
Notwithstanding the theory of risk sharing and its relation to risk transfer, there are 
serious practicality issues with some of the Islamic risk sharing propositions to be 
undertaken at the contractual-level (i.e., contractual hedging) (Al-Baz, 1999; Al-
Rubaia, 1992; Al-Suwailem, 2006, pp. 120-138; Herak, 1988, p. 87) whereby, for 
instance, the supplier and producers share the bounties of the profits of the producer 
and his/her losses in some form of a mixed-sum game framework (rather than the 
perception of prohibition of zero-sum games).   
 
This is because, apart from losing the benefits of risk consolidation (i.e., combination 
and diversification), these real sector operators ought to be more focused on their 
core operations rather than the issues and costs associated with contractual hedging. 
These include credit exposure to the producer/supplier, monitoring costs, and moral 
hazard as well as issues related to asymmetry of information.  In fact, the contractual 
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hedging proposition becomes even more unrealistic in the era of globalization 
wherein an organization‟s list of partners is increasingly international in nature, 
many of whom harbour no Islamic finance inclinations.   
 
Other risk sharing suggestions offered in Islamic finance circles, such as the asset 
swap schemes, are also arguably offering expensive and legally-uncertain artificial 
religious forms to address a legitimate economic issue (see Derivatives in Islamic 
Finance Chapter [Chapter 6]). Moreover, it appears that these propositions do not 
account for the low probability of the “double coincidence of wants” between real 
sector counterparts in that it is unlikely that there is an exact same hedging need and 
a comparable asset for the swap in order for the transaction to come to fruition.  
 
Perhaps in an effort to address this difficulty of matching the wants of hedgers, 
Hassan proposes the involvement of banking institutions at the contractual-level 
(mainly through Murabaha contracts) as facilitators for the hedging of market risks 
(Hassan, 2012, pp. 26-28). Although, once more, his suggestions involve multiple 
transactions to produce, as he admitted, essentially the same outcome as generated by 
conventional hedging (with added uncertainty and fees).  
 
Thus, one can argue against the claims made by Askari et al that “since risk sharing 
is the foundation and a basic activity in Islamic finance, it is governed by rules that, 
if and when observed, lead to lower transaction costs than in conventional finance” 
(Askari, et al., 2012, p. 71). Essentially, it is not entirely certain what these rules are, 
how can they be objectively observed to promote the professed desire for fair 
sharing, and how do they relate to the issues and costs outlined earlier. This should 
be contextualized in a financial environment where the costs of risk transfer (e.g., 
spreads), due to competition and better market intelligence, have gone done 
significantly and thus provide an effective and efficient means to hedge market risk 






Section V: Rationale for Hedging  
 
Prior to continuing on to the next chapter with its focus on derivatives, it is perhaps 
necessary, for the sake of completeness, to delve into the rationale behind the desire 
for the relative safety of hedging rather than speculating on the movements of the 
financial markets with unhedged market risk exposures.
60
  For this, one starts with 
the assumptions behind the rationale for pursuing hedging practices; these are: 1) 
External sources of finance (debt and equity61) are more expensive to a business than 
internally generated funds; 2) In addition to being more expensive, the external 
sources of finance are not perfectly elastic in that higher levels of funding are met 
with an increase in the overall marginal cost;62 and 3) Taxes are a convex function of 
earnings (i.e., higher earnings are taxed at a higher tax bracket than lower income) 
(Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993).  
 
The first reasoning for pursuing hedging practices, which was alluded to previously, 
is that they reduce the probability of financial distress and its associated costs.  These 
comprise legal costs, the reduction in the value of the firm, diversion of management 
time and focus, and the cessation of strategic and operational control (Culp, 2004; 
Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993; Mello & Parsons, 2000; Smith & Stulz, 1985). Of 
particular importance, especially when viewed from a normative Islamic perspective, 
are also the costs that affect a firm‟s commitment to its stakeholders (including 
employees, management, suppliers63, customers, and tax beneficiaries) in a financial 
distress scenario (Bessembinder, 1991; Shapiro & Titman, 1986).  The case of 
managers and employees are particularly severe due to their undiversified financial 
exposure to the firm (Bessembinder, 1991; Brown, 2001).   
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 This assumes working with an ex-post risk exposure after risk consolidation and cost-effective risk 
reduction. 
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 The (additional) equity infusion into the firm is costly to current shareholders in terms of dilution of 
their control and benefits. 
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 In debt financing, this marginal increase is in the form of higher required returns (e.g., interest or 
mark-up) for higher amounts of debt requested.  Equity financing, on the other hand, imposes higher 
levels of discount of the firm value for higher levels of equity infusions. 
63
 Suppliers, who provide the life line of the production process, may choose to mitigate their risk 




The second reasoning is related to the growth potential and the prospect for above 
average profitability by the companies that hedge their market risk exposures, some 
of which may have tighter financial constraints (i.e., lack of desire or ability to access 
the costly debt and equity markets).  Specifically, it has been argued extensively in 
the risk management literature that the use of hedging instruments to ensure the 
sufficiency of internal funds, by reducing the variability of free cash flows, to take 
advantage of attractive investment opportunities is a common strategic decision by 
managers.  This is also especially valid in the context of the observed decreasing 
marginal returns to investments (i.e., output is a concave function of investment) 
(Bernstein, 1996; Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993; Geczy, Minton, & Schrand, 
1997; Lessard, 1991; Shapiro & Titman, 1986; Smith & Stulz, 1985; Visvanathan & 
Schrand, 1998). 
 
Thus to return to the potential risk retention strategy as outlined earlier and proposed 
by some in the Islamic finance industry to legitimize returns, companies that seek to 
employ that particular strategy are effectively being pressed to choose between a 
finite reserve system to face an unknown exposure to market risk (timing, magnitude, 
etc.), expensive external debt and equity financing, or loss of profitable investment 
opportunities (and consequently a lower firm value). The evolution of this dilemma, 
at the macro-level, is likely to entail a reduction in private sector investment and an 
overall sluggishness in the economic progress of Islamic countries (i.e., not entirely a 
correspondence to the theory of Maslaha).   
 
The third rationale for hedging is linked to the competitiveness of companies 
operating in the real sector. In essence, in today‟s globalized landscape, managers, 
particularly in multinational companies, need to be able to rely on stable financial 
inputs, such as market interest and foreign exchange rates and commodity prices, for 
their operational planning and pricing decisions (Allayannis & Weston, 2001; 




utilization of hedging instruments to lower financial expenses by way of accessing 
“cheaper” capital markets around the world.64  
 
Eventually, the ability to hedge market risk exposures can result in competitive and 
stable pricing that can contribute to not only the protection, but also the 
maximization of market share. Additionally, insofar that competition results in lower 
prices to consumers, the reduction of market risk exposure by companies can result 
in a higher societal welfare (i.e., Maslaha). This reasoning is also relevant to Islamic 
banking institutions that face competitive pressures in their home markets as well as 
in their efforts to seek cross-border market share enhancements. 
 
The fourth, and final, justification for hedging discussed in this section focuses on 
the taxation of enterprises.  As mentioned earlier in the discussion on the 
assumptions, many countries adopt a progressive tax system to add an element of 
fairness to their tax receipts whereby higher earnings are taxed at a higher tax bracket 
than lower earnings.  In this setting, an increase in the volatility of earnings due to 
the exposure of market risks poses a real possibility that the risk retention strategy 
entails a net enlargement of the tax liability.  That is to say, the taxation of the 
abnormally high income at an elevated tax rate and abnormally low income at the 
lower tax rate will most likely result in higher average taxes than the ones paid at the 
average moderate tax rate that reflects the earnings from core operations 




The contemporary risk challenges faced by real sector companies, and the banks that 
finance their operations, are much different from those that were encountered by the 
early Muslim community in the seventh century, a period which provides the juristic 
basis for the current perspectives on the subject matter by the Shari’a scholars.  The 
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 For example, a real sector borrower can utilize a swap to borrow in financial markets where they 
have a comparative advantage (tenor, fixed/floating, currency, etc.) and swapping this exposure to 
their desired position (tenor, fixed/floating, currency, etc.) for an overall cost saving.  There are 
potential diversification benefits to this strategy as well.  Finally, these hedging instruments can help a 
company become flexible to changes to its operations and market conditions over the life of the 




introduction of the volatile-natured interest rates as benchmarks for asset pricing, 
floating exchange rates for cross-border dealings, and unstable prices for 
commodities that serve as indispensable inputs for the real economic sectors have 
been shown to exert tremendous pressure on the profitability and survival of ordinary 
businesses.   
 
In this chapter, the topic of market risk as well as the various frameworks and tools 
that are available for institutions to deal with it was examined in detail. For this, 
while it was stated that risk is an indispensable component in the search for profit, it 
has been also contended, with reasoned economic argumentation that builds on 
Islamic jurisprudence that the relationship between risk and return is not an “all or 
nothing” arrangement as viewed by some in the Islamic finance industry.  It is, in 
fact, a relative relationship with the degree of return being a factor of the extent of 
riskiness involved.  Essentially, the arguments on risk management in Islamic 
finance should transcend the discourse concentrating on the importance of 
associating risk with return, which is a given in economic thought65, and move into 
the sphere of maximization of genuine return and the minimization of risk through 
legitimate means.   
 
Subsequently, one can proceed to differentiate, through proper identification and 
measurement, between the controllable core risks whose presence is an integral part 
of the existence of a particular firm (e.g., operations, primary market, etc.) and the 
non-core exogenous risks (e.g., market risks) whose random nature makes their 
retention a rather speculative endeavour. In terms of the risk strategy, it has been 
shown that the risk reduction and consolidation (i.e., combination and 
diversification) strategies, although useful for an enterprise, can only be 
compliments, not substitutes, to the efficiency and effectiveness of the market risk 
transfer strategy.   
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 The concept of the risk-free rate is a fallacy as evidenced by the downgrading of the U.S. credit 
rating by Standard and Poor‟s and Euro zone debt crisis in 2011-2012. In fact, the complete, or at least 
a major, disassociation between risk and return results in market disequilibrium, which ultimately 




With that, it is acknowledged that at the heart of the risk transfer process are 
derivative instruments that, by virtue of their pre-designed negative correlations with 
the specific market risk exposure, can provide hedging opportunities to real sector 
entities, which can, in turn, reduce the probability of financial distress, 
underinvestment, loss of potential financing savings and market competitiveness, and 
lower overall firm value. 
 
To be certain, transacting in derivative contracts whose pricing behaviour is related 
to another underlying variable is currently not wholly limited to the hedging sphere. 
Effectively, it can be contended that speculation in the financial markets with 
financial instruments in the commodity, interest rate, and foreign exchange rate 
markets, that have grown tremendously over the same period, is also a culprit in the 
increase of market risks.  However, the realization of this contention, which is partly 
true, provides little relief from the serious consequences of unmanaged market risks 
to businesses operating in the real sector.  In fact, a more logical argument could be 
put forth that the speculation with open market risk exposures in the financial 
markets, and the resultant increases in volatilities, are more of a reason to ensure the 
implementation of an appropriate risk management framework, which in turn 
requires the usage of hedging techniques and instruments within a broader risk 
transfer strategy.  
 
To that end, the next chapter will examine the economics and the rationale for the 
utilization of these derivative instruments with a particular focus on market risk 
management in order to address the often made association between these 










The discourse on the usage of derivatives in the Islamic finance industry commenced 
not too long after the tremendous growth of these instruments in the western markets 
in the 1970s as evidenced by the formal discussions surrounding these instruments 
that commenced in the Makkah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy in January, 1984. That 
is not to say that derivative markets did not exist in Islamic countries prior to that 
date.  In fact, the cotton futures market in Alexandria, Egypt is considered one of the 
oldest futures markets in the world having commenced operations in 1861 (Kamali, 
2000a). Moreover, many commodity markets exist in numerous Muslim countries 
and offer the ability to transact over a wide variety of products. 
 
However, it seems that despite the existence of these markets in Muslim countries for 
a rather extended period of time that a sense of confusion still reigns over the 
technicalities and usage of the derivative instruments in the Islamic finance industry.  
This was apparent in some of the interviews with respondents across the four groups 
as well as becomes particularly self-evident when one examines the discourse that 
has taken place on the subject matter by the Shari’a standard-setting bodies (see next 
chapter) with an almost exclusive focus on the contractual forms of these instruments 
and their analogy to pre-modern “Islamic” commercial contracts that have very little 
similarity in terms of scope or usage.  
 
With that, this chapter continues with the discourse on the topic of market risk 
management in Islamic finance that commenced in the last chapter but with a focus 
on the economics of the derivative instruments themselves as tools that facilitate 
market risk transfer. Specifically, the formulation of the pricing of the derivative 
instruments along with their relationship to prices in the cash markets for the 
underlying variables will be examined in a manner that anticipates the views of some 
of the contemporary Shari’a scholars and academics that will be the focus of the next 
chapter. Moreover, the technicalities of the utilization of derivatives as hedging tools 





Section I: Economics of Derivatives 
 
The basis for the creation and evolution of any financial instrument is inherently an 
economic one.  Thus, to fully understand the technicalities of the derivative 
instruments, one should look at the economic theories that underlie their existence. 
To that end, economics is defined by Marshall as the “study of mankind in the 
ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which 
is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material 
requisites of wellbeing” (Marshall, 1910, p. 1).  Robbins adds further granularity by 
stating that economics, as a science, “studies human behaviour as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins, 2007, p. 16). 
 
An economic system, for its part, manages that relationship by focusing on the 
efficient allocation and distribution, across time and space, of resources between 
economic agents in a manner that strives for the attainment of the most valuable uses 
of those resources. It is within this conceptualization that derivatives, much like 
equity and fixed income securities, perform their main function of the temporal and 
spatial shifting of risk and return to different market participants (Culp, 2004, p. 16). 
 
A derivative is usually defined as a financial instrument created as a result of a 
bilateral contract or payment exchange agreement whose value is based on (or 
derived from) the value of another underlying variable such as a physical asset, 
reference rate, or a benchmark (G30, 1993, p. 2; Hull, 2009, p. 1). The underlying 
variables in the case of the market risks that will be examined comprise benchmarks 
for interest rates (LIBOR or Treasury rates), foreign exchange rates, and/or actual 
commodity prices.   
 
However, despite sharing with equities and fixed income securities an analogous 
economic function, derivatives are unique financial instruments for four main 
reasons.  First, a derivative instrument can, through time, oscillate between being an 




liability with a negative charge (Chance & Brooks, 2010).  In terms of valuation, it 
should be emphasized that the notional amounts in the derivative contracts do not 
provide an accurate measure of the level of asset or liability (and any associated risk 
exposures) as does the face value of the other securities.  This is because the actual 
amount of the asset or liability implicit in a particular derivative contract is 
connected to its “replacement cost” in the financial markets, which is, in turn, 
dependent on the prevailing interest rates, exchange rates, and/or commodity prices. 
In other words, the valuation of a particular derivative instrument is related to the 
cost it would take a counterparty to purchase a similar contract in the financial 
markets with the same economic value as the one provided by the derivative 
instrument.  
 
Second, as demonstrated by Nobel Laureate Hicks, derivative contracts contain an 
explicit time element in that there is traditionally a delay in the delivery of both the 
underlying asset and the transfer of cash to settle a liability claim (Culp, 2004; Hicks, 
1931). Specifically, a spot transaction in the cash markets, which is the basis for most 
of the contracts in Islamic finance, entails an immediate payment by the buyer (or a 
credit agreement) in return for prompt delivery by the seller. However, a derivative 
instrument normally involves the payment for and receipt of an asset at a time that is 
different from the time the contract is concluded. Thus, in broad terms, derivative 
contracts can be considered as facilitators of asset transfers over time and space 
between economic agents who have diverse sets of opportunities and constraints 
(Culp, 2004, p. xxi). 
 
Third, a derivative instrument can be used exclusively as a hedging mechanism in the 
risk transfer process outlined in the previous chapter.  This is in contrast to other 
financial instruments that serve mainly as investment and resource mobilization 
vehicles. In essence, while a derivative instrument cannot be used to reduce the 
market risks that are associated with the ownership or production of assets, they can 




framework, to either another hedger with an offsetting exposure or a financial 




For this, a hedger can enter into a short hedge where the already owned, but perhaps 
incomplete, asset is expected to be sold at some time in the future (e.g., crops, oil, 
etc.) or for an asset that is currently not owned but will be owned after a period of 
time (e.g., a foreign currency receivable by an exporter).  Alternatively, a long hedge 
is utilized for taking a position in a derivatives contract to lock in the price of an 
asset or exposure that will have to be settled in the future (e.g., interest rates, fuel for 
aircraft, etc.). 
 
To be certain, derivatives can be, and have been, used as investment products by 
market participants, excessively in some circumstances, who seek to benefit from the 
flexibility offered by these instruments and their lower transaction costs to 
synthetically create exposures with tailored risk and return preferences. However, it 
is the usage of derivatives as hedging instruments for market risks that is the focus of 
this chapter and indeed the purpose of the whole research.  That said, the investment 
potential for derivatives, and the consequences for its usage for that purpose, shall be 
explored in the Hedging, Maysir, and Derivatives Chapter (Chapter 8).  
 
Fourth, while equities and fixed income securities primarily provide an indication of 
the value of a particular company and its credit quality, respectively (and presumably 
also a signal of wider market sentiment), derivatives, because they derive their values 
from market variables, provide an exceptional opportunity for price discovery of 
many financial and commodity products in a centralized and more inclusive market 
place.  Effectively, the open market bidding system and real-time price dissemination 
reduce the asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers participating not 
only in the same market but also in similar markets around the globe. For example, a 
farmer has an opportunity to learn of the prices paid for his crop in his home market 
and those in the other regions of the world.     
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The attainment of the aforementioned price discovery is a product of market 
intelligence and analysis (mainly by financial intermediaries) as well as the economic 
Law of One Price and the theory of arbitrage. For market intelligence and analysis, 
the advances in communication and information technology in addition to the use of 
sophisticated mathematical and statistical techniques by ever skilled market 
participants have resulted in a pricing system that is a much closer approximation of 
market equilibrium (which is never static).   
 
The law of one price, for its part, is significant in that it not only prices the derivative 
instruments but is also the driving force in the pricing of the underlying variables 
(i.e., interest and exchange rates in addition to commodity prices). Basically, in 
efficient financial markets
67
, the law of one price states that all identical goods with 
the same payoff structure for one, or multiple, point(s) of time in the future should 
have the same price at the present (Cox, Ingersoll, & Ross, 1981, pp. 323-324).  
 
The facilitator for the attainment of the outcomes of the law of one price is the theory 
and practice of arbitrage which serves an important role by ensuring pricing 
convergence, based on economic fundamentals, of identical goods in different 
markets. In essence, arbitrageurs, in striving to make profits by utilizing the base-rate 
market rates (e.g., LIBOR) for borrowing (lending) and simultaneously buying 
(selling) similar financial products in different markets to take advantage of any price 
discrepancies, are crucial to preserving the harmony between the cash and 
derivatives markets.   
 
The significance of the law of one price and the theory of arbitrage in the hedging 
sphere is in the fact that they both allow hedgers to rely on derivative instruments 
and their stable correlation with the cash markets to appropriately transfer their 
market risk exposures.  Furthermore, the law of one price and the theory of arbitrage 
exert convergence pressures between the various derivative instruments (e.g., 
forwards, futures, swaps, options, etc.) whose payoff structures are equivalent and 
bear the same relationships to goods in the cash markets.  
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With that background and in light of the on-coming examination of financial 
instruments, including the so-called “Islamic derivatives,” it is important for the 
participants of the Islamic finance industry, especially the Shari’a scholars, to 
understand that the law of one price and the theory of arbitrage apply to any financial 
instrument being traded and/or uses similar underlying variables for pricing in the 
financial markets.   
 
In effect, given that: 1) Hedgers utilize derivative instruments, and their stable 
correlations with the cash market, to hedge market risk exposures, 2) Any Islamic 
derivative instrument has to perform the same hedging function as the one performed 
by its conventional counterpart since the market risk exposures are all-encompassing 
(i.e., the exposure of market risks are not completely unique for Islamic institutions), 
and 3) The underlying variable in both the conventional and Islamic derivative 
instruments are identical (e.g., foreign exchange, oil, etc.), then the pricing of the 
conventional and Islamic derivative instruments will be the same at any given time.  
The added complexity of contemporary Islamic derivative contracts along with the 
inclusion of non-precious commodities, multiple contracts, and numerous agents to 
the structure the transaction will not change that economic reality. In fact, if 
anything, they are likely to exacerbate the market risk management challenges for 
companies operating in the real sector (see next chapter).   
 
Apart from the conceptual framework (i.e., law of one price and theory of arbitrage) 
that regulates the pricing of derivatives, the economics behind the actual attainment 
of the pricing of the derivative instruments should also be considered in order to 
enlighten the current legal-centric discourse in the Islamic finance industry on the 
subject matter, particularly in the focus areas of the prohibitions of Riba (usury) and 
Gharar (excessive uncertainty).  Essentially, the pricing of any derivative instrument 
is centred on Black‟s cost-of-carry formula whereby market interest rates, the cost of 
storing an asset, and its convenience yield are analysed by market participants to 
develop expectations regarding the future prices of the underlying assets (Black, 





For market interest rates, as discussed earlier in the Market Risks and Their 
Management Chapter (Chapter 4), the prohibition of Riba in Islamic finance, while 
addressing the issue of indebtedness within a society, is less relevant when it comes 
to the pricing of assets and liabilities in contemporary financial markets. This is 
because interest rates are used in this context to account for the preferences and 
perceptions of economic agents as well as a benchmark for the uncertainty associated 
with the holding period of a particular financial instrument. Specifically, the pricing 
of any financial instrument (including Islamic contracts) is dependent, in part, on the 
discounted cash flows over its life. The tool used to discount the cash flows of 
tradable financial instruments is traditionally the base rate, which is customarily 
either the market-determined LIBOR or the Treasury rates.  
 
Notably, the base rate is also used for the pricing structure within the framework of 
the law of one price. This is done in two ways: First, the base rate is used to account 
for the borrowing and lending taking place by arbitrageurs to exploit any mispricing 
in the financial markets.
68
  Second, given that the base rate is used to discount the 
cash flows of financial instruments, the theory of arbitrage ensures that the 
relationship between the spot prices and the prices for the instruments in the future is 
stable in that it depends on the timing and amount of the cash flows. 
 
In addition to the market interest rate considerations and insofar as the prices of the 
derivative instruments are based on the pricing behaviour of the assets themselves, 
the storage costs and the convenience yields are also considered important factors in 
the derivative pricing formula.  Storage costs are mainly applied in the pricing of the 
derivatives associated with commodities (cereal, cocoa, oil, gold, etc.) by considering 
it as a negative income.  Essentially, storage costs can be considered as either a 
discounted cash outflow occurring at particular time intervals or simply a constant 
cost proportion of the market prices (Hull, 2009).  
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 The borrowing and lending at the base rates is a theoretical construct that serves primarily as a 
means to include the opportunity cost of capital in determining the potential value of exploiting an 
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(e.g., a non-rated or lower rated arbitrageur). This may alleviate some of the Riba concerns regarding 





Convenience yields, on the other hand, serve a vital function in the pricing of 
derivative instruments in the commodities markets in that they distinguish between 
the value generated from owning the derivative instrument vis-à-vis actually 
possessing the underlying variable (Black, 1976; Brennan, 1991; Hilliard & Reis, 
1998; Hull, 2009).  Moreover, the convenience yields also serve as a barometer of 
market sentiment regarding the supply and demand forces that shape the pricing 
structure of a particular asset.   
 
In effect, there are particular benefits (i.e., utility) in holding an asset as opposed to 
holding a financial instrument whose value is derived from that asset. An oil refinery, 
for instance, is likely to view having an inventory of crude oil to ensure continuous 
production in addition to profit from any temporary shortages as having a greater 
usefulness than simply a derivative contract with crude oil as an underlying (i.e., 
synthetic inventory).  Moreover, to account for the diverse benefits accruing to the 
various institutions storing the asset, the level of the utility of the convenience yield 
is a product of the equilibrium obtained from the competition between the various 
users of the asset.   
 
It should be stated here that it is not self-evident that Al-Suwailem, in his criticism of 
forward-based derivatives vis-à-vis its “Islamic” alternatives, particularly Salam 
(forward sale) and Bay Ajel (deferred payment sale) contracts, was cognizant of this 
component in the pricing of derivative instruments (Al-Suwailem, 1999, pp. 84-85). 
More specifically, his argumentation that the Islamic temporal contracts of 
commerce have different payoffs than conventional derivatives lacks empirical 
evidence. On the contrary, the inclusion of the convenience yield in the cost-of-carry 
pricing formula, as indicated above, is precisely accounting for the issue of “real 
exchange effects” that Al-Suwailem (1999) seeks to address; although, he does so in 
a manner that paradoxically criticizes conventional derivatives. In other words, Al-
Suwailem‟s remarks reinforce the convenience yield component in the cost-of-carry 





An additional aspect of the convenience yield is its use as a mechanism to express 
the market expectations regarding, what Stevens calls, “the adaptation of the 
probable supplies to anticipated requirements” (Stevens, 1887, p. 62). In essence, the 
market perception regarding the economic fundamentals of a particular asset is 
internalized within the convenience yield as a measure of not only the utility derived 
from owning and storing the asset, but also the expectations regarding this utility in 
the future. 
 
Notably, the importance of the storage costs and convenience yields is relevant only 
in the commodity sphere as it formulates the relationship between spot prices and 
futures prices. The markets of monetary financial derivatives, however, such as those 
relating to interest and foreign exchange rates, do not contain storage cost or 
convenience yield elements; otherwise arbitrage opportunities will present 
themselves resulting in the ultimate disappearance of these non-applicable variables.  
 
That said, the pricing for these monetary financial derivatives does share with their 
commodity counterparts the interest rate component in the cost-of-carry model. 
Although, the foreign exchange markets are distinctive in that the interest rate 
component is adjusted to account for the differentials in the interest rates in each 
country.  This is to conform to the arbitrage-free interest rate parity relationship of 
international finance.  
 
The previous discussion into the economics of derivatives is significant in two 
respects: First, it indicates the value of utilizing derivative instruments to achieve an 
optimal allocation and distribution of resources (including their associated risk and 
return) among economic agents across time.  Second, the discussion provides 
important insights that can serve to alleviate some of the Shari’a concerns that often 
circulate in the discourse, which were also ostensible in the opinions by respondents 
in all four groups, on derivative contracts; in particular the perceived association 





For Gharar, it should be realized that the existence of derivatives actually reduces 
Gharar by allowing market participants to decrease not only the uncertainty with 
how the prices of assets are derived in the cash markets, but also the doubt associated 
with the pricing of assets at different times in the future. This is achieved, as outlined 
previously, by way of an all-inclusive (base rate plus storage costs minus the 
convenience yield) and transparent price discovery process that is made available to 
all relevant stakeholders (farmers, producers, customers, government bodies, among 
others). Indeed, in regards to the charges of dealing in Gharar due to uncertainty of 
the price in the future, Kamali (2000) has argued (through the articulation of the 
opinions of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Al-Qayyim, Musa, Sulayman, and Hasan) that it has 
been accepted in Islamic jurisprudence to set a future market price for a contract on 
the condition that it is agreeable to both parties and clear enough to eliminate dispute 
(Kamali, 2000b, p. 95).  
 
In regards to Riba, it may be apparent at this stage that interest rates are employed in 
the context of the base-level cost of capital that is used to discount the cash flows of 
any asset or liability (including all assets/liabilities in Islamic financial markets), all 
while adhering to the arbitrage-free pricing structure that ensures that market prices 
are in equilibrium. Notwithstanding the above, it is remarkable that the criticisms 
hailed at the derivative instruments due to its supposed handling of Riba (in the form 
of the base rate for pricing) are done at a time where there seems to be a wide 
agreement among Shari’a scholars on the acceptability of the usage of LIBOR as a 





With that added understanding of the economics of derivatives, it may be now 
appropriate to proceed to the examination of the various derivative instruments 
existing in the global financial markets and how their individual traits have led to 
particular preferences by hedgers in utilizing them to off-set their specific market 
risk exposures. The implication of this discussion will become ostensible in the next 
chapter in which the attempts to associate these derivative instruments to pre-modern 
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“Islamic” contracts through the theory of Qiyas (analogical reasoning) will be 
delineated along with the legal-centric endeavours at financial engineering to 
replicate their payoff structure.  
 
Section II: Conventional Derivative Instruments 
 
All derivative contracts are built from two basic and fundamental building blocks – 
forwards and options (G30, 1993).  Forward-based instruments include forwards, 
swaps, and futures, while the option-based contracts not only contain options on 
tradable assets as a stand-alone instrument but also can be made “exotic” through 
innovative structures that seek to construct an almost unlimited array of transactions 
and strategies.   
 
Broadly speaking, a forward contract is a relatively simple contract that is negotiated 
between two counterparties whereby a binding commitment is made for specific 
terms of agreement for the purchase/sale of an asset in the future, which, in turn, is 
based on the particular needs of the counterparties.  The terms of agreement are fixed 
for the duration of the contract and include the price at maturity (forward price), 
contract size, quality, and delivery location and time (Culp, 2004; G30, 1993; Hull, 
2009; Richard & Sundaresan, 1981).    
 
Notably, the initiation of the contract is completed by agreement without any 
payment exchanging hands between the counterparties.  At maturity, the long hedge 
receives the underlying variable in the contract from the short hedge in return for the 
forward price. If the parties agree, however, the contract can be cash-settled in which 
case the cash equivalent value, based on the prices in the financial markets, of the 
underlying variable is given by the short hedge to the long hedge in lieu of the asset 
itself.   
 
The basis for the allowance of cash settlement for hedging transactions is that the 
transaction itself is meant to manage the market risks associated with a particular 




Essentially, a hedger, for a commodity risk exposure for instance, is likely to want to 
continue with the existing relationship with its current suppliers based on an already 
established supply chain (with preferences for delivery location, grade, size, 
transport, etc.), even if those suppliers are not in a position to provide a viable 
hedging counterparty to the business in question.   
 
Put differently, a hedging transaction should not force real sector companies to alter 
their operational decisions to respond to market risks.  In fact, the whole purpose of 
market risks management is for businesses to effectively manage their market risk 
exposures without the need to undertake costly changes to their modus operandi. In 
the realm of derivatives with a financial variable as an underlying, the delivery is 
either impractical (e.g., LIBOR) or just simply adds to the transaction costs in an era 
of electronic banking (e.g., currency). 
 
That said, the cash settlement feature in modern derivative instruments also allows 
pure speculators to enter the derivative markets, which is evidently a major concern 
of Shari’a scholars (see next chapters). However, while it is acknowledged that the 
excesses of speculation have been a prominent factor that contribute to global 
financial instability, it should be recognized that the forcing of delivery, besides 
constraining the risk management potential for derivative instruments by imposing 
operational inconveniences and transaction costs on true hedgers, will likely serve to 
only limit, but not eliminate, speculation in the derivative markets.  This is because 
the costs of delivery by pure speculators, much like being done by pure speculative 
traders in the spot market, will simply be included in the transaction costs within a 
wider cost-benefit analysis of pure speculative endeavours.  
 
In terms of valuation, at initiation, the forward contract has no value because in an 
arbitrage-free setting the maturity price is an approximation of the future spot price 
otherwise arbitrageurs would exploit the market differentials, which would return 
the forward contract to a zero valuation setting.  Throughout the life of the contract 
the valuation of the forward contract will likely fluctuate to respond to spot market 




fluctuation, for its part, is dependent on the degree of change in the economic 
fundamentals affecting that particular variable and the belief about potential changes 
in the future.  Interestingly, with that overview of the pricing of forward-based 
derivative contracts, it is remarkable that the charges of association with the 
prohibition of Gharar are still being levied in the Islamic finance literature. 
 
At maturity, if the forward price (i.e., contractually-agreed to price) is higher than the 
prevailing price of the asset in the spot market then the long hedge (short hedge) 
makes a profit (loss) and vice versa.  This zero-sum payoff structure between the 
counterparties should largely offset the market risk exposure in a true hedging 
transaction.  Put differently, as discussed in the previous chapter, the purchase of the 
forward contract that is negatively correlated to the market risk exposure will 
counterbalance any gains or losses experienced due to the changes in prices in the 
spot markets in the future.   
 
Moreover, for the purpose of Islamic jurisprudence that is quite averse to the 
accumulation of debt and the unjust exploitation that may result in the process, it 
needs to be emphasized that a forward contract is not considered debt in a true sense.  
This due to a three main reasons: First, at the most fundamental level, as discussed 
earlier, a forward contract does not have a value at initiation.  Second, after initiation, 
a forward contract does not have a face value or a pre-defined one-sided cash flow 
stream; it simply contains a commitment by the counterparties to transact on a 
variable with specific terms of agreement in the future.  
 
Third, despite the presence of counterparty risks, a forward contract does not have a 
pre-defined creditor/debtor structure at initiation; in fact, the exact party that benefits 
financially from the contract will be only be made apparent at maturity. Thus, with 
that distinction, it may become apparent that the classification of forward 
transactions as debt by some contemporary Shari’a scholars as well as the 
formulation of analogies between the derivative instruments and the financial 
exploitation that are a fundamental part of usurious transactions is an inaccurate 





In terms of the variables underlying the contracts, these can range from agricultural 
and physical commodities to currencies (i.e., foreign exchange forwards) and interest 
rates (i.e., foreign rate agreements or FRAs). The commodity forward contracts are 
quite straight forward in that they outline the purchase of a particular commodity in 
the future at a particular price.  The foreign exchange forwards entail the exchange of 
specific amounts of notional currencies between the counterparties at a designated 
date in the future.   
 
A forward rate agreement, for its part, is a contract defining interest rates that will 
apply to borrowing and lending of a particular notional principle in the future.  The 
base rate often used is LIBOR but can be any pre-defined interest rate that is 
correlated with the desired interest rate exposure for one, or both, of the 
counterparties.  The reverse position in the forward contract is a fixed rate of interest 
that ensures an arbitrage-free interest rate parity position for the duration of the 
contract at its initiation.  The overall purpose of this form of transaction in a true 
hedging scenario is the implementation of an effective asset-liability management 
(ALM) policy in institutions exposed to interest rate risk.   
 
Besides contributing to the effective management of interest rate risks in the 
financial markets, the FRAs also serve an important role in the price discovery 
process for financial assets by aiding in the determination of the interest rate curve.  
Essentially, through interpolation from existing FRAs trading with specific 
maturities, the financial markets can derive market interest rates even for those 
maturities with no tradable derivative instruments.  This benefit allows companies 
and financial institutions to properly strategize their financial structure in future 
periods based on the costs and opportunities existing in the financial markets.  That 
is, the presence of the interest rate curve, as derived from the FRAs, helps the market 
participants reduce the uncertainty (e.g., Gharar) associated with financial planning.  
 
Futures, as the second form of derivative instruments examined in the risk transfer 




between two parties to buy or sell a specified underlying variable for a certain price 
on the contract maturity date.  However, there are a number of differences between 
forward and futures contracts that should be clarified for an added understanding of 
these instruments (Catania & Alonzi, 1997; Cornell & Reinganum, 1981; G30, 1993; 
Kamali, 2007; Richard & Sundaresan, 1981).   
 
First, the futures contracts are traded in a centralized exchange as opposed to the 
over-the-counter (OTC) market where most forwards (and swaps; see below) are 
traded. The exchange, which is a voluntary association of its members, provides 
buyers and sellers of the futures contracts the infrastructure (location and IT 
systems), legal framework (rules and arbitration procedures), and clearing 
mechanisms to ensure a smooth and unambiguous transaction process.  
 
Second, apart from the determination of the pricing of futures by the laws of supply 
and demand (as with all derivatives), the parties to a futures contract do not negotiate 
the terms of the agreement as these are standardized by the exchange where they are 
traded.  These terms of agreement are: the quantity and quality of the underlying 
variable, time and place of delivery,
70
 and the method of payment. In the hedging 
sphere, the standardization of the futures contracts with specific quantities, quality, 
and delivery dates around the year compels the hedging party to seek a contract that 
most resembles, but not exactly matching, the factors that define its market risk 
exposure (Ederington, 1979). This hedging behaviour in the futures markets can 
explain the early settlement tendencies by even the pure hedging parties in the 
futures markets. 
 
To illustrate, an oil refinery with a no longer needed long hedge on oil futures will 
close out that position by assuming a short hedge position of the exact same contract 
in the futures market. Similarly, a financial institution with a terminated interest rate 
exposure will seek to close the open futures contract (Eurodollar deposits or Treasury 
bills/notes/bonds) with another that offsets it. In effect, once the original market risk 
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exposure is terminated for a hedging party, it can proceed to offset its open position 
with a contract that is equal (quantity, quality, date, etc.) but the reverse (buy/sell) of 
its open futures contracts in order to assume a zero net exposure in the derivatives 
market.   
 
With that, it is acknowledged that the standardization of the futures contracts has also 
contributed to the emergence of a new class of traders in the futures markets that 
have no concurrent exposure to the cash markets and no intention to deliver or 
receive the underlying variables. Essentially, they are simply motivated by the profit 
potential from trading in the commodities/financial variable markets in the future and 
accordingly proceed to open and close futures contract positions in response to 
market opportunities that present themselves.  
 
However, as stated previously within the discussion on forward contracts, the 
imposition of delivery is not the proper means to eliminate gambling behaviour in the 
financial markets.  For besides the negative effects to the hedging community, 
especially since the contracts are not tailored to the specific exposures of the various 
hedging parties, the forced delivery will be simply considered as a transaction cost 
by the pure speculators much like the costs of the margin system are (see below).  
The eventual outcome will be a framework that comprises higher transaction costs 
with no discernible benefits.  
 
Interestingly, the often quoted figures of very low delivery ratios for futures contracts 
is likely a result of both the lack of tailored contracts for hedgers and the presence of 
pure speculators; not only a function of the latter.  Along the same lines, for the cash-
futures link, it is not the actual delivery that is important in the context of the pricing 
of the futures contracts; it is actually the prospect of delivery. This is because the 
presence of the prospect of delivery, and indeed the requirement for delivery for 
those who have not offset their contracts prior to maturity, serves the same role by 
forging the cash-futures link whereby the futures price is approximately equal to the 
cash price at the expiration of the contract.  In other words, contrary to some beliefs 




markets do not exist in a vacuum of pure gambling that is completely detached from 
the activities and prices in the real economy.  
 
The third difference between forward and futures contracts is that the counterparties 
do not actually trade with each other but rather enter directly into a futures contract 
with the exchange itself which becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to 
every buyer.  This system was designed with the intention of reducing the risks of 
default by the counterparties as well as facilitating the clearance activities of the 
futures market participants. Thus, within the framework of futures, the counterparties 
are, in effect, liable to the exchange for performance; and if a particular counterparty 
defaults on a futures contract, the exchange honours the contract to the other 
counterparty by the absorption of the loss from its own reserves.  To that end, the 
financial integrity of the exchange is sustained by a process called marking-to-market 





The margin accounts are accounts by the party with an open position in the exchange 
that benefits from and absorbs the losses from market fluctuations.
72
 At the initiation 
of the contract, the margin account usually requires funds totalling around two to five 
per cent of the value of the underlying assets of the futures contract and can be paid 
in cash or by pledging securities at a discounted value in order to avoid cash 
payments
73
 (Catania & Alonzi, 1997; Hull, 2009). Further, the initial margin is also a 
function of the volatility of the price of the underlying variable and the nature of the 
client entering into a particular futures contract (i.e., hedger vs. pure speculator).   
 
Specifically, a higher volatility in the market prices of the underlying variable and/or 
the adoption of speculative motives by the transacting party will necessitate higher 
initial margin requirements while lower pricing volatility and a bona fide hedging 
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 The members of exchange can, in turn, require margin accounts by the various traders and clients 
who seek access to the exchange through their patronage. 
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 The trader or client can withdraw excesses from the margin account in case of favourable market 
movement and are required to put up more funds in the account to address losses from unfavourable 
market movements. 
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 For example, Treasury bills and common stock are usually accepted at ninety per cent and fifty per 




profile allow for a lower initial margin due to the lesser risks of default. That said, 
the margin system should be thought of as a performance bond or a good faith 
deposit and not a premium (as in options) or leverage (as in debt) for the transaction. 
Interestingly, the OTC markets for forwards and swaps have begun to adopt a similar 
structure to the futures margining system by introducing collateralization to their 
contractual structures for counterparties with less than perfect credit ratings (Hull, 
2009).  
 
Fourth, the futures contracts are effectively rewritten every trading day at the new 
futures price due to exchange rules stipulating daily mark-to-market of open 
positions.  Hence, as with the forward contracts zero-valuation at initiation due to the 
theory of arbitrage, the futures contracts have a valuation of zero at the beginning of 
every trading day until maturity. This feature, in effect, makes futures contracts 
similar to a forward contract paid for on a unique instalment plan that is a factor of 
the movement of the market prices throughout the duration of the contract (Cox, 
Ingersoll, & Ross, 1981; Richard & Sundaresan, 1981).   
 
Essentially, the buyers (sellers) of the futures contracts are expected to make 
(receive) daily instalment payments towards the eventual purchase (sale) of the 
underlying asset for the price stipulated in the futures contract.  When the contract 
matures, the buyer and seller of the underlying asset will have already paid/received 
the difference between the initial price in the futures contract and the futures price at 
maturity, which, as mentioned earlier, will equal the spot price prevailing in the 
financial markets in an arbitrage-free setting due to the prospect of delivery (Richard 
& Sundaresan, 1981).   
 
After outlining some of the structural differences between forward and futures 
contracts, it should be noted that there are also divergences in the pricing 
configuration of the two derivative instruments due to the different payoffs 
structures. For while the cash flows of the forward contracts only occur at maturity 
resulting in the accumulation of any changes within the contract until its termination, 




instalments) between the counterparties as a result of market fluctuations (Black, 
1976; Cox, Ingersoll, & Ross, 1981; Jarrow & Oldfield, 1981; Richard & 
Sundaresan, 1981). This fundamental difference has implications not only in the 
equality of forward and futures prices, but also in the effectiveness of the market risk 
hedges, even in arbitrage-free settings.  
 
More specifically, the receipt and payment of the daily cash flows throughout the life 
of the contract introduce an element of uncertainty due to inclusion of the 
opportunity cost of capital (i.e., base rate) in the pricing of the derivative instruments. 
At the heart of the uncertainty is the fact that a forward contract is priced with a base 
rate that is assumed to be a deterministic and thus constant until maturity. 
Conversely, in the futures contract, the continual reinvestment and/or borrowing 
cannot be assumed to be done at a constant rate because interest rates themselves 
have stochastic (random) tendencies in their fluctuations.  Having said that, the 
sufficiently low correlation between interest rates and most futures prices can result 
in a fair approximation between the two contracts (Minton, 1997).  
 
The third derivative instrument that will be examined is the swap contract.  In a 
swap, the counterparties agree to exchange periodic payments based on a pre-
determined amount of principle at specified intervals that usually extend into the 
medium- to long-term timeframe. The payments, in turn, can either be fixed or may 
float with an agreed-upon benchmark that varies over time. Essentially, one set of the 
cash flows is the one associated with a party‟s market risk exposure and the second 
cash flow is related to their desired exposure based on the status of their balance 
sheet and future operational expectations.  These cash flows can be related to interest 
and currency rates as well as commodity prices.  However, given that commodity 
swaps are not a large part of the swaps market and when they are utilized they are 
traditionally viewed as tailored investment products rather than hedging instruments, 
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The “plain vanilla” interest rate swap is the most common type of swap (Brown & 
Smith, 1995) and involves the exchange of a fixed set of interest rate payments for a 
floating one on a common principle amount by counterparties known as the fixed-
rate payer (long hedge) and the floating-rate payer (short hedge).  The floating side 
of the periodic payments is usually linked to LIBOR or some other variable interest 
rate; while the fixed rate, for its part, is broken down into two components: a 
Treasury note yield and a swap spread (Brown & Smith, 1995). Basically, the fixed 
rate is determined by using the yield on the most recently issued (and usually the 
most liquid) Treasury note with the same maturity as the swap along with the spread 
added on by the financial intermediary that accounts for its fees (hedging and 
operating costs plus profit) as well as the premium for the default and liquidity risks 




Notably, the principle is only “notional” in that it is not exchanged neither at the 
beginning nor at the end of the contract because there is no economic value to 
exchanging exactly the same amount of money at exactly the same time. Moreover, it 
is market convention that settlements are made on a net basis in that, based on the 
movements of the market interest rates, the party owing the larger amount will 
simply pay the other party the difference. 
 
Currency swaps are different from the interest rate swaps in that the counterparties 
engage in the spot exchange of the principle at inception, the payment of the cash 
flow streams at specific dates for the duration of the contract, and then the reversal of 
the swap with the re-exchange of the principle at the agreed-upon maturity, all of 
which are denominated in two different currencies (Cooper & Mello, 1991; Hull, 
2009). The contracts can be more flexible by defining the intermediary cash flows as 
being fixed-fixed, fixed-floating, or floating-floating in the benchmark rates of the 
different currencies.  Needless to say, the flexibility of the currency swaps, while 
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 The ability of market participants to unambiguously monitor the current treasury yield results in the 
market convention of quoting only the swap spreads. For its part, the swap rate is the average of the 
fixed rate that the financial intermediary is prepared to pay in exchange for receiving floating (bid 




offering tailored hedging products, do make the pricing of these instruments more 
complex and preclude it from payment netting.   
 
Thus, as demonstrated by the aforementioned description of the interest rate and 
currency swaps, the essential variables in each swap contract is the level of the fixed 
rate, the manner in which the variable rate is determined, the scale of the transaction 
(i.e., notional principle), the currency of the cash flows, the dates of periodic 
payments along with the maturity, and the events of default (Brown & Smith, 1995, 
p. 3; Cox, Ingersoll, & Ross, 1980; Ramaswamy & Sundaresan, 1986).  These 
negotiated variables, which are a function of the preferences by the counterparties, 
serve as the fundamental elements for their pricing and valuation.   
 
With that, there are two basic approaches to the pricing and valuation of swaps.  The 
first, and simpler, approach is to view the swap as the exchange of two hypothetical 
securities (Bicksler & Chen, 1986).
76
 For example, in an interest rate swap, the fixed-
rate payer can be viewed as the seller of the fixed-rate bond in return for the floating-
rate bond given by the floating-rate payer.  Alternatively, in the second approach, the 
swap can be considered as a series of forward transactions extending until the 
maturity date.  An exporter, for instance, who utilizes currency swaps to manage 
currency risks is effectively entering into successive foreign currency forwards for 
specific durations (e.g., six months) with known but different fixed rates for each 
period that continue until the currency exposure is terminated (Litzenberger, 1992).  
 
Thus, with the assumptions that: 1) The floating- and the fixed-rate securities sell at 
par at initiation (i.e., the cash flows are discounted at the relevant interest rate),
77
 2) 
The forward interest rates are realized, 3) The term structure of interest rates is 
upward sloping
78
, and 4) The presence of arbitrage-free market conditions (i.e., any 
mispricing in the securities given their defining features will be eliminated by market 
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 The floating rate is set at initiation and usually paid in arrears.  Further, the floating rate security is 
considered “fair deal” at each settlement date in that it is valued at par. 
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forces), the interest rate swaps fixed rate will be a present value of the average of 
forward rates for the duration of the swap.  Effectively, this means that the fixed-rate 
payer expects to make net payments at the earlier part of the swap duration and 
receive net payments in the latter part (Smith, Smithson, & Wakeman, 1988; Sun, 
Sundaresan, & Wang, 1993).  
 
For the currency swaps, the same set of assumptions apply with the addition that it is 
also presumed that the forward exchange rates, in addition to the interest rates in 
each currency‟s home market, are realized. As for cash flows, if the interest rates in 
the two currencies are different, it can be construed that the payer of the higher 
interest rates throughout the duration of the swap will have a positive final exchange 
and vice versa (Brown & Smith, 1995).   
 
In terms of valuation, the value of any swap instrument (a.k.a. its “replacement cost”) 
is: 1) The difference in the values of the two hypothetical securities, and/or 2) The 
present value of the difference between the application of the average forward rates 
(i.e., the fixed rate) and the floating rate to the notional principle.  As a practical 
matter, the calculation of the value of a swap instrument can be undertaken by direct 
observation of prices and rates in the financial markets (e.g., OTC-traded FRAs or 
exchange-traded futures) or through the interpolation process which, as described 
earlier, is based on inferences from available market variables (Litzenberger, 1992). 
Notably, in an arbitrage-free setting, the hypothetical security or FRA-based pricing, 
whether done by direct observation or calculation, will always be the same. 
 
Having discussed the technicalities of the interest rate and foreign currency swap 
instruments, it may be necessary to state the economic rationale for their particular 
usage and high growth since that first transaction was organized by Solomon 
Brothers between the World Bank and IBM in 1981 (Chancellor, 1999).
79
 For this, 
the most cited economic rationale is based on the comparative advantage argument 
that is built on the existence of what Bicksler and Chen (1986) call “quality spread 
differentials.”   
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The quality spread differentials are the differences in the spread between what the 
lower-quality borrower must pay over the higher-quality borrower for funds in the 
same denomination for an identical maturity (Bicksler & Chen, 1986; Litzenberger, 
1992; Visvanathan & Schrand, 1998).  These spreads are observed to be increasing 
with the prolongation of the maturity associated with credit financing (Wall & 
Pringle, 1989); and are thought to exist also in foreign exchange markets (Hull, 
2009).  
 
In contrast, the swap markets are said to offer lower quality spread differentials than 
credit markets for lower-rated parties (Sun, Sundaresan, & Wang, 1993).  Thus, the 
swap markets offer different comparative advantages to the various counterparties in 
that the higher-rated counterparties often have an advantage in borrowing in the 
fixed-rate markets and the lower-rated counterparties have an advantage in 
borrowing in the floating-rate markets.
80
  Similarly, a particular swap counterparty is 
likely have an advantage in borrowing in its home currency due to lower asymmetry 
of information.   
 
Therefore, it can be beneficial for the counterparties to transact in the markets where 
they have the comparative advantage and swap the unwanted exposure for their 
original desired exposure in terms of interest rates (fixed/floating) and/or currency 
(Brown & Smith, 1995; Hull, 2009; Litzenberger, 1992; Whittaker, 1987).  For 
example, the higher-rated counterparty is recommended to borrow in the fixed-rate 
market, even though it is interested in a floating-rate financing in a wider context of 
asset-liability management, and swap that exposure with a lower-rated counterparty 
who has transacted in the floating-rate market even though it is actually interested in 
the fixed-rate financing. Likewise, a company from Turkey, for instance, is advised 
to borrow in Turkish Lira, even though it is interested in meeting an exposure in 
Malaysian Ringgit, and swap that exposure with a counterparty that is seeking an 
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exposure to the Turkish Lira.  Ultimately, the cost savings can be shared between the 
counterparties through negotiation.   
 
To be certain, the prospect of credit arbitrage, as outlined earlier, has been 
unconvincing to some writers since the presence of arbitrage, by its nature, has the 
seed to its own demise.  Specifically, the presence of credit arbitrage opportunities 
should technically result in the elimination of the quality spread differentials and 
eventually the severe reduction, not growth, of the swap markets (Kuprianov, 1994; 
Smith, Smithson, & Wakeman, 1988; Turnbull, 1987). In light of that assertion, it is 
also important to recognize that the credit markets can and do exhibit structural 
particularities due to the insertion of qualitative analysis in the overall credit 
extension process.  That is to say, the lack of exclusive focus on the base rate, as in 
the analysis of derivatives and the overall pricing of assets/liabilities, does introduce 
opportunities for different interpretations of credit risks by various market 
participants. 
 
However, despite the arguable existence of quality spread differentials, the 
tremendous growth of the swaps market in the last thirty years probably includes the 
concomitant presence of other equally valid causes.  For this, Smith et al (1988) note 
that the general increase in the risk management awareness by institutions and the 
ability to create tailored hedging and investment instruments is likely to have 
contributed to the popularity of the swap contracts. It has also been contended that 
these instruments have tended to exhibit lower default and liquidity risk 
characteristics than those existing in the credit markets (and even the forward 
derivative markets) due to the resetting mechanisms throughout the duration of the 
swap contract (Litzenberger, 1992; Smith, Smithson, & Wakeman, 1988).   
 
Finally, the transaction costs of the swap market have not only been low since its 
inception, but have been tightening as a result of the competition in and 
sophistication of the swap markets. This is in contrast to the higher transaction costs 
associated with the prospect of issuance of bonds (Sukuk) in financial markets which 




advantage markets only to exchange them) or the cost associated with the entrance 
into a series of forward transactions.  In other words, the pricing of the swaps by way 
of analysing the hypothetical exchange of securities and/or a series of forward 
contracts does not necessitate that one take on the costs related to these transactions 
for the effective realization of the hedging benefits of swaps.   
 
Having examined the technicalities of the utilization and valuation of the forward-
based derivative instruments, it is perhaps necessary to outline some of the 
distinctive risks that are assumed by the parties in those types of derivative contracts.  
These include: market risk, default risk, basis risk, and accounting risk.   
 
Market risk and default in the realm of derivatives are mirror images of each other in 
that they are inversely related.  More specifically, market risk is the risk that the 
mark-to-market value of the derivative instrument is negative to the hedger resulting 
in it becoming a liability.  However, in a true hedging scenario, this risk is largely 
offset by the original market risk exposure in the cash markets.  That is, the gain 
(loss) on the derivative instrument will be offset by a loss (gain) on the balance sheet 
of the hedger as a result of the market risk exposure.  
 
Default risk, in contrast, is the risk that the counterpart will default on its obligation 
when the derivative instrument is an asset to the hedger (i.e., a liability to the 
counterparty).  With that, it should also be noted that the default risk on a derivative 
instrument is not similar to the default risk in credit markets.  This is because the 
default of a derivative contract does not involve the “notional” principle that forms 
the basis of the instrument but rather the costs of default are only the replacement 
cost of the contract which is essentially based on the differentials between the 
discounted cash flows of the initially agreed upon price and the expected market 
price at maturity. In fact, the fallacy of having the notional principle being the 
measure of exposure can be ostensible in that swaps with longer maturities have a 
higher exposure than swaps with shorter maturities even though the notional 





Further, this gross amount is reduced even further as one considers netting 
arrangements that is common in those contracts along with the assignment of 
collateral for the transaction. Additionally, the dynamic nature of the derivative 
contracts in that they can fluctuate from being an asset to being a liability to the 
counterparties makes it more fluid rather than a static format of default exposure. 
 
Along the same lines, at the macro-level, the total systemic risk
81
 posed by 
derivatives should be contextualized before one could properly analyse its effect on 
the financial markets.  In effect, apart from the inappropriateness of using the 
commonly quoted outstanding notional principles as a means to enumerate risk 
exposures, the off-setting risk exposures of the totality of open derivative contracts 
along with the overall volatility of the particular market segment as well as the 
differing sensitivities and time to maturity in addition to risk profiles of the various 
instruments in relation to the underlying assets should also be considered in order to 
arrive at a more informative statistic (G30, 1993).   
 
In terms of managing the risk of default, as stated earlier, these are largely absent in 
the futures contracts due to the interfacing by the relevant exchange.  For forwards 
and swaps, however, the parties to these instruments often actively analyse their 
prospective counterparties prior to entering into a derivative contract with them (i.e., 
minimum credit rating, concentration of any existing exposure, etc.) as well as are 
contractually obligated in some cases (e.g., swaps) to adhere to bilateral netting 
provisions which stipulate the offsetting of losses from gains from any outstanding 
contracts with the defaulting party. The posting of collateral, even if costly, has been 
also effective in that regard.   
 
As for the basis risk, it was originally recognized by Holbrook Working in 1953 that 
“a major source of mistaken notions of hedging is the conventional practice of 
illustrating hedging with a hypothetical example in which the price of the future 
bought or sold as a hedge is supposed to rise or fall by the same amount that the spot 
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prices rises or falls” (Working, 1953, pp. 320-321).  In essence, basis risk is the 
correlation between the price of the underlying variable tied to the original market 
risk exposure and the price of the variable underlying the derivative instrument 
(Haushalter, 2000, p. 108).  The lower the correlation between the two, the less 
perfect is the hedge and the greater the basis risk (Ederington, 1979; G30, 1993).  
 
The presence of basis risk is greater in the commodity markets than in the interest 
rate and currency markets. Basically, each hedging party has its unique inputs into its 
production (quality and grade) with a rather specific timing for these needs. The 
negotiation with the counterparty may yield an agreed-upon contract that differs, 
albeit to a small extent, from the exact requirements of each party.  In the case of 
futures, the standardization of contract sizes, quality, and delivery dates poses its 
own format for the basis risk.    
 
However, the laws of arbitrage-free pricing do keep the basis risk to a minimal level 
in the commodity markets (due to the prospect of making delivery) and render it 
almost non-existent in the interest rate and currency markets. Thus, overall, it can be 
construed that the hedging party by utilizing the derivative instrument trades the 
uncertainty associated with a market risk exposure to the much lesser prospect of 
basis risk.   
 
The accounting risk, for its part, is the “uncertainty over the proper accounting 
treatment of the derivative transaction” (Chance & Brooks, 2010, p. 557).  This risk 
is present in the international financial markets as the debate over regulation and 
disclosure of the derivative instruments continues to unfold in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis; however, there is currently a set of basic minimum of 
standards that is elaborated by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).   
 
For institutions operating in the Islamic finance industry, the accounting risk is 
compounded by the unavailability of any accounting standard by the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).  This is despite 




some of the respondents in the practitioner group, use swaps (in particular Islamic 
swaps) as part of their operations at an increasing pace especially after the growing 
acceptability by the various Shari’a committees in the industry and the development 
of the Tahawwut (hedging) Master Agreement (TMA) for swap transactions by the 
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM).   
 
In fact, the acuteness of this particular risk in the Islamic finance industry has been 
made apparent in that only one of the many respondents asked directly about the 
recognition of derivatives in the financial statements by the entities that use them was 
able (by way of conjecture) to state the proper accounting treatment for these 
instruments (the issue of recognition will be discussed at length in the coming 
chapters).  
 
As for the motivations for entering into one forward-based derivative contract over 
another, the motivations for the utilization of a particular derivative instrument for 
the management of market risk exposures are essentially a factor of the nature of the 
actual market risk exposure and the transaction costs as well as the risks associated 
with the derivative instrument itself. Thus, it can be observed that market risk 
exposures with frequent cash flows (e.g., borrowing/lending-based interest rate and 
currency exposures) are more likely to be hedged with swap contracts due to its 
customization benefits along with the lower transaction costs taken in totality.  
Futures and forwards can be used more in commodity and currency transactions that 
deal with less frequent, but possibly larger, exposures.   
 
The unique risks of the derivative contracts do also play a part in the decision 
process.  Specifically, the lower default risks inherent in the futures transactions 
followed by swaps and then forwards are balanced against the increase of the basis 
risk offered by the futures transactions vis-à-vis the more tailored swaps and 
forwards in forming the optimal risk transfer strategy.  
 
The discussion in this section thus far has focused on the forward-based contracts, 




swaps. The remainder of this section will concentrate on the examination of the 
option-based contracts, as the second form of derivative instruments, with the 
aspiration that this should provide a more complete picture of the derivative markets. 
 
The option contract is the foundation of all the option-based instruments, which can 
include very sophisticated derivative strategies
82
 that are more innovative than those 
offered by forward-based contracts. The sophistication of the option strategies, and 
the concomitant growth in options trading, were an outcome of the Black-Scholes-
Merton mathematical modelling that was developed in 1973 in papers by Black and 
Scholes as well as Merton (Black & Myron, 1973; Merton, 1973) in addition to the 




There are essentially two types of options: the call option and the put option.  A call 
option gives the holder the right to buy a specific underlying variable by or at a 
certain date (depending on the nature of the option
84
) at a pre-determined price.  The 
put option, on the other hand, gives the holder the right to sell a specific underlying 
variable by or at a certain date at a pre-determined price.  Notably, the right by the 
holder of the option is not an obligation from his/her part to “exercise” the option.  
This is in contrast to the obligation by the writer of the option to honour the right of 
the holder to exercise the option in the framework that is stipulated in the contract 
(maturity, exercise price, underlying asset, etc.).  In return for the rights contained in 
the option contract, the holder of the option pays a premium to the option writer as a 
form of compensation for the risk exposure.   
 
Thus, as can be apparent, the option contract is, for many reasons, fundamentally 
different from the forward-based contracts outlined earlier.  First, while the 
obligations in the forward-based contracts are mutual, the responsibility for 
performance in the option contract rests solely with the option writer.  This supplants 
the nature of the mutual risk transfer, and shared asset/liability classification, that is 
present between the counterparties in forward-based contracts. Second, entrance into 
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a forward-based contract is cost-less for the counterparties (except maybe the cost of 
the margin account for the futures market and the collateral in swaps and forward 
markets), the commencement of an option contract, however, entails an explicit fee 
payment from the option holder to the option writer.   
 
Third, whereas the hedging strategies of the forward-based instruments are linear in 
nature in that these instruments, for the most part, exactly offset market risk 
exposures, the option instruments are non-linear in that they eliminate exposure to 
adverse market movements all the while allowing the option holder to benefit from 
favourable ones. In essence, option contracts are more akin to insurance than true 
hedging because their value to the holder, after the payment of the premium, is either 
positive or zero. However, it should also be noted that the asymmetry in the payoff 
for options can be quite dramatic in that the buyer (seller) of the option chooses the 
certainty of the loss (gain) of the premium over the potentially unlimited gain (loss) 
in the value of the contract. 
 
Aside from the contractual differences, the option contract offers a much different 
pricing and valuation structure than the one presented earlier under the various 
forward-based contracts. Essentially, the valuation of an option as per the Merton-
Scholes model is dependent on: 1) The market price of the underlying variable, 2) 
The exercise price of the option, 3) Time to expiration of the option, 4) The volatility 
of the market price of the underlying variable, and 5) The base rate over the life of 
the option (G30, 1993).  
 
From these factors, two sets of values materialize in the valuation of option 
instruments: the intrinsic value and the time value. The intrinsic value of an option to 
its holder is the greater of either zero (if a negative value) or the difference between 
the market price and the exercise price (if a positive value). The time value is any 
premium that the market adds to the value of the option that is greater than the 
intrinsic value.  This premium is greatly affected by the time to maturity and the 
volatility in the market price of the underlying asset. In effect, the longer the time to 




(and vice versa).  Thus, as time passes, and if the price of the underlying variable 
remains relatively constant, the only way that the value of the option remains 
constant or increase is by way of an increase in volatility in the price of the 
underlying.   
 
Thus, one may discern that, apart from the non-linearity and the asymmetry of the 
payoff of the hedging functionality, the actual pricing of the options poses challenges 
to its effective use in the risk management sphere.  These challenges revolve around 
the valuation of the option that is to be used and its effectiveness in offsetting the 
adverse market risk movements affecting the actual exposure to the underlying asset.  
For while the relationship between the valuation of the forward-based derivatives and 
the price of the underlying asset is relatively constant throughout the duration of the 
contract, such a case is not apparent with options which are considerably affected by 
the factors stated earlier, not the least of which is volatility.    
 
Eventually, the utilization of options in a hedging strategy requires a much more 
dynamic risk transfer approach that is continuously adjusted in a process named 
“delta hedging.”  This process, which seeks to ensure a fairly perfect hedge, entails 
the continual adjustment of the hedging position to account for the effects that time 
and volatility (along with stochastic interest rates) exert on the value of the option.
85
 
This, of course, imposes the need for constant monitoring and analysis by the hedger 
along with the necessary transaction costs to implement the required changes. 
 
The previous discussion on the utilization of options demonstrated serious issues 
(maybe even shortcomings) with their usage in pure hedging scenarios, especially 
when compared with the linearity and relative certainty of the payoffs of forward-
based contracts along with the simplicity of their utilization for market risk 
management. In effect, the unique nature of the forward-based contracts endows it 
                                                          
85
 The time decay, volatility, and interest rates are called theta risk, vega risk, and rho risk, 
respectively.  Theta risk is the exposure to a change in the value of the portfolio to the passage of time. 
Vega risk is the change in the value of the portfolio to the change in expected volatility of the price of 
the underlying asset. Rho risk is the exposure to the change in the value of the portfolio to a change in 




with a form of risk sharing between the counterparties rather than a one-way system 
that is based on a right to one party and one obligation by another. 
 
Moreover, the importance of volatility in the pricing of options have arguably 
imposed negative systemic implications in that it provides an incentive to the 
financial markets to generate profits from option-based strategies through 
manipulating volatility.  This was elucidated in a 2003 speech by Gertrude Tumpel-
Gugerell, the ex-member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, with 
her statement that volatility is:  
“[A] tradable market instrument in itself. On one hand, we can measure and estimate 
volatility and in doing so affect the value of that volatility. On the other hand, we 
can buy, or sell, volatility, and by doing so clearly affect its value.  This volatility 
trading is carried out by means of dynamic trading strategies involving options, 
mainly plain vanilla calls and puts, but increasingly also more complex option 





From the foregoing analysis, it can be construed that one would have an easier task 
defending the market risk hedging argumentation by way of the utilization of 
forward-based derivative instruments (i.e., linear risk and return payoffs) than their 
option-based counterparts because of the undeniable speculative characteristics of the 
option-based strategies, even if they are used for hedging. This is, despite claims to 
the contrary in some of the Islamic finance literature (Kamali, 2000b, pp. 181-182; 




To be sure, it has been contended that there are situations (e.g., contingent liabilities) 
in which options are most effective in hedging such as in, for example, the usage of 
options by contractors to hedge currency and commodity exposures as part of a 
bidding process (Bacha, 1999, p. 8) or by farmers who are eager to hedge both the 
price and quantity of their production (Al-Amine, 2008, p. 201).   
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However, while these contentions are true to some extent, it is also apparent that 
there is a form of speculation in their usage. In effect, for the bidding argument, the 
pure hedging assertions begin to weaken with the potential combination of a refused 
bid and a favourable value of the option position (i.e., in-the-money). As for hedging 
both the price and quantity, apart from the importance of assuming core risks (in this 
case the quantity of crops by the farmer), as discussed in the previous chapter, it is 
not evident how would a favourable price movement and a high yielding crop season 
would factor into a pure hedging strategy using options.  
 
In effect, if one concedes that the usage of derivatives in hedging contexts is 
undertaken in matters relating to an insurable interest by the hedging party wherein 
the derivative instrument provides indemnity to any sustained losses, then as stated 
by Culp: “The requirement of that the hedger has an insurable interest means by 
definition, that the net [sic] of the indemnity contract and the natural position of the 




This chapter delved into the economics of the derivative contracts and the 
technicalities of their usage in the financial markets with a particular focus on 
hedging transactions. The significance of this discussion, and the greater 
understanding that it is trying to elicit, will become apparent in the coming chapters 
not the least of which the next one that concentrates on the conceptualization of 
derivatives in the Islamic finance industry by the Shari’a scholars and academics, 
which, in turn, played a major role in instigating a movement of superficial 
replication by market participants.  
 
Suffice it to note at this stage that this chapter demonstrated that derivative 
instruments, by virtue of the law of one price and the theory of arbitrage, are an 
effective means to lessen Gharar (excessive uncertainty) in the financial markets in 
that they, when used as tools for risk transfer, reduce the uncertainties of future 





Further, and with a particular reference to the prohibition of Riba, it has been shown 
that derivative transactions are not debt transactions with a unique debtor-creditor 
relationship.  In fact, derivative contracts cannot serve the financing needs of any 
party since they do not provide funding at contract initiation. Essentially, they are a 
complement to financing (including operational arrangements) to make it more 
effective and efficient for the parties involved.  
 
As for the interest component in the pricing of these instruments, it has been also 
shown that the interest rates are not used in a usury context in the credit markets; 
rather, much like the utilization of LIBOR for Ijara (leasing) financing in Islamic 
finance, they are used for pricing to account for the preferences (e.g., liquidity, 
among others) of economic agents as well as a benchmark for the uncertainty 
(including inflation uncertainty) associated with the holding period of these financial 
instruments.  
 
In terms of the potential usage of derivative contracts in the Islamic finance industry 
as investment instruments by parties seeking to speculate on market movements, it is 
contended that this is a complex subject due to the state of the Islamic finance 
industry itself as well as the multifarious nature of the effects of these instruments on 
economic growth, in general, and the stability of financial markets, in particular.
88
 
With that, it should be stated that the interviews with the respondents show that the 
majority of respondents, across all groups, expressing an opinion on the utilization of 
derivatives for investment purposes were sceptical, if not outright apprehensive, of 
the idea of using derivatives as investment vehicles due to its perceived proximity to 
Maysir.  
 
That said, a more complete analysis on the permissibility of derivative instruments as 
investment vehicles may be warranted, but is nonetheless outside the scope of the 
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current discussion that is focused on their usage in the context of proactive, 
prudential measures in a wider market risk management framework. In fact, if 
anything, it is important to realize that the usage of derivatives in the context of 
hedging (e.g., immunization) is actually the reverse of Maysir in that the institutions 
facing exogenous non-core market risks are choosing to not “play the market” and 
are instead following a more disciplined approach that centres on core competencies 
and risks. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, there are some facets of this issue that will be partly 
covered in the Hedging, Maysir, and Derivatives Chapter (Chapter 8), which can be 
of value in forming the basis for a future exploration of derivatives as investment 
products.  The discussion in the nature of the underlying assets of the derivative 
contracts, particularly interest rates and currency, as part of The Permissibility of the 
Underlying Variables and the Recognition of the Contract Chapter (Chapter 7), can 
also be of value in the wider debate.  
 
It is perhaps appropriate at this juncture to also state that the focus (although not 
exclusive) in the remaining chapters will be on the forward-based derivative 
instruments due to their more amenable utilization as contracts in a hedging context 
without the controversial charges of speculation that has often circulated with their 
usage.  Essentially, while it is acknowledged that options contracts can be used for 
risk management, the nature of their payoff structure (i.e., non-linear) does make the 
argumentation for the acceptability of their usage in Islamic finance exclusively as 
hedging instruments more challenging. 
 
Apart from the issue of permissibility, it is recognized, from the foregoing 
discussion, that there are some aspects in the derivative markets that merit reform 
and innovation.  These range from contractual changes to further reduce uncertainty 
and reduce costs to institutional transformations that should seek to increase 
regulation as a way to reduce the harmful effects of the derivative markets.  These 
will be alluded to in the coming chapters and will hopefully make their way to the 




the case in the Maqasid Al Shari’a (Objectives of Islamic Jurisprudence), is to 
increase human welfare through the stable and sustainable growth in wealth.   
 
However, it needs to be emphasized here that the pursuit for the realization of the 
Maqasid Al Shari’a in commercial matters is invariably linked to economic theory as 
an active part, alongside the juridical and legal theories, in the process of contextual 
conceptualization of the discourse that surrounds derivative instruments. In effect, it 
should to be acknowledged, to a greater extent than is currently observed, that the 
significance of the economics can only be evident by the wealth of Ahadith that have 
economic content.   
 
Interestingly, these Ahadith have shown repeatedly the flexibility of the Prophet 
(PBUH) in the face of the real commercial challenges that confronted the Muslim 
population (e.g., allowing Salam financing).  This realization is important as one 
proceeds to the coming chapters that will examine the wide array of issues, 
collectively and individually, that surround market risk management in Islamic 









The previous two chapters discussed the topics of market risk management and the 
utilization of derivatives as hedging instruments in conventional finance in order to 
assist in the efficient transfer of these risks (and returns) between economic agents. It 
has been argued that hedging, in general, not only reduces the possibility of financial 
distress and its associated costs, but also serves to assist in the creation of an 
enabling environment for capitalizing on growth opportunities in competitive 
markets as well as potentially reducing the tax costs of businesses.  
 
In this chapter, the research moves more prominently to Islamic finance with the 
detailed examination of the prohibitive resolutions elaborated by the three leading 
standard-setting bodies in Islamic jurisprudence (i.e., Makkah-based Islamic Fiqh 
Academy, Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, and AAOIFI) in addition to the 
contributions of the various Shari’a scholars on the topic of derivatives. Moreover, it 
is perhaps important to highlight the widening acknowledgment of the significance 
of these instruments by industry participants and commentators in the past few years, 
especially with the prospective growth of the Islamic finance industry (Al-Amine, 
2008; Bacha, 1999; Dusuki, 2009; El-Gari, 1993; Jobst, 2007, p. 2; Kamali, 2000a; 
Khan & Ahmed, 2001, p. 137; Moody's, 2010 p. 1). This was also confirmed by the 
views of many respondents from all the four groups.  
 
Consequently, the contemporary market risk management practices by Islamic 
institutions will be explored in a manner that mixes the resolutions of the standard-
setting bodies and opinions circulating in the Islamic finance literature as well as 
those of the respondents.  Furthermore, the relevant elements of the discussion on 
market risk management and the economics of derivatives as outlined in the previous 
chapters will also be examined in light of the forgoing exploration. Finally, a 




within the context of the Islamic theories that allow for flexibility in the setting of 
Shari’a directives. 
 
Section I: Resolutions by Standard-Setting Bodies in Islamic 
Jurisprudence  
 
The discourse into the utilization of derivatives in Islamic finance effectively 
commenced with the debate on the view of the Shari’a regarding contemporary 
security and commodity markets (i.e., financial markets) by the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy of Makkah in its Seventh Session in January, 1984. In its resolution on the 
subject matter
89
, the Academy noted the benefits of the financial markets in 
promoting Maslaha (public interest) by providing a permanent forum for buyers and 
sellers of securities and commodities to transact within the framework of supply and 
demand. Interestingly, the benefits highlighted were exclusively focused on the cash 
markets in the realm of investments without any reference to the original purpose of 
the derivative markets, which is risk management.  
 
However, the derivative contracts were explicitly mentioned as part of the negatives, 
which according to the Academy,
90
 were: 1) The contracts in the derivative markets 
are not “real” transactions in that the parties involved do not transfer the actual 
underlying assets (i.e., delivery and receipt); 2) The seller is mostly selling what they 
do not own to another party in the future with the payment exchanged at that date, 
which is in contrast to Salam contracts that require upfront payment (see below); 3) 
The derivative contracts, which entail an artificial exchange, are sold and resold 
many times until maturity to many parties with the sole objective being the gambling 
on price differentials; and 4) The derivative markets serve the purpose of the large 
traders at the expense of small traders, mainly by spreading rumours and market 
manipulations, resulting in wealth destruction and economic crises.  
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In the latter part of the resolution, the Academy did acknowledge that the benefits 
and negatives of the financial markets co-exist in a manner that makes it difficult to 
provide a general ruling, but rather each type of transaction should be given a 
specific ruling.  Surprisingly and notwithstanding this acknowledgement, the 
Academy proceeded with the following general resolution that pertains to derivative 
transactions: 1) Cash market contracts whereby the goods are owned by the seller 
and is transacted on a spot basis are allowed, with the exception being the Salam 
contracts for forward sales in which the payment is completed on the spot and 
delivery is stipulated at a forward date with no third party selling in the interim 
period; 2) Any spot or forward transactions involving bonds with interest are 
disallowed due to the prohibition on Riba; and 3) All forward contracts that have an 
underlying asset that is not owned by the seller is not permitted.  
 
The Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy,
91
 an equally powerful standard-
setting body in the Islamic finance industry, for its part, examined the derivative 
instruments as part of its discussion regarding the Financial Markets in its Seventh 
Session in May, 1992. Prior to outlining its Resolution No. 63/1/7 on the subject 
matter, it may be necessary to survey the research papers by some of the renowned 
Islamic jurists that shaped the final decision by the Academy.  
 
Of the seven research papers, six of them were mainly focused on options and appear 
to be in response to eight specific questions by the Academy to the Islamic jurists.  
These questions were: 1) Is the option contract a known Islamic contract or is it a 
new type of contract? Moreover, if it is a new contract, what is the Shari’a opinion 
on its permissibility? 2) What is the relationship between the option contract and 
other contracts such as Urbun (earnest money), pre-specified asset sale, Salam, and 
gifting? 3) What is the Shari’a opinion regarding charging a premium by the seller 
for granting a purchase right to the buyer? 4) Can a simple right to the underlying be 
the object of the contract? 5) If these contracts are exchanged within the framework 
of an exchange that guarantees performance, what is the Shari’a opinion on its role 
and the actual guarantee? 6) Can a put option be sold or is it a sale of an asset that is 
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not owned by the seller despite its presence in the market? 7) Can the option contract 
be considered as a type of purchase stipulation (Khiyar Al-Shart), which would 
render it a permissible contract? and 8) If the contract is not permissible, in whole or 
in part, how can it be altered in order to make it permissible? (OIC, 1992, pp. 280-
281). 
 
The communication of these questions by the Academy, which appear to be partly 
based on the aforementioned resolution by the Makkah-based Academy, to the 
Islamic jurists is significant in that it not only pre-emptively influenced the direction 
of the submitted research papers, but also shaped the discourse that was to follow in 
the Academy and beyond. The last question, particularly, was quite important in 
providing the juridical foundation, by way of Qiyas (analogical reasoning), for the 
partaking of financial engineering by market participants in the years that following 
the resolution with the objective of finding a Shari’a-compliant hedging instrument.  
 
The six research papers on options (Al-Ikhtiyarat) concluded that these contracts, 
which were acknowledged as being new forms of contracts unlike any other pre-
modern Islamic era ones (e.g., Salam, Urbun, Khiyar Al-Shart, etc.), were 
impermissible in Islamic jurisprudence. Specifically, the rather consistent findings 
echoed those of the Makkah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy in that it was stated that 
options should be prohibited because of: 1) The lack of ownership of the underlying 
asset by the transacting parties; 2) The sale of a non-existent underlying asset at the 
time of the contract; 3) The transacting in a contract that is independent of the 
underlying asset; 4) The partaking in gambling behaviour by market participants by 
way of those contracts; 5) The prohibition of the transfer of these contracts to third 
parties; and 6) The lack of delivery and receipt by the transacting parties (OIC, 1992, 
pp. 73-339).  
 
The sole research paper on the forward-based contracts was one on futures by Justice 
Usmani
92
, also the Chairman of the AAOIFI Shari’a Board (OIC, 1992, pp. 341-
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who has famously stated in a paper at the World Economic Forum Annual 
Meeting in 2010:  
“When we speak of Islamic Finance or Islamic economic principles, it is generally 
assumed that these principles are emphasized by Muslim scholars only to satisfy the 
religious requirement of Muslims, or that they are meant only for Muslims to the 
exclusion of all others. This is an incorrect assumption. Although Islam is basically 
represented by a set of beliefs, the benefits of its social, political and economic 
principles are not restricted to Muslims; they are meant for the common good of 
humanity at large” (Usmani, 2010, p. 3). 
 
In his analysis of the futures markets, Justice Usmani advanced the position that the 
parties transacting in the forward-based derivatives are either speculators seeking to 
gamble on price differentials in the underlying assets or hedgers seeking to 
monopolize an asset to increase their profit margins (OIC, 1992, p. 354). Further, he 
asserted that the trading in the forward-based contracts is unlike the Salam contracts 
and is more akin to “the sale of one debt for another” (Bay’ Al-Kali’ Bil-Kali’), 
which was reported to have been prohibited by the Prophet (PBUH). Finally, Justice 
Usmani raised the issue of ownership of the underlying asset that was posed earlier 
by the Islamic jurists examining the option contracts.  Consequently, the final 
opinion, for him, was that these contracts should not be allowed to take part in the 
Islamic finance industry.  
 
This prohibitive opinion was elaborated further by Justice Usmani in later 
discussions on the subject matter in which he maintained that these transactions are 
invalid because: 1) Sales and purchases cannot be affected for a future date; 2) 
Delivery is not intended and consequently settlement occurs by price differentials 
only; 3) Even if delivery is intended, the seller does not have full control over the 
underlying asset which can be a form of deceit to the buyer; and 4) The transactions 
are tied together, which is prohibited in Islamic jurisprudence (Usmani, 1999, 2010). 
Eventually, and once more, he declared these transactions as being “totally 
impermissible regardless of their subject matter. Similarly, it makes no difference 
whether these contracts are entered into for the purpose of speculation or for the 





To return to the ruling by the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, Resolution 
No. 63/1/7 stated the following: For options, “[o]ption contracts as currently applied 
in the world financial markets are new types of contracts which do not come under 
any one of the Shari’a nominate contracts. Since the object of the contract is neither 
a sum of money nor a utility or a financial right which may be waived, then the 
contract is not permissible in Shari’a. As these contracts are primarily prohibited, 
their handling is also prohibited” (IRTI, 2000, p. 131).  
 
As for forward-based contracts, “[t]his contract is not permissible because of the 
deferment of the two elements of the exchange. It may be amended to meet the well-
known conditions of „salam‟ (advance payment). If does so [sic], it shall be 
permissible. Moreover, it is not permissible to sell a merchandise purchased under 
„salam‟ terms with advance payment, unless the merchandise has been received” 
(IRTI, 2000, p. 132). Further, in regards to the futures contract settlement by entering 
into an opposing transaction, the Academy decided that “it is not permissible at all” 
(IRTI, 2000, p. 133).   
 
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI), as the third main standard-setting body in Islamic finance, appears to 
have not deliberated the usage of derivatives by Islamic institutions at any sufficient 
extent as evidenced by the lack of any Shari’a Standards on this issue.  This could 
have been due to the belief that this issue was examined at length by the Makkah and 
Jeddah-based Islamic Fiqh Academies and that the aforementioned analysis was 
deemed thorough and correct in its assumptions and conclusions.   
 
Alternatively, the decision of avoiding to refer to derivative instruments may have 
possibly had its roots in the elaboration of prohibitive opinions regarding the 
utilization of interest rate benchmarks and currencies for speculation or risk 
management purposes (see next chapter).  The eventual outcome was that this 
institution has chosen excluded itself from the discourse on the subject matter despite 
being in a superior, and indispensable, position to closely interact with both the 




understanding of the challenges being faced by contemporary business and financial 
environments with a focus on financial reporting. 
 
Prior to delving into the Shari’a issues that were outlined earlier by the standard-
setting bodies, it is important to take note of the explicit prohibition of any form of 
hedging through forward-based derivative instruments by Justice Usmani which 
eventually contributed to their broad rejection by the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh 
Academy, and also presumably led to the decision by AAOIFI to ignore derivatives 
all together. In effect, if the argument was simply regarding the fear of engaging in 
pure gambling and its effects on global financial stability, the issue would have been 
understandable, and to a certain extent manageable, even if one disagrees with the 
generalization.  
 
Apart from the gambling behaviour, it is rather surprising that such a strong 
conviction was demonstrated by these standard-setting institutions regarding an 
instrument that has been acknowledged by all their Islamic jurists and their 
Resolutions as being “new type of contracts” without specific proscriptions in the 
scripture, which takes it out of the purview of Qiyas with pre-modern contractual 
forms as a source for the analogy. In other words, it does not appear that the 
discourse on these instruments in the juridical sphere gave adequate consideration as 
to: 1) Whether or not derivatives are beneficial to society? and 2) if they are found 
beneficial in some respects and detrimental in others (increased competitiveness and 
reduction in probability of bankruptcy due to hedging vis-à-vis global financial 
instability due to excessive pure gambling), how should they be handled and 
regulated?   
 
Essentially, the work of Al-Ghazali (1993) on the five essential elements (Al-
Durariyat Al-Khamsa) in his Al-Mustafa Min Ilm Al-Usul, especially in regards to 
the protection of wealth (Mal), and those of Al-Razi and Al-Qarafi on the same 




(Hassan, 1994) and Daroura (Abu Sulayman, 2003)
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, along with an open dialogue 
with the industry‟s stakeholders in a more inclusive discourse process, would have 
undoubtedly been of value to arrive at more thorough findings.  This is especially 
true in the widely recognized disparity between the religious perceptions of Islamic 
finance by the Shari’a scholarly community and the real challenges facing 
institutions in the contemporary business and financial environments (Al-Amine, 
2008; Bacha, 1999, 2004b; El-Gari, 1993; Jobst, 2007; Kamali, 2000a; Moody's, 
2010 ; Obaidullah, 1998). The disparity, in turn, was evident in the ambiguity that 
was manifested by the divergent opinions within and across the four groups of 
respondents in regards to these instruments.  
 
Notwithstanding the perplexing and arguably religiously unsupported opinions (see 
below) regarding the prohibition of derivative hedging transactions, it is appropriate 
at this stage to explore the issues that were outlined earlier as the basis for the 
prohibition of derivative instruments by the three standard-setting bodies. These 
issues can be divided into four groups: The first group contains theoretical Shari’a 
issues; the second group comprises contractual Shari’a issues; the third group, which 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, is related to the nature of the 
underlying asset with particular reference to derivatives tied to currencies and 
interest rates; and the fourth, and final group, which will be explored in the following 
chapter, entails the examination of the charges of Maysir (gambling) that were 
deemed to be integral to the derivative markets, in a wider context that includes 
financial intermediaries. 
Section II: Theoretical Shari’a Issues 
 
The theoretical Shari’a issues that have led to a prohibitive stance regarding the 
derivative hedging instruments revolve around two main points which, in addition to 
the literature, were corroborated by some of the respondents in the interviews 
(particularly in the academics, Shari’a scholars, and legal experts group).  The first 
point is related to the supposed exchange of debts by the counterparties in a 
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derivative transaction that is akin to the prohibition on Bay’ Al-Kali’ Bil-Kali’ (sale 
of one debt for another) which was deemed prohibited in Islamic jurisprudence. The 
second point, for its part, focuses on the possession and ownership of assets that are 
inexistent at the time of the transaction as well as the small prospects of effective 
delivery at maturity, the sum of which is thought to render these contracts as not 
being true and genuine.   
 
For the first point, its basis, which led to the proscription of derivative instruments, is 
connected to a Hadith by the Prophet (PBUH) that was reported by Ibn Umar in 
which the Prophet (PBUH) forbade Bay’ Al-Kali’ Bil-Kali’ (Al-Suwailem, 2001, pp. 
16-17). The authenticity of this Hadith has been a point of contention between 
Shari’a scholars (Al-Amine, 2008; Al-Masri, 1991; Al-Suwailem, 2001; Hammad, 
1986; Kamali, 2007) over the years with the arguable outcome that its penetration 
into Islamic jurisprudence has less to do with the actual Hadith and more with the 
Igma’a (consensus) among the various Shari’a scholars of the impermissibility of the 
sale of one debt for another.  Effectively, it can be discerned that the consensus view 
among the Shari’a scholars was formulated mainly due to the explicit prohibition of 
Riba as well as the fear of the emergence of societal discord if the debt contracts 
were not fulfilled, especially if the circle of participation was extended to multiple 
third parties by exchanging debt contracts.  
 
To be certain, these viewpoints can be characterized as being quite valid in usurious 
situations where a debtor, unable to pay a particular debt on its due date, asks (or is 
forced by) the creditor to buy his old debt for another one that is much higher (in 
absolute and percentage terms) to be settled at a later date.
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  Another contentious 
situation can arise whereby a creditor sells his rights over a particular debt to a third 
party that may be in a separate disagreement with the debtor causing conflict 
between all the parties. Needless to say, this last example can have, in addition to 
Riba, forms of Gharar if the debt itself is in dispute.  
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Apart from these scenarios, it is difficult to economically rationalize some of the 
arguments that seek to extend the prohibition of Bay’ Al-Kali’ Bil-Kali’ to any 
future-centred transaction, such as in the derivative markets, on the grounds that they 
amount to the sale of one debt for another. This is especially true in an industry that 
has accepted the existence of Salam (forward sale), Istisna’a (commission to 
manufacture), and Hawala (debt transfer), which can all be characterized as being 
types of future-centred commercial transactions.
95
 In fact, within the context of the 
clear preference for spot transactions in the currency markets in contemporary 
Islamic jurisprudence, a contention can be made that in modern settings that the spot 
trading of currencies, if one wants to take the interpretations of the scripture to their 
literal ends, is partaking in Bay’ Al-Kali’ Bil-Kali’ (sale of one debt for another) 
since any currency, after the fall of the Bretton Woods monetary system, is simply a 
form of debt backed by the “faith and credit” of the issuing authority. In sum, 
contextualization does matter. 
 
Moreover, it is evident that the examination of these instruments in the previous 
chapter should not have led to any comparisons between derivatives and debt, as is 
often done in Islamic finance circles and in comments by some of the respondents, 
especially when one examines the forward-based contracts.  As outlined earlier, these 
are a compliment, not a substitute, to the credit markets in that they are not funding 
transactions, as such, since there is no exchange of principle.
96
 Further, the forward-
based derivatives examined offer no static and party-unique asset/liability exposure; 
in fact, in some transactions there is an asymmetry in the default risk exposure in that 
this type of risk is theoretically different for the counterparties at different points of 
time until maturity (i.e., early vs. late exposure in interest rate swaps). 
 
The prohibition of derivative instruments because they facilitate the trading of debt 
could be discerned to also likely be a result of the unawareness of the technicalities 
of the forward-based derivative markets rather than a true resemblance between debt 
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and derivatives in the context of the proscription of Riba. For besides the fact that 
these derivatives are not debt instruments as stated earlier, forward-based derivatives 
themselves are not tradable financial instruments because they traditionally don‟t 
have “rights of assignment” that facilitate their exchange in the secondary market 
(Marshall & Kapner, 1993). A counterparty that is seeking to exit from a forward or 
a swap agreement can only negotiate for the cancellation of the agreement directly 
with the counterparty whereby the replacement value is used as the basis for the 
negotiation. For futures, the cancellation is undertaken with the exchange based on 
the daily mark-to-market nature of exchange-based derivative contracts.  
 
Interestingly, when one observes the essence of the rules on Maqassah (clearance) in 
Islamic jurisprudence, which is defined as “mutual cancellation or compensation” 
(Al-Zuhayli & El-Gamal, 2003, p. 285), it may become apparent that the substantive 
rationale for the regulations placed in regards to the clearance of exposures by the 
counterparties are also related to the perception that clearance will lead to debt and 
Riba (Al-Zuhayli & El-Gamal, 2003, pp. 285-289). In fact, if anything, in the 
AAOIFI Shari’a Standard No. 4 (“Settlement of Debts by Set-off”), once the 
usurious debt aspect is removed, it generally follows the market norms for settlement 
of forward-based derivatives (AAOIFI, 2010, pp. 47-49).  
 
This, of course, is notwithstanding the ambiguous statement: “The currency swaps 
that are concluded on the basis of Riba are not permissible. This is because in this 
process it is the interest-based securities that are set-off against interest-based 
securities” (AAOIFI, 2010, p. 49).  Notably, the above statement is considered 
ambiguous because all financial assets are associated with interest in one way or 
another (e.g., pricing), including Islamic financial assets. Furthermore, some in the 
practitioner group of respondents have confirmed that the yield curve based NPV 
pricing is the basis for the mark-to-market recognition in the Islamic finance 
industry. 
 
Options, for their part, which also do not have any semblance to debt financing 




traded by their purchasers to third parties. That said, if the issue was in the tradability 
of these instruments to third parties, the options could have simply been declared 
untradeable by the Islamic jurists. As for the static asset - liability structure (even in 
the prospective “out of the money” situations) for the buyer and sellers of these 
instruments, it is not evident that this framework amounts to a creditor – debtor in a 
classical sense, and even if it were viewed as such by the Islamic jurists, the 
generalization to all derivatives (i.e., including forward-based derivatives) is clearly 
an over-reach. 
 
In addition, there is little economic substance to the claims that all derivatives 
increase Gharar.  In fact, everything that was presented in the previous chapter 
should have demonstrated that derivatives, in a hedging context, are tools that 
actually reduce Gharar. The details of the contracts are unambiguously 
predetermined and are either negotiated between the parties or set by the derivatives 
exchange. Further, it is not exactly apparent how the forward-type contracts increases 
Gharar through the augmentation in the risk of default, either in economic theory or 
through empirical evidence, as argued by Al-Suwailem (Al-Suwailem, 2001, p. 61), 
as opposed to, say, the Salam or Istisna’a contracts. Thus, it can be validly argued 
that the only uncertainty in the derivative markets is regarding the future movements 
of the prices of the underlying asset, which for true hedgers are reduced with the 
proper utilization of derivative instruments (i.e., exposure offset).  
 
Actually, as mentioned earlier, the ability of the counterparties to negotiate the 
dissolution of the contract based on the replacement cost, besides the flexibility 
offered, is quite transparent and relatively Gharar-free and is in stark contrast to the 
usurious relationships in some credit markets.  Thus, for all intents and purposes, it 
can be proclaimed that derivatives are a powerful tool for the reduction of market 
risks and Gharar in a debt-free environment.   
 
Having said that, if, on the other hand, the issue is the belief that Gharar (excessive 
uncertainty) is a part of Maysir (gambling) and should therefore be prohibited on 




Bay’ Al-Kali’ Bil-Kali’ (or the debate on the other theoretical issues as will be 
outlined below for that matter) and should be taken up in the discourse on gambling 
using financial instruments with the prospect for some type of regulations to ensure 
that these instruments are not used in gambling contexts.  
 
The second main point that have led to the proscription of derivative instruments by 
the Islamic jurists starts with that state of existence of the underlying assets at the 
time of the contract and continues to the nature of the possession as well as 
constructive ownership and finally to delivery from the seller to the buyer as a means 
to conclude the transaction. For this, it is acknowledged by all parties to the 
discourse in the literature and the four groups in the interviews (both for and against 
derivative instruments) that the nature of derivatives is: a.) Transacting for the 
purchase/sale of assets that will come into existence at a specific time in the future, 
and b.) Transacting in an asset that is not actually owned or possessed by the parties 




As for delivery, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, the delivery of the 
underlying asset may not actually take place since the hedging parties seek primarily 
to reduce their market risk exposure within their current operational framework (i.e., 
suppliers, supply chain, etc.). This practice of hedging was acknowledged, in fact, by 
Al-Suwailem (a notable critic of derivatives) in that he states: “This clearly shows 
that the primary objective of a forward is hedging not physical exchange” (Al-
Suwailem, 1999, p. 84). 
 
In regards to the juridical basis for the requirement of the underlying asset‟s 
existence at the time of sale, it is reported that the Prophet (PBUH) has prohibited the 
sale of some inexistent subject matter such as the unborn calf of an animal, milk in 
the udders of a cow, fruit on a tree before its appearance, among others (Al-
Islambouly, 2003; Kamali, 2000a).  
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In terms of the issue of the actual asset ownership and possession, three Ahadith that 
have been quoted on this matter; in the first Hadith it was reported by Hakim Ibn 
Hizam that he asked the Prophet (PBUH): “A man comes to me and asks me to sell 
him something that I do not have. Should I sell it to him and then go and acquire it 
for him from the marketplace?” The Prophet (PBUH) replied: “Do not sell what is 
not with you?” (Sunan Al-Tirmidhi). A second Hadith stated that the Prophet 
(PBUH) said: “He who buys foodstuff should not resell it until he is satisfied with its 
measurement” (Sahih Al-Bukhari). The third Hadith that has been deemed to be 
related to ownership is: “Profits are justified for the one bearing the liability for 
losses” (Al-Kharaj Bi Al-Dhaman) (El-Gamal, 2006, p. 145; Obaidullah, 2005, p. 
28), which was viewed by Al-Suwailem as directly referencing ownership (Al-
Suwailem, 2007, p. 63).  
 
The aforementioned Ahadith resulted in quite a large, and diverse, body of literature 
over the past centuries from all schools of thought as to how to apply them in the 
commercial affairs of Muslims.  One contentious matter was whether the 
interpretation of the Ahadith stresses ownership or just simply possession?  Other 
questions included: How would an exposure in a contemporary setting to, say, 
market risks where there is no ownership or possession of a future underlying asset, 
fit into Islamic jurisprudence? Does the object of sale under the purview of these 
Ahadith include all assets underlying any transaction or just foodstuff (with specific 
reference to particular foodstuff)? Also, would the nature of the asset itself (i.e., 
fungible goods vs. specific goods) alter the religious legal opinion? In addition, it 
appears that the deliverability of the underlying asset to the buyer was given 
importance in the course of an elaboration of a particular ruling (Al-Amine, 2008; 
Al-Qaradawi, 1987; Ibn Taymiyyah & Al-Qasim, 1978; Jundi, 1988; Kamali, 2000a, 
2007; Khan, 1988). 
 
Notwithstanding what can be described as an enormously juridical and technical 
debate, there seems to be a general consensus in the literature that the effective cause 
(„Illah) of the Ahadith is the avoidance of Gharar in commercial transactions (in 




certain extent Maysir.  Further, in examining the pertinent literature as well as in the 
views by some of the respondents (particularly in the academics, Shari’a scholars, 
and legal experts group), it can become clear that the focus that has manifested itself 
from the discourse is on prepayment and delivery as being the ultimate tests of the 
validity of the transaction from the viewpoint of Islamic jurisprudence.  
 
That is to say, there appears to be a wide belief among some commentators on the 
subject matter that in order to deliver an object of sale, it has to be existent as well as 
constructively owned and possessed. Alternatively, it has to abide by the rules of the 
anomalous Salam and Istisna’a contracts with prepayment as a centrepiece that 
legitimizes their existence as exceptions to the general cash market-natured rules of 
Islamic jurisprudence in commercial transactions.
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Interestingly, in light of the above observation, it may be contended that this 
tendency for the preference for spot delivery or prepayment is given paramount 
importance vis-à-vis what is arguably the true reason for the directive in Islamic 
jurisprudence in the first place which is the fulfilment of contracts as was explicitly 
mentioned the Quran where God stated: “O you who have believed, fulfil [all] 
contracts” (Quran: 5:1).   
 
In other words, while it is recognized that delivery is a form of fulfilling a particular 
set of commercial contracts, it is not the only way for all business or financial 
transaction to be fulfilled. For if the seller was unable to complete the sale as agreed 
with the buyer and returned the purchase price to them along with any costs incurred 
by the buyer in a manner that eliminated the prospect of “Akl Al-Mal bi Al-Batel” 
(misappropriating the property of others) and dispute, then there would be very little 
issues of Gharar or deceit that formed the basis for the prohibition in the Ahadith. 
This would be especially true if the market modalities and contractual terms were 
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detailed and agreed to prior to the effectiveness of the contract, as is currently 
practiced in the derivatives markets.   
 
In fact, one can argue that there is a greater chance of Gharar, deceit, and dispute by 
way of the prepayment characteristics of Salam (forward sale) and Istisna’a 
(commission to manufacture) contractual forms, in spite of their delivery 
stipulations, than in the derivative markets transactions that are based on pre-defined 
and widely-traded commodities.
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 That is to say, in these “Islamic” forward 
contracts, the unique objects (i.e., an agricultural product from a particular person‟s 
garden) are not only non-existent, but also neither owned nor possessed in tangible 
form and, as a result, have greater risks that are associated with deliverability in a 
manner that avoids dispute than the rather standardized and liquid underlying assets 
in the derivative markets.  
 
If, however, the asset underlying the Salam contract is easily procurable and 
standardized in the market, then one can argue, following the traditional conservative 
stance, that the ugly head of Maysir becomes an all-too-evident prospect since the 
prepayment can simply be considered a wager placed on the market price movements 
of the asset.  In this scenario, the liquidity, transportation, and carrying costs would 
effectively amount to transaction costs to be analysed vis-à-vis the potential profit.
100
 
True, speculation in the sphere of Salam would be limited in a manner that 
corresponds to availability of the underlying asset (i.e., not added levels of pure 
speculative bets); nevertheless, such a limitation can still be ensured in the realm of 
derivatives by constraining their usage to hedging real and legitimate market risk 
exposures (see next chapter). 
 
In terms of the matter raised earlier by Al-Suwailem, and other Shari’a scholars and 
academics (in the literature and interviews), regarding the interpretation of the 
liability of loss in the Hadith by the Prophet (PBUH) as being derived from 
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ownership, it can only be stated that it is not self-evident that the word “Al-Dhaman” 
unequivocally means ownership. In fact, if anything, Al-Dhaman, linguistically and 
economically, can be broadly related to legitimate exposure (which includes 
ownership, but not on an exclusive basis) than possession of the actual legal title. 
This was established in the detailed writings of Al-Zuhaily on the subject matter of 
Dhaman wherein he made it quite clear, in inspecting the Quran, Ahadith, and work 
of the Imams of the four Mazahib and their followers (including the venerable Al-
Ghazali), that the word and usage of Al-Dhaman is related to a commitment of 
responsibility (Al-Zuhayli, 1998).  
 
Al-Zarqa, for his part, demonstrated in his distinguished work on Islamic 
jurisprudence that the usage of Al-Kharaj Bi Al-Dhaman is associated with an 
(economic) exposure that one must be able to confront in order to legitimately derive 
profits (Al-Zarqa, 1998a, pp. 1035-1036). Once more, this can be related to actual 
ownership, but is not necessarily defined by it. To illustrate, in Arabic, when one 
states that they are the “Al-Dhamen” of someone else in paying their debt in case of 
default, it is understood that what is meant is that they are placing themselves in a 
position of exposure (i.e., the aforementioned possibility of loss) rather than 
ownership. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, even as one goes back to the history of the focus on 
ownership in the interpretation of the Hadith, it can become clear that this focus has 
originated from the desire by the Shari’a scholars, especially Abu Hanifa, to limit the 
debate on compensatory benefits to those who have legitimately acquired the rights 
associated with an object.  This was, in turn, conjectured to be invariably related to 
ownership (Al-Zuhayli, 1998, p. 214).   
 
Notably, this traditional position of Al-Dhaman is not a literal translation of the 
Hadith, but rather an extension in the interpretation. Moreover, the interpretive 
extension does add its own uncertainty when combined with the Shari’a views on the 
liabilities associated with the concept of Wa’ad (promise) wherein no ownership 





Thus, one can safely estimate that the root of this Hadith can be linked to the 
importance of the reduction of asymmetry of information in business transactions 
(which lead to Gharar, deceit, and dispute) as well as perhaps also the prohibition of 
Riba in Islam in that a usurious transaction entails a lender that is relying on the 
sanctity of the repayment of debt obligations in Islam (i.e., no Al-Dhaman or 
exposure of loss) to generate profits from the debtors.  
 
In a similar vein, within the realm of exposure, it should be recognized by the 
proponents of the full advance payment in derivative contracts (to make them similar 
to the Islamic forward-based contracts such as Salam, Istisna’a, etc.) that the forced 
application of this view, gambling issues aside, entails a higher degree of systemic 
risks than a system that is geared towards settlement of price differentials. Put 
differently, the credit risk of the full amount of exposure plus the counterparty risk of 
the market price differences will invariably be larger than the unique exposure to 
counterparty risks.  
 
Eventually, one may be able to discern that in the context of derivatives that the 
whole convoluted discourse on the details of existence of the object of sale as well as 
its ownership and possession and eventually delivery (in addition to the rules of the 
exceptional Salam and Istisna’a contracts) has less to do with legal contractual 
formalities that are based on the Gharar and deceit argumentation and more with the 
fear of engaging in gambling behaviour by way of fabricated and disingenuous 
transactions.   
 
This estimation presents itself clearly in that it has been stated repeatedly in the 
majority of the negative opinions on the permissibility of derivatives that since the 
parties concentrate on the cash settlement of differences in market prices at contract 
maturity then it must be a form of gambling.  Correspondently, in Al-Suwailem‟s 
view, the ownership of the underlying is the only legitimate means of having profit 




proprietorship, including exposure in future settings in a stand-alone fashion, can be 
ascribed to the realm of gambling (Al-Suwailem, 2006).  
 
With that, it becomes apparent that the tests of prepayment and delivery were 
formulated without the adequate recognition that these requirements simply add to 
the transaction costs (financial and operational) and legal uncertainty of true hedgers 
with only the prospect of reducing, and not eliminating, the gambling behaviour of 
the counterparties who are intent on speculating in the markets.  Ironically, pure 
gamblers are likely to ignore these contemporary Shari’a injunctions anyway and 
participate in the conventional derivative markets, thereby placing the burdens of 
these resolutions on the shoulders of true hedgers who strive to operate within the 
confines of Shari’a principles in real economic sectors.  
Section III: Contractual Shari’a Issues 
 
The resolution by the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, especially its last 
question addressed to the Islamic jurists wherein it was asked: “If the contract is not 
permissible, in whole or in part, how can it be altered in order to make it 
permissible?,” (OIC, 1992, pp. 280-281) captivated the imagination and 
argumentative spirit of Shari’a scholars, lawyers, and finance practitioners alike.  
Specifically, the repeated reference in that resolution to Urbun (earnest money) and 
Khiyar Al-Shart (contractual stipulations) in the discussions about options were 
deemed as an indication of the suggested boundaries in the discourse on these types 
of derivative contracts.  
 
In a similar vein, the continuous judgment of the forward-based derivative 
instruments in relation to Salam contracts instigated an exercise that attempted to not 
only redefine the Salam contract in a contemporary setting, but also to extend the 
reference of Salam to also include other pre-modern Islamic contracts such as 
Istisna’a, Bay’ Al-Mu’ajjal (ex-post payments for already delivered products), Bay’ 
Al-Istijrar (prepayment of delivery instalments), and even Murabaha (instalment 




1999; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007; Kamali, 2007; Khan, 1988; Khan, 1997; Moody's, 
2010 ; Obaidullah, 1998, 2005).
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Notably, this exercise was undertaken despite the fact that there were some 
commentators who attempted to stress that derivative contracts are quite novel to 
Islamic jurisprudence and should be evaluated based on their contemporary 
utilization in the financial markets (Abd Al-Qadir, 1982; Azzam, 1985; Kamali, 
2007). In fact, one of the respondents from the practitioner group (international 
investment bank) stated that their speciality is offering their Islamic clients 
(corporates and IFIs) some of their conventional products but structured Islamically 
by replicating the same cash flows with the same risk and return profiles. Eventually, 
it can be perceived from the literature and in the views by some of the respondents 
across the groups, that the ultimate objective of the focus on the pre-modern Islamic 
contracts is to seek the appeasement of the Shari’a scholars as well as satisfy market 
demands by attempting to “generate a similar economic profile to comparable 
conventional derivative instruments, albeit through a Shari‟a compliant structure” 
(BMB, 2010, p. 132).   
 
 
It is perhaps important at this juncture to point out that the approach adopted by the 
Islamic jurists regarding derivative instruments is considerably different from the one 
followed in the examination of stock market activity.  Specifically, the Jeddah-based 
OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy itself, in regards to the topic of “Participation in Stock 
Companies” in the same resolution that contained the prohibitive ruling on 
derivatives (i.e., Resolution Number 63/1/7), has decided that: “Since the essential 
thing about transactions is their licit nature, the establishment of a joint stock 
company with unprohibited purpose and activities is permissible” (IRTI, 2000, p. 
127).  
 
Accordingly, for equity participations, a series of rules were given to govern that 
financial activity. In essence, for the participation in stock companies, the 
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conventional financial practice, even though not exactly analogous to the classical 
modes of partnerships in Islamic jurisprudence, was viewed in the resolution as a 
“licit” activity on the whole; however, some rules were elaborated to ensure that its 
advantages were harnessed and its disadvantages were limited.  In contrast, the work 
derivatives, for some puzzling reason, commenced with an outright prohibition and 
continued on this rejectionist trajectory by the Islamic jurists.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, on the options derivative instruments front, the discourse 
evolved mostly into a debate on whether Khiyar Al-Shart (contractual stipulations) or 
Urbun (earnest money), which were forms of extensions of pre-modern sales 
contracts, can serve as a basis to permit options trading in Islamic jurisprudence.  On 
one end of the debate, commentators who have written extensively on derivative 
instruments such as Kamali, Obaidullah, Al-Qadir, and Al-Jundi seem to prefer the 
Khiyar Al-Shart modality (Abd Al-Qadir, 1982; Jundi, 1988; Kamali, 1997; 
Obaidullah, 1998), while others, including: Vogel and Hayes, Al-Amine, and El-
Gari, tend to believe that the Urbun model is more appropriate (Al-Amine, 2008; El-
Gari, 1993; Vogel & Hayes, 1998).  
 
Interestingly, the conflicting opinions exist in spite of the professed position by some 
of those same writers that these pre-modern contractual extensions have little to do 
with contemporary option derivative instruments (El-Gari, 1993, p. 16; Kamali, 
1997, pp. 26-27; Obaidullah, 1998, p. 80; Vogel & Hayes, 1998, p. 156). With that, it 
is perhaps necessary to highlight these two forms of contractual extensions in more 
detail in order to address some of the arguments that were used as a basis to prohibit 
the options derivative instruments.  
 
The Khiyar Al-Shart contract extension, whereby one or both parties to a contract 
enjoy the availability of an option to confirm or rescind a sale agreement, has 
evolved as an accepted addition to the Islamic theory of contracting.  Originally, the 
acceptability of Khiyar Al-Shart was based on a Hadith where it was reported that 
Hibban Ibn Munqidh complained to the Prophet (PBUH) that he was often cheated in 




sale, you may say there must be no fraud and you reserve for yourself an option 
lasting for three days” (Sahih Al-Bukhari).  
 
Subsequently, a rather technical debate started on the following points (some of 
which were raised in the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy) that were 
specific to Khiyar Al-Shart: 1) Whether the three days were fixed or given for 
illustrative purposes and can, therefore be extended depending on the nature of the 
transaction and the prevailing market custom; 2) Whether it is appropriate for the 
seller to demand a fee (i.e., option premium) from the potential buyer for the right to 
rescind a contract; 3) Whether the option itself, as a right, can be traded as a form of 
Mal (wealth or money) to third parties; and 4) Whether the liability of loss during the 
Khiyar Al-Shart period falls upon the seller or the buyer (Kamali, 1997, 2000a; 
Obaidullah, 1998; Usmani, 1999; Vogel & Hayes, 1998).  
 
As for the Urbun contract extension, its basis, rather than an actual Hadith, is mainly 
a report by Nafis Ibn Harith, an Officer of the Calif Umar in Makkah, to the effect 
that he contracted with Safwan Ibn Umayyah for the purchase of a prison house for 
four thousand Dirhams on the condition that the Calif agree to the transaction, 
otherwise Safwan would be given four hundred Dirhams as a form of compensation 
for the inconvenience of a potential lost sale (Ibn Al-Qayyim, 1991, p. 389). Thus, 
Urbun can be conceptualized as a form of good faith deposit on the part of the buyer 
in return for some time and flexibility to finalize a sale transaction.  
 
Notably, this was the essence of the ruling of the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh 
Academy when it developed a consensus on the matter of Urbun in its Resolution 
No. 72/3/8 in June, 1993 whereby it was agreed that: “Down-payment (earnest) sales 
are permissible if the time frame of the contract is set, and the down payment is 
considered as part of the selling price if the purchase is carried through, and as the 
property of the seller if the buyer desists” (IRTI, 2000, p. 156). 
 
In a manner similar to the points raised in the Khiyar Al-Shart debate, the issues 




Whether the premium, which is independent of the strike price in conventional 
derivative transactions, should be a part of the sale price of the underlying asset; 2) 
Whether the option itself, as a right, can be traded as a form of Mal (wealth) to third 
parties; 3) Whether the time period for the option‟s maturity is to be open or fixed; 
and 4) Whether the seller also has a right to reject the sale (for general fairness and 
also as a basis for put options) (Al-Amine, 2008; IRTI, 2000; Obaidullah, 1998; 
Vogel & Hayes, 1998).  
 
It can only be stated at this point that the imposition of the Urbun contractual 
extension in the debate on option-based derivatives is a unique case of financial 
creativity on the part of its partisans. For it is clear to market participants that a 
premium does not hold any semblance of a deposit in an option transaction. 
Specifically, a $2 premium on a an option with a strike price of $50 is never really 
characterized as a deposit on the purchase of that stock at $50 since, in reality, the 
outcome of the option contract is simply the calculation of the differential of the 
actual price of the stock in the market at contract maturity and the strike price. 
Further, even if the Urbun was part of the deposit, in some kind of effort to curb 
gambling activity, the suggestion has little economic substance behind it since the 
Urbun-based option pricing would likely be calibrated to account for the increased 
transaction costs that will depend on the price expectations of the underlying, the 
base-rate, and the time frame of the contract.  
 
The difficulty of conceptualizing a put option as a “reverse Urbun” is but another 
manifestation of how difficult the proposition of utilizing earnest money has become. 
To illustrate, to profit and/or hedge against declines in market prices, El-Gari offers a 
rather elaborate financial scheme that combines elements of Wakala (agency 
agreements), Mudharaba (investment agency), and Jo’ala (service contract) (El-
Gari, 1993). Vogel and Hays, for their part, formulate some form of system that is 
dependent on a third party (e.g., a bank) guarantee to compensate the “seller” of the 
underlying when the buyer walks away, in a premeditated manner, because of a 





In due course, it does become self-evident that the discourse on options, which is 
essentially an economic subject matter, has been quite legal-centric in a way that 
evolved with the broader objective of simply finding any means to re-create 
conventional option contracts with an “Islamic” wrapping.  In effect, what can be 
observed is that the materialization of the debate on option-based derivatives, by way 
of invoking the many different elements of the Islamic theory of contracting, have 
been elaborated without a commensurate reference to economic theories 
(effectiveness, efficiency, law of one price, theory of arbitrage, etc.).  This, in turn, 
resulted in essentially partaking in a discussion that is focused on the legal details at 
the expense of the bigger economic picture, which is the facilitation of the 
commercial practices of Muslim entrepreneurs away from the prohibited concepts of 
Riba, Gharar, and Maysir.  
 
Effectively, one ought to be careful in their attribution of a particular pre-modern 
practice to a contemporary financial instrument. For it should be ostensible that the 
effective cause („Illah) of the Ahadith by the Prophet (PBUH) is to benefit the 
Muslim community by ensuring commercial trust and reducing the asymmetry of 
information (or allowing for flexibility in the case of the Calif Umar) rather than 
allowing for market risk management tools (or even investments), as such. 
Interestingly, the attempted rationalization of the arguments in favour of using some 
of these pre-modern contractual forms have opened numerous other types of issues 
(time frame, right transfer, premium, etc.) that needlessly warranted further 
superficial rationalization within the framework of Qiyas (analogical reasoning) 
causing even more ambiguity and discord on this important subject matter. 
 
In light of the aforementioned controversy on the permissibility of options, it may be 
argued that a better approach would have been the one taken by Kamali, despite 
falling into the Qiyas trap himself with the debate on Urbun and Khiyar Al-Shart 
(with a preference for the latter), in which he concludes that “there is nothing 
inherently objectionable in granting an option, exercising it over a period of time, or 
charging a fee for it, and that options trading, like other types of trade, is permissible 




has granted to the individual in respect of trading civil transactions and contracts” 
(Kamali, 2000a). Notably, the foundation for Kamali‟s conclusion is the theory 
general permissibility (Ibaha; see below) in the Shari’a in allowing individuals the 
freedom to tailor the contracts to their legitimate needs and benefits if in fact there is 
no partaking in what is explicitly prohibited in the scripture (e.g., Riba, Gharar, and 
Maysir). 
 
The discourse on the permissibility of forward-based transactions, for its part, 
followed a similar path to the one taken in discussing the option-based contracts. As 
mentioned earlier, the literature on the topic of forward-based derivatives contained 
many suggestive forms of pre-modern Islamic contracts that were thought, 
individually or in combination, to assist in the replication of conventional forward-
based instruments. However, it appears that the arguments regarding the Salam-type 
contracts were the most prevalent and will, therefore, be the focus of the examination 
of the contractual Shari’a issues of the forward-based instruments. 
 
In its Ninth Session in April, 1995, the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy 
(Resolution Number 85/2/9) defined a Salam contract as a forward sale transaction 
that stipulates immediate payment by one of the counterparties (buyer) and a delivery 
of a marketable good with definable features on a relatively specific date by the other 
counterparty (seller) (IRTI, 2000, p. 185). The basis for that resolution is a report by 
Ibn „Abbas wherein he stated that when the Prophet (PBUH) migrated to Madinah 
from Makkah he found that the inhabitants were engaging in a one to three-year 
forward sales of agricultural products with price being prepaid at inception.  To 
address this unique form of financing, the Prophet (PBUH) is narrated to have said: 
“Whosoever engages in a Salam contract, let him specify a volume or weight for the 
object of sale, and a definitive term of deferment” (El-Gamal, 2006, p. 81). 
 
The permissibility of the Salam contracts in Islam provides two notable distinctions 
from other contractual forms: Firstly, the Salam contract is an exception to the norm 
since it is not a classic spot market transaction that is highly regarded in Islamic 




transaction were it not for the inclusion of an underlying asset (or real activity) as the 
basis of financing. Put differently, the Salam contract is, in actual fact, two contracts 
in one.  On the one hand, it is a financing transaction on the part of the buyer of the 
underlying asset to the seller. This implicit realization is apparent in that the Jeddah-
based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy (and some writers on this topic) uses the term 
finance, pawn/security, and banking institutions, in its resolution on Salam (Bacha, 
1999, pp. 20-22; El-Gamal, 2006, p. 241; IRTI, 2000; Khan, 1997; Vogel & Hayes, 
1998).    
 
On the other hand, the Salam contract is a form of risk management strategy for the 
parties who are looking to transact in the underlying asset at some future time.  For 
this, one may also assume that the party financing the Salam (e.g., a bank/financier 
or a trader in per-modern settings) is not necessarily interested in hedging its risk 
exposure as much as it is interested in benefiting from the profits generated from the 
forward sale.  
 
Based on the above, it should be recognized that the consistent attempts by the 
promoters of the forward-based derivatives to alleviate the “controversial issue” of 
the prepayment of contract value as a basis for resolving the juridical issues 
surrounding these instruments is futile (Al-Amine, 2008; Iqbal, 1999; Khan, 1997). 
In essence, the prepayment of the contract value is an integral part of the asset 
finance component of the Salam contract in order to allow the seller to undertake the 
necessary investments to ensure the generation of the underlying assets (including 
providing for sustenance) in the future.  
 
With that realization, one can disagree with Al-Suwailem in his assertion the essence 
of the prepayment is to move the transaction from a prohibited zero-sum gambling 
nature to some other mixed-sum framework (Al-Suwailem, 2006, p. 76),
102
 since any 
movement in the market prices in the Salam framework is, in effect, a zero-sum 
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outcome to the parties of the transaction. The prepayment of the contract value does 
not negate that ex-post effect.  
 
To continue with the Salam transactions, on the risk management and 
investment/speculation fronts, the appearance of the proposed Parallel-Salam 
structure to facilitate the trading of non-existent assets (Al-Amine, 2008, p. 50; Al-
Suwailem, 2006, p. 135; Bacha, 1999, pp. 20-22; Vogel & Hayes, 1998, p. 252), 
whether to the original seller (to offset the transaction) or to third parties, is 
needlessly stretching the Salam contract to fit the forward-based derivative model 
and causing more of a basis for rejection than consensus of acceptance based on the 
fundamentals of the transaction (KFH, 2012).  This becomes obvious with the 
recognition that in the Parallel-Salam framework, it is “required” that both Salam 
contracts with the same assets exist independently of each other.  
 
Along the same lines, the suggestions by Al-Suwailem of devising contractual 
agreements along the lines of “Value-based Salam” (quantity times unit price) and 
“Hybrid Salam” (for rate of return risk), which do not seem to have generated 
sufficient interests from academia or the Islamic finance practitioners (or any of the 
respondents across the four groups), can be viewed as being symptomatic of the 
difficulty of finding some form of Islamic contracts to hedge market risks (Al-
Suwailem, 2006, pp. 131-134).  
 
A much more rational and direct argument could have simply entailed highlighting 
the fact that, in light of asymmetry of information and transaction costs, 
contemporary financial markets can produce a much more efficient outcome for all 
the parties, along with higher utilities, by dividing this contract into its two 
components.  That is, the seller of the commodity need not convince the financier to 
assume the market risks of the underlying asset in order to conclude a financing 
agreement, the failure of which entails limiting the productive capacity of businesses.  
 
Essentially, the financier may be more interested in the capacity (technical know-




produce the commodity at a particular date for a particular price, which in turn is 
factored into their profitability expectations. This could be because the costs of 
gathering and analysing market intelligence for the pricing behaviour of the 
commodity itself may be too great for the financier. Thus, the forced carry-on of the 
market risk by the financier in this scenario is likely to increase the risk premium to 
the transaction due to the elevated perception of uncertainty than would be the case 
through the efficient division of the contract into two components. 
 
Likewise, the seller of the commodity does not have to strive to persuade the buyer 
to always finance ex-ante the seller‟s operations by prepaying the contract value. The 
buyer of the commodity, if a true hedger, is likely to be only interested in the 
commodity itself (or its cash equivalent) at a particular date.  If it is a 
trader/speculator, then they enter into the transaction with the seller of the 
commodity after formulating their profit expectations based on the gathering and 
analysis of market intelligence of the pricing behaviour of the underlying asset over 
the life of the contract. The capacity of the seller of the commodity to produce it adds 
an unnecessary risk element that they may not be in the best capacity to evaluate, 
which, much like the case described earlier, is also likely to increase the risk 
premium to the transaction due to the elevated perception of uncertainty than would 
be the case through the efficient division of the contract into two components. 
 
Effectively, the commodity seller can, and should be able to, obtain a lower 
financing from the financier market to properly invest in the generation of the 
underlying asset (in a manner that is not too dissimilar to the concept of bank-
financed Istisna’a contracts or even Musharaka). At the same time, they are more 
likely to obtain better pricing for their hedging endeavours within the derivative 
markets that centre on the evaluation of market prices of the underlying assets rather 
than the profile of its producers.  
 
In essence, it may very well be conjectured that the Prophet (PBUH) in his Hadith 
that formed the substance for making an exception for Salam was likely to be less 




in sustaining a real economic activity in a manner that reduced the potential for 
Gharar and Riba, including any disputes and/or injustice that may arise in the 
process. Put differently, the Salam contract is simply a means to a higher end, not an 
end in itself. Thus, as it turns out, Majd El-Din Azzam was right when he stated that 
“there is no compelling need to subsume [futures] under Salam in any capacity 
whatsoever; rather one should see it as it is and then determine its validity not by 
reference to the works of [Islamic jurists], but to the basic evidence of Shariah” 
(Kamali, 2000a, p. 172).  
Section IV: Contemporary Derivatives in Islamic Finance 
 
Despite the literature that favoured the permissibility of options, forwards, and 
futures in Islamic finance, there does not seem to be a wide uptake regarding these 
three products in the Islamic markets. The confusion created by the acceptability of 
these products along with the lack of consensus by their proponents on which 
contractual forms to use (Khiyar Al-Shart, Urbun, Salam, Istisna’a, etc.) may have 
been a contributing factor for this lacklustre response. 
 
However, the exception in the lack of enthusiasm in Islamic finance circles for the 
derivative instruments was the swap contracts, which were deemed quite useful for 
the management of foreign currency and profit rates (i.e., interest rates) risk 
exposures faced by commercial and financial institutions that are increasingly being 
connected to the global financial markets. Moreover, as can be expected, the 
discourse on the permissibility of the swap derivative contracts followed the same 
Qiyas-by-product path that was taken to argue the permissibility of the other 
derivative contracts that were outlined earlier.  
 
Specifically, in order to elicit a favourable response from the Shari’a scholars, the 
participants in the Islamic finance industry developed two main avenues for 
structuring Islamic swap instruments in order to generate similar cash flows to the 
ones offered by conventional derivative products with a wider aspiration of assisting 




they use a “Master Agreement” that utilizes the Murabaha (instalment sale)
103
 
financing scheme and the concept of Wa’ad (promise) in Islamic jurisprudence 
whereby a series of Murabaha and Reverse Murabaha transactions for the 
purchase/sale of non-precious commodities are entered into by the swap 
counterparties for the duration of the swap.
104
   
 
However, where they differ is in that the first method envisions “two unilateral 
promises” (which makes it a bilateral exchange of promises) to actually undertake a 
series of Murabaha transactions at designated points for the duration of the swap 
within the framework of Maqassah (netting). The second method, on the other hand, 
entails an execution of a “unilateral promise” by only the out-of-the-money party to 
undertake the purchase/sale of the underlying asset from the in-the-money party at 
the agreed price in the contract. That is to say, both the parties give and hold the 
promises that are to be utilized, either paying or receiving, on the various settlement 
dates (BMB, 2010; Dusuki, 2009; Hussain & Mehboob, 2008; Moody's, 2010 ; 
Tredgett & Uberoi, 2008; Tredgett, Uberoi, & Evans, 2008; Uberoi & Evans, 2008).  
 
Throughout the process, a non-precious commodity and a series of commodity 
brokers, as agents of the counterparties, serve the vital roles of ensuring, à la fois, 
that: 1) An underlying asset exists in the sale contract; 2) The transaction combines a 
series of sale contracts that contain “profit” (i.e., not interest or Riba); 3) The 
exchange of one debt for another (i.e., Bay’ Al-Kali’ Bil-Kali’) does not take place; 
and 4) The underlying assets (i.e., non-precious commodities) are owned, possessed, 
and “constructively” delivered at the designated dates. The usage of fixed interest 
rates and floating interest rates (e.g., LIBOR) along with foreign currencies, if 
applicable, formalize this Islamic swap structure.  
 
In terms of preference, even though the first method seems to have been preferred by 
the Islamic finance industry accounting for nearly 70 per cent of Islamic derivative 
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products in 2009 (BMB, 2010, p. 134), the risks (market risk, indemnities, etc.) of 
non-precious commodity ownership (even for a fleeting timespan as confirmed by 
one of the respondents) in addition to the execution risk (i.e., unacceptability of two 
unilateral promises executed at the same time in the Shari’a) were deemed too great 
for industry participants, which resulted in the increasing preference for the second 
swap method in recent years (BMB, 2010, pp. 149-150; Hussain & Mehboob, 2008; 
Parker, 2010).  
 
Eventually, the growth in the usage of these instruments along with the lack of 
standardization of the various swap contractual agreements that were used by 
industry participants led to the efforts by the International Islamic Financial Market 
(IIFM) in Bahrain to partner with the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) in New York to develop the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut (Hedging) 
Master Agreement (TMA) in 2010.
105
   
 
The touted key benefits of this agreement are: 1) The reduction of costs that are 
expended in the evaluation and negotiation of the swap documentation; 2) Providing 
balance and fairness to the counterparties; 3) Increasing efficiency, liquidity, and 
certainty; 4) Establishing a benchmark that provides a reference point (e.g., LIBOR, 
currency, etc.); and 5) Reducing the price divergence between Islamic hedging 
instruments and their conventional counterparts (IIFM, 2010). 
 
Effectively, the TMA, which is derived almost entirely from the ISDA Master 
Agreement, uses the aforementioned Murabaha contractual form along with the 
Wa’ad concept to develop a framework that comprises: a single agreement, 
governing law, representations, flawed asset and conditionality, and close out 
mechanism and netting.
106
  However, where it does differ from the ISDA Master 
Agreement, apart from the requirement that there is an underlying asset that is 
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with its inclusion in the TMA modalities. Interestingly, since the Qiyas methodology was invoked in 
the formation of the TMA, the close-out mechanisms are facing many obstacles of acceptance as 




religiously permissible (mainly Zinc and Aluminium), is in that it stipulates that the 
contract should be entered into for hedging purposes and that interest cannot be 
chargeable in the transaction; and in the event that interest is granted as part of court 
proceedings, it must be promptly be given to charity.  
 
One should be able at this stage, based on the discussion in the previous chapter, to 
question the validity of two key components of the TMA:  First is the requirement 
that interest not be part of the transaction. For on the face of it, it may be lauded in 
Islamic finance circles that the TMA structure does not partake in any usurious 
activity.  However, it is also notable, from an economic and financial sense, that 
aside from the facts: a.) The swap instrument is not a lending transaction from one 
party to the other, and b.) The underlying (profit rates and currency) are based one 
way or another on the base rate (e.g., Treasury or LIBOR), that the “replacement 
cost”
107
 of any swap (which is explicitly included in the TMA contract) is in itself 
determined, in part, by the base rate no matter which valuation method is used.   
 
Moreover, the obligation to take the interest, which is an integral part of the cost-of-
carry valuation model, out of the replacement cost in court proceedings (or give it to 
charity), in the event of default, will likely cause an increasing level of uncertainty 
due to a potential variability in the judicial interpretation and consequently dispute in 





Apart from the issue of Riba, the second questionable component is the deployment 
of the concept of Wa’ad (promise) in these instruments as well as the forced usage of 
non-precious commodities. Originally, the concept of Wa’ad was used by early 
Muslim jurists in charitable situations whereby, in the interest of sustaining the 
philanthropic contribution by the wealthy members of the society, it was deemed that 
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the promise of a donation was to be binding on the donor unless a justifiable reason 
for its withdrawal is given (Al-Masri, 2003; Al-Zarqa, 1998b, pp. 1032-1035).  
 
After the establishment of the Murabaha contractual form within the structure of 
financial intermediation in the 1970s as the primary financing means for banking 
institutions to service their clients‟ asset purchases, it was realized that there are 
promissory elements by many parties which required regulation.  For as opposed to 
the basic, and historically prevalent, situations where the seller agrees to sell a 
product to the buyer on the spot based on instalments with the condition that the 
buyer become contractually obligated to make the payments on their due dates, the 
modern-day Murabaha financing schemes technically involve the buyer requesting a 
particular good to be financed by the bank and makes a promise to purchase it from 
the bank once the bank acquires it.  If the promise by the buyer was not binding, in 
the event that they decide not to conclude the contract, the bank (and/or the original 
seller) can be exposed to a loss. 
 
This exposure, along with the prospect of the associated injustice and disputes, was 
the basis that was used by jurists such as Al-Zarqa, Al-Qaradawi, Al-Shazli and 
many others in expanding the binding nature of Wa’ad to Murabaha contracts (Al-
Masri, 2003; Al-Qaradawi, 1987; Al-Zarqa, 1998b, pp. 1032-1035). However, the 
issue of how to distinguish between a contractual obligation („Aqd) from a Wa’ad 
presented itself soon after the elaboration of those opinions since these two formats, 
which are quite identical in the view of a court of law, were deemed to be 
unworkable in a parallel fashion in Islamic jurisprudence.  
 
To address this challenge, it was ruled by the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh 
Academy that a “unilateral” promise is binding while a bilateral binding promise is 
not allowed because it amounts to an „Aqd (IRTI, 2000, pp. 86-87). Notably, there 
have been many commentators, such as Al-Masri, who perhaps in following Ibn 
Taymiyyah‟s doctrine of the supremacy of the focus on truths and real objectives 
(Maqasid) rather than superficial wording (Al-Suwailem, 2012, p. 19), have derided 




unacceptable, and denotes a misinterpretation of some jurisprudential texts” (Al-
Masri, 2003, p. 32). This is despite its well-meaning intentions, by the Academy and 
Shari’a scholars with similar opinions, of balancing the difficulty in assisting Islamic 
banks and their clients on one end and the prohibition on Riba on the other. 
 
To return to the subject of the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut (Hedging) Master Agreement, 
the same difficulty facing Islamic jurists in the Murabaha financial structures, and 
the subsequent solutions, resulted in the use of Qiyas (analogical reasoning) to apply 
both the Murabaha contractual form and the concept of Wa’ad to underlie the TMA 
structure.  The final outcome is that, possibly even more so than is present in the 
traditionary Murabaha sale transactions, it is quite difficult to intellectualize a 
“Master Swap Agreement” that includes a wide array of unilateral promises between 
hedgers, commodity brokers, and banks on multiple payment dates that are expected 
to be enforceable in a court of law according to Islamic jurisprudence principles that 
prohibits bilateral binding commitments. This is especially evident in that the Shari’a 
explicitly bans the superficial multiplication of contracts to circumvent Islamic 
jurisprudence where it was reported that the Prophet (PBUH) prohibited the joining 




To this point, the confusion regarding the TMA becomes quite ostensible in that in 
the management of counterparty default risks the following convoluted statement is 
made as a form of guidance to its users:  
“As the purchase undertaking given by each of the Bank and the Counterparty must 
remain independent of each other for Shari‟a compliance reasons, the default or 
termination by a party under one purchase undertaking cannot trigger a cross default 
or termination of the other, so as to effect early termination of the whole swap 
transaction. However, the use of a master swap agreement, which documents, 
amongst other things, agreed mechanisms which lead to the termination of both 
purchase undertakings have been accepted by Islamic scholars. On the basis of this, 
financial institutions are increasingly using swap documentation based on the 
conventional ISDA architecture (comprising a master agreement and transaction-
specific purchase undertakings) which, over time, are developing into a familiar-
looking umbrella agreement containing provisions on matters such as representations 
and covenants, events of default, termination events, and Shari‟a-compliant 
termination payment calculations” (BMB, 2010, p. 150). 
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In regards to the innovative structuring of the swap through multiple sales contracts 
of non-precious commodities, there does not seem to be any recognition by the 
Shari’a scholars, legal experts, or the Islamic finance practitioners of the economic 
reality of this transaction. In essence, it should be obvious that if the commodity was 
genuinely placed in the structure of the swap to demonstrate a true purchase and sale 
transaction in the future along with the assumption of all the association risks of 
ownership by the parties, which is perceived to be a chief way to legitimately 
transact in the future by the majority of current Shari’a scholars,
110
  then the overall 
pricing behaviour of the swap will differ, sometimes significantly, from the one 
offered by the conventional swap contract with the same underlying reference rate or 
price (i.e., foreign exchange or interest rate).  
 
This is because whatever non-precious commodity is used has a pricing behaviour of 
its own that is determined by way of the equilibrium between the forces of supply 
and demand in the financial markets where they are traded (e.g., London Metal 
Exchange, Bursa Malaysia, etc.).  Moreover, in times of market stress, the liquidity 
of the Islamic swap transactions can be severely affected if there is insufficient 
liquidity in the market of whatever non-precious commodity is used.  
 
It should also be appreciated that the real partaking in the purchase and sale of these 
commodities in the future for the purpose of generating some form of a tangible 
underlying is likely to result in distortions in the pricing of these commodities due to 
artificial elements of supply and demand, which, in turn, has negative implications to 
their users in the real sector who have no relation whatsoever to the swap contract. 
Thus, for all intents and purposes, the inclusion of the non-precious commodities, if 
undertaken in a true and genuine manner in some sort of bid to directly relate the 
transaction to the “real sector,” not only makes the swap defective for hedging 
purposes due to uncertain pricing patterns, but also is likely to negatively affect the 
real sector that Islamic jurisprudence is so much in favour of promoting.   
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The reality of incompatibility between economic theory and the current interpretation 
of the Shari’a proscriptions in economic matters is equally harsh on the financial 
engineering suggestions made by the various authors in the Islamic finance literature 
that were alluded to earlier.  These include the writings by Iqbal and Mirakhor who 
espouse the position favouring the use of financial engineering to replicate 
conventional derivatives in an Islamic manner as a means to facilitate market risk 
management (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007, pp. 209-220).  
 
The modalities proposed by those distinguished authors range from Jo’ala (service 
contracts), Murabaha, and equity structures to Sukuk (Islamic bonds) issuances. In 
judging the appropriateness of these suggestions, at a basic level, it is not entirely 
understood how the invocation of all these contractual forms, vis-à-vis conventional 
derivatives, resolves the substance of the self-imposed prohibitions that were placed 
by the standard setting bodies, especially those relating to Riba (usury) and Maysir 
(gambling).  
 
As for the genuine utilization of the Murabaha (i.e., not in a swap format), it 
becomes apparent that the utilization of this contractual form through the use of 
commodities, serving as the collateral component of financing, in market risk 
management transactions effectively transforms the currency or interest rate 
exposure into either commodity price risk or credit risk (depending on how the 
transaction is structured). If the commodity price risk is assumed then the hedge 
largely becomes defective in managing the market risk exposure.  Further, the risk 
would be compounded if the commodity itself in the structure is not marketable.  
 
For credit risk, it has been argued that the default of the counterparty does factor into 
producing disparities in the pricing of the derivative instrument as in the case 
forward vs. futures contracts (Kane, 1980).  This would be even more evident in a 
scenario where the potential losses from derivatives (i.e., difference between contract 
price and market price) are much less than the potential losses of the full principle of 




transaction costs and the negative effects to the real sector due to the artificial 
creation of trade transactions on usable commodities still apply.   
 
Similarly, the challenges faced in implementing the suggestions of utilizing equity 
participation certificates in some form of asset swap between institutions go beyond 
the author-admitted difficulty of finding matching securities to offset the market risk 
exposures. This is because there are fundamental problems associated with 
asymmetry of information and adverse selection in this arrangement, which were 
made all-too-evident in the securitization framework that contributed to the structural 
deformities that instigated the recent global financial crisis (Ayoub, 2012a).   
 
Finally, it appears that the proposition of actually utilizing the concept of Sukuk for 
hedging transactions has its foundations in the use of the methodology that was 
discussed in the previous chapter for pricing swaps which assumes a hypothetical 
exchange of bonds by the counterparties.  Nevertheless, within the current paradigm 
for interpreting the Shari’a in the scholarly community, which will be disputed in the 
next chapter, this hypothetical exchange is impermissible because there are no real 
assets underlying the exchange.  This alone would negate any reasoning to proceed 
with the hypothetical Sukuk exchange framework in lieu of the much more market-
recognized swap structures.  
 
Furthermore, any attempt to overcome the challenges of the restrictions placed on the 
usage of hypothetical securities by: 1) Actually transacting in the secondary Sukuk 
market in order to exchange real Sukuk as a means of offering a tangible asset to 
underlie the hedging transaction, or 2) Having the counterparties actually issue 
securities in the primary market for the same purpose, would be a much more costly 
and inefficient method to manage market risk exposures.   
 
Specifically, in regards to the engagement of the secondary market, it will be quite 
difficult in the current illiquid Sukuk secondary market to find securities that offer the 
flexibility provided by derivatives to match the exact market risk exposures by the 




utilization of Sukuk for hedging purposes is likely to result in an increase in the 
prices of the Sukuk trading in the financial markets (i.e., lower yields) as a result of 
the increase in demand for these instruments.  In time, the higher prices for Sukuk 
would very likely trickle down to lower quality Sukuk issuance and trading in the 
financial markets. This would, effectively, be a form of wealth transfer from the 
hedging community to the issuers of Sukuk in the primary market.   
 
Interestingly, the eventual outcome, which is probably not the one desired by the 
Shari’a scholarly community, of this low yield environment is that organizations will 
find it more beneficial to include increasing levels of Sukuk in their financial 
structure rather than the equity forms that are so well regarded in the Islamic finance 
industry (i.e., more debt and systemic risk). 
 
As for the use of the primary market by the counterparties to issue Sukuk to match 
the market risk exposures, the issuance of any security in the primary market entails 
prohibitive costs that can only be accepted in the context of resource mobilization for 
an enterprise.  Thus, the use of that route for market risk management is rather 
unrealistic, especially with the recognition that finding another hedger with an exact 
offsetting exposure is quite improbable and that a financial intermediary, taking the 
opposite exposure, will undoubtedly include their cost of primary market issuance as 
a part of their fees.  
 
Eventually, it becomes hard to imagine how any of these suggestions of financial 
engineering to address market risk management is related to, or can be used to hedge, 
the actual balance sheet exposures faced by organizations as part of a wider 
framework that is built on the effectiveness and efficiency of the portfolio approach 
to asset-liability management. The increasingly complex nature of the global 
business and financial environments and its manifestation on the risk exposures of 
organizations, which require elements of flexibility and dynamism in the market risk 





Based on the above, it could be validly contended that these expensive, untenable, 
and legally uncertain exercises (i.e., Islamic swaps and financial engineering) could 
have been averted by simply invoking the theory of Maslaha (public interest) and/or 
Daroura (necessity) to allow the conventional derivative instruments exclusively 
within a hedging framework for companies choosing to operate under the auspices of 
Islamic jurisprudence. This is particularly relevant since it has been argued 
repeatedly that the derivative instruments, although having speculative elements do 
not entail: a.) Riba because they are not lending transactions, as such, with static 
debtor-creditor relationships, or b.) Gharar since their valuation is based on 
obtainable economic theories and their pricing is undertaken in the financial markets 
in a transparent manner.  
 
Essentially, in a similar manner to that utilized in the evaluation of the permissibility 
of the contemporary form of Musharaka (i.e., common stock ownership) whose 
market prices are determined, in part, by the base rate in developing the fair value of 
the company by looking at its book value along with the present value of all its future 
cash flows, derivatives should be explored based on the contemporary forms of risk 
management challenges facing religiously legitimate businesses operating in the real 
economy.  Put differently, it is asserted that, if properly regulated with clear (and 
auditable [see next chapter]) usage terms to minimize negative externalities, surely 
Islamic jurisprudence cannot prohibit something that is of benefit to mankind (i.e., 
more effective risk management, lower probability of default, improved effectiveness 
and efficiency, enhanced competitive capacity, increased investment, etc.). 
 
That said, the decision by some of the largest and most respected banking 
organization, including their Shari’a Boards, to accept to operate by some of the 
aforementioned contractual structures, that are by no means cost effective or legally 
certain, to confront the real and legitimate market risk challenges by the Islamic 
finance industry is quite perplexing. At the institutional level, it demonstrates the 
inability of academic institutions and Islamic banking organizations, and to a certain 
extent the IIFM and the IFSB, to penetrate (or be allowed to penetrate) the decision 




representation of the opportunities and challenges facing the Islamic finance 
industry. 
 
For this, it is should be recognized to a greater extent that the generation of 
knowledge in a dynamic and inclusive process of discourse between jurists, 
researchers, regulators, and practitioners is a much needed necessity in order to 
arrive at conclusions that depend on the interpretation of the wisdom of God in the 
scripture regarding the economic matters between individuals. Specifically, the use 
of faith as a foundation along with the divine gifts of intellect and reason to 
understand the basis for God‟s explicit prohibitions in contemporary contexts would 
undoubtedly be of assistance in a framework that seeks to ensure Maslaha (public 
interest) for mankind. 
 
Section V: Flexibility, Regulation, and Innovation in Islamic 
Finance: The Case of Derivatives  
 
The discussion in this chapter, particularly in the last two sections, has demonstrated 
the highly juridical nature of the policies that dictate the modus operandi of the 
Islamic finance industry. These policies, one could contend, entail the imposition of a 
framework that effectively sustains the market risk exposures for legitimate 
businesses operating in the real economy as well as increase their transaction costs 
and legal uncertainty.  In addition, this framework could arguably be viewed as being 
less than ideal in that it focuses on the means (i.e., contractual forms) as conjectured 
from the practices of the early Muslim community rather than the ends (social well-
being, productive work ethic, reducing injustice and disputation, etc.) that form an 
ostensible part of the scripture (Ayoub, 2012b).   
 
For aside from the questionable basis that was formed to prohibit the derivative 
hedging contracts, the incremental adjustments to the pre-modern contracts to 
conform to the contemporary issues have arguably increased the contention rather 
than reduced it. In fact, when one closely examines some of these incremental 




management practices are exactly in line with the spirit of the Shari’a (e.g., 
multiplication of Wa‟ad , multiplication of Murabahas, superficial insertion of a 
commodity). 
 
In a bid to understand this controversial phenomenon, it is may be important to 
examine the incremental adjustments in light of the general theory of Ibaha 
(permissiveness) as well as other Islamic theories that have been outlined thus far in 
the research, namely Maslaha, Daroura, and Qiyas. Moreover, the topic of 
innovation in Islamic finance was a topic of discussion among many of the 
respondents of interviews on the subject matter of derivatives and will therefore be 
assessed in light of industry practices. 
 
To commence with, the basis in the Shari’a regarding commercial matters is the 
theory of Ibaha (permissiveness), which stipulates that the worldly dealings between 
individuals are permitted unless expressly prohibited in the scripture (Al-Qaradawi, 
1987; Ibn Al-Qayyim, 1991; Kamali, 2000a). As a background, the theory of Ibaha 
itself is developed from the divine words in the Quran that establish the religious 





In fact, the Quran shows that God favours the benefiting from his worldly creations 
without the unnecessary self-imposed complications by specifically stating: “And 
why should you not eat of that upon which the name of Allah has been mentioned 
while He has explained in detail to you what he has forbidden you” (Quran: 6:119) as 
well as “Say, „Have you seen what Allah has sent down to you of provision of which 
you have made [some] lawful and [some] unlawful?‟ Say, „Has Allah permitted you 
[to do so], or do you invent [something] about Allah?” (Quran: 10:59). The 
importance of this theory should be apparent in the discourse on derivative 
instruments in that what is often adopted is the reverse of the directives of God in the 
Quran whereby there is the widely held perception that products and services are not 
Shari’a-compliant except if certified as such.   
                                                          
111





With this Ibaha foundation, one can agree, without too much difficulty, with 
Kamali‟s (2000) assertions that it effectively transcends into the following in the 
realm of derivatives: 1) There is no need to declare a transaction as valid by way of 
searching for affirmative evidence in the scripture. All that is needed is to investigate 
if there are any clear prohibitions that exist and if there are none found, then the 
transaction may be presumed as being valid; 2) The forms of commerce in Islam that 
were undertaken during the time of the Prophet (PBUH) are not exhaustive and 
should not be viewed as precluding new varieties (e.g., derivatives) on which the 
Shari’a is silent (mostly because market risks did not exist then as vigorously as they 
exist in modern settings); and 3) Consequently, there is no need to search for 
evidence to support new forms of commerce (Kamali, 2000a, pp. 69-70). 
 
In addition to Ibaha, the theories of Maslaha and Daroura provide a fresh new light 
under which one can add depth to the examination of the derivative hedging 
instruments. Essentially, the theory of Maslaha (public interest), which was 
discussed previously in the Research Philosophy Chapter (Chapter 2), promotes 
increasing human utility through greater benefit derivation from the bounty of God to 
mankind and/or the reduction of any hardship that may arise in worldly endeavours 
(Hassan, 1994).  This is especially relevant to the current discussion on market risk 
management and derivatives due to the changing circumstances facing Muslims 
throughout time and space.  
 
Notably, the reverse of Maslaha is Mafsada (public detriment), which is the outcome 
of the improper usage of the Godly-granted resources (including intellect and 
reason).  In a complementary fashion to Maslaha, the theory of Daroura (necessity), 
for its part, is built on the Quranic verses that demonstrate the generosity of God in 
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Thus, in summary, the importance of the theories of Ibaha, Maslaha, and Daroura in 
human inter-dealings, from the Islamic perspective, stems from the fact that God has 
granted mankind an abundance of resources for its perusal in order to increase 
Maslaha along with specific prohibitions that seek to reduce the Mafsada. For it is 
implausible, in Islam, that God imposes certain proscriptions that can reduce the 
benefits of his generosity, cause harm, and/or limit the productiveness of mankind 
(Ibn Taymiyyah, 1899, pp. 226-227).   
 
However, in spite of the above, it is often observed in the application of these 
theories that they are overshadowed by the seemingly supreme emphasis on the 
theory of Qiyas (analogical reasoning), which, although very important in Islamic 
jurisprudence, does not hold the key unlocking the religious mysteries in every 
situation. Effectively, the circular-natured debate on derivatives has followed the two 
approaches that were ostensibly delineated by Shalabi (1982). In the first approach, 
proponents of the position of prohibiting derivatives have quoted a wide array of 
opinions from early Islamic jurists and extended them by way of analogy in the 
discourse on derivatives with strong, and seemingly certain, opinions towards the 
proscription.  On the other hand, the partisans of derivative instruments have utilized 
the second approach to Qiyas, which entailed looking for juristic views that 
supported their opinion for permissibility. Both of these approaches, Shalabi teaches 
us, are erroneous and hold the potential for inaccuracy in the face of new transactions 
addressing contemporary opportunities and constraints (Kamali, 2000a; Shalabi, 
1982, p. 244).  
 
Thus, with this substantive basis of the doctrine of the Shari’a as it pertains to 
commercial matters, it may appropriate at this stage to stop and give serious 
consideration to the discourse into the contractual issues as well as contemporary 
derivatives in Islamic finance as outlined earlier. For it will be a difficult path to 
argue that the incremental adjustments to pre-modern contracts entail any elements 
of added efficiency and effectiveness from an economic sense.  This is also true for 
the contention that the prohibition of derivative hedging instruments, with the 




Riba, Gharar, and Maysir. In fact, it could be asserted that the financial innovations 
in the Islamic finance industry, as they pertain to the hedging sphere, should have 
some basic economic rationales that improve the welfare of society (or reduce 
injustice) in order to be appropriately endowed with the coveted “Islamic” title. 
 
Eventually, it may be discerned that the use of the untenable religious basis to create 
a religious prohibition without any clear economic rationales that benefit society 
eventually resulted in religiously questionable outcomes. This became evident in that 
the Islamic finance industry proceeded along the path predicted by Miller (Miller, 
1986, p. 460) in regards to innovating to circumvent regulation.  In this case, the 
focus was on devising new ways to elude questionable religious directives to make 
their Islamic financial products synthetically equivalent to their conventional 
counterparts no matter the costs (including reputational risk).  
 
Ironically, as opposed to Miller‟s prediction of innovating to circumvent exogenous 
regulatory impositions (laws, regulations, tax, accounting rules, etc.), the financial 
constraints of the Islamic finance industry were self-imposed. In other words, the 
Islamic finance industry in its contemporary form designed a framework with extra 
constraints on those seeking to operate within the purview of the economic doctrine 
of the Shari’a that have arguably gone beyond the scope of the directives of the 
Shari’a and then proceeded to devise new ways to circumvent those constraints. 
 
The discussion in this chapter is not meant to deride the burgeoning Islamic finance 
industry. Rather, it is meant to show the pitfalls when, as confirmed by the literature 
and many respondents in the interviews, the frame of reference in the industry 
becomes solely the contract, not the framework and the context in addition to the 
contract.
113
 Put differently, the adherence to the religion rests in following the 
substance of the Shari’a directives rather than contemporary Arabic-named 
contractual forms with little resemblance to their pre-modern ancestors.   
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Specifically, in order for the Islamic finance industry to grow and prosper (and aid 
the people on depend on it in the process), it should be allowed to follow 
conventional financial practices where no real conflicts exist (i.e., hedging 
instruments, secured lending, deposits
114
, etc.) and properly deviate through 
appropriate financial innovations in other incompatible circumstances (i.e., usurious 
lending, pure gambling in derivative markets, superficial securitization, etc.). Once 
more, the acceptance of the conventional forms of stock ownership, even though they 
don‟t exactly follow the rules of partnerships in the commercial practices of the early 
Muslim community, should serve as a model in the utilization of the theory of 
Maslaha in that regard.  For derivative instruments, one may argue that there is also 
an added element of Daroura that should justify their utilization as a hedging 
mechanism. 
 
Therefore, it is firmly believed that the Islamic finance industry should be more 
confident that the substance of the economic directives of the Shari’a (not simply its 
form), with its three pillars of the prohibition of usurious debt creation (Riba), 
excessive uncertainty (Gharar), and gambling (Maysir), hold the potential to 
positively transform the international financial architecture in areas where market 
discipline in conventional finance may be less than optimal.   
 
This confidence should lead to real value-added innovations that contribute to a more 
sustainable and equitable economic growth and wealth creation that transcends its 
current regulatory circumventing nature and contribute to aligning the interests of the 
economic agents in society.  For this, the profound faith by the individuals along 
with their God-given intellect and reason can make all the difference necessary to 
focus on the substance of Maqasid Al-Shari’a (Objectives of Islamic Jurisprudence), 
which is sincerely believed to have strong economic components in the realm of 
Mua’amalat (commercial transactions).  
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The examination of derivatives in Islamic finance in this chapter is built on the 
economic foundations that evolved from the discussion in the two previous chapters 
on market risk management and conventional derivative instruments. Specifically, it 
has been argued that derivative instruments are powerful tools for hedging the non-
core market risk exposures in a manner that does not involve excessive uncertainty 
(Gharar) or usurious debt creation (Riba).  This contention is, of course, 
contextualized as being part of a larger risk transfer strategy that also allows for the 
benefiting from the prospects of risk consolidation (combination and diversification) 
through a portfolio approach to risk management rather than the utilization of 
contractual forms that are costly and contain a larger amount of risk to the 
counterparties.   
 
In essence, even though this chapter is a key chapter in the thesis, the rationale for 
the earlier two chapters revolves around the estimation that the study of market risks 
and derivatives would have not been complete without attempting to shed some 
economic light, which will continue in the next two chapters, on some of the 
controversial issues that surround the opinions of some Shari’a scholars on the 
subject matter. This, obviously, is a much more challenging road to travel than the 
one offered by the superficial formulation of contractual structures that comply with 
the form of Shari’a proscriptions rather than their substance. However, the meeting 
of this challenge becomes necessary as one recognizes that the prohibitions in Islam 
are focused mainly on the substance or the essence of the impressible act.  That is 
evident when one examines a comparable in that it is not the colour of wine or its 
ingredients that is the basis for the prohibition; rather it is its intoxicating effect.  
 
Thus, one may argue that the same analogy applies to the Islamic derivatives sphere 
in that even if the ingredients of Islamic swaps are individually permissible, their 
presence leads largely to the same effects of conventional swaps and should therefore 
result, if one takes the anti-derivative arguments to their literal ends, in being 
impressible under the auspices of the Shari’a. Notably, the facilitative arguments for 




engineering is necessary to produce “Islamic” contracts since by equivalence the 
Islamic slaughter of animals is the only means to produce “Halal” beef is seriously 
ignoring the reasoning behind the God-given directives. 
 
For example, it was stated by one of the respondents (Shari’a scholar) in the 
interviews that some in the Islamic finance industry feel that Islamic swaps are 
necessary “Because this is the Islamic way to do it.  It is like being offered a halal 
burger and a regular burger. They are the same thing but one was slaughtered in a 
certain way to make it more compliant with Shari’a.” The analogy with meat 
continues, but with a contrary argument, by another respondent (also a Shari’a 
Scholar) were he states that if the problem entails “lamb” and not “pork” then it can 
be worked out.  Effectively, he was denoting that if derivatives are used for 
legitimate purposes then the Shari’a can be flexible. Having elaborated the foregoing 
views by some of the respondents, it should be highlighted that the respondents in the 
academics, Shari‟a scholars, and legal experts group were split in the need to 
structure everything in the Islamic finance industry by way of pre-modern contracts. 
 
Thus, it can become rather apparent that the use of financial engineering, 
commodities, and questionable legal contracts do not and will not affect the 
substance of the prohibition, as they are being perceived by the Shari’a scholars, 
because the end result is mostly the same.  In fact, it has been demonstrated that 
these reformulations of the conventional derivative contracts offer adverse 
consequences for their users and society as a whole in that they hold the prospect of 
being defective hedges with negative externalities to real sector operators due to the 
imposition of artificial supply and demand forces for whatever underlying 
commodity is used.  If, however, the commodities are placed in the transaction only 
for cosmetic reasons (i.e., fleeting or ineffective ownership), as is currently the case 
with some Islamic hedging contracts, then one must really strive to examine the 
direction the Islamic finance industry is headed to.    
 
With that, the in-depth consideration of the religious basis for some of the negative 




some of the respondents across the various groups) have arguably delineated the 
position that the main obstacle to the acceptance of the derivative instruments is 
perhaps the implicit unease of the Shari’a scholars in accepting the nature of the 
underlying reference rate (e.g., LIBOR) or price (e.g., currency) in the derivatives 
contract, which has a corresponding ambiguity in the recognition of the derivative 
contract on the financial statements of the hedging entities.  
 
A second obstacle observed to effective acceptance is a product of the 
institutionalization of derivatives trading along with the widening of the level and 
nature of the market participants, especially when these instruments are viewed 
within the background of the prohibition on Maysir (gambling) wherein there is a 
clear involvement of added levels of pure gamblers in the derivative markets. The 





Chapter Seven: The Permissibility of the Underlying 




The previous three chapters provided evidence supporting the argument that market 
risk management, particularly with derivative instruments, should be encouraged in 
Islamic finance.  More specifically, the discussion on market risk management 
should have demonstrated that the other risk management strategies are complements 
not substitutes to the risk transfer strategy.  Along the same lines, it was explained 
that the proposed risk sharing arrangements by commentators in the Islamic finance 
literature are built on risk transfer modalities, and thus cannot simply be touted as a 
superior form of risk management. Further, it was argued that derivatives, especially 
the forward-based contracts, provide the most effective and efficient technique for a 
portfolio approach to market risk management.   
 
In the two chapters that followed, the economic and operational particularities of 
conventional derivative instruments were illustrated in a manner that sought to 
respond to the repeated attempts by some Shari’a scholars and academics to link the 
usage of derivative contracts in hedging contexts to the prohibitions of Riba (usury), 
Gharar (excessive uncertainty), and Maysir (gambling).   
 
In particular, in the examination of the contemporary Islamic derivative instruments, 
it has been argued that the continuous attempts to advance the Qiyas-based 
reformulations of pre-modern contracts to fit the modern-day market risk 
management environment are futile due to operational and financial constraints that 
are imposed on their users. This was evident in the analysis of the Islamic swaps that 
showed that these contracts oscillate between being unsound hedging instruments 
with negative externalities (i.e., defective economic contracts) and being religiously 
flawed in that they were shown to follow the form not the substance of the Shari’a 
prohibitions that instigated the efforts for their formulations in the first place (i.e., 





Eventually, it was proposed that derivatives contracts are neutral instruments whose 
ultimate positive or negative implications depend on their usage by market 
participants. This stance, in essence, requires that Islamic jurisprudence, and the 
Shari’a scholars who shape it, strive to pursue a deeper and more complete analysis 
of all the issues and technicalities of the complex topics that surround contemporary 
market risk management.  
 
This chapter continues the discussion that was elaborated in the previous ones with a 
particular focus on the permissibility of the underlying variables of the derivative 
contracts, which was one of the main factors that have led to their outright 
prohibition by the standard-setting bodies and the resultant superficial replication of 
conventional derivatives in seemingly Shari’a-compliant forms by operators in the 
Islamic finance industry. For this, the remaining sections shall focus on the interest 
rate and foreign exchange rate risk management endeavours due to three main 
reasons: Firstly, as noted in the Market Risks and Their Management Chapter 
(Chapter 4), there is growing recognition in Islamic finance circles of the importance 
of the management of interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk to the future health 
of the industry.   
 
Secondly, this particular area in the discourse on the permissibility of derivative 
instruments has not elicited a significant amount of thought, even by some of the 
earlier mentioned commentators who have a favourable view on the acceptance of 
derivatives in the Islamic finance industry. Thirdly, the majority of respondents 
across the four groups have demonstrated, in the course of the interviews, a sense of 
misperception of these two underlying variables and their relationship with money, 
in general, and how they interact with the recognition of the contract, in particular. 







Section I: Permissibility of the Underlying Variables: Interest Rate 
Benchmarks 
 
The examination of the permissibility of the underlying variables in derivative 
contracts commences with a discussion on the use of benchmarks. Benchmarks that 
affect the financial statements of the entities exposed to their movements by virtue of 
being connected to the global economy and consequently can be used as underlying 
variables in the derivative contracts to offset that exposure.  In particular, the 
benchmarks that appear to be most contentious in Islamic jurisprudence, as shown in 
the literature and the interviews, are the interest rate benchmarks (e.g., treasury rate 
curve, LIBOR, KLIBOR, SAIBOR, etc.) and the currency benchmarks (the 
movement in the value of the currency itself).
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Incidentally, these two benchmarks are unique in that they not only form the bulk of 
market risk exposures for most entities, especially financial institutions, but also 
directly confront the greatest of prohibitions in the economic doctrine in the Shari’a: 
the prohibition of Riba.  With that, one, essentially, has two choices in attempting to 
deal with the challenges posed by the volatilities in the movements of interest rates 
and currencies.  
 
One choice is to side-step the perception of the existence of Riba in derivative 
transactions that are designed to hedge interest rate and currency exposures. This 
essentially means avoiding the exploration of the causes and effects of the interest 
rate and currency volatilities and the possible mitigants to the challenges posed by 
their existence. Accordingly, the supporters of this choice either decide to preclude 
derivative instruments all together or alternatively camouflage it somehow (insertion 
of a commodity, Wa’ad, etc.) to give it the appearance of a legitimate Shari’a-
compliant transaction.   
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The second choice is to attempt to examine the supposed relationship between the 
hedging endeavours of entities and the engagement in usurious transactions that are a 
type of injustice and consequently form the focus of the prohibition in Islamic 
jurisprudence.  This section and the next elaborate the intent of proceeding along the 
path of the second choice since it has become apparent after the examination in the 
preceding chapters that the first choice has resulted in self-contradictory and 
economically-deficient outcomes (e.g., risk sharing vs. risk transfer, superficial 
financial engineering, negative externalities, etc.).   
 
One can begin with the vagueness surrounding the permissibility of the utilization of 
the interest rate benchmarks to manage this particular type of market risk exposure. 
Once more, the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy Resolution No. 63/1/7 in 
1992 shall serve as a starting point, where it has stated that the: “sale and purchase of 
the index are not permissible for they are pure gambling and constitute the sale of 
something fictitious (something that does not exist)” (IRTI, 2000, p. 133).  
 
Sixteen years later, the AAOIFI, presumably upon realizing that the Jeddah-based 
OIC Academy Ruling has been deemed ambiguous in an industry that has been 
increasingly using LIBOR as a benchmark for some Islamic transactions (e.g., 
leasing, Sukuk, etc.), decided to issue its Shari‟a Standard 27 in 2006 which 
attempted to both allow for and regulate the use of LIBOR in the Islamic finance 
industry.  
 
In effect, the AAOIFI Shari’a Standard 27 permitted the following forms of usage of 
indices: “[5/1] It is permissible in the Shari‟a to use indices to discern the magnitude 
of change in a certain market…[5/3] It is permissible to use an index like LIBOR, or 
a certain share/commodity price index, as a basis for determining the profit of a 
Murabaha pledge…[5/4] It is permissible to use the index to determine the portion of 
the variable Ujra (rent) that represents the return” (AAOIFI, 2010, p. 489). As for the 
prohibitions, the AAOIFI Shari‟a Standard 27 stated that: “[6/1] Shari‟a prohibits 
trading in indices or taking advantage of their changes in the financial markets, 




an index, and without selling or buying the real assets which the index represents or 
any other asset. Such dealing is prohibited even if it is practiced for the sake of 
hedging against potential risk…[6/5] It is prohibited in Shari‟a to connect the amount 
of a cash debt, at the time of lending, to the price index” (AAOIFI, 2010, pp. 489-
490).  
 
Moreover, in a bid to not appear out of harmony with the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic 
Fiqh Academy Resolution, the AAOIFI Shari’a Standard 27 has specifically 
mentioned the OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy ruling in the Appendix to its own 
Standard after having explained the rationale for its approval.  The rationale being 
that: 
“Developing indices is permissible in Shari‟a because they constitute a method of 
forecasting and a means of observing the state of circumstances (inferences). 
Resorting to inferences is a well-recognized practice in judicature and financial 
transactions. Ibnul Qay’yam [sic] in his book on Judicial Methods presented a 
number of proofs on permissibility of using inferences. Permissibility of using 
indices to forecast the market situation is derived from acceptability of using 
inferences for judgment. As indicated above, Shari‟a does not object to using 
inferences to make current or future judgment based on past events, or to initiate 
practical actions in the light of probable developments. Selling or buying indices is 
prohibited because it is nothing more than payment or receipt of money for the mere 
existence of a certain reading or figure. Such an act constitutes a form of gambling 
and an illegal act of gaining money. Hence, prohibition of selling or buying indices 
has been well emphasized by the Resolution of the [Jeddah-based] International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy which states that is not permissible to sell or buy an index 
because this constitutes pure gambling. It is an act of selling an imaginary object that 
never exists” (AAOIFI, 2010, p. 493). 
 
The roots of the aforementioned rationale by AAOIFI, which does demonstrate a 
shift in how the Islamic scholarly community conceptualize interest rate benchmarks, 
may have very well been influenced by the writings of Justice Usmani, the Chairman 
of the AAOIFI Shari’a Board, who wrote an opinion, possibly in recognition of the 
contemporary difficulties facing Islamic financial institutions, in 2002 within his An 
Introduction to Islamic Finance that argued:  
“Many institutions financing by way of murabahah [sic] determine their profit or 
market-up on the basis of the current interest rate, mostly using LIBOR. (Inter-bank 
offered rate in London) as the criterion. For example, if LIBOR is 6 per cent, they 
determine their mark-up on murabahah equal to LIBOR or some percentage above 
LIBOR. This practice is often criticized on the ground that profit based on a rate of 
interest should be as prohibited as interest itself. No doubt, the use of the rate of 




certainly makes the transaction resemble an interest-based financing, at least in 
appearance, and keeping in view the severity of prohibition of interest, even this 
apparent resemblance should be avoided as far as possible” (Usmani, 2002, p. 48).  
 
One has to admit that, based on these arguments, that it is hard to rationalize the 
persistent refusal by the Shari’a scholars in allowing derivative instruments in 
hedging contexts for interest rate exposures. For they are clearly not related to the 
expressed reasons for the rational, namely pure gambling, illegal act of gaining 
money, or the sale of an imaginary object that never exists. Moreover, it is not 
entirely understood how could the statement of discerning the magnitude of the 
change in a certain market, which was preceded by pointing to the need to measure 
market situations to forecast future developments before they take place in order to 
facilitate investment decisions (in section 2/2 of the AAOIFI ruling), could be related 
to anything other than developing expectations for investment purposes and 
managing the risks associated with those expectations. These include the interest rate 
(and currency risk) exposures, which have been shown to be mostly non-core in 
nature, that are due to the entrance into contracts that are a part of an entity‟s normal 
operations (i.e., core functions) and consequently form an integral component of its 
financial statement as well as its asset-liability management framework.  
 
Furthermore, such an inconsistent position does pose its own set of questions, the 
answers to which are important in order to begin to produce a cohesive juridical 
position that can be a formidable basis to the current policy of prohibiting interest 
rate derivative contracts for hedging purposes: Firstly, how could LIBOR be 
prohibited because it is an imaginary object that never exists (or a “theoretical 
construct” as per some respondents), and at the same time be allowed for usage in 
determining the profit rate in Shari’a-compliant transactions? In effect, according to 
this Shari’a stance one cannot receive cash flows, revenues, or even be subject to its 
associated liability due to the passing of an imaginary event.   
 
Secondly, how is hedging classified as pure gambling? This is, once more, a 
significant query since this hedging-gambling association is a recurring theme in 




down into the comments by some of the respondents, particularly in the academics, 
Shari’a scholars, and legal experts group.  This is despite the fact, as has been argued 
at length in previous chapters, that hedging is actually the opposite of gambling in 
that the hedging parties choose not to “play” the financial markets and, as a result, be 
at the mercy of its rises and falls.  
 
Thirdly, in a manner similar to the second question above but with a focus on Riba, 
how is it that the usage of interest rate benchmarks is determined by the standard-
setting bodies as a key means that transforms commercial transactions from being 
legitimate to being Ribawi (usurious) financial ones because it is an “illegal act of 
gaining money,” and at the same time be permitted in the Islamic finance industry by 
one of the chief proponents for the prohibition of interest-rate derivatives, even for 
hedging purposes?  
 
Effectively, the position of the standard-setting bodies goes against the arguments 
advanced by Justice Usmani himself in his book in 2002 wherein he  stated: “But one 
should not ignore the fact that the most important requirement for the validity of 
murabahah [sic] is that it is a genuine sale with all its ingredients and necessary 
consequences…merely using the interest rate as a benchmark for determining the 
profit of murabahah does not render the transaction as invalid, haram [sic] or 
prohibited, because the deal itself does not contain interest” (Usmani, 2002, p. 48).  
 
Eventually, it becomes clear, yet again, upon closer analysis of the discourse on 
interest rate derivatives that the fear of gambling behaviour, not the prospect of 
indulging in Riba, by the users of these derivative instruments is ever present in 
setting the context for the rulings by the standard-setting bodies.  With that, one may 
estimate that the actual fear exists primarily due to the involvement of an ambiguous 
fusion of the concepts that define the risk transfer strategy by way of derivative 
hedging instruments and the explicit proscriptions in Islam. Nevertheless, this fear is 
still perplexing because the answers to alleviating it are implicit in the prohibitive 





More specifically, it appears that the invocation of Maslaha (public interest) in 
contentious contexts, such as the usage of LIBOR in rent contracts with very little 
relation to interest rate movements in the capital markets, is permissible if there is a 
legitimate commercial transaction in the real economy. Other analogies used include 
the allowance for using the profit margins of alcoholic beverage producers in 
determining the profit margins of halal beverage producers.
116
 Needless to say, this 
divergent stance begs the important question of: How are pure hedgers precluded 
from using LIBOR to hedge their interest rate risk exposure that is derived from 
legitimate and genuine transactions in the real economy?   
 
Notwithstanding the above, even the restricted acceptance of the use of interest rate-
based benchmarks in an Islamic economy could not mask the unease in its presence 
in the Islamic finance industry as evidenced by the continuing calls by Shari’a 
scholars and Islamic economists for the development of an Islamic benchmark that is 
disassociated from any appearance of usury. Justice Usmani himself, having 
elaborated his rationale for the acceptance of LIBOR in certain contexts, was one of 
the main advocates calling for an Islamic benchmark for Shari’a-compliant pricing 
and discounting in the Islamic finance industry (Usmani, 2002, p. 49).  To be sure, he 
was not the first and will certainly not be the last to delve into an issue that is still far 
from settled. 
 
The discourse into the development of an Islamic benchmark appears to have started 
in the early 1980s with the debates surrounding the pricing of assets in an Islamic 
economy.  It could be conjectured that the impetus for that exercise is the belief 
among some academics that Islamic assets should somehow be priced differently 
from conventional assets, arguably because the current interest rate-based 
benchmarks are not only Islamically impressible, but also economically deficient.  
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The notable suggestions that ensued comprised the use of the rates of return on 
comparable projects (Zarqa, 1983), the rate of profit in the economy (Azhar, 1992), 
the market average rate of return (El-Ashkar, 1995), the rate of returns on deposits of 
different maturities (Khan, 1991), the “true” opportunity cost of venture capital 
(Ahmad, 1994, p. 15; Zarqa, 1983, p. 190)
117
, and rate of return on government paper 
collateralized against development and infrastructure projects which are deemed to 
be analogous to the return on the real sector of the economy (Haque & Mirakhor, 




The aforementioned propositions that call for Islamic benchmarks are important 
insofar as it seems that the invocation of Maslaha in allowing the usage of interest 
rate benchmarks, such as LIBOR, for hedging legitimate interest rate exposures is 
impeded due to the views by some Shari’a scholars and some respondents (in the 
academics, Shari’a scholars, and legal experts group) that there is a very real 
prospect of instigating an Islamic benchmark that would re-orient all the 
opportunities and challenges to permissible channels. Consequently, taking a look at 
the substance of some of those Islamic benchmark propositions may be warranted in 
order to ascertain the soundness of that belief. 
 
With that, one can start with the assertion that there may be economic arguments that 
preclude the viability of some of these suggestions as well as ones that offer the 
potential to improve the feasibility of others. This, obviously, is normal in economic 
thought where even in the conventional finance sphere, such a work-in-progress 
mentality for benchmark formulation is common.  In effect, it is similar economic 
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argumentation that, in a bid to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
financial markets, instigated a market movement to the usage of LIBOR for pricing 
which was deemed to be superior in its ability to reflect the base rate for investment 
decisions than the Treasury rates (due to lack of favourable tax treatment and 
regulatory capital restrictions) (Hull, 2009, p. 75). 
 
Thus, if the Islamic finance industry is keen on developing a benchmark that can be 
used as a base rate that is more reflective of its substance and operations, then it is 
wholeheartedly believed that they should be encouraged to do so with the caveat that 
it should be built on empirically-tested economic argumentation. A starting point can 
be to formally acknowledge that the constant appeals for a zero rate of time 
preference (i.e., no time value of money) are not supported in the Shari’a and are 
simply not a practical means, grounded in theory, to explain the behaviour of 
economic agents with resources through time.
119
 For it is apparent that Islamic 
jurisprudence allows parties to factor in the uncertainties associated with the time 
element in some transactions such as Murabaha and Salam whereby the pricing for 
the settlement of a spot transaction is different from the pricing in transactions that 
involve payment, in money or product, through time.  
 
To that point, it should be recognized in the Islamic finance discourse on market risk 
management that, in terms of the practicality of the usage of a base rate in the capital 
markets, the rationale for the existence of a base rate is that the variability in the 
movement in the pricing of a particular asset or liability should be studied in 
reference to some benchmark or some minimum rate of return that the investor has to 
exceed (Bernstein, 1996, p. 261). Notably, this goes beyond the advocated usage by 
one of the respondents in the practitioner group of the zero-beta portfolio rate of 
return in Islamic finance, which he later admitted is very similar to the base rate.    
 
To be certain, one may be able to tailor that minimum rate of return to be derived 
from the movement of the returns of comparable projects or asset classes for better 
measurement and evaluation of outcomes; however, these are unlikely to be lower 
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than the lowest rate of return in international markets (e.g., LIBOR, Treasuries, zero-
beta portfolio, etc.) due to many factors, not the least of which is diversification.   
Effectively, almost any asset in an economy is priced on a base rate-plus framework 
whereby even tailored minimum rates of return are placed in a particular category, or 
risk premium group, in the base rate-plus framework.   
 
Moreover, in situations where interest rate risk is a factor in a particular exposure, 
even if solely derived from the real economy (i.e., credit markets, deposits, 
receivables, etc.), time is a source of a quantifiable dimension of risk because it is the 
summation of the length of the exposure facing an entity to the risk of default and 
thus the possibility of greater volatility to its profitability (LiPuma & Lee, 2005, p. 
421). Thus, an entity that is faced with choices that relate to the receipt and the 
payment of resources over time needs to be able to decipher how their interest rate 
risk exposure relates to the base rate (and the yield curve) in the financial markets for 
the precise timeframe of the exposure (i.e., one week, one month, three month, etc.).  
 
Notwithstanding the above discussion into the development of an Islamic 
benchmark, in the realm of market risk management, it is of paramount importance 
to highlight the fact that one traditionally hedges their exposures with the exact same 
variables that impose volatility on the financial statements of the hedging entities in 
the first place.  Thus, if market risk exposures to a particular entity originated within 
the context of an economically-sound Islamic benchmark, then it would be important 
for that entity to use that benchmark for hedging purposes.  However, if the 
movements in the interest rates, as manifested by LIBOR, for example, explain the 
bulk, if not all, of the interest rate exposure then LIBOR (and not LIBOR mixed with 
some commodity price volatility) should be used as the benchmark to underlie the 
derivatives hedging contracts in order to offset the original exposure. Put differently, 
the use of LIBOR in the derivative instruments for hedging purposes is putting the 
cart behind the horse; it is not a decision taken due to some sort of affinity by the 





Notably, the recent charges (2011-2012) of the manipulations of LIBOR by large 
banking institutions, which is a shameful act, does not change the necessity of the 
utilization of LIBOR, if it is in fact the benchmark that correlates the most to the 
movements of assets and liabilities on the financial statements of the hedging 
entities.
120
 Once more, the choice of the benchmark to underlie derivative contracts 
for hedging purposes is a matter of exposure and not a matter of a debate on which 
benchmark should normatively be used by the hedging community to counterbalance 
market risk exposures.  
 
With that foregoing exploration of the use of interest-rate benchmarks as an 
underlying variable in derivative hedging transactions, one can turn to the issues 
surrounding the usage of foreign exchange rate movements for market risk 
management purposes.  
 
Section II: Permissibility of the Underlying Variables: Currency 
Benchmarks 
 
As was done in the previous section, the examination of the permissibility of 
transacting in currencies as variables to underlie derivative instruments for hedging 
purposes shall start with the resolutions articulated by the various standard-setting 
bodies. For this, the Jeddah-based OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, in deliberating the 
issue of the inclusion of currencies in forward transactions, during its Seventh 
Session in May, 1992 (i.e., Resolution No. 63/1/7) decided that the “purchase and 
sale of currencies are not permissible [in the forward markets]” (IRTI, 2000, p. 133). 
This view was reaffirmed later in their Resolution 102/5/11 in November 1998 
wherein it was stated: “It is not permissible in Shari’a to sell currencies by deferred 
sale, and it is not permissible, still, to fix a date for exchanging them” (IRTI, 2000, p. 
236). 
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Interestingly, the Academy, in its Twelfth Session in September, 2000 (i.e., 
Resolution No. 115/9/12), also ruled in a related issue, namely Inflation and 
Currency Value, in a manner that confirmed its view that was given earlier in 
December, 1988 (i.e., Resolution No. 42/4/5 on Currency Rate Fluctuations) 
whereby it was stated: “In principle, debts that have already been created in terms of 
a certain currency should be repaid in terms of that same currency and not in terms of 
an equivalent value, because a debt has always to be settled with its exact similar” 
(IRTI, 2000, p. 263; emphasis added).   
 
Although, it appears that the resolution, which focused on the debt markets, tended to 
view exposures to any particular currency in an absolute sense, rather than a relative 
one. That is to say, it is not evident that it was recognized by the Academy that the 
risks of foreign currency exposures are not confined to the inflation in the country of 
the home currency, as such, but rather to inflation (among other factors) in the home 
country in relation to inflation (among other factors) that affect the home currency of 




Thus, with these resolutions of the Academy, one can discern that the overall 
directive is perhaps that entities with operations that entail cross-border trade and 
investment are required to assume the open currency risks that are associated with 
the transaction. Consequently, if two firms, one in Malaysia and the other in Saudi 
Arabia, decide to conclude a transaction, then they would have to negotiate as to who 
will assume this market risk exposure (or how it could be shared between them).
122
  
The possibility of utilizing the risk transfer strategy by way of derivative contracts, 
with currencies as underlying variables, in order to assist entities with inclinations 
toward the implementation of Shari’a directives, is apparently precluded.
123
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Moreover, in the context of derivatives, it is not certain how, as mentioned in the 
resolution that deals with Inflation and Currency Value, the assurance of the payment 
and receipt of cash flows in the home currency due to the utilization of a derivative 
contract (e.g., indexation) is related to Gharar (excessive uncertainty) and Jahala 
(ignorance). In particular, it was stated by the Academy that in dealing with different 
values at different points of time that there is the very real potential that “both parties 
will not be in a position to know what will be the commitment at the end” (IRTI, 
2000, p. 264).  
 
The uncertainty in the proper comprehension of that position emanates from three 
main aspects: Firstly, at the transactional-level, it is the market norm in international 
trade and investment that the payment and receipt of currency in whatever 
transaction is already pre-agreed upon in the contract that regulates the transaction. 
Secondly, even if there is a form of indexation to another benchmark, through 
perhaps the inclusion of a financial institution as an intermediary, the expected value 
is determined, and can be locked, in advance in the derivatives markets and its actual 
value throughout the period of engagement is transparently communicated to both 
parties by the financial press. Thirdly, as stated in an earlier chapter, Kamali (2000) 
has shown that many distinguished Shari’a scholars (e.g., Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Al-
Qayyim, etc.) have allowed setting a transacting price in the future based on the 
market price prevailing at the time of the exchange if it is agreeable to both parties 
and clear enough to eliminate dispute.  
 
The AAOIFI, for its part, despite the absence of any Standard focused specifically on 
derivative instruments, did formulate the Shari’a Standard Number 1 – Trading in 
Currencies, adopted by the AAOIFI Shari’a Board in May, 2000, which states:  
“It is prohibited to enter into forward currency contracts. This rule applies whether 
such contracts are effected through the exchange of deferred transfers of debt or 
through the execution of a deferred contract in which the concurrent possession of 
both the counter values by both parties does not take place. It is also prohibited to 
deal in the forward currency market even if the purpose is hedging to avoid a loss of 
profit on a particular transaction effected in a currency whose value is expected to 
decline. It is permissible for the institution to hedge against the future devaluation of 
the currency by recourse to the following: a.) To execute back to back interest free 
loans using different currencies without receiving any extra benefit, provided these 




respect to an account payment to sell goods on credit or by Murabaha (asset sale) in 




Having delineated the most pertinent resolutions by the standard-setting bodies in 
regards to the forward dealings in currencies, it may be appropriate at this juncture to 
discuss the justification for the formulation of the opinions contained therein in order 
to develop a greater degree of understanding of the basis and reasoning behind the 
prohibitive judgements that were articulated.  For this, it has been explicitly declared 
by the standard-setting bodies that the basis for the general prohibition in the dealing 
of currencies in the forward market is the literal translation by Shari’a scholars of 
some of the Ahadith by the Prophet (PBUH).   
 
One of the Ahadith was reported by „Ubadah Ibn Al-Samit stating: “Gold for gold, 
silver for silver – until he said – equal for equal, like for like, hand to hand, and if the 
kinds of assets differ, you may sell them as you wish provided that it is hand to 
hand” (AAOIFI, 2010, p. 21).  In a second Hadith, it was reported by Abu Sa‟id Al-
Khudri that the Prophet (PBUH) said “Do not sell gold for gold except equal to equal 
and do not sell what is deferred for a spot exchange” (AAOIFI, 2010, p. 21).   
 
Upon a closer examination of the literature surrounding these Ahadith, it may 
become obvious that, despite some early divergence in their interpretation by some 
leading Shari’a scholars (Al-Amine, 2008, pp. 84-86; Islahi, 2005, p. 52), most 
Shari’a scholars agree that the „Illah (efficient cause) for their elaboration 
concentrate on the prohibition of Riba, with its two forms being: a.) Riba Al-Fadl 
where items are exchanged on the spot, in different quantities (e.g., 1 oz. of gold for 
1.1 oz. of gold on the spot) and b.) Riba Al-Nasi’ah which entails the exchange of 
items for a deferred period (e.g., 1 oz. of gold for 1.5 oz. of gold in the forward 
market) (Obaidullah, 2005, pp. 24-25). Moreover, it has been decided by the 
Makkah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy in its Fifth Session in February, 1982 that in 
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conforming to the rules of Qiyas that the items in the Ahadith are mentioned in the 
context of their utilization as Thamaniyya (money) and thus money, whatever its 




The use of Qiyas in the above context, in time, has evolved into the usage of the 
Ahadith to develop a juridical opinion in regards to ‘Aqd Al-Sarf (currency exchange 
contract), with Sarf being defined by Al-Zuhayli as “the exchange of one monetary 
form for another in the same genera, i.e. gold for gold coins, gold for silver, silver for 
gold, etc., whether it is in the form of jewellery or minted coins. Such trading is 
allowed since the Prophet (PBUH) permitted the exchange of properties for which 
Riba applied hand-to-hand in equal quantities in the same genus, or with difference 
in quantities in different genera” (Al-Zuhayli & El-Gamal, 2003, p. 281). In short, 
the conceptualization of Riba Al-Fadl and Riba Al-Nasi’ah applies to trading in 
money as characterized by currencies.  
 
Thus, with an emphasis on the prohibition of Riba Al-Fadl, it is not permitted to 
enter into a contract to trade currencies of the same Jins (genre) for different amounts 
in the spot market (i.e., USD 10 for USD 11).  Similarly, while it is permitted to 
agree to exchange in currencies of different Jins in different quantities on the spot 
(i.e., 6.7 Egyptian Pounds for 1 USD), it is not acceptable to transact in currencies of 
different Jins for different quantities in the future (i.e., 6.7 Egyptian Pounds for 1 
USD in the future) due to the Riba Al-Nasi’ah proscription.   
 
There are, of course, a few points of contention here that should be elucidated in 
regards to the all-encompassing interpretations given in a seemingly wholesale 
fashion to any form of transacting in currencies in the forward market, even if it is 
done in order to manage market risk exposures.  The first, which has been argued 
repeatedly in the previous chapters, is that derivative transactions are not debt 
instruments with unique debtor-creditor relationship between the parties, which is the 
context in which the aforementioned Ahadith are to be understood.   
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Essentially, the proscription was targeting the banning of the use of the items that can 
be regarded as money as subject matter in Ribawi (usurious) contracts despite having 
the appearance of innocuous purchase and sale transactions.  In fact, these Ahadith 
are likely related to the often quoted verse in the Quran on Riba where it was stated:  
“Those who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as 
one stands who is being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, 
"Trade is [just] like Riba." But Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden Riba. So 
whoever has received an admonition from his Lord and desists may have what is 
past, and his affair rests with Allah. But whoever returns to [dealing in usury] - those 
are the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein (Quran: 2:275; 
emphasis added)” 
 
In this context, the proscription in the Shari’a of the two sales in one becomes an 
effective enforcer of the Riba prohibition to confront seemingly clever structuring of 
usurious transactions by scrupulous money lenders under the guise of trade.  
Specifically, it was argued by Al-Qaradawi, in agreement with the interpretation of 
Ibn Qayyim, that the proscription of the two sales in one preclude the ability of one 
party to say to another “I will sell you this item on a deferred basis for one hundred 
dirhams, for instance, on the condition that I buy it from you immediately after 
selling it to you now for eighty” (Al-Amine, 2008, p. 265; Al-Qaradawi, 1987, p. 
53). Effectively, with the requirement of having items in spot transactions being of 
the same genre to have the same quantity and the proscription of joining two sales in 
one, the prospect of Riba Al-Fadl is eliminated because it becomes a value-less 
transaction to the parties of the contract.  
 
Notably, a dissimilar situation arises in the endeavours to implement the religious 
commands in regards to Riba Al-Nasi’ah in the forward markets whereby, in a pure 
debt setting, a party pre-pays another party a particular form of money (Gold, Silver, 
USD, MYR, SAR, etc.) and agrees to be paid back at a particular point (or points) in 
time in the future either the same or a different form of money with an added 
premium. Here, it should be appreciated that the items included in the Ahadith were 
not only standardized, but also had prices that were generally stable during the time 
of the Prophet (PBUH) and the period of the first four Califs where it was observed, 
for example, that the ratio of gold to silver at that time was a constant 1:10 (Chapra, 





To return to the topic of the utilization of derivative instruments for market risk 
management purposes, it is perhaps difficult to comprehend the argument that 
purports that currencies should be viewed as gold and silver, as existing in 7
th
 
century Arabia, and should, therefore, not be traded in the forward markets. At a 
basic level, the inclusion of the time factor ought to be properly contextualized in the 
above Ahadith in that the prohibitions contained therein are likely to have a deeper 
meaning than the one contained in the propositions calling for the institutionalization 
of a zero time value of money (i.e., spot price should always equal forward price in 
an Islamic economy). For as discussed in the previous section, it is evident that the 
classification of Riba, in contemporary settings that include the consideration of 
Maslaha (public interest), is moving in the direction of granting more credence to the 
nature, or substance, of the transaction.  
 
Thus, it can be argued that the unease in Islamic jurisprudence should be focusing on 
the trading of currencies in the forward markets in a “naked” manner whereby there 
is no clear linkage to the real sector that can serve as a foundation to justify the 
transaction. Essentially, this view can be considered to espouse a sound position that 
promotes the proper consideration of the origin of the exposure in the first place 
which in true hedging transactions is generated from activities tied to the real sector.  
 
That is, it is neither a lending transaction within the framework of Riba nor a contract 
of Maysir (gambling) trading in variables that are built on a superficial exchange of 
money. To that end, if one closely examines the acceptance of Salam contracts, 
which is by its very nature a forward contract (with a financing element), in Islamic 
jurisprudence by the Prophet (PBUH) when he arrived to Madinah, they may not find 
a large degree in divergence in how a transaction on the face of it may be viewed as 
prohibited, but is ruled as acceptable due to the legitimacy of the practical need.  
 
Accordingly, it may be contended that proper contextualization on the juridical 
issues surrounding the utilization of currencies was not undertaken in a 




have evolved; for surely it is not the intention of God to limit the currency 
transactions, even if it is done on a forward basis, that underlie legitimate trade 
amongst mankind.  With that, it could be inferred from the literature and the 
interviews that the apprehension of the Shari’a scholars and some of the respondents 
across the interviewed groups is actually in the dealings of money between 
individuals in a manner that is formalized by a contract where there is no reference in 
the contract to any specific genuine and real sector transaction (hence the advent of 
the commodity Murabaha structures). To illustrate, it was acknowledged by many of 
the respondents that the sale transaction with a tangible underlying asset, even if 
superficial, is the justification for the transaction in order to avoid the money-for-
money characterization.  
 
For that, the research turns to the nature of money in Islam to shed light on its usage, 
particularly in the form of interest rate and currency benchmarks, in the derivative 
markets. 
 
Section III: The Nature of Money in Islam 
 
The conceptualization of money in Islamic jurisprudence is a controversial matter 
whose discourse is almost completely centred on the prohibition of Riba.
126
 This, it 
can be argued, is partly due to the seemingly rigid interpretations of the scripture by 
some the Shari’a scholars in mostly descriptive terms with little engagement with 
economic theory in what is essentially an economic subject matter. With that, it 
should be stated that monetary economics with its focus on exploring the behaviour 
of economic agents with money (Brunner & Meltzer, 1971; Keynes, 1937; 
Lavington, 1968; Marshall, 1923; Tobin, 1956, 1965) is outside the scope of the 
research. There are some of its elements, however, that will be used to contextualize 
some of the opinions that have been transmitted in regards to money in Islamic 
thought. 
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 However, it was not just Islamic jurisprudence that conveyed the potential evils of money and the 
institution of usury that surrounded its existence.  These beliefs go back as early at the time of 
Aristotle who was sceptical of the unnatural usage of “barren” money to generate profit.  This 




At this stage, it is best to begin with a deeper understanding of the concept of money 
and what is meant by the slippery term along with the reasoning for its existence. 
The unit of account characterization presents itself first where from the dawn of time 
humans have sought to account for what is theirs.  In time, the simple calculation of 
the wealth of an individual and his/her income, as an economic agent that seeks to 
undertake rational decision-making, necessitated the existence of a common 
denominator, or a single numeraire, in order to gauge the values of objects (not only 
their number) with greater precision (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991; Simmel & 
Frisby, 2004).  
 
To this, Simmel offers a particularly rich conceptualization in the usage of and 
rationale for the unit of account functionality of money, as the numeraire in society, 
by teaching his readers that: 
“[T]he superstructure of money relations erected above qualitative reality determine 
much more radically the inner image of reality according to its forms. The 
mathematical character of money imbues the relationship of the elements of life with 
a precision, a reliability in the determination of parity and disparity, an 
unambiguousness in agreements and arrangements in the same way as the general 
use of pocket watches has brought about a similar effect in daily life. Like the 
determination of abstract value by money, the determination of abstract time by 
clocks provides a system for the most detailed and definite arrangements and 
measurements that imparts an otherwise unattainable transparency and calculability 
to the contents of life, at least as regards their practical management. The calculating 
intellectuality embodied in these forms may in its turn derive from them some of the 
energy through which intellectuality controls modern life” (Simmel & Frisby, 2004, 
p. 445). 
 
To be certain, the relevancy of the eloquent viewpoint imparted by Simmel is 
dependent on the dynamic relationship that exists between the unit of account 
characteristics of money with the second defining trait of money: medium of 
exchange. Specifically, the rationale for the utilization of money as a unit of account 
can be considered to be largely a factor of the realization by economic agents in 
society that its standardization leads to systemic efficiency, due to less pricing 
uncertainty, if it is used as a medium of exchange in trade and investment.  
 
This is especially true in increasingly specialized economies that depend on trade 




takes place (Thornton, 2000, p. 53). In effect, the reduction in the pricing uncertainty 
is a product of having the market forces achieving a balance in what Weber calls 
“conflict of interests and compromises” between economic agents in a society in 
regards to the price of money vis-à-vis other objects (Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 1978, 
p. 108).  
 
Interestingly, due to the focus on the prohibition of Riba in Islamic jurisprudence, the 
literature on the use of money as a medium of exchange is particularly rich in Islamic 
thought.  Among the notable Islamic writers who understood, and wrote on, the 
important role money plays in promoting commerce are Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and 
Al-Ghazali. For Ibn Rushed, “Justice in transactions lies in approximating 
equivalence. So, when realizing equivalence between different things was found to 
be almost impossible, dinar and dirham were made to evaluate them, that is, measure 
them. As between different kind of commodities, I mean those which can neither be 
weighed nor measured, justice lies in their being proportionate. The ratio of the value 
of one thing to its kind should be equal to the ratio of the other things to that thing‟s 
kind” (Ibn Rushd, 1998, p. 135; Islahi, 2005). 
 
Al-Ghazali, for his part, viewed the existence of money being derived from the need for:  
“[A] measure on the basis of which price can be determined, because the exchanged 
commodities are neither of the same type, nor of the same measure which can 
determine how much quantity of one commodity is a just price for 
another.  Therefore, all these commodities need a mediator to judge their exact 
value… Allah Almighty has, therefore, created dirhams and dinars (money) as 
judges and mediators between all commodities so that all objects of wealth are 
measured through them…that is why Allah has created them, so that they may be 
circulated between hands and act as a fair judge between different commodities and 
work as a medium to acquire other things…Therefore, there was needed a thing 
which in its appearance is nothing, but in its essence is everything.  The thing which 
has no particular form may have different forms in relation to other things like a 
mirror which has no colour, but it reflects every colour. The same is the case of 
money.  It is not an objective in itself, but it is an instrument to lead to all 
objectives” (Al-Ghazali, n.d., p. 348; Usmani, 2010). 
 
These writings, especially in their explicit reference to “justice” can be discerned to 
follow, and elaborate on, the specific instructions of the Prophet (PBUH) for the 
prohibition of the earlier described Riba Al-Fadl, whereby it was narrated by Muslim 




(PBUH) with some high quality dates, and the Prophet (PBUH) inquired about their 
source. Bilal explained that he traded two volumes of his lower quality dates for one 
volume of the higher quality dates in the market. The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) 
said: "this is precisely the forbidden Riba! Do not do this. Instead, sell the first type 
of dates, and use the proceeds to buy the other" (Muslim).  
 
Thus, the unit of account and medium of exchange functionality of money in Islamic 
thought are thought to transcend the exclusive focus on the realm of the preference 
for systemic efficiency and also include the requirement for clarity and justice in the 
economic dealings between individuals. In essence, the prohibitions of Riba Al-Fadl 
and Gharar, as elucidated by the Prophet (PBUH), hold an intimate relationship in 
providing guidance for greater human well-being through transparent cooperation.  
 
This was well articulated, but in more neutral terms in regards to well-being, by 
Simmel, in that he stated: „Exactness, precision, and rigour in the economic 
relationships in life, which naturally affect other aspects of life as well, run parallel 
to the extension of monetary matters (Simmel & Frisby, 2004, pp. 444-445). With 
that, as with the axiom of Alghonom Bialghorom, the fact that these economic-
centred directives were elaborated in the seventh century, much earlier than their 
conceptualization in economic theory in the past few centuries, especially the 20
th
 
century, should be a source of pride to Muslim economists. 
 
Up to this point, and after discussing the unit of account and medium of exchange 
roles of money, there does not appear to be much disputation in the conceptualization 
of money between western and Islamic thought.  However, as the discourse evolves 
into the third and final role for money, namely storage of value, the divergence in 
conceptualization of money begins to emerge. Once more, there are indications in the 
literature of the presence of a fear in the engagement of Riba in the conscience of 
Shari’a scholars (see below) since it was consistently viewed by them that the 
dealings of money between individuals, if unregulated, amount to indulgence in Riba 




Along the same lines, some of the respondents demonstrated the importance of the 
time value of money debate within the discourse. 
 
It is not self-evident how the fear of the exchanging and the saving of money as a 
store of value for transactions and investment (not necessarily in the credit realm) 
turned in contemporary settings to a focus on commodities as a means to ensure the 
avoidance of Riba. Commodities, of course, being defined in modern-day settings as 
something with ample supply and demand that is standardized, homogenous, and 
reasonably durable.  
 
One may conjecture that the earlier mentioned verse in the Quran stating: “But Allah 
has permitted trade and has forbidden Riba” (Quran: 2:275) was interpreted by some, 
including one of the respondents who is a well-known academic with numerous 
publications (articles and books) focusing on the Islamic finance industry, not as an 
indication by God that trade and usury should not be thought of as one in the same 
for those who seek to pursue usurious money lending under the banner of trade, but 
rather that God was specifying economic dealings to be exclusively divided between 
individuals as either trade or Riba (i.e., mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive). The appreciation of this difference in interpretation is fundamental in 
order to understand the constant push for commodities to underlie any Islamic 
finance product where no clear asset is discernible even if the transaction is actually 
linked to the real economy (e.g., market risk management). 
 
With that, one may both agree and disagree with the statements by some Shari’a 
scholars and academics regarding the use of commodities in Islamic finance as an 
objective test of legitimacy (Al-Amine, 2008; BMB, 2010, p. 132; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 
2007, p. 209; Usmani, 2010).
127
  True, money should not be treated as a commodity 
to be used with no real commercial rationale that is clearly linked to the real 
economy, the end result of which is probably associated with either Riba or Maysir.  
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 Obviously, one of the problems in the focus on commodities as a legitimate form of exchange is 
that it starts a contentious debate of what items are Ribawi (usurious) commodities and cannot be a 




At the same time, the view that is expressed by several writers in the literature as 
well as shared by some respondents that money cannot be a store of value because: 
1) it is not an asset, 2) that can be an object of trade, 3) since it has no utility is 
perhaps more dependent on philosophical reasoning and less on economic substance. 
For if this is the case then what is essentially being proposed entails the complete 
reformulation of economic theories and an overhaul of the accounting practice (as 
will be discussed in the next section). That is not to say that this extreme measure is 
not impossible; however, its serious undertaking requires more than a passing 
philosophical argument by its adherents. 
 
It may be necessary at this stage to discuss the characterization of the storage of 
value functionality of money in Islamic thought, which requires delving into some of 
the perspectives that deal with the property rights of individuals (and entities) in 
Islam. For this, it should be affirmed that there is no text in the scripture that defined 
the concept of Mal (property); however, the major schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
(Maliki, Shafi‟i, Hanbalis, and Shafi‟i) do define Mal, broadly, as any „Ayn 
(corporeal) and Manfa’a (usufruct) that can bestow on its owner current or potential 
benefit (Kamali, 1997, p. 27).  Consequently, in carrying this definition to a medium 
of exchange framework, economic agents can be thought of as exchanging assets for 
their benefit. This includes the purchase of money from other economic agents in 




Notably, the bought and sold money does not have to be commodities or precious 
metals (or even any object at all for that matter). This becomes evident when one 
observes the often quoted description of the embodiment of money in society by  
Paul Samuelson, whereby he states that money is “an artificial social convention,” 
since any substance, for whatever reason, that begins to be used as money, people 
will begin to value it (Samuelson, 1998, p. 55). In fact, one may observe that this 
returns the discussion back to James‟ pragmatic theory of truth that was elaborated in 
the Research Philosophy Chapter (Chapter 2) wherein he argued that pragmatism 
propels people to have belief in the truth of an object even in the absence of clear 
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 In the context of usufruct, one is selling the use of a something, including their labour, to the other 




correspondence of thoughts and things.  Interestingly, the metaphor that he uses as an 
object in the flow of some of his argumentation is none other than money where he 
contends: “Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and 
beliefs „pass,‟ so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as 
nobody refuses them. But this all points to direct face-to-face verifications 
somewhere, without which the fabric of truth collapses like a financial system with 
no cash-basis whatever. You accept my verification of one thing, I yours of another. 
We trade on each other‟s truth. But beliefs verified concretely by somebody [sic] are 
the posts of the whole superstructure” (James, 1907, pp. 207-208). 
 
To be certain, it was not the western economic thought of the twentieth century that 
bestowed on money this abstract qualification. For even within the realm of early 
Islamic thought, it was reported that Umar, the second Calif (d. 644 A.D.), 
considered, but later decided against, the issuance of camel skin coins as money (Al-
Baladhuri, 1983, p. 456).
129
 That potential act was followed later by opinions by 
some of the leading Shari’a scholars, including Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Hazm, and Ibn 
Taymiyyah, who advanced the belief that custom and usage are actually the chief 
factors that determine the endowment of a particular item with the coveted title of 
“money” (Chapra, 1996, p. 5). One can estimate that this is probably due to the fact 
that, again, there is no specific text in the scripture that require the Islamic 





Thus, with the agreement that the medium of exchange functionality is, in effect, 
defined by whatever custom and usage in society determine as being worthy of the 
highly respectful money status;
131
 one should also accept that in the post-Bretton 
Woods system, the money that society has agreed upon is pure paper currency that 
entails people holding government issued pieces of paper because they are certain 
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 Umar‟s advisers were apparently fearful of excessive camel slaughter. 
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 Nonetheless, there were writings by some Shari’a scholars, such as Abu Hanifah, Al-Ghazali, and 
Ibn Khaldun, that favoured the position that gold and silver are money by nature and consequently 
other metals used as money were relegated to the Fulus category (coins of other substances) (Islahi, 
2005). 
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 Alternatively, society may choose to use the costly bartering system which has been effectively 




that others will accept the same. This certainty is derived from the collective 
agreement, even if implicit, that they (or more precisely their issuing authority as a 
representative) will limit its issuance and will share any seigniorage that accumulates 




Interestingly, this modern-day convention was acknowledged by the Jeddah-based 
OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy, in its Third Session in October, 1986, in that it stated in 
its Shari’a Rules Governing Paper Money and Currency Rates Fluctuations 
Resolution (No. 21/9/3): “Paper money is real money, possessing all characteristics 
of value, and subject to Shari‟a rules governing gold and silver vis-à-vis usury, Zakat 
[sic], Salam and all other transactions” (IRTI, 2000, p. 34). 
 
With that background into money, whatever its form, it may be difficult to 
conceptualize the argument that money as an imaginative construct that is built on 
social convention has no utility.
133
 This is because this assertion does not elaborate a 
concrete and defendable position as to why money is held by individuals in the first 
place. To address that conundrum, and without indulging too much in the diverse 
economic theories surrounding that query, it may be simply stated that money, being 
a unique asset unlike any other, provides utility that emanates from the particular 
circumstance of its users and their specific needs for its presence in their lives.  
 
To that point, Hicks, remarking on the nature of money, once wrote: “one of the 
advantages that are got from the use of money is that people do not have to pass it on 
immediately; they can choose the time of theirs purchase to suit their convenience. If 
they use this facility moderately, it is useful to them; and it does no harm to other 
people” (Hicks, 1971, p. 21; emphasis added). The moderate use of money and its 
potential harm will be explored below; however, at this stage, it should be noted that 
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 Seigniorage is the revenue accruing to the issuing authority when the exchange value of money 
issued exceeds the money‟s production cost. 
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 Justice Usmani, quoting Imam Al-Basri, makes an argument that the utility of money is derived 
when it leaves the individual in an exchange for another object (or service) (Usmani, 2010).  But he 
did not elaborate on why we choose to hold on to money in the first place; perhaps he should have 




there is inherent utility in the holding and use of money, otherwise one may discard it 
with little regard to their well-fare.  
 
In effect, money is one of the centrepieces that affect the behaviour of individuals in 
regards to choices of consumption over time (including the transfer of consumption 
capacity to inheritors).
134
 Specifically, it was stated by Marshall: “A prudent person 
will endeavour to distribute his means between all their several uses, present and 
future, in such a way that they will have in each the same marginal utility” (Marshall, 
1910, p. 119). 
 
Thus, while one may concur with some of the Shari’a scholars that money should not 
be desired for its own sake (Al-Ghazali, n.d., pp. 114-115; Ibn Al-Qayyim, 1955, p. 
137; Ibn Taymiyyah, 1963, p. 472; Islahi, 2005, p. 47), it not, however, sensible to 
assume a position that money should not viewed as an objective and a means to 
increase human well-fare, if done in a legitimate manner. Effectively, money, being a 
store of value, is an integral component of wealth.  
 
To be certain, money is not the only component of wealth; for there are many asset 
groups that can assist in allowing for the attainment of the most efficient temporal 
distribution of consumption choices (i.e., wealth management). In fact, it is 
recognized that other assets groups dominate money in their ability to manage wealth 
over time, including wealth transfer.  Yet, individuals still hold money, as a store of 
value, even if it is costly for them to do so due to inflation, and in Islamic contexts, 
the payment of Zakah (alms) on liquid funds.
135
 This is because money is unique in 
that it offers functions that other assets cannot provide, namely a cost-efficient 
medium of exchange.  
 
With that, it may be contented that the Shari’a scholars and other writers who 
continue to hold unfavourable views on the use of money as a store of value should 
perhaps re-examine the aforementioned Hadith regarding Bilal and the sale of his 
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 The temporal choices of consumption include aspects of savings/investment, production, cost of 
labour, technology, among other factors that create and preserve wealth through time.  
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dates. For it can be quite apparent, in monetary terms, that the Prophet (PBUH) 
instructed Bilal to cede ownership of his lower quality dates for the ownership of 
money as a commercial act that precedes the one entailing the forgoing of money in 
return for the ownership of the high quality dates. Notably, these two exchanges did 
not have to be simultaneous since Bilal could have sold his low quality dates on 
Monday, for example, and purchased the high quality dates a week later (possibly 
due to disagreement on the purchase price on Monday).  During that week, Bilal had 
ownership of the money from the sale of the low quality dates, essentially as a store 
of value, until he effected the high quality dates transaction.  
 
Interestingly, in this transaction, the use of money was not associated with capital, 
investment, or lending as is often done in the literature in Islamic finance when one 
speaks of money (Kahf, 2006; Khan & Mirakhor, 1994; Usmani, 2010). In effect, the 
elaboration of the aforementioned example of Bilal is significant because it really 
demonstrates that the use of money is primarily related to choices of consumption 
over time rather than simply adopting a simple and narrow view of money being a 
means for Riba. Specifically, in the case of Bilal, it was a choice of a spot transaction 
or one that is completed one week later.  
 
In trade these choices are almost limitless between the numerous operators in the real 
economy; and the amount of money held for those transactions is a factor of many 
associated and inter-related variables. These include: the wealth of the individual, 
planned volume of transactions, and the timing of receipts and payments as well as 
the size, extent, and activity of the financial markets (credit and equity). Thus, the 
discussion into the store of value characterization of money may be concluded by 
stating that money is considered a store of value because trade, by its very nature, is 
a process that takes time; and thus, anything that serves as a medium of exchange 
must be held as a store of value (Brunner & Meltzer, 1971; Thornton, 2000).  
 
There are, of course, the concerns of hoarding money with its adverse effects on the 
economy and the well-fare of economic agents within it.  This, if one would recall, 




contains many advantages to people: “If they use this facility moderately, it is useful 
to them; and it does no harm to other people” (Hicks, 1971, p. 21; emphasis added).  
The fear here, which is not peculiar to Islamic jurisprudence in that it has been an 
active issue of concern in monetary economic theory, is that the hoarding of money 
is likely to suppress economic activity and consequently create a loss of well-fare in 
society.  
 
As a background, many writers on monetary economic theory have shown that the 
hoarding of money in modern contexts is, essentially, a reaction by individuals to 
some exogenous economic factors such as economic shocks, poorly developed 
financial markets, dearth of investment opportunities, among others (Thornton, 
2000). This should be contextualized by stating that economic agents, despite the 
views to the contrary in some of the Islamic finance literature, have an incentive to 
economize their holdings of money, as part of their portfolio, in a non-zero interest 
rate (as well as profit rate) environment since money has traditionally a negative rate 
of return due to inflation and other pressures (e.g., Zakah). 
 
However, in Islamic jurisprudence, it can be clearly observed that there is a constant 
view by some of the Shari’a scholars and commentators that the holding of money 
amounts to hoarding as a deliberate malicious act of economic injustice by some 
individuals who seek to circumvent the real economy in order to generate returns on 
money lending and/or activities unlinked to the real economy (Abu Saud, 2002; Al-
Ghazali, n.d.; Al-Suwailem, 2012; Siddiqi, 1982; Usmani, 2010). This indiscriminate 
view of hoarding exists despite the fact, as was stated earlier, that money is inferior 
to other asset classes for wealth management over time. If anything, it is more 
rational for profit-maximizing individuals to hoard other asset classes especially 
those corporeal assets that are highly favoured by contemporary Shari’a scholars that 
offer more cost-efficient returns.  
 
To be certain, this distrustful position in the holding of money is not without a 
justification; for it is closely associated with the literal interpretation of the verse in 




the monks devour the wealth of people unjustly and avert [them] from the way of 
Allah . And those who hoard gold and silver and spend it not in the way of Allah - 
give them tidings of a painful punishment.” (Quran: 9:34; emphasis added).  
 
However, it should be recognized, as outlined in the second chapter on the 
philosophy of truth in Islam, that a more certain path to developing an interpretative 
conjecture (and consequently an economic policy) in Islamic jurisprudence depends 
on both the details as well as the contextual understanding of what is being 
communicated by God. In essence, it is not the nature of what is being amassed that 
should be the focus of the discourse on money in Islamic finance, but rather it is in 
the act of illegitimate amassing (i.e., malicious hoarding) itself that is forbidden in 
Islam. That is, hoarding, no matter what asset, if undertaken illegitimately, because it 
entails greed, selfishness, and deception, is an act of injustice and should therefore be 
forbidden.
136
 In fact, if one wants to be devious, they can simply rely on the literal 
translation by the Shari’a scholars in order to give themselves the juristic approval to 
circumvent the prohibition on ill-intended hoarding by focusing on the rational, 
profit-maximizing amassing of all asset classes, except gold and silver (or even 




Notably, in the circumstance of economic uncertainty and a dearth of investment 
opportunities within poorly developed markets (i.e., economic explanations for 
hoarding behaviour), one can hardly imagine that Islam, as a religion, supports the 
imposition on people to invest and expose themselves to losses or be condemned to 
“painful punishment.” Indeed, this would be very much against logic and reason as 
well as the juristic consensus in support of Al-Durariyat Al-Khamsa (five necessities) 




The above discussion on the nature of money in Islam is intended to address the 
steady association in the literature and in some of the interviews between the explicit 
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 Similarly, it is not what is being stolen that is prohibited, it is the act of stealing itself. 
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 Of course, they can use the lack of specificity in the divine instruction in the verse to show that 
they did not contravene the prohibition on not spending the money “in the way of Allah.” 
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 The Zakah in this framework can be considered a cost (or tax) to motivate investment, not a means 




prohibition of Riba in the scripture and money, which, in turn, manifests itself in the 
beliefs about benchmark variables (interest rate and currency) that underlie 
derivative instruments, which were discussed in the previous two sections. In 
particular, one should realize that in the context of Riba, the usurious credit contracts 
are a type of an asset class to the creditors, albeit an impressible one, that evolves 
from the transacting of money.  
 
In other words, it is the prohibition of usurious lending that should be the focus in 
terms of proscription not money, or financial instruments whose value is related to 
money (e.g., derivatives). For in the realm of commerce, the purchase and sale of a 
prohibited item (e.g., wine, pork, etc.) are effected with money, yet one does not 
usually charge money with the commitment of the prohibited act since it is the act 
itself that is prohibited.  
 
The aforementioned distinction is significant insofar as it allows for the existence of 
financial instruments, such as derivatives, which serve as market risk management 
tools with benchmarks that are built on money as an underlying, whether in terms of 
interest rates or currencies. The relevancy of this becomes apparent in hedging 
contexts with little, if any, relationship with the credit markets or any gambling 
activities.  
 
With that, and given that derivative instruments are monetary contracts that serve to 
hedge balance sheet exposures by employing a contrarian market risk transfer 
methodology, it is important to also shed light on some of the side-effects of the 
prohibition of these instruments, especially in relation to the formal recognition of 
the derivative contracts. This becomes especially pertinent since in the course of the 
interviews, the opinions revolving around the form and modality of the recognition 
of the derivative instrument by the majority of the respondents, across the groups, 
who commented on the matter were found to be vague (and even contradictory) by 





To illustrate, one of the ambiguous rationales that was communicated was in regards 
to the accounting classification of derivative instruments (particularly Islamic swaps) 
throughout their duration wherein the confusion surrounding the tangible vis-à-vis 
the intangible characteristics were manifested in the inconsistent designations of 
assets and liabilities. Another remarkable comment by one of the chief architects of 
the TMA is that these contracts do not have (monetary) value. 
 
Section IV: The Recognition of the Derivative Contract 
 
The importance of delving into the formal recognition of the derivative contracts in 
the financial statements of the entities that use them stems from the quintessential 
reason for their existence. Effectively, in a hedging context, any particular derivative 
instrument is designed to ensure that the economic factors that contribute to the 
worsening of the balance sheet position of a hedging entity are largely offset by the 
rise in the value of the derivative instrument. That is, the gain (loss) on the balance 
sheet of the entity as a result of the market risk exposure will be offset by a loss 
(gain) on the derivative instrument. This defining element of the usage of derivative 
instruments for market risk management necessitates the presence of accounting 
rules that acknowledge this practice and ensure that it is communicated to the 
readers, including regulators, of the financial statements in the most transparent 
manner possible. In fact, one of the respondents in the practitioners group who 
focuses on rating has confirmed that the assurance of transparency is of importance 
in the rating of enterprises.  
 
For this, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued the IAS 39 - 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement Standard - which outlines the 
requirements for the recognition, de-recognition, and measurement of financial assets 
and liabilities, including derivative contracts.  In effect, the initial recognition is 
undertaken once an entity becomes a party to the contractual provisions of the 
derivative instrument and this recognition of the derivative instrument shall continue 
on its financial statements until the rights, obligations, and control ceases to exist. In 




which is the amount for which the asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, 
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm‟s length transaction (e.g., market 




Remarkably, if the derivative instrument is used for hedging purposes, the IAS 39 
allows the usage of hedge accounting.  The importance of the IAS hedge accounting 
provision is in its extension to the hedging community the “privilege” of overriding 
the normal accounting treatment for derivatives (fair value through profit or loss in 
the period incurred) and/or providing the ability to adjust the carrying value of assets 
and liabilities.  The reasoning behind the offering of this privilege is that the 
derivative hedging instruments should not have an accounting life of their own, 
rather they should be considered as a part of a unified package of an operational 
and/or financial commitment plus an instrument to serve as a hedge to that 
commitment (DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995, p. 747).   
 
The above treatment is significant insofar as the hedging instruments generate cash 
losses and gains over their life while the transactions they are designed to hedge 
produce only paper gains and losses until they are recognized in a later period, which 
in turn results in greater volatility, and thus uncertainty, in the income statement of 
the hedging entity. In essence, as noted by in a report by PricewaterhouseCoopers:    
“The basic principle in IAS 39 is that all derivatives are carried at fair value with 
gains and losses in the income statement. However, derivatives are commonly used 
to hedge recognised assets and liabilities that are measured at cost, amortised cost or 
at fair value with gains and losses recognised in equity or items such as forecast 
transactions or firm commitments that are not recognised in the balance sheet. This 
creates a mismatch in the timing of gain and loss recognition. Hedge accounting 
seeks to correct this mismatch by changing the timing of recognition of gains and 
losses on either the hedged item or the hedging instrument. This avoids much of the 
volatility that would arise if the derivative gains and losses were recognised in the 
income statement, as required by normal accounting principles” 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005, p. 7). 
 
In order to qualify for hedge accounting, an entity has to comply with onerous 
requirements that oblige the existence of formal documentation at the 
commencement of the recognition of the derivative contract. This is in addition to the 
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achievement of stringent effectiveness tests for the life of the hedge in a manner that 
confirms the strength of the relationship between the underlying risk exposure and 
the derivative instrument. If either of these requirements is not present, hedge 
accounting may not be used.  
 
Specifically, the formal documentation that is demanded require that the hedging 
entity identify and certify their risk management objective, the hedged item, the 
hedging instrument, the nature of the risk being hedged, and the methodology that 
will be followed for the effectiveness tests. In particular, the hedge should be highly 
effective at the inception of the contractual relationship and expected to be within the 
range of 80 per cent and 125 per cent until it is de-recognized (prospectively and 
retrospectively).  
 
This approach that centres on providing an effectiveness band does leave some room 
for ineffectiveness in case the correlation between the derivative instrument and the 
relevant risk exposure experiences some changes due to mismatches in the 
underlying variables (e.g., different maturities), changes in counterparty risks, and/or 
if the underlying variable in the derivative contract is a proxy for the actual item 
affecting the balance sheet exposure (e.g., oil futures for jet fuel cost variation). 
Notably, it should be clear from the aforementioned requirements that the push for 
the utilization of commodities to underlie the Islamic derivative instruments may 
very well disturb their effectiveness within the IAS 39 framework, and thus diminish 
the prospect of the usage of that privilege, due to the exogenous volatilities imposed. 
 
The effectiveness tests, for their part, comprise three methods, whose choice of 
utilization should be included in the documentation at the inception of the hedge. The 
first method is the critical terms comparison which consists of comparing the critical 
terms, such as: notional principle, amounts, term, pricing dates, timing, and quantum 
and currency of the cash flows, as well as the confirmation that there are no features 
that would invalidate an assumption of effectiveness. The second method is the 
dollar offset method that entails the quantitative assurance that the change in the fair 
value or cash flows of the derivative instrument corresponds to the change in the fair 




undertaking of a regression analysis of the relationship between the derivative 
instrument and the underlying exposure in order to statistically test effectiveness 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005, pp. 13-15).  
 
The privileges to hedgers also extend to the taxation sphere in that the taxing 
authorities in some jurisdictions offer preferential tax treatment in the recognition of 
gains and losses that result from the utilization of derivatives for risk management 
purposes.  For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States has 
elaborated tax regulations that do not force the application of the mark-to-market 
rules to hedging transactions and allow instead a closer matching between the gains 
and losses of the derivative instrument and the underlying risk exposure (Bloom & 
Cenker, 2008).  
 
Lastly, for banking institutions, the recognition of the derivative contract as a 
hedging transaction could translate to the prospect of lower capital adequacy 
requirements, if approved by the supervisory authorities. More specifically, under the 
Internal Models Approach (IMA) of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) that is used to calculate the capital adequacy requirements for banking 
institutions, derivative instruments can be considered as risk mitigants and as such 
reduce the Value at Risk (VaR) figures that are used to calculate the capital charge. 
In addition, if the model of risk management captures appropriately the spread risk, 
default risk, and event risk, the multiplier used is given a favourable treatment by 
according it a lower value thereby reducing the capital charge even further.  
 
The forgoing discussion into hedge accounting, taxation, and capital adequacy (for 
banking institutions) is significant in that it provides a view into the practicalities that 
surround the recognition of the derivative contracts in a manner that appreciates the 
rationale of their existence (i.e., offsetting risk exposures). Notwithstanding the 
above, it is remarkable that the AAOIFI had not sought to establish some form of an 
accounting standard for derivative usage.
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  This, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, could be due to its opinion that the matter was settled in the Shari’a 
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scholarly community and accordingly did not warrant deliberations of accounting 
and auditing technicalities.   
 
Alternatively, it may have thought that it had made its position clear with the 
injunctions against the usage of currencies (Shari‟a Standard No. 1) and benchmarks 
(Shari‟a Standard No. 27) for hedging purposes (AAOIFI, 2010). Nonetheless, this 
position is not completely comprehensible since the growth in the utilization of the 
Islamic swaps in the Islamic finance industry should have clearly propelled it to at 
least consider the implications of its usage by industry participants.  
 
Then again, it could be the case that AAOIFI deemed the Islamic swap contracts 
(i.e., TMA and other variants) a matter of transacting in commodities which renders 
them within the purview of the accounting treatment that is normally accorded to the 
ordinary purchase and sale of assets. If this is indeed the case, AAOIFI‟s position is 
problematic for two main reasons: Firstly, as per accounting convention, it forces the 
participants of dynamic hedging in the Islamic finance industry to hold the 
underlying commodity contracts as held-for-trading which necessitates measurement 
at fair value with the changes in the valuation reported in the income statement until 
the maturity of the contract.  
 
This becomes a rather prohibitive stance because, as alluded to earlier, the volatility 
of the commodity market price is effectively added to the movement of the Islamic 
swap due to the changes of the underlying risk exposure (e.g., interest rates and 
currencies).  Both will, accordingly, manifest themselves through increased 
uncertainty over the stability of earnings of the hedging entity (i.e., higher risk 
premium). Notably, this treatment may also have negative implications on the capital 
adequacy prospects for Islamic banking institutions. 
 
Secondly, AAOIFI‟s position precludes the possibility of utilizing the stringent 
requirements (documentation, effectiveness tests, etc.) articulated by the IASB in 
order to benefit from the privileges of hedge accounting.  Specifically, the 




regarding the efforts to avoid Maysir (gambling) which appears to be a major 
concern for the standard-setting bodies and some of the sceptical Shari’a scholars 
and academics. For this, the IAS 39 requirements could provide insights on the 
necessary, and testable, evidence that the management of entities would need to 
show in order to prove that their derivative usage is not within the realm of gambling 
in the financial markets.  
 
In effect, hedge accounting can be easily tested and monitored by the board of 
directors, Shari’a supervisory boards, regulators, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders of the entities that are seeking to utilize derivatives in their market risk 
management endeavours in order to confirm that the entity is not engaging in 
gambling activities that increase its risks of financial distress as well as have other 
negative externalities in regards to the stability of the global financial markets.  
 
With that prospect in mind, it should be stated that the current implicit AAOIFI 
acceptance of the usage of Islamic swaps by the participants in the Islamic finance 
industry offers virtually no accounting oversight over seemingly clever treasurers 
and CFOs who decide to use these commodity-based instruments to generate excess 
returns within pure gambling contexts.  To be certain, the usage of Islamic swaps is 
usually preceded by an approval by the Shari’a supervisory board of the entity that 
hopes to use them, which is invariably given within a hedging mandate.   
 
However, as opposed to the stringent rules of the hedge accounting requirements, the 
hedging mandate can be easily circumvented by those in the Islamic finance industry 
intent on using them as investment tools to potentially increase their profitability 
performance, and consequently salary bonuses, since the gains and losses for these 
instruments are treated as ordinary gains and losses in the financial statements.  That 
is to say, they are not necessarily separate line items or activities that require special 
disclosures which, in turn, does affect the transparency of the information provided 
to the readers of the financial statements.
141
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The above is not a hypothetical situation or an unlikely scenario; there is ample 
literature on agency theory and moral hazard that support the presence of those risks 
and implore the need to appropriately prepare for and manage them. In fact, the 
treasurer and accounting professionals of a major Islamic banking institution, as 
respondents in the practitioners group, have stated that most of their Islamic swap 
usage is outside of the IAS 39 band of 80 to 125 per cent and that there is no clear 
hedging rationale for their usage. Notably, these particular accounting professionals 
felt that the stringent reporting requirements by IAS 39 were burdensome.  
 
Interestingly, the decision by AAOIFI to completely disregard any policy directive or 
accounting standard related to derivatives does offer a glimpse, which was shared by 
one of the respondents in the academics, Shari’a scholars, and legal experts group, 
into the advancement of religious-based normative accounting principles in the 
Islamic finance industry at the expense of the neutral accounting requirements that 
focus on providing greater transparency for effective decision making. This arguably 
exists despite the fact that a study undertaken by Deloitte recently has shown that 79 
per cent of the Islamic finance industry leaders surveyed support a convergence 
initiative of the AAOIFI standards to the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) (Deloitte, 2010, p. 25).  
 
To be certain, it is acknowledged that accounting theory does have elements of 
normative principles in that the recognition, measurement, and disclosure 
requirements may provide incentives for “proper” financial behaviour by firms (i.e., 
making it harder to engage in tax evasion, money laundering, income smoothing, 
etc.). However, this facet of accounting theory is not deemed to be in a position to 
overpower the chief role of accounting in providing neutral and technical information 
that centre on promoting rational decision making by the readers of the financial 
statements. This defining attribute of accounting, which had been famously stressed 
by Weber, Sombart, and Schumpeter are a point of agreement among contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                                    
rationale and practice of the derivative instrument utilization.  This, understandably, involves a 
balance between the costs (sharing proprietary information to competitors) and benefits (better 




accountants and accounting historians (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991, pp. 35-36; 
Chambers, 1966; Littleton & Zimmerman, 1962; Schumpeter, 1950; Sombart & 
Epstein, 1967; Weber, 1981).  
 
Aside from the principles that encompass the theory of accounting, there are practical 
issues that surround the recognition of derivative hedging instruments within the 
Islamic finance industry in a manner that promotes effective decision making. In 
essence, in order to develop understanding, whose objectivity is determined by the 
neutrality of the information presented, one would have to be able to interpret the 
information before them; in this case numbers indicating the consequences of past 
actions of a particular entity. Needless to say, the understanding of the meaning of 
these numbers does not exist for its own sake; rather it is a precursor to a particular 
set of decisions that are to be taken at the present and will continue indefinitely into 
the future (e.g., to invest in/sell, to deal with/not deal with, to partner with/not partner 
with, etc.).  
 
The link between the numbers in the financial statements of an entity and the 
decisions to be taken by its stakeholders is the theory of rational choice, which 
according to the utility maximization model, involves the measurement of the 
subjective usefulness of a particular set of decision alternatives in such a way that, if 
one follows the Bayesian approach to utility maximization, the chosen alternative 
always has the highest utility (Gärdenfors & Sahlin, 1988, pp. 1-13; Harsany, 1977).  
 
The choice of the economic agent may also be contextualized by the theory of 
marginal utility (five slices of pizza do not hold five times the utility of one slice), 
the level of risk aversion that he or she may have as outlined by the Arrow-Pratt 
theory of risk, and the consideration of the reference level as shown by Kahneman 
and Tversky in their work on prospect theory that comprise the effects of the changes 






With that background regarding the linkages between accounting and decision 
making, it is important to appreciate that, within the realm of the financial markets, it 
is the numbers as presented in the financial statements, with double-entry accounting 
as a foundation (Laylor, 1956; Yamey, 1956), that form the substance of rational 
economic decision making.  This is both in terms of the values presented as well as 
the historical experience of those values (i.e., past statistics) which, in turn, translate 
into probabilities that have shaped the evolution of contemporary risk management.  
 
Notably, the concept of utility is not a foreign notion in Islamic thought where it is 
directly related to the conceptualization of Manfa’a (benefit and usufruct)
142
 that is 
evident in many parts of the scripture
143
. This is notwithstanding the fact that some 
members of the scholarly community in Islamic jurisprudence have decided to detach 
these two concepts mainly on linguistic grounds with the rationale being that utility, 
in a western context, is always associated with the perception of value to the 
individual, even if it was, in fact, detrimental to their well-being (e.g., 
intoxication).
144
 That is, to derive value from something may not necessarily mean 
that it is for one‟s benefit.  
 
Consequently, a proposition evolved that differentiated the nature of the value 
generated from any particular object between Manfa’a and Darar, with the later 
professing harm to the individual (Al-Amarani, 2003, p. 62).
145
  This 
conceptualization of Manfa’a and Darar, in turn, appears to have trickled into 
accounting theory in that it was deemed improper to record an impressible asset or 
liability, such as some transactions (e.g., derivatives) that record the dealings of 
money between economic agents.  
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Needless to say, this position becomes rather perilous in its implementation in a 
global setting wherein it has become established in the legal corpus that the courts 
(and even some regulatory bodies such as capital market authorities) focus on the 
legality of the contracts not its permissibility (El-Gamal, 2008). In other words, an 
impressible liability is viewed and will be ruled as a liability if it is entered into by 
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm‟s length transaction. With that, it is 
remarkable that there are still some commentators who still promote a strict 
compliance with the religious-based normative accounting theory even if it entails 




The articulation of the foregoing discussion on accounting, transparency, rational 
choice, and utility is worthy of consideration for two reasons: Firstly, the 
understanding that it is trying to elicit seeks to commence a process whereby the air 
of uncertainty, which was clearly present in the opinions of many respondents in the 
course of the interviews, is removed in regards to the recognition of the “monetary” 
derivative instrument in the financial statements of the entities that use them.  In 
effect, this may very well plant the seeds for the practical implementation of the 
arguments whose evidence was outlined in the present and previous chapters on the 
acceptability of the risk transfer strategy in Islamic finance, especially for interest 
rate and currency risk exposures, with derivative hedging instruments as its main 
tools of application.  
 
Secondly, it moves the discourse away from the insinuation of the existence of a real 
debate on the merits of Manfa’a as a concept that is distinguishable from utility, 
which would put into doubt the use of the economic theories that are based on utility, 
including the utility that surrounds the store of value functionality of money.
147
   For 
this, the literature of Islamic jurisprudence would certainly benefit from an open 
discourse that focuses on the proper understanding of the concept of Manfa’a that is 
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mentioned numerous times in the scripture, which may even in the future provide 
another avenue for the proper contextualization of the concept of utility with the 




The significance of examining the viewpoint of the Shari’a on the permissibility of 
the underlying variables in the derivative contracts stems from the charged, and 
sometimes divergent opinions of some Shari’a scholars and academics regarding 
monetary benchmarks that are related to interest rates and currencies. The common 
theme, as has been communicated repeatedly in the Islamic finance literature, is that 
the dealings in interest rate benchmarks and currencies in the forward markets 
amounts to the indulgence in an ambiguous blend of Shari’a prohibitions that include 
Riba, Gharar, and Maysir. 
 
The aforementioned viewpoint, in turn, can be estimated to have manifested itself in 
the lack of any technical directives by any of the standard-setting bodies for the 
recognition of the derivative contracts by the companies that use them, even if they 
are used exclusively for market risk management.  Notably, this stance exists despite 
the growing usage of Islamic derivative instruments (primarily swaps) as hedging 
contracts in the Islamic finance industry.  
 
To address the unease of the Shari’a scholars in accepting financial instruments with 
monetary benchmarks as underlying variables, and the resultant policy vacuum in 
their recognition, the pertinent parts of the scripture were examined in this chapter 
along with the myriad juridical opinions that relate to the various commercial and 
financial transactions that centred on money. In the examination process, multiple 
arguments were articulated that, as was done in the previous chapters, contextualized 
the discourse with the relevant economic theories in order to bring out a more 
comprehensive and thorough understanding of this complex subject matter. 
 
For this, it has been contented that the religious sensitivity in the dealings of money, 




emanates chiefly from the fear in the engagement of Riba, with the injustices 
associated with hoarding as an associated concern.  Interestingly, this sensitivity 
endured notwithstanding the almost complete transformation of the commercial and 
financial practices of economic agents, including the Muslim populace, due to the 
advent of new theories and practices that offer a host of novel opportunities and 
challenges.  
 
In other words, it is not evident that, as is often stated by some commentators, God 
limited the economic practices of Muslim to either trade (with an underlying 
corporeal asset) or Riba with nothing permitted in between. It is likely, instead, that 
our divine gifts of logic and reason were meant to help Muslims distinguish between 
the permissible and the proscribed transactions in a framework that adheres with the 
Maqasid Al-Shari’a.  
 
Remarkably, in the middle of all the anti-derivative rhetoric by some of the 
distinguished Shari’a scholars and academics, there is a clear appearance of these 
divine gifts at work with the ostensible pragmatism in their opinions on matters that 
were until recently deemed closed and settled (e.g., usage of LIBOR in commercial 
transactions). Yet, for some odd reason, there is this obstinate belief amongst some 
of those same individuals that the usage of derivatives for hedging purposes should 
not enjoy the fruits of contemporary enlightenment in some form of bid to protect the 
Islamic finance industry from the contaminated effects of the usage of the derivative 
contracts.  
 
Given that the presence of wide-ranging evidence throughout the research that 
supports the permissibility of the utilization of derivative contracts for hedging 
purpose, it may be necessary to devote the last chapter to exploring a recurring 
concern in the discourse on derivative instruments in the Islamic finance literature 











The preceding chapters concentrated on market risk management, as a framework, 
and derivative instruments, as tools within that framework. Throughout the 
discussion, it has been shown that risk management is encouraged in Islamic thought; 
this especially includes the market risks that do not come under the direct control of 
the enterprises that have chosen to follow the economic doctrine of the Shari’a.  It 
has also been delineated, while challenging the contemporary restrictive stances, that 
derivative instruments have very little, if anything, to do with the prohibitions of 
Riba and Gharar; and if used in a hedging context are actually far from the 
prohibition of Maysir (gambling) in that enterprises that utilize them choose not to 
hinge their fortunes on the movements of interest rates, currencies, and commodities 
in the global financial markets.  
 
Nonetheless, the necessity in the elaboration of this chapter emanates from the 
widely held viewpoint, among many writers in the Islamic finance literature (as 
noted in the previous chapters) as well as some of the respondents spanning all four 
groups, that the usage of derivative instruments is analogous to partaking in 
gambling behaviour. This is above and beyond the generalized belief that is often 
expressed which designates derivative instruments (no matter what contract, which 
underlying variable, which market, etc.) as the chief culprits of the financial crises 
that have been experienced in modern history. 
 
To be certain, Islamic finance is not unique in its hostility to derivative instruments; 
for, as will be outlined below, they have had a history of opposition in the last two 
centuries in western society.  This came to the fore, after some period of tacit 
acquiesce, subsequent to the latest global financial crisis which was instigated, in 
part, by the Credit Default Swaps (which interestingly does not have a strong relation 
to market risks). That being said, what is perhaps distinctive in the discourse on 
derivatives in Islamic finance circles in recent decades is the invocation of obstinate 




regarding what is in actual fact an indefinite and complex subject matter.  The end 
result that can be observed is the all-encompassing simplistic stance that derivatives 
are tools of Maysir. This is no matter what context and without response to how 
derivatives exactly relate to the actual prohibition in the religion: The act of 
gambling. 
 
Section I: A Conceptualization of Maysir in Islamic and Western 
Thought 
 
The prohibition of Maysir (gambling) is considered one of the pillars of the 
economic doctrine in the Shari’a.  Indeed, as should have been self-evident in the 
previous chapters, within the realm of the subject matter of the research, one can 
clearly observe based on the literature and interviews that Maysir is an overarching 
concern for most of the participants in the discourse on market risk management and 
derivatives in the Islamic finance industry.  
 
To be certain, this concern is understandable given the direct reference to the 
prohibition in multiple verses in the Quran wherein it was stated in one verse: “They 
ask you about intoxicants and Maysir. Say, „In them is great sin and [yet, some] 
benefit for people. But their sin is greater than their benefit.‟” (Quran 2:219) Two 
other pertinent verses in the Quran, for their part, declare: “O you who have believed, 
indeed, intoxicants, Maysir, [sacrificing on] stone alters [to other than Allah], and 
divining arrows are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may 
be successful. Satan only wants to cause between you animosity and hatred through 
intoxicants and gambling and to avert you from the remembrance of Allah and from 
prayer. So will you not desist?” (Quran 5:90-91).  
 
The concept of Maysir in Islamic thought, as one that represents gambling behaviour, 
does seem to require some clarification. This is because, from a definition standpoint, 
it is related to the concepts of Qimar and Rahan which also express similar meaning. 
For this, Al-Masri (1993) and Al-Saati (2007) illuminate the distinction by stating 




rewards (i.e., amusement), whereby two or more individuals engage in a competition 
that engages their intellectual and bodily strength, their belief in chance (or luck), or 
a combination of the two.  
 
The difference between the three concepts to these authors, however, lies in that 
Maysir can include social, non-monetary-based gaming while Qimar and Rahan are 
specifically played for the sake of monetary gain. In addition, Rahan, as opposed to 
Qimar, is being distinguished further on the basis of the outcome of an event that is 
exogenous to the control of the players of the game (Al-Masri, 1993, pp. 31-32; Al-
Saati, 2007, pp. 21-22).  
 
That said, for the purposes of the research, the definitions of Maysir, Qimar, and 
Rahan will be equated since it is conjectured from the literature on the topic that the 
rationale for the prohibition of Maysir is mostly related to: 1) Unearned gains and 2) 
Anti-social behaviour (Al-Masri, 1993; Haroun, 1953). Indeed, the root of the word 
Maysir in the Arabic language (i.e., Yousr) can be embodied by the word “facile” in 
the English language that Merriam-Webster (2012) defines as something that is 
“easily accomplished or attained.”  
 
The relationship to anti-social behaviour, for its part, in Islamic thought becomes 
quite apparent after the reference to “animosity and hatred” in one of the 
aforementioned verses in the Quran. Essentially, Maysir is one facet that can be 
considered as being related to, but still somewhat distinct from, theft, cheating, 
bribery, etcetera, which is directly addressed in the Quranic verse: “O you who have 
believed, do not devour one another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business 
by mutual consent” (Quran: 4:29). 
 
Moreover, it is believed that the extension of the label of Maysir to prohibiting 
games that are being played exclusively for amusement with no monetary reward is 
unwarranted since it was shown that games that contributed to the generation and 
refinement of skills were accepted during the time of the Prophet (PBUH) (Al-




effectively, preclude any type of participation of Muslims in games, either nationally 
or internationally (sports, Olympics, strategy, etc.).   
 
As for the particularity between Qimar and Rahan and the wider relationship that is 
symbolized by Maysir, it may be contended that the distinction is perhaps a 
manifestation of the perception of the role of skill and chance in unearned gains. 
However, as will be elaborated below, the role of skill and chance in gambling is so 
intertwined and complex that the focus should really be on the concept of Maysir 
itself with its chief traits of unearned gains and anti-social behaviour. 
 
To be certain, Islamic jurisprudence is not unique in its objective of seeking to 
eradicate gambling behaviour in society; for one can clearly observe that the same 
rejectionist stance is endemic in the history of western thought with an 
accompanying diverse and deep discourse in the realms of religious studies, law, 
politics, sociology, psychology, mathematics, and economics on this intricate subject 
matter. Notably, with a focus on the economic realm, the discourse on gambling in 
western thought, especially in the last two hundred years, much like its contemporary 
Islamic counterpart, have transcended the traditional argumentation that centre on 
games of chance and have broached other contentious (or uncontroversial, depending 
on the perspective) topics such as insurance in addition to commodity and stock 
trading (Brenner & Brenner, 1990; IRTI, 2000; Kreitner, 2007).  
 
However, where the two discourses differ is in the level of depth of western thought 
on the subject of gambling due to the more involved presence of a multitude of 
interested parties shaped by multifarious perspectives.  These have been traditionally 
formed around institutional arrangements that covered the spectrum of opinions and 
beliefs; from the speculative-favouring organizations (e.g., commodity exchanges, 
investment banks, hedge funds, among others) passing through the risk management-
centred consortiums (hedging community, monetary authorities, etc.) and on to the 
policy-oriented establishments (government, religious groups, etc.). Throughout, 
diverse academic interest has spurred with myriad perspectives built on many 





This, of course, provides an excellent opportunity for researchers seeking to enrich 
the debate on gambling in Islamic thought, in general, and Islamic finance, in 
particular, beyond the commendable work by many writers on the subject matter of 
gambling within the purview of the Shari’a in recent decades (Al-Masri, 1993; Al-
Saati, 2007; Haroun, 1953; Rosenthal, 1975). However, since the topic of gambling 
is rather complex and the discourse surrounding it is nowhere a point of resolution or 
consensus, the discussion in this chapter will be limited to areas that were deemed 
important in the context of the debate on the permissibility of derivatives in Islamic 
jurisprudence for market risk management.  
 
One can begin with the definition of a wager or a bet within the larger context of 
gambling; for this, the definition of a wagering contract elaborated by Henry 
Hawkins in his ruling on the Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company in July, 1892 
seems to have taken hold in Common Law148 wherein he stated:  
“It is not easy to define with precision what amounts to a wagering contract, nor the 
narrow line of demarcation which separates a wagering from an ordinary contract; 
but, according to my view, a wagering contract is one by which two persons, 
professing to hold opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, 
mutually agree that, dependent on the determination of that event, one shall win 
from the other, and that other shall pay or hand over to him, a sum of money or other 
stake; neither of the contracting parties having any other interest in that contract than 
the sum or stake he will so win or lose, there being no other real consideration for 
the making of such contract by either of the parties. It is essential to a wagering 
contract that each party may under it either win or lose, whether he will win or lose 
being dependent on the issue of the event, and, therefore, remaining uncertain until 
that issue is known” (Finch, 1896, p. 30). 
 
The statement articulated by Hawkins defining wagering contracts is interesting on 
many levels and does have a high degree of relevancy to the present discussion on 
derivatives. To commence with, it acknowledges the often overlooked matter in the 
literature in Islamic finance (as evidenced by the discourse presented in the previous 
chapters) that there is difficulty in the differentiation between a wagering contract 
and an ordinary contract since any contract as MacNeil has put it is a “projection of 
exchange into the future”(MacNeil, 1974, pp. 712-713).  
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That is to say, the future is always uncertain and this uncertainty propels economic 
agents to create contracts (and actually contribute to the evolution of contract law) 
for their dealings with one another whether they are for religiously-legitimate 
transactions such as Ijara, Musharaka, and Murabaha in the Islamic finance industry 
or a wagering contract that encapsulate the rules of the game that surround the spin 
of the roulette wheel. In fact, the central role of uncertainty continued to be apparent 
in contract law almost a century later on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean where 
in the Spartech Corp. v Opper case heard before the US Court of Appeals in 1989 it 
was stated by the court that: “a principal purpose of contracts and contract law is to 
allocate the risk of the unexpected in accordance with the parties' respective 
preference for or aversion to risk and their ability or inability to prevent the risk from 
materializing” (Kreitner, 2007, p. 97).  
 
With that, one should be able to recognize that the first significant trait in Hawkins‟ 
definition of a wager underlines the fact that the parties to the contract hold opposing 
views regarding a future uncertain event and that the payment of monetary 
consideration from one person to the other becomes an obligation once the event that 
surrounds the opposing views is determined. On the face of it, this does endow the 
wagering contracts with a monetary zero-sum feature whereby, in the absence of any 
other mutual exchange, the interests of the parties to the contract are diametrically 
opposed and consequently the contract itself can only be considered as one 
regulating a pure win-lose transaction.  
 
To be certain, the nature of gambling contracts as zero-sum games that dictate 
winnings and losses between contesting parties have been recognized much earlier in 
Islamic thought with the notable contributions of writers such as Ibn Taymiyyah and 
Ibn Al-Qayyim, and others, who have built their restrictive stances on gambling 
contracts, in part, based on this mathematical characteristic (Al-Suwailem, 2006; 
Kamali, 2000b).  
 
The second defining attribute of wagering contracts is in the fact that parties enter 




is no other “interest” or “real consideration” for one gambling party that impels them 
to seek a counterparty for their wager other than the prospect of monetary gain 
(and/or perhaps the thrill of a game with monetary stakes). Thus, in a manner that 
complements and contextualizes the aforementioned zero-sum feature, the pure win-
lose scenario of the game becomes the full story, as it were, of the transaction with 
the hopes of the players being solely linked to the gains taken from the counterparty 
and, conversely, their fears being exclusively connected to the losses given to the 
counterparty.  
 
The shared apprehension for the two previous features of wagering, which has been 
communicated repeatedly in the literature on the subject matter in both Islamic and 
western thought (as highlighted earlier in this and previous chapters), revolves 
around the unearned gains from social unproductive endeavours as well as the anti-
social behaviour that can result due to wagering.  This is understandable since any 
particular party can only gain monetarily, and thereby avoid monetary losses, if, and 
only if, the other party loses. Once more, this assumes that there is no other 
consideration for entering into these contracts. 
 
More specifically, for the unearned gains, the professed concern, which was also 
revealed by some of the respondents, is that wagering encourages a wasteful vocation 
that artificially creates risks in society which can wrongly be viewed as a facile 
alternative to participating in the human welfare-oriented and wealth generating (to 
the individual and to society) productive commerce that is built on disciplined ethic 
and hard work (Borna & Lowry, 1987; Crump, 1875; Freeman, 1907; Halliday & 
Fuller, 1975; Kamali, 2000b, p. 147; Kreitner, 2000; Patterson, 1931; Samuelson, 
1976). In fact, the perception of gamblers is often so negative that the parties to 
wagering contracts were often labelled as “social parasites” (Patterson, 1918, p. 386). 
 
As in regards to the anti-social behaviour, it was perceived that wagering contributes 
to the advent of harmful aspects in society that include: vice, crime (including 
corruption of public officials, fraud, and market manipulation), impoverishment of 




among many others (Al-Saati, 2007; Brenner & Brenner, 1990; Patterson, 1931). 
Indeed, the anti-social effects of gambling were well encapsulated by Freeman when 
he stated: “[G]ambling has been found to destroy the solidarity of social life and to 
make of men anti-social individuals, because, first, it is founded on anti-social 
feelings and aims, namely, the desire for gain at the expense of another; second, it 
involves exchange of property on a false basis, rendering the condition of 
cooperative life less secure; and third, it entails great disorganization of mind and 




The final attribute of a wagering contract, as per the definition of Hawkins, is that it 
is determined by a particular event. For this, wagering contracts are traditionally 
known for being quite precise in the definition of the event and the monetary 
consideration being transferred as a result. Thus, in effect, the only uncertainty, 
which is the chief trait in the wagering contract, resides in the passing of the event 
itself, including the manner of its passing. Moreover, it should also be highlighted at 
this juncture that the dominance of the Hawkins‟ definition of wagering is arguably 
in its implicit recognition that, as opposed to the opinions of many writers on the 
subject matter of gambling (Al-Suwailem, 2000, p. 11; Borna & Lowry, 1987; 
Brenner & Brenner, 1990; Freeman, 1907; Hobson, 1905), it is not the element of 
chance, whether “pure” or “mixed,” in the passing of the event within these contracts 
that detains them within the realm of gambling.  
 
Notably, chance, which has been a central feature in the discourse on gambling (and 
consequently important to the present discussion), has been defined by Newman in 
his seminal book on The World of Mathematics as: 
“Phenomena (events or variations) that are not exactly determined, or do not follow 
patterns described by known exact laws, or are not the effects of known causes. That 
is to say, the domain of chance varies with our state of knowledge – or rather of 
ignorance. Such ignorance may be fundamental because the relevant exact laws of 
causes are unknowable; it may be non-essential or temporary, and exist because the 
exact laws do not happen to have been discovered or the ignorance may be 
deliberately assumed because the known exact laws and causes are not of such as 
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character that they can profitably be used in the particular inquiry at hand” 
(Newman, 1956, p. 1469)” 
 
In essence, the implications of the lack of exclusivity of chance in wagering contracts 
are that it broadens the scope of contracts that could be given the wagering label. 
Thus, a contract between players to a game of chess, for example, where the winner 
would be paid a certain sum of money from the loser, would still be labelled as a 
wagering contract within the context of the definition by Hawkins despite the 
arguable reduction in the role of chance in the outcome of the game vis-à-vis the skill 
of the players. Put differently, wagering contracts are not simply confined to the 
traditional games of lottery or those existing at Casinos; they can include a whole 
range of contracts between individuals.  
 
Effectively, as has been realized (and even internalized) in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century in the public policy and legal circles in the United States and Europe 
(Kreitner, 2007), which in a sense is being replayed today with the contemporary 
Shari’a prohibition on derivatives,150 it is acknowledged that wagering contracts 
could very well include seemingly ordinary contracts with legitimate underlying 
variables, such as derivatives, in the financial markets with the uncertainty of the 
event being the rise and fall in prices. This, of course, also applies to the “Islamic” 
derivatives that entail multiple contracts with commodities as an underlying between 
the parties in the Islamic finance industry if, in fact, they collectively meet the 
definition of a wager as articulated by Hawkins. 
 
That said, and with the agreement that the usage of derivatives can be done in 
gambling contexts (see below), it should also be recognized, as has been repeatedly 
argued in the previous chapters, that one should not be hasty in the simplistic 
adoption of a prohibitive stance on derivative contracts without a greater appreciation 
of all the facts that surround their existence and the social utility that is provided by 
that existence. In effect, the whole purpose of seeking to define some contracts as 
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wagering contracts in public policy was not some sort of attempt to delve into 
technicalities in the legal sphere, but rather it is to serve as a normative attempt to 
ensure societal well-being through the rejection of the act of wagering.   
 
Thus, the focus on the contract served as a means to a higher end, not an end to itself. 
This characterization can become self-evident upon the examination of the discourse 
on the subject matter in the legal sphere with judges in western societies considering 
the underlying causes and traits of the contract (including “intent” and “insurable 
interest”) in addition to the background of the parties to the contract (i.e., not simply 
contractual structure and language) in order to formulate an opinion that, in turn, 
established a public policy stance by the state for a particular period of time 
(Kreitner, 2007).151   
 
In other words, it is not the contract that defines the act of gambling; rather, it is the 
act of gambling (with due consideration to the multi-layered definition by Hawkins) 
that manifests itself in the wagering contract. This, of course, does have implications 
to the subject matter of the research in that it effectively calls for the discourse (as 
was made apparent in the literature and interviews) on this topic in the Islamic 
finance industry to transcend the comforts of the simplicity of contractual analysis 
and venture into the complexity of a more thorough examination of the context of 
usage of derivative contracts (market risk management vis-à-vis playing the market 
for gambling purposes) in order to appropriately devise a juridical and policy 
position on their usage.  
 
This should ideally be done in a comprehensive manner that accounts for both the 
positive and negative externalities to society. The greater ambition here, of course, is 
the possibility of adopting, following the large corpus of evidence in the Quran, the 
opinions by the Prophet (PBUH), and the tradition of Maslaha (public interest), a 
pragmatic utilitarian approach to Shari’a rulings in a manner clearly within the realm 
of Mua’amalat (i.e., not Ibadah, or worship) that promotes social welfare through the 
maximization of societal benefits and the reduction of harm.  
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Section II: Maysir, Gharar, and the Indeterminacy of the Zero-sum 
Prohibition 
 
Having expounded on the concept of Maysir and its manifestation into a wagering 
contract, it may be important to address the recent trend in the Islamic finance 
literature to define the “act” of Maysir by linking it to any zero-sum arrangement in 
an absolute monetary sense.  The aim of this anti-zero-sum movement is conjectured 
to be an attempt by some writers to add objective certainty (almost in a check-list 
fashion) to the basis for contemporary Shari’a opinions regarding modern-day 
financial contracts as opposed to what can only be discerned to be the intolerable 
subjective contextualization in the elaboration of permissibility.  
 
This position can be exemplified by the multiple writings by Al-Suwailem, on the 
subject matter of Maysir (and indeed Gharar which he views as being largely the 
same)152 wherein he stated: “The economic significance of the zero-sum measure 
provides insights into the Islamic view of economic behaviour. Elimination of zero-
sum arrangements can be viewed as a paradigm governing Islamic principles of 
exchange” (Al-Suwailem, 1999, p. 98).153   
 
Needless to say, the danger of this attempt at objectivism in matters of religion is that 
it has been shown to be emulated by other commentators in their subsequent writings 
on derivatives (Hassan & Mahlknecht, 2011, p. 376; Jobst & Sole, 2012; Jobst, 2007; 
Kunhibava, 2011; Obaidullah, 2002) and were present in the opinions by one of the 
respondents in the course of the interviews wherein the evaluation of the Shari’a-
compliance characteristics of the ISDA-IIFM TMA, as an Islamic swap, by one of 
the respondents included references to the proscriptions of zero-sum transactions. 
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The eventual risk, of course, is that this new contract classification paradigm may 
seep into the decision making process of Shari’a scholars as a foundation for a 
juridical stance in the standard-setting bodies on any zero-sum contract without the 
necessary appreciation of the assumptions (and contradictions) that were apparent in 
the formulation of such a perspective in the first place.  
 
With that, it may become apparent that the contemporary Islamic finance literature 
on Maysir, often with a reference to derivatives, has elected to impart with the path 
of humility that was followed by Hawkins (as noted earlier) in acknowledging the 
difficulty in the designation of a particular contract with the wagering label and the 
need to consider a wider set of factors in order to arrive at a proper conclusion. The 
chosen course, instead, seems to have been built on the belief that one can 
distinguish, based on the absolute monetary zero-sum traits of the contract (i.e., not 
the act) in question, whether it is considered prohibited or not. In the face of such a 
sure-footed conceptualisation of Maysir as any zero-sum game, it is perhaps 
imperative to investigate some of the assumptions in the multiple writings of Al-
Suwailem (who has been one of the chief critics of derivatives in recent years based 
on zero-sum argumentation) that were used to construct that particular 
epistemological stance.   
 
To commence with, one of the dominant assumptions made by Al-Suwailem, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly to a writer who often interjects game theory in the Islamic 
finance discourse, is that the zero-sum characterization of Maysir contracts are self-
limited to “strictly competitive games” with a paramount focus on monetary payoffs 
due to an add-on assumption imposed which states that from a strategic sense strictly 
competitive games and pure zero sum games are equivalent (Al-Suwailem, 1999, pp. 
62, 65, 67; 2006). Accordingly, besides the fact that these assumptions confounds the 
conceptualization of the way the game is played strategically and the nature of the 
payoffs (monetary vs. utility gain/loss), one can establish without too much difficulty 
that the acknowledgements by Hawkins in the previous section of the potential role 




“real consideration” in contextualizing an opinion on a particular contract (i.e., 
wagering vs. ordinary) is explicitly dismissed by Al-Suwailem.   
 
The power of such a simplifying assumption cannot be overstated and really does 
demonstrate the importance of examining the basis for conjectures in the economic 
realm with real effects on the welfare of individuals especially those used as a pretext 
to prohibit certain practices, such as derivative and insurance contracts, under the 
banner of religious adherence. The strength of the prohibition in this case was 
communicated by Al-Suwailem with a reference to the potent and often quoted 
Quranic verse proscribing the “devour[ing] one another's wealth unjustly” (Quran: 
4:29) (Al-Suwailem, 1999, p. 65).  
 
To continue with the Al-Suwailem conjectures, having shown that all zero-sum 
games are prohibited in Islamic jurisprudence, what appears to be allowed according 
to him are nonzero-sum games espousing cooperative arrangements. Specifically, he 
maintains that: “A necessary requirement for a transaction to be permitted [in Islamic 
jurisprudence] is the possibility of cooperation, as in nonzero-sum games.  It is left to 
players to achieve cooperation in such games through rational decision making. 
Strictly competitive games, however, exclude this possibility by design, and thus, no 
matter how rational players are, one can win only at the expense of the other” (Al-
Suwailem, 1999, p. 63). Thus, a monetary contribution into the equity of a company, 
by say buying common stock, or the execution of a mutually beneficial trade is 
considered a nonzero-sum game in this setting. 
 
However, the above statement does become quite abstruse with the dual additional 
proclamations in the work of Al-Suwailem wherein he states: 1) “This is not to say 
that only cooperative games are permissible,” (Al-Suwailem, 1999, p. 63) which, in 
effect, signals to the prospect of accepting zero-sum games in some contexts; and 2) 
“From Shariah [sic] point of view, generally speaking, the acceptability of such 
mixed games depends on the likelihood of the cooperative, positive-sum, outcome,” 
(Al-Suwailem, 2006, p. 73) which apparently interposes some elements of 





Notably, the aforementioned proclamations (especially the latter), show, with a 
unique sense of irony, that the search of definitional objectivity by Al-Suwailem for 
the concept of Maysir (vis-à-vis perhaps the wider and more humble definition by 
Hawkins) exclusively through the zero-sum paradigm is not as certain as it may have 
been hoped to be.  This can be ostensible in that it does disintegrate once one 
considers his passing (but still significant) announcement on the very next page that 
probabilities should be considered as being subjective (Al-Suwailem, 1999, p. 64).  
In consequence, the whole assignment of the zero-sum and mixed-sum labels based 
on probability theory is, by default, an equally subjective endeavour.154  
 
Interestingly, the use of subjective probability theory does offer a glimpse into more 
eclectic choice of positions adopted by Al-Suwailem in regards to what can arguably 
be other zero-sum transactions.  This includes the acceptance of Urbun (earnest 
money) modalities, but not options; and the rejection of conventional insurance, but 
not Takaful (cooperative) insurance (Al-Suwailem, 1999, pp. 77, 80; 2007).  In the 
case of the former, it appears that that “intent” factors into the analysis despite its 
subjectivity (Al-Suwailem, 2007, p. 90).  The case of the latter, for its part, in a zero-
sum framework, is rather intriguing since it is not entirely understandable how the 
cooperative insurance arrangement changes the zero-sum nature of contracts between 
it and its policy holders, as perceived by Al-Suwailem (e.g., premiums paid and 
indemnities received in the insurance industry), since it appears that any context 
outside the contract itself is irrelevant in the Al-Suwailem‟s conceptualization of 
Maysir and Gharar (see below).   
 
Notwithstanding the above, it can also be observed from the writings of Al-Suwailem 
on the conceptualization of zero-sum games that utility theory does take a rather 
ambiguous role in his analysis. For on the face of it, he does clearly acknowledge 
utility theory as he outlines the religious refutations to zero-sum games; this can also 
be evident in Al-Suwailem‟s (1999) acknowledgement of the utility theory-laden 
concepts of normal exchange, regret theory, loss aversion, and marginal utility. 
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Indeed, his own definition of zero-sum games being: “strictly competitive games, 
without implying that utilities of the two parties are identical” (Al-Suwailem, 1999, 
p. 62) is explicit in its recognition of the role of utility in zero-sum frameworks. 
Nonetheless, for some paradoxical reason he chooses to limit utility theory only to 
the descriptive acknowledgement corner with very little usage of it in his analysis to 
build his argumentation for the rather serious affair of religiously proscribing 
contracts that formalize zero-sum arrangements (i.e., derivatives). 
 
More specifically, the work of Al-Suwailem can be observed to concentrate almost 
exclusively on monetary payoffs in an absolute sense (e.g., ex-post monetary payoff 
of a coin toss) or relative to expected values based on probabilities (e.g., a 20 per 
cent chance of finding a lost camel valued at 1000 Dinars grants it an expected value 
of 200 Dinars) to draw the conclusion that zero-sum games are normatively inferior 
to nonzero-sum games (Al-Suwailem, 1999, 2006). Needless to say, while such a 
simplifying assumption can assist in an academic exercise of extending game theory, 
on the strategy front, to multiple settings (Gintis, 2009; Harrington, 2009); its usage 
in the realm of economics, however, requires special care because it provides an 
incomplete framework for the analysis of human decision making in regards to 
resources. 
 
In fact, the need to expand the horizon of decision making was realized as early as 
1738 through the pioneering work of Daniel Bernoulli in the resolution of the St. 
Petersburg Paradox that exposed a game with an infinite expected value denoting the 
possibility of an wager with an infinite price (Bernoulli, 1954).155  The source of the 
paradox being the credulous supposition that the expected value is all that mattered 
in rational human decision making. Accordingly, the solution to the paradox, and 
arguably the advent of modern economic theory, came from Bernoulli‟s simple 
statement of: “[T]he determination of the value [sic] of an item must not be based on 
its price [sic], but rather on the utility [sic] it yields” (Bernoulli, 1954, p. 24).  
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As a background, the concept of utility, which was discussed in the previous 
chapters, can be related to usefulness, desirability, or satisfaction (Bernstein, 1996, p. 
103). This intuitive conceptualization of utility imparted by Bernoulli was 
transformed by the influential work by von Neumann and Morgenstern (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953) as well as Savage and Friedman (Friedman & 
Savage, 1948; Savage, 1954) into a mathematical construct of preferences by 
economic agents, who are assumed to operate in a framework where they will 
instinctually rank and choose their preferences based on the highest utility for 
each.156 
 
Thus, within the realm of risk management, when one speaks of risk aversion or loss 
aversion, they are, for the most part, actually speaking the language of utility.  In 
fact, the section outlining the rationale for hedging, and all the associated literature, 
in the Market Risks and Their Management Chapter (Chapter 4) is largely 
constructed on the foundations of utility theory in that particular events are being 
favoured (higher utility) while others are being disliked (lower utility). With that, it 
may be necessary to briefly discuss the concepts of risk aversion and loss aversion in 
order to further appreciate the power of the assumptions made by Al-Suwailem.   
 
To commence with, the theory of risk aversion, as developed by Arrow and Pratt in 
their extension of utility theory to the domain of decisions under uncertainty (Arrow, 
1951, 1971; Pratt, 1964), was unique in that it formulized a notion that was 
recognized in circles of economic academia much earlier. In effect, the theory of risk 
aversion postulates that an uncertain income tends to valued less by economic agents 
than its mathematical expectation.  This, consequently, will lead these economic 
agents to seek solutions for reducing the uncertainty burden (insurance, fixed-income 
securities, derivatives, etc.).  
 
Put differently, economic agents tend to choose a surer “certainty equivalent,” even 
if it is for a less amount than an expected value that is at least partially dependent on 
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chance (or wholly dependent on chance, depending on the particular perspective on 
the source of risk). This behavioural trait is what endows the majority of economic 
agents with the often-mentioned risk-averse title. In the context of market risk 
management by way of derivatives, it can be observed that firms choose a more 
certain hedged outcome (even if it is for a lower overall income), rather than “play 
the market” (even if it has a higher expected value).157  
 
The reverse of the above proposition is also advanced in the literature on the subject 
matter of risk aversion whereby risk-seekers are more inclined to require a higher 
certainty equivalent in order to forgo the prospect of full return based on chance. The 
theory of loss aversion developed by Tversky and Kahneman (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), for its part, adds another angle to behaviour 
under uncertainty by showing that rational economic agents would seek to avoid 
losses, even if that entails assuming more risk.   
 
With that, and based on the above formulation of the concept of utility and the 
theories that surround its existence, once one amalgamates Al-Suwailem‟s 
perspectives on the subject matter, namely: a.) The need for active risk taking in 
investment decisions (Al-Suwailem, 2000, p. 4), b.) The impermissibility of reliance 
on chance to achieve desired outcomes (Al-Suwailem, 2000, p. 9), and c.) The 
rejectionist stance of derivatives that, in actual fact, allow economic agents, who are 
mostly risk averse, to transpose the chance of expected value based on the 
randomness of the market risks to a safer certainty equivalent; it becomes apparent 
that the conclusions drawn by Al-Suwailem regarding the prohibition of derivatives 
based on zero-sum argumentation evolve into a full circle of indeterminacy.  
 
That being said, and in returning to the discussion of the Shari’a derivative contract 
proscription due to its monetary zero-sum trait that was interpreted to be linked to 
Maysir, there is no reason to suspect, as Al-Suwailem (1999) proclaims, that parties 
to a zero-sum game, as in a derivative contract, for example, must have one risk 
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averse counterparty and one risk taking counterparty or two counterparties with 
neutral risk preferences (Al-Suwailem, 1999, p. 74).158 At the very least, this 
conjecture exhibits the neglect of the prospect of having a mutual gain for two 
hedging parties to a derivative transaction (which exists albeit uncommonly) who are 
both risk averse.159 In fact, it has been shown that by employing hedging modalities 
both parties enjoy higher indifference curves (i.e., mutually higher utilities) (Culp, 
2004, p. 79).  
 
Considering the above, a real contention can be made that the probability of the 
existence of two hedging parties in the derivatives markets is dwarfed by the 
presence of speculators, many of whom are of the gambling type.  To this, it should 
be stated that legal theory never prohibited the existence of contract law under the 
pretext of eliminating wagering contracts; rather it chose various means to facilitate 
the existence of ordinary contracts and attempted to reduce the incentives to engage 
in the wagering ones.   
 
Such a stance can be observed to exist unequivocally in Islamic jurisprudence and 
has, interestingly, even been acknowledged by Al-Suwailem himself in his reference 
to the work of Ibn Al-Qayyim in regards to the contentious Gharar characterization 
of the sale of hidden (e.g., underground) fruits and vegetables wherein Ibn Al-
Qayyim argues: “To consider this (particular transaction) as gharar is not to the faqih 
[Shari’a scholar] (as such). It is experts who decide whether it is gharar and 
gambling or not” (Al-Suwailem, 1999, p. 79). Thus, after all, it may be conceivable 
that the “experts” armed with less stringent assumptions on human economic 
behaviour may provide insight that shows that derivatives may in certain contexts not 
be regarded as Maysir (and Gharar). 
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That being said, it is acknowledged that the early Muslim scholars did have it right in 
their description of Maysir as a zero-sum game in terms of monetary payoff.  This 
description is not disputed and has, in fact, been recognized as one attribute in the 
still-in-use common law definition of wagering contracts by Hawkings many 
centuries later. What is being disputed, however, is the reverse argumentation by Al-
Suwailem that attempts to cast any zero-sum game as Maysir (and Gharar). Indeed, 
this is what El-Gamal was attempting to convey in his work on Gharar wherein he 
rejected Al-Suwailem‟s attempts at the formalization of the prohibition of Gharar 
along zero-sum lines by affirming that: “there are many examples of pure zero-sum 
games which are not forbidden based on gharar, and other contracts which are 
forbidden because of gharar, but which are not near-zerosum” (El-Gamal, 2001, p. 
2). 
 
The focus in this section has been on the work of one distinguished academic: Al-
Suwailem.  This is due to the clear recognition of the influence of his work on the 
discourse of Maysir (and Gharar), in general, and derivatives, in particular, as 
evidenced by the imprints of his conclusions in the Islamic finance literature that 
followed and indeed the comments by some of the respondents in the interviews. It is 
common to critique an academic endeavour (including the present one); the emphasis 
here has been in the appropriateness and soundness of assumptions that underlie the 
work of Al-Suwailem that called for the prohibition of derivatives (and many other 
contemporary contracts) based on the perception of zero-sum traits.  
 
It has been argued that these assumptions were: a) misplaced since they actually 
target the use of zero-sum games in strategy contexts, and b) incomplete in that they 
really did not tell the entire story behind the existence of zero-sum contracts (e.g., 
derivatives and insurance) in the first place or the behaviour of economic agents that 
surrounds their existence (i.e., utility). In the end, one can clearly discern a sense of 
confusion in the conjectures by Al-Suwailem in his multiple writings on the topic 
whereby the professed stance (e.g., rejection derivatives for risk management) is 





Essentially, one must be careful in the modelling of their work as an objective law of 
science when, in fact, it is built on many assumptions many of which vary in the 
degree of appropriateness and soundness. This applies even more forcefully in the 
realm of jurisprudence where academic conjectures can lead to outright religious 
prohibitions. To this, it should be affirmed that the present research, even in its 
stance on the permissibility of derivatives, is an argumentation based on available 
evidence that was presented throughout this and the previous chapters.  
 
With that, and after arguing in this and the preceding section that a wagering 
contract, which is an elusive concept to define, entails multiple traits that include but 
are not defined by zero-sum monetary payoffs; how can society distinguish between 
speculation which is part of everyday life and gambling that has been shown to be 
the source of social malcontent? This is an important question insofar as it is 
significant to define the acceptability of the type of environment that hosts market 
risk management endeavours by way of derivatives along with the classification of 
the parameters for their usage. In essence, the discussion into the permissibility of 
derivative instruments would not be complete without due consideration to the 
environment that facilitates risk transfer, which includes the contentious matters of 
speculation and financial intermediaries that were raised in the course of the 
interviews. This is what the next sections will seek to address. 
 
Section III: Investment, Speculation, and Gambling: The 
Environment of Risk Management  
 
The difficulty in the exact conceptualization of gambling is equally present in the 
conceptualization of its less sinister (or not sinister at all, depending on the 
perspective) cousin: speculation (Kreitner, 2007, p. 100), which is believed to have a 
second personality by the name of investing.  Effectively, one can largely estimate 
gambling behaviour; and they may be able to largely view preservation of capital as 
investing.160 It is the delineation of the limits of the wide reaches of speculation that 
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sits between those two concepts that poses the greatest difficulty for the social 
sciences (economics, law, sociology, etc.) (Kreitner, 2007; Tumpel-Gugerell, 2003) 
and apparently also Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
Essentially, there is wide recognition, even in Islamic thought as evidenced by the 
literature (Al-Masri, 1993, p. 35) and in the opinions by some of the respondents 
across all groups, that every affair, economic or otherwise, in life is a form of 
speculation due to the uncertainty of the future. For example, from the interviews, 
one of the respondents stated that: “I think investment, in one way or another, entails 
speculation.” However, one does not know with a high degree of precision the lines 
that separate all these three concepts in the realm of economic theory since they all 
commence with a particular resource endowment and the desire to increase it through 
time as per some sort of target or objective. That being said, at least some form of 
classification, even if of the general type, may be warranted in order to address the 
near constant barrage of accusations of financial mischief thrown at derivative 
instruments in the Islamic finance discourse (Al-Suwailem, 2006; IRTI, 2000; OIC, 
1992; Usmani, 2010). 
 
With that, the search for the definition of speculation, which is perhaps harder to 
define than its gambling cousin, commences with the examination of the attempts by 
many writers to allocate particular attributes to the elusive concept (Fridson, 1993). 
For Adam Smith, one of the fathers of modern economic theory, a speculator is one 
who: “exercises no one regular, established, or well-known branch of business. He is 
a corn merchant this year, and a wine merchant the next, and a sugar, tobacco, or tea 
merchant the year after. He enters into every trade when he foresees that it is likely to 
be more than commonly profitable, and he quits it when he foresees that its profits 
are likely to return to the level of other trades. His profits and losses, therefore, can 
bear no regular proportion to those of any one established and well-known branch of 
business” (Smith, 1778, p. 140). 
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The above reference to speculation by Smith (1778) certainly does add some 
guidance to the path of distinction between investing and speculating on the decent 
portion of the normative scale, as it were, of economic activities. In effect, the force 
that propels speculation to forego its roots in the relative safety of investing appears 
to depend, in part, on the level of opportunism through a proactive engagement with 
the various markets that hold prospects of higher profits considering its relative 
riskiness vis-à-vis the passivity in the acceptance of the status quo with perhaps some 
mild improvements.  This, it is conjectured, can be thought of as the key that begins 
to unlock the mysteries of the boundaries of speculation with investing and gambling 
at either side of it. To be able to turn the key, however, it is important to at least get a 
distinction (once more, even if not exact) of the middle ground on the normative 
scale based on the profit generation inclinations.  
 
For this, and in recognizing the commentary of the notables: Emery, Schumpeter, 
and Kaldor when they were remarking that price change is a chief objective of the 
speculators (Emery, 1896, p. 96; Kaldor, 1939, p. 1; Schumpeter, 1939, p. 679), it 
may be argued that the characterization of the middle ground on the normative scale 
depends, in essence, on the behaviour of economic agents in regards to price 
changes. That is, it is the nature and extent of opportunism with regards to price 
changes that is a crucial trait of a speculator whether this exists in the real economy 
in the pricing of goods and services (closer to investing), the financial and tradables 
sectors in the pricing of securities and other assets that trade on the secondary 
markets (perhaps somewhat in the middle), or in the pricing of odds by 
counterparties (closer to gambling).  
 
Accordingly, while it is acknowledged that the price changes can influence the 
timing (hours vs. days vs. weeks vs. months vs. years) of the purchase and sale of 
whatever it is that is bought or sold and can possibly be an indication of the place of 
the economic agent on the normative scale (Kamali, 2000b, p. 147), it should also be 
recognized that more than one motive can inspire short-term trading (Stout, 1999). In 
fact, with a particular focus on Islamic jurisprudence, there seems to be no evidence 




short-term trading may not be prohibited as such, there may be reasons to reduce the 
incentives for its excessive engagement due to its negative externalities on the 
financial markets (e.g., increased volatility, financialization of the economy, etc.); 
indeed, the negative externalities can be discerned to be the rationale behind the 
public policy decision to increase the tax rates on this type of practice in some 
jurisdictions.   
 
Interestingly, this does demonstrate a reverse of the argumentation that has been 
elaborated thus far in this discussion with its contention, based on available evidence, 
for the sanctioning of what has previously been impermissible.  In effect, the case of 
contemporary tax law in regards to high turnover trading does demonstrate the need, 
in some circumstances, to limit less-than-ideal practices, even if on the face of it they 
are rather legitimate.161  In other words, the understanding of the prohibitions is not 
static; new restrictions and prohibitions may be imposed on previously permitted 
activities under the banner of Mafsada (public harm) in the same manner that 
hitherto prohibited transactions should be allowed within the context of Maslaha 
(public interest). 
 
To return to the topic of the boundaries of speculation, it is of high importance to 
note here that it is not so much the line of business of the speculator (including their 
background) or the instrument that they use (or its ownership traits) that defines in an 
unequivocal fashion where their economic actions belong on the normative scale. 
Rather, it is in the ability of these actions to demonstrate how they perceive to be the 
best manner to generate profit from their ex-ante resource endowment. For history is 
replete with a plethora of individuals and businesses (e.g., real sector operator, 
traders, financial intermediaries, etc.) that have used a multitude of tools (e.g., 
Tulips, equities, fixed-income securities, derivatives, etc.) with varying degrees of 
ownership that instigated crises due to gambling behaviour with profound social, 
economic, and political consequences (Chancellor, 1999). This, again, relates to the 
points that were elaborated in the Derivatives in Islamic Finance Chapter (Chapter 6) 
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wherein it was contended that ownership (and the associated issues of delivery and 
possession) is not a sole endower of transactional legitimacy; nor is the act of 
entering into a derivative contract, absent any contextualization, a true indicator of 
committing a religiously prohibited deed. 
 
To illustrate, and with a focus on the derivatives, when one scrutinizes some of the 
sensational disasters (Procter and Gamble, Gibson Greetings, Orange Country, etc.) 
that were the result of the usage of these instruments, they will observe that, in 
Bernstein‟s words, “these disasters in derivative deals among big-name companies 
occurred for the simple reason that corporate executives ended adding to their 
exposures to volatility rather than limiting it. They turned the company‟s treasury 
into a profit center. They treated low probability events as being impossible” 
(Bernstein, 1996, p. 323). Moreover, even when one examines the financial sector‟s 
derivatives debacles of Barings Brothers and LTCM; in addition to, more recently, 
AIG, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, among many others, there it may become self-
evident that: “they ignored the most fundamental principle of investment theory: you 
cannot expect to make large profits without taking the risk of large losses [sic]” 
(Bernstein, 1996, p. 323).  
 
Thus, it very much appears that the omnipresent axiom of Alghonom Bialghorom, as 
elaborated in the seventh century, was right on the spot; and with it the reinforcement 
of what was stated previously: it is the perception of the best manner to generate 
profit by way of changing prices from the ex-ante resource endowment that is a 
rough indicator of the place of those activities on the normative scale. Along the 
same lines, the notion of the intent of entrepreneurs in regards to hedging or 
gambling aims has been mentioned by some of the respondents in the interviews and 
can, consequently, be considered within the wider conceptualization of the 
aforementioned axiom and the normative scale.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is acknowledged that there are some traits that are 
generally associated with the propensity of gambling behaviour that can add (and 




are: turnover (Glaser & Weber, 2009; Simonson, 1972), classification of the 
economic agent (Bessembinder & Seguin, 1993; Chang, Chou, & Nelling, 2000; de 
Roon, Nijman, & Veld, 2000; Wang, 2003), and usage of credit (Chancellor, 1999; 
Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Mill, 1848, pp. 393-396). Other indicators (in addition 
to some of the above) that were provided by many respondents in interviews include: 
percentage of profit generated from speculative activity, gap between upside and low 
side, exposed book size, and the undertaking of proper due diligence. However, even 
though the merits of many of these designations are not disputed, it should be 
recognized that these general indicative traits are just that; they are generalizations, 
not definite classifiers. 
 
One may be tempted to add to the above list the type of instrument used by the 
speculator, which may indicate their propensity to leave the anchor tying them to the 
realm of investing in a bid to wade into that of gambling. Indeed, this appears to be 
the crux of the Maysir argumentation of the Shari’a scholars and some of the 
respondents, particularly in the academics, Shari’a scholars, and legal experts group, 
outlined in the Derivatives in Islamic Finance Chapter (Chapter 6) who professed a 
judgement against derivatives. In essence, the view (and the hope) is that the 
elimination of the instrument leads to the elimination of the act.  
 
To this, it may be simply stated that derivatives are merely tools, albeit versatile 
ones, for a wide variety of purposes. True, apart from risk management, they may be 
used to speculate and gamble (with profound consequences) on the changes in prices 
in the financial markets. However, it should also be notable that this practice is not 
too dissimilar to that of using equities (e.g., remember Saudi Arabia Tadawul 
exchange in 2003-2006) or real estate (e.g., remember Dubai in 2005-2009) in an 
irresponsible manner for an economic gain. In effect, the nature of the instrument 
and/or the underlying variables has become almost an irrelevant consideration to 
those parties intent on gambling since there is, as Bernstein said, clearly an impaired 
ability to exercise self-control due to heightened emotion clouding rational decision 
making and a lack of a full understanding of what they are dealing with (i.e., 





The positive thing that emerges from the discussion in this and the previous chapters 
is that it revolves around the permissibility of derivatives for market risk 
management endeavours that are verifiable by modern accounting theory and market 
practice. Specifically, they should arguably be used in the context of transferring the 
non-core market risk exposures of real sector entities (and financial institutions that 
facilitate their existence), which can, in turn, reduce the probability of financial 
distress, underinvestment, loss of potential financing savings and market 
competitiveness, and lower overall firm value. The anchor, consequently, to the 
investment sphere is stronger than any that has been examined thus far (ownership, 
delivery, possession, instrument, turnover, credit usage, and classification of 
economic agent).   
 
The above also concurs with the clear pre-eminence of the real sector in Islamic 
jurisprudence that can be observed to manifest itself in the commentary that exists in 
the Islamic finance literature in regards to gambling, in general, and derivatives, in 
particular (Al-Suwailem, 2006; El-Gari, 2010; Kamali, 2000b; Khan, 1997; Moody's, 
2010 ; Salamon, 2000).  This was also apparent in the opinions by many of the 
respondents; to illustrate, one respondent stated that “the preference for contractual 
hedging [in Islamic finance] is to have hedging activities tied to the real economy.” 
 
Effectively, some of the contemporary commentators in Islamic finance do make a 
distinction between the constructive risks that are created as part of real economic 
activities (including speculative risks) and the artificial risk creation by the gambling 
parties that is exogenous to the real sector (Al-Suwailem, 2006, p. 40; Kamali, 
2000b, p. 147).  This can be perceived to correspond to what Emery wrote in the late 
nineteenth century when he stated: “whereas gambling consists of placing money on 
artificially created risks of some fortuitous event, speculation consists in assuming 
the inevitable economic risks of changes in value” (Emery, 1896, p. 101),  
 
Along the same lines, in regards to the charge by Al-Suwailem that derivatives 




activity (Al-Suwailem, 2006, pp. 39-41), it is not self-evident how the derivative 
contracts commoditize risk and separate it from real economic activity in a manner 
that is different from, say, Salam contracts.  For besides the fact that the ex-post vis-
à-vis the ex-ante character of payment is an irrelevant consideration from the 
severance of risk standpoint, when one enters into a derivative contract, particularly 
the forward-based ones, that the transferred risk, which presumably originated from 
the real economy, goes along with any associated return (i.e., the farmer transfers the 
potential gain to the trader along with any potential losses [risks]).  
 
With the above generalized conceptualization of the environment that hosts the 
market risk management endeavours of real sector entities (including the association 
between gambling, speculation, and investment), the discussion now turns to a 
related subject, which is the role of the financial intermediaries who facilitate 
hedging practices as speculators in the financial markets.  
 
Section IV: The Role of Financial Intermediaries as Speculators 
 
The discussion thus far has concentrated on the usage of derivative instruments as 
hedging tools for market risk management in scenarios that are linked to the real 
economy.  Notably, it was argued that the market risk exposures for real economic 
activity also include those being faced by financial institutions, such as Islamic banks 
(e.g., interest rates/profit rates and currency), that enable real sector entities to create 
wealth in society in a value-added manner that promotes human well-being.  
Throughout the discussion there have been allusions to the role of financial 
intermediaries, or risk transfer specialists as referred to by Culp (2004), who, even 
though not hedgers themselves, have been shown to be indispensable for the 
effective and efficient undertaking of market risk management activities in society 
due to the diversity in the needs that exist between the various hedging counterparties 
(Catania & Alonzi, 1997; Smith, Smithson, & Wakeman, 1988).  
 
One starts with an articulation by Marshall on the role of speculators in producing a 




“Man cannot create material things. In the mental and moral world indeed he may 
produce new ideas; but when he is said to produce material things, he really only 
produces utilities; or in other words, his efforts and sacrifices result in changing the 
form or arrangement of matter to adapt it better for the satisfaction of wants. All that 
he can do in the physical world is either to readjust matter so as to make it more 
useful, as when he makes a log of wood into a table; or to put it in the way of being 
made more useful by nature, as when he puts seed where the forces of nature will 
make it burst into life.  It is sometimes said that traders do not produce: that while 
the cabinet-maker produces furniture, the furniture dealer merely sells what is 
already produces. But there is no scientific foundation for this distinction. They both 
produce utilities, and neither of them can do more: the furniture-dealer moves and 
rearranges matter so as to make it more serviceable than it was before, and the 
carpenter does nothing more” (Marshall, 1910, p. 63).  
 
The words of Marshall are particularly relevant to the subject matter of derivatives 
contracts in that the financial intermediary, as a speculator that specializes in the 
transfer of risks that emanate from the real economy, can be thought of as serving a 
function that is not too much different from the role of a financier operating as a 
middleman between depositors/investors and entrepreneurs/fund seekers.  In effect, 
they use the benefits of economies of scale to lower their search costs to generate a 
more certain knowledge base (in a relative sense to the hedging community) in order 
to reduce forecasting errors (Arrow, 1951; Culp, 2004).162  
 
Essentially, and as recognized early in the twentieth century by Fisher, the role of the 
financial intermediary can be thought of as being built on the recognition of the 
inverse relationship between risk and knowledge (Fisher, 1906, p. 291).  
Furthermore, the utility produced to society, above and beyond the potential for risk 
reduction due to the increase in the knowledge base, also includes increased 
liquidity, lower trading costs, enhanced market depth, and immediacy in execution 
(Catania & Alonzi, 1997; Culp, 2004).  
 
In undertaking their function, the financial intermediary, after utilizing the full 
potential of the portfolio approach to risk management by way of the combination 
(i.e., better statistical inferences) and diversification (i.e., less-than-perfect 
correlation opportunities) benefits, can decide whether to maintain the residual 
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exposure on its balance sheet or transfer them to another financial intermediary 
(Knight, 1921; Kreitner, 2007). That is, if they have adequate capital reserves, they 
can choose to absorb the price risk inherent in the “warehousing” of derivatives by 
not offsetting the unmatched exposure with another party; or, alternatively, they 
could decide to “run a balanced book” with matched assets and liabilities (Whittaker, 
1987).  This approach was incidentally confirmed by one of the respondents in the 
practitioners group However, it would appear that financial intermediaries, at least 
the prudent ones, choose to run a balanced book by offsetting any residual exposures 
to outside parties (Culp, 2004, p. 60; Haushalter, 2000, p. 106; Hull, 2010, p. 72).  
 
Interestingly, based on the above, it may become ostensible that, absent artificial risk 
creation by excessive speculation in a manner that is akin to wagering, this 
framework that is driven by market risk management (or reverse inquiry as noted by 
a respondent in the practitioners group) may actually offer society lower overall 
risks.  This is because the risks that are transferred are anchored to real market 
activities even if continuously transferred in smaller chunks to third parties in the 
financial sector.  
 
Further, although there may be systemic risks due to the potential of default by a 
major financial intermediary in the aforementioned inter-linked chain of risk 
management (Hull, 2010), this particular risk is reduced by the fact that a default by 
hedgers tends to be more idiosyncratic (i.e., good candidate for diversification) than 
default on loans.  In effect, the defaulted derivative contract will have to be 
characterized by both financial distress by the counterparty and a negative contract 
value (Smith, Smithson, & Wakeman, 1988).  
 
With that, it may now be appropriate to broach the topic of fees charged by financial 
intermediaries, which is a topic that was raised in the Market Risks and Their 
Management Chapter (Chapter 4) and one that has been a point of contention in the 
Islamic finance discourse (as noted by one of the respondents in the academics, 
Shari’a scholars, and legal experts group, for whom the best alternative was risk 




intermediary, they are not premiums to guarantee against a certain amount of loss as 
is done in the insurance industry which is apparently negatively perceived by Islamic 
jurists.  
 
Thus, as stated by Patterson in a manner that fits rather nicely with the Alghonom 
Bialghorom axiom: “[T]he hedger will not pay his „premium‟ in cash, he pays it by 
foregoing his gains on a rising market. This brings the „insurer‟ in as a participator in 
the enterprise, a situation which is incompatible with the analogy of insurance. To 
deduct a fixed premium from gross profit (as the insured does in shifting his fire risk) 
is quite a different matter from turning over to the risk-taker an unpredetermined 
portion of the possible profits of the enterprise. Hence hedging does not fit the 
Procrustean bed” (Patterson, 1931, p. 882).  
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is not self-evident from some of the Islamic finance 
literature on derivative contracts where does the animosity towards fee generation by 
financial intermediaries reside and what is the rationale for its prohibition in a 
hedging context  (Al-Shubaili, 2012, pp. 49-50). This is especially pertinent since, as 
has been argued by Kamali, the intermediaries, whether on a Mudharib (investment 
manager) or Wakeel (agent) basis, are allowed to earn remuneration for their efforts 
(Kamali, 2000b, p. 176). In effect, there is really no need for the fees, as advocated 
by Chapra and Khan, to be “Islamised by resorting to Islamic instruments” (Chapra 
& Khan, 2000, p. 81). 
 
Apart from the ambiguity in regards to the religious permissibility for fee generation 
in some of the contemporary financial practices, it is difficult to economically 
rationalize an argument whereby the costs related to building an infrastructure to 
collect and analyse market intelligence (e.g., highly skilled personnel and expensive 
computational and statistical systems) in order to ascertain intrinsic values should be 
done without some form of compensation. The importance of these fees in building 
the necessary capital reserves that can respond to market shocks, as a counterparty to 
the hedging parties, is also not an insignificant consideration. In addition, the fees 




competitive as a result of being determined by the supply and demand forces in the 
financial markets. Essentially, the hedging community has a wide array of financial 
intermediaries to choose from based on their contractual fees and reputation.  
 
That said, there are merits to the argument that the for-profit nature of the financial 
intermediaries in the hedging sphere, especially when combined with pure 
speculative strategies, can result in aggressive behaviour that eventually goes beyond 
the positive role of financial intermediation into the unsustainable realm of gambling.  
This is perhaps what Al-Suwailem (2006) was referring to when he noted the classic 
problem of the willingness vs. the ability to take risks in the financial markets. 
Although, in the case of market risk management (i.e., not credit derivatives that are 
mostly priced on a mark-to-model basis), this has little to do with the professed 
distortions in pricing due to asymmetries of information between the hedging party 
and the financial intermediary (Al-Suwailem, 2006, pp. 37-38).   
 
Thus, it may be estimated that the concern here relates, in a sense, to the discussion 
in the previous section with its focus on the normative scale of economic activities 
and the tendency by some economic agents to transcend the realm of speculation into 
that of gambling.  This was seconded through the assertion by one of the respondents 
in the academics, Shari’a scholars, and legal experts group, while commenting on 
derivatives usage, that one may, under the auspices of the Islamic theory of Daroura 
(necessity), be allowed to drink wine if their life is in peril (e.g., extreme thirst with 
no water resources). However, the issue, in Islamic jurisprudence, as he quickly 
noted, then becomes when the use of Daroura becomes the accepted norm in the 
Islamic finance industry (i.e., derivatives for pure speculation becomes the custom). 
Another respondent from the same group said the issue is: “where does it stop?” 
 
Interestingly, while recognizing the aforementioned legitimate concern, it may be 
conjectured that the fee structure of financial intermediaries can be of value in the 
evolution from theoretical formulation of the normative scale of economic activities 
to practical application in that it can actually be a decent measure of the gambling 




derivatives markets. In essence, it has been contended by some writers that distorted 
fee structures that are not backed by economic fundamentals and financial realities 
may actually encourage aggressive risk taking in a bid to generate excess profits 
(Murphy, 2012; Whittaker, 1987). Specifically, the willingness to take risks may not 
be commensurate with the ability to do so based on the size of the transaction, the 
characteristics of warehoused inventory of derivatives, the capital base, profile of the 
counterparty, investing and funding charges, and any cost structures that should be 
factored explicitly into the willingness vs. ability equation (G30, 1993; Hull, 2010; 
Litzenberger, 1992).   
 
Accordingly, it becomes apparent based on the above that the social good offered by 
financial intermediaries in efficiently allocating the risks that exist in society as 
opposed to perhaps creating risk for its own sake depends in no small part to their fee 
structures.  These fee structures are, in actual fact, observable to their own internal 
risk management function and externally to the other counterparties, not least of 
which are the supervisory authorities.
163
 In effect, the stability of the utility provided 
by the financial intermediary, as a speculator focusing on risk transfer, is contingent 
on their proper indication of willingness to take risks (i.e., competitive vs. 
uncompetitive fees) in a manner that accurately corresponds to their ability to do 
so.164 In short, it is not exclusively a weakness; it can also be an opportunity.   
 
With that, one may conclude this section by stating that the discussion on the role of 
financial intermediaries in the hedging sphere and the expressed potential for 
improvement in the current modus operandi of the derivatives markets were 
elaborated with the objective of exploring the prospect of having Islamic financial 
institutions serve the role of financial intermediaries in the derivatives markets to 
facilitate the hedging activities of their clients, even if it is on a reverse inquiry basis.  
This is something which does not currently exist; in fact, as noted by some 
respondents in the practitioners group, the conventional financial institutions have 
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the Islamic finance industry as a “captive market” in that regard. Notably, this reality 
endures even for the Islamic swaps market.  Effectively, even if the argumentation 
for the permissibility of the derivative instruments were accepted by the Islamic 
finance scholarly community, the decision to preclude the speculative services of 
financial intermediaries in the hedging sphere would make the market risk 
management endeavours by operators in the real economy a much more challenging 
task in terms of execution.  
 
Moreover, it supports some of the calls being made within the Islamic finance 
industry for a pragmatic approach to the conceptualization of permissibility; 
particularly, in contemporary activities in the financial markets (Bacha, 1999; El-
Gamal, 2006; El-Gari, 1993; Kamali, 2000b). This was perhaps best articulated by 
El-Gari, in the context of stock markets, when he argued:  
“Therefore, we do not find it useful to follow an approach of ignoring the stock 
market transactions and brushing aside everything that we feel is not permitted in 
Islam, arguing that the remainder should be the basis for the Islamic market. Indeed, 
we do not feel that this is a useful approach. What we feel is more appropriate is to 
identify the components that we have already dealt with and then build up a structure 
of the Islamic market depending upon what is legally permitted and alternatives for 
whatever is not allowed, in order that we can ensure full compliance with the rules 
of Shari'ah [sic] and, at the same time, a market that is vigorous and bristle…The 
fact that [there] is a possibility or likelihood [of impermissible activities] does not 
provide a sufficient justification for doing away with a large number of market 




It has been contended throughout the thesis that the Islamic finance literature should 
transcend the supreme emphasis on the legal sphere in the interpretation of the 
scripture and grant more credence to the economic theories that can explain human 
behaviour with resources. In this chapter, the discussion focused on one of the key 
topics that were often repeated in the discourse on derivatives in Islamic finance, 
namely the linkages between these financial contracts and the prohibition of Maysir.  
 
For this, it has been argued in this chapter that one ought to distinguish between the 
instrument, the framework, and the act even if they all centre on dealings that relate 




framework of Shari’a, the act of Maysir should be the focus of the prohibition not 
the particular financial tools (i.e., derivatives) and frameworks (i.e., risk transfer and 
financial intermediaries), which have been shown to provide positive economic 
effects. The significance of that argument becomes apparent in the paradoxical 
prohibitive stance in regards to derivatives that exists even in the face of appeals for 
allowing the use of these instruments only for market risk management purposes.  
 
In effect, it should be realized that the complete elimination of particular forms of 
financial instruments is not the answer to the Maysir problem since it eradicates 
positive benefits for no clear and attainable purpose (i.e., eliminate gambling 
behaviour). Essentially, as is markedly understood by the students of economic 
theory, one should be reminded that the formulation of any economic-related 
directive should be ambitious in that it seeks to maximize the benefits (human 
welfare) and reduce the costs (including negative externalities) associated with its 
implementation, but should not adopt an untenable objective of seeking to guarantee 
only the emergence of benefits.  
 
In fact, what could be contended, instead, is that the aspiration for complete purity in 
financial transactions by way of the juristic rejection of the utilization of derivatives 
as hedging instruments by real sector operators, is that such a position can be a form 
of injustice.  This is because it opens the door for increased uncertainty, and its 
effects, in the economic dealings in society (i.e., financial distress, reduced 
competitiveness, lower economic development, etc.).   
 
Finally, it is appreciated that there is a concern amongst the majority, if not all, of the 
stakeholders in the Islamic finance industry regarding the possibility of having the 
risk and return profile of derivative usage become so unbalanced that it overwhelms 
the beneficial economic functions of these instruments and result in financial crises 
with profound negative consequences.  The answer to that concern, or any other for 
that matter, is not in the complete elimination of any financial tool that contains the 
prospect of instability, rather it is allowing an important instrument that assists in the 




this, the imposition of the IAS 39 hedge accounting rules, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, in addition to the prospect for increased disclosure in regards to inherent risk 
exposures of financial intermediaries along with their fee structures can be of great 
value.
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 Notably, the financial intermediaries can be an SPV of a larger banking institution focusing on 
market risk management services for the Islamic finance industry.  This would alleviate some of the 




Chapter Nine: Conclusion and Ending Remarks  
 
Section I: Summary of Research Findings  
 
The thesis commenced with the formulation of two particular aims which have been 
addressed in the course of the research: Firstly, economic-centred theories, along 
with a wider elaboration of the modus operandi of the financial markets, were 
inserted into the Islamic finance discourse on the subject matter. Secondly, the 
rationale for the various stances on the permissibility of derivatives hedging 
instruments were examined in a manner that accounts for the numerous instruments 
currently existing in the financial markets as well as some of the proposed solutions 
circulating in the Islamic finance industry.  
 
Along the same lines, the thesis strived, by way of the deductive research strategy 
and qualitative methodology, to tackle the research questions that were articulated, 
namely: 1) What is the basis for the proscriptions of the usage of derivative hedging 
instruments for market risk management in the Islamic finance industry, and 2) What 
is the basis for allowing derivative hedging instruments for market risk management 
in the Islamic finance industry? 
 
In effect, the preceding six chapters were elaborated with the objective that was built 
on the need of having a comprehensive, multi-layered discussion on the subject 
matter of market risk management, in general, and the usage of derivatives as 
hedging instruments, in particular, within the Islamic finance industry. However, 
before the articulation of the six substantive chapters, it was deemed important to 
start with the Research Philosophy Chapter (Chapter 2) which endeavoured to 
demonstrate the significance of the conceptualization of truth in Islamic thought.   
 
This is especially relevant in matters within the realm of Mua’amalat (dealings 
between individuals) wherein truth is arguably a product of consensus regarding its 
utility for human well-being. Notwithstanding the above, it should be recognized that 
humans traditionally struggle to attain proximity to the truth in religious matters due 




scientific study of Islam, consequently, calls for more humble epistemological 
stances rather than the obstinate belief in the veracity of economic-centred religious 
positions (i.e., not acts of worship).  
 
With the philosophical foundation in place, the thesis then proceeded with an 
increased focus on the subject matter of the research commencing with the Market 
Risks and Their Management Chapter (Chapter 4) that sought to show that the 
contemporary challenges and opportunities faced by the real sector is much different 
from those existing in seventh century Arabia.  Furthermore, there were numerous 
rationales elaborated that substantiated the importance of managing non-core market 
risk exposures to interest rates, currencies, and commodities (particularly through 
risk transfer mechanisms). Notably, the above was formulated with an associated 
contention that Islam does not impose the passive acceptance of all risks as 
evidenced by the proper contextualization of the firmly established doctrines of Al-
Durariyat Al-Khamsa, Al-Akhdh Bel-Asbab, and Alghonom Bialghorom.  
 
The Conventional Derivatives: Theory and Practice Chapter (Chapter 5), for its part, 
contributed to the achievement of the aims of the thesis by focusing on the usage of 
derivatives as hedging instruments within the realm of economic theory and market 
practice. The significance of this chapter does become ostensible with the often-
mentioned viewpoint within the Islamic finance industry of the presence of linkages 
between derivatives and the prohibitions of Riba (usury), Gharar (excessive 
uncertainty), and Maysir (gambling).  Specifically, it was argued in the course of the 
chapter that derivatives are not debt instruments since there is no funding 
arrangements within their structures.  Moreover, the interest rates are used within the 
framework of pricing, not a means to uniquely increase the indebtedness of one party 
to another in a consistent manner.  
 
In regards to Gharar, it was actually shown that derivatives are versatile tools that 
can reduce the uncertainties associated with the financial markets in a transparent 
manner. As for the proximity to Maysir, it may have become self-evident that 




derivative instruments.  Notably, the delineation of the specifics of the conventional 
derivatives anticipated some of the arguments that were outlined in the following 
chapters in regards to the proscription of cash settlement and margining.  
 
The Derivatives in Islamic Finance Chapter (Chapter 6), by directly focusing on the 
permissibility of the derivative instruments, detailed the complex and circular-
natured juridical debates on the topic of the research by the Shari’a standard-setting 
bodies as well as many of the Islamic finance commentators and interview 
respondents.  In the course of the discussion, the thesis contributed to the discourse 
on the subject matter by classifying the various viewpoints into two distinct groups.   
 
The first group comprised the theoretical Shari’a issues that dealt with the 
characterization of derivatives as debt instruments as well as those that revolved 
around the possession and ownership of assets that are thought to be inexistent in a 
manner that precluded the prospect of delivery. In the course of the discussion, it was 
argued, once more, that the preceding chapter on conventional derivatives should not 
have led to any association between derivatives and debt instruments.  In addition, 
the issues surrounding possession, ownership, existence, and delivery were shown to 
be centred on the reduction in the prospect of usury, disputation, ill-intent, and 
gambling behaviour rather than being elaborated for the purpose of curtailment of 
hitherto legitimate economic activity.   
 
The second group, for its part, focused on the contractual Shari’a issues wherein 
reformulations of conventional derivative contracts were undertaken through the 
forcing of tenuous linkages between them and pre-modern “Islamic” contracts.  The 
hoped-for outcome, it may be conjectured, was to legitimize an a priori position in 
regards to the permissibility of derivative instruments under the purview of the 
Islamic jurisprudence. The end result, however, was far from the aspirations in that 
what was on offer was arguably not a means to safe guard the Islamic finance 
industry, but rather a choice between either what effectively amounts to defective 
economic hedging instruments with negative externalities or what is, in essence, 





In light of the foregoing, the existing literature on the topic of the research along with 
the interviews undertaken have revealed that it is perhaps not the theoretical issues or 
contractual specifications that are the crux of the prohibitive stances on the usage of 
derivative hedging instruments.  Instead, there was evidence that it may be the 
unease in the dealings of money (including hoarding behaviour) and the fears of 
permitting the indulgence in gambling activity that are the dominant forces in the 
restrictive positions.  
 
The unease in the dealings of money, which was discussed in the Permissibility of 
the Underlying Variables and the Recognition of the Contract Chapter (Chapter 7), 
can become ostensible in the context of derivative instruments that have monetary 
underlying variables (e.g., interest rates and currencies). A chief apprehension in this 
circumstance is the potential for engaging in Riba transactions (particularly its Al-
Fadl and Al-Nasi’ah forms). The above, in turn, was revealed by the presence of two 
strains of conjectures in the Islamic finance literature and the views by the 
respondents: a.) Islam dictates the exclusive dealing in trade related activities that 
revolve around tangible underlying variables (e.g., commodities), and b.) The 
concentration on the prohibition of hoarding is on money, as a means of hoarding, 
rather than the act of hoarding itself. The research showed that both of these 
conjectures are erroneous. 
 
A related issue that emerged, particularly in the course of the interviews, is the 
manifestation of the restrictions in the dealings in money on the formal recognition 
of financial instruments with monetary underlying variables. In effect, the absence of 
any AAOIFI ruling on the derivative instruments (even the “Islamic” varieties) has  
showcased the triumph of normative accounting principles in the Islamic finance 
industry vis-à-vis neutral information reporting for optimal decision making (which 
may have religious overtones). 
 
As for the concerns associated with the utilization of derivative instruments as 




ensuing anti-social behaviour, the Maysir, Hedging, and Derivatives Chapter 
(Chapter 8) has demonstrated that the conceptualization of gambling is a taxing and 
multifarious affair that is by no means a precise science (at the current stage of 
knowledge, at least). Accordingly, it was shown that the search for the objective 
exclusion of the means to the indulgence in gambling whether in terms of framework 
(i.e., zero-sum arrangements) or instruments (e.g., derivatives) has thus far continued 
to be elusive and has mostly remained in the subjective territory. That being said, the 
façade of the existence of some form of objective criteria that can eliminate gambling 
has actually served to impose on the hedging community unnecessary restrictions 
that hamper real economic activity.  
 
In a similar vein, given that speculation (which is understandably difficult to define) 
as a concept is not proscribed in Islam, the thesis espoused a position that financial 
intermediaries, as facilitators of hedging activities in the real economy, should be 
permitted to operate within the confines of Islamic jurisprudence, if they are willing 
and able to perform that function in a manner that does not compromise the stability 
of the financial markets. 
 
Section II: Contribution of the Thesis and Implications of the 
Findings 
 
The delineation of the findings of the research in the previous section moves the 
discussion onto the contribution of the thesis.  One can start with the inferences that 
can be made based on the research findings wherein it may be stated that the thesis, 
has revealed what can arguably be described as an over-generalized discourse on the 
topic of the research in the Islamic finance literature and commentary.  In particular, 
it was shown that the prohibitive stances on the market risk transfer strategy and 
derivative instruments as tools for the implementation of that strategy were adopted 
in a generous fashion without the needed level of extensiveness and depth in the 
understanding of what is essentially an economic subject matter. This, of course, 
became apparent in that the standard-setting bodies in the Islamic finance industry 




Islamic theory of Qiyas (analogical reasoning), untroubled not only by the potential 
for large unmitigated market risk exposures of a growing Islamic finance industry 
that is being increasingly interconnected to the international financial markets, but 
also in the probable negative implications of these open exposures on the real sector.  
 
More specifically, the thesis sought to contextualize the debate on derivatives in the 
Islamic finance literature and commentary with a more thorough discussion on the 
economics, rationale, and usage of derivative instruments in a market risk 
management framework (i.e., not for gambling) that has numerous benefits for the 
hedging entities, in particular, and for sustainable growth in Islamic economies, in 
general, (increased cross-border trade and investment, reduced distress costs, etc.).  
 
The aforementioned approach, it is argued, surpasses the chosen path for the modus 
operandi in the Islamic finance industry in regards to facing up to the market risk 
management challenges which appears to have been built on contentious juridical 
judgements based on incomplete legal analysis of contemporary contractual forms 
vis-à-vis their pre-modern “Islamic” counterparts (with an ensuing circular-natured 
debate on technicalities).  Accordingly, the hoped-for outcome of the thesis has been 
transcending the modern “Islamic” hedging instruments/frameworks that revolve 
around being either: 1) Transaction level solutions that inherently disregard the 
difficulties of implementation along with an ostensible neglect of the benefits of a 
portfolio approach to risk management, or 2) A formulistic exercise of financial 
engineering with multiple Arabic-named contracts that generate the exact same risk 
and return profile as well as payoff structures of the prohibited conventional 
derivative instruments.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is acknowledged that the contention that derivatives 
are effective instruments for the management of market risks in the most efficient 
manner will undoubtedly be met with hostility by some in the Islamic finance 
community who will continue to refuse to accept the presence of derivatives in the 
industry. In the course of the rebuttal, they may choose to continue to evoke a 




to regenerate the attempts to superficially associate derivative usage for hedging 
purposes with the prohibitions of Riba, Gharar, and Maysir.  
 
This, almost certainly, will be undertaken by citing multiple opinions of some of the 
most respected jurists in Islam in an effort to gain juridical legitimacy for the 
proposed judgment with little regard to the required contextualization of these 
venerable opinions to whatever perspective they are applied to.  Surprisingly, and for 
some paradoxical reason, it is not apparent, as has been shown in the thesis, that the 
indispensable Islamic theories of Maslaha and Daroura have had a role in this 
almost exclusive Qiyas-based framework of juridical determination.   
 
To confront this conundrum, one should perhaps start with the recognition that the 
view of the Shari’a on economic matters will inherently be an economic perspective, 
not a legal one that focuses on contractual technicalities. This realization, in turn, 
leads to three essential theoretical foundations that underlie the substance of the 
whole thesis. First, economics is the scientific study of the behaviour of economic 




Second, the behaviour of economic agents is indiscriminate in that a Muslim 
economic agent with resources will largely behave the same way as a non-Muslim 
economic agent.  That is, the Muslim brain is not wired any differently to a Non-
Muslim brain.  To be certain, there may be religious and cultural factors that may 
affect behaviour; however, there have not been any evidence that would point to the 
fact that Muslims behave in a fundamentally different manner with resources than 
non-Muslims.
167
  Finally, Islam as a religion that communicates the message of God 
to mankind (not just Muslims) shows a path for a better distribution of those limited 
resources among the economic agents.  
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 This definition is closest to the one offered by Lionel Robbins in his An Essay on the Nature and 
Significance of Economic Science in that he stated that: “Economics is the science which studies 
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” 
(Robbins, 2007, p. 15).  Notably, the definition that is used implicitly acknowledges the 
conceptualization of the ends and means by economic agents as well as the alternative uses along with 
the explicit mention of time. 
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The statement “better distribution,” in the last sentence, along with the 
acknowledgement that all economic agents behave in largely similar fashion is 
fundamental to the proper understanding of economics in the Islamic finance 
industry and the formulation of an effective policy that focuses on the noble 
objectives in the Shari’a. With that, one can proceed with the appeal to the Islamic 
finance industry to go beyond the emphasis of labelling contracts as being either 
Islamic or conventional along formulistic lines and proceed to grant greater credence 
to the all-too-important substance of the justice (or injustice) that surrounds the 
distribution of limited resources.   
 
This should be undertaken in light of a better understanding, as shown in the thesis, 
of how the proscriptions of Riba, Gharar, and Maysir (as divine clues cloaked in the 
garb of prohibitions) manifest themselves in contemporary commercial and financial 
environments. It is aspired that the present thesis on market risk management and 
derivative hedging instruments in Islamic finance can be regarded as a step in that 
direction.   
 
In terms of the implications arising from the elaboration of the thesis, one may start 
with the recommendation, based on the evidence presented in the course of the 
research, that the Shari’a scholarly community and the standard-setting bodies 
should adopt a position that grants permissibility, in theory and in practice, to the 
contemporary market risk management framework.  This should also entail the 
acceptance of derivative instruments as tools for the implementation of that market 
risk management framework (i.e., not for gambling). 
 
To be certain, it is recognized that the usage of the option-based instruments in the 
Islamic finance industry may be a contentious matter to some members of the Islamic 
finance community due to their asymmetric payoff structures wherein there is a 
potential for profit-making in a manner that exceeds the losses associated with 
original market risk exposures. The above is an understandable position when the 




being said, the forward-based derivative instruments are not endowed with such 
payoff ambiguity if there is indeed an equal offsetting risk exposure to the hedging 
entity. Thus, given that the forward-based instruments, for the most part, neutralize 
the risk exposure they should be allowed within the Islamic finance industry as an 
effective means of hedging market risks.  
 
Moreover, it has been shown in the research that there is no substantive evidence that 
backs the opinion that only commodity price risk can be hedged and that any other 
types of risk have to be dealt with exclusively through commodity Murabaha 
contracts combined with Wa’ad structures. Consequently, it is recommended that 
entities with legitimate hedging needs should be allowed to use derivative 
instruments (once more they can be limited to the forward-based ones) to manage 
interest rate and foreign exchange market risk exposures in a manner that allows 
financial intermediaries to function as facilitators for the hedging activities of real 
sector entities.  
 
Finally, the standard-setting bodies should strive to ensure that the usage of these 
instruments is properly recognized on the financial statements of the entities that 
utilize them; for this, IAS 39 has been shown to offer confidence that the derivative 
instruments are properly accounted for in addition to an assurance that they are used 
in a hedging context. This IAS 39 framework can be conjoined with a derivative 
trading platform in the form of an exchange that is centred on market risk 
management endeavours in a manner that incorporates the highest standards of 
transparency and good governance.  
 
Section III: Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research  
 
In terms of the limitations of the thesis and the suggestions for further research, the 
thesis has perhaps revealed that, despite the recent focus granted to the subject 
matter, the Islamic finance industry is just scratching the surface on this important 
topic. One of the chief limitations that was evident in the course of carrying out the 




variables which, in turn, has resulted in the lack of relevant empirical evidence. This 
is perhaps an area where infrastructure organizations in the Islamic finance industry 
(e.g., IIFM, AAOIFI, IFSB, etc.) along with academic institutions can contribute in 
order to advance the discourse.  
 
As for the potential for further research, it would be of immense value to 
comprehend, to a greater extent than is currently present, the role of conviction on 
the economic behaviour of people. In effect, the deeper elaboration of this research in 
the future would undoubtedly be useful to a superior understanding (and perhaps 
even measurement) of the behaviour of various groupings of economic agents given 
their religious belief system.   
 
Moreover, even though it is not peculiar to the Islamic finance industry, further 
research that can result in a better conceptualisation of gambling in economic 
thought will certainly be beneficial in the proper contextualization of dual purpose 
financial instruments (i.e., investment/hedging tools).  This should, in turn, result in 
less aptitude for sweeping generalizations as has been markedly present in the 
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1. Overall view on market risk management in Islamic finance? 
2. How does your organization (or your clients) view and implement risk 
management? 
a. Gap-Analysis, Duration-Gap, VaR, etc. 
b. Immunize the portfolio vs. opportunistic risk management 
3. Should all risk be accepted in order to legitimize returns? 
4. Overall view on risk transfer as a strategy of risk management (reduction, 
consolidation [combination and diversification]? 





1. Overall view on derivatives? 
2. Why should they be permitted or prohibited? 
a. Riba, Maysir, Gharar, or contractual deviances?  
3. Should they be permitted for risk management? 
4. Should they be permitted for investment/speculation? 
5. If derivatives are permitted exclusively for risk management, what would be 
your views? 
6. Does it matter what the structure of the derivatives is if it is used for a 
legitimate purpose?  (ends vs. means) 
a. Should companies be allowed to use conventional derivative 
instruments for hedging? 
i. Common stock for Shari’a-compliant firms. 
b. Should Islamic finance design Islamic derivatives that replicate 
derivative hedging instruments? 
i. Commodity Murabaha and Wa’ad? 
ii. Urbun and Khiyarat for Options? 
iii. Salam and Istisna’a? 
7. How are derivatives dealt with in accounting methods? 
a. Hedge accounting vs. Mark-to-market 
 
Gambling vs. Hedging vs. Investing 
 
1. How would you differentiate between: a.) Investing, b.) Speculation, and c.) 
Gambling? 
2. Does it make a difference if the derivatives are used for hedging, investing, 
speculating, and/or gambling? 
 
Currency and Riba 
 
1. What is an asset and how is it defined in Islamic finance? 




2. What is a liability and how is it defined in Islamic finance? 
a. How is Dayn defined? 
3. Is currency a commodity? 
4. Is currency an asset (haqq)? 
a. Why and why not? 
5. Is Gold or Silver a commodity in Islamic jurisprudence? 
a. What if it is used as a currency? 
b. Does it matter if it is backed by the value of Gold or the faith and 
credit of the issuing government? 
6. Why would you think that some writers consider Gold a type of Mal and not 
currency (physical, chemical composition, value by the society, etc.)? 
7. Is Libor as a benchmark an asset? 
8. Can Libor be bought or sold? 
a. Implications on derivatives? 





1. Do you think that Islamic hedgers should participate in conventional 
derivative markets? 
2. Should there be an Islamic derivatives platform? 
a. How should it be structured? 




1. Do you think a debate on derivatives should take place again at the Fiqh 
Academy and AAOIFI? 
a. It has been 20 years since it was last discussed in the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy. 
2. Do you think that AAOIFI should issue a standard on derivatives? 







AAOIFI. (2010). Accounting, Auditing, and Governance Standards for Islamic Financial 
Institutions Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions. 
Bahrain. 
Abd Al-Qadir, A. (1982). Ta'qib 'ala Ra'y Al-Tashri' fi Masa'il Al-Bursa. Cairo, Egypt: Al-Ittihad 
Al-Duwali li Al-Bunuk Al-Islamiyah. 
Abu Saud, M. (2002). Money, Interest and Qirad. IIUM Journal of Economics and 
Management, 10(1), 67-97.  
Abu Sulayman, A. W. I. (2003). Fiqh Al-Daroura wa Tatbikatou Al-Mo'asara. Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
Aertsen, J. (1988). Nature and Creature : Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought. Leiden; New 
York: E.J. Brill. 
Ahmad, Z. (1994). Islamic Banking: State of the Art. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research 
and Training Institute. 
Al-Amarani, M. B. A. (2003). Al-Manfa’a Fel Qard. Dammam, Saudi Arabia: Dar Ibn Al-Jauzi. 
Al-Amine, M. a.-B. M. (2008). Risk Management in Islamic Finance : An Analysis of 
Derivatives Instruments in Commodity Markets. Leiden; Boston: Brill. 
Al-Baladhuri, A. (1983). Futuh al-Buldan. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah. 
Al-Baz, A. A. M. (1999). Ahkam Sarf Al-Nuqud wa Al-Omlat fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami. Amman: Dar 
Al-Nafa'is. 
Al-Ghazali. (1993a). Al-Mustafa Min Ilm Al-Usul. Jeddah: Sharikat Al-Madina Al-
Munawwara. 
Al-Ghazali. (1993b). Asas Al-Qiyas. Riyadh: Maktabat Al-Abikan. 
Al-Ghazali. (n.d.). Ihya Ulum al-Din (Vol. 4th ). Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Nadwah. 
Al-Ghazali, & Marmura, M. E. (1997). The Incoherence of the Philosophers: Tahafut al-
falasifah: a parallel English-Arabic Text (1st ed.). Provo, Utah: Brigham Young 
University Press. 
Al-Ghazali, & Watt, W. M. (1953). The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali. London: G. Allen and 
Unwin. 
Al-Islambouly, A. M. K. (2003). Al-Uqud Al-Mustaqbaliya wa Ra'y Al-Shariah Al-Islamiya. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. American Open University. Cairo.  
Al-Masri, R. Y. (1991). Al-Jami' fi Usul Al-Riba. Damascus, Syria: Dar Al-Qalam. 
Al-Masri, R. Y. (1993). Al-Maysir wa Al-Qimar (1st ed.). Damascus, Syria; Beirut, Lebanon 
Dar Al-Qalam; Al-Dar Al-Shamia. 
Al-Masri, R. Y. (2003). The Binding Unilateral Promise (wa'd) in Islamic Banking Operations: 
Is it Permissible for a Unilateral Promise (wa'd) to be Binding as an Alternative to a 
Proscribed Contract? Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, 15(1), 
29.  
Al-Qaradawi, Y. (1987). Bay' Al-Murabahah li Al-Amir Bil-Shira' (2nd ed.). Cairo: Maktabah 
Wahbah. 
Al-Razi, F. A.-D. (1988). Al-Mahsul Fi Ilm Usul Al-Fiqh. Beirut: Dar Al Kutub Al-Illmiyya. 
Al-Rubaia, S. M. A. (1992). Tahwil Al-Masraf Al-Ribawi ila Masraf Islami wa Muqtadayatuh: 
Markaz Al-Makhtutat wa Al-Turath. 
Al-Saati, A.-R. (2007). Speculation and Gambling in Financial Markets: Economic and Legal 
Analysis. . Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, 20(1), 3.  




Al-Shubaili, Y. B. A.-A. (2012). Tatbiqat Al-Himaya Al-Badila ‘an Uqud Al-Tahawwut wa Al-
Daman. Paper presented at the The AAOIFI Annual Shari’a Conference, Manama, 
Bahrain. 
Al-Suwailem, S. (2000). Decision under Uncertainty: An Islamic Perspective. Al-Rajhi Banking 
and Investment Corporation. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  
Al-Suwailem, S. I. (1999). Towards an Objective Measure of Gharar in Exchange. Islamic 
Economic Studies, 7(1-2), 61-102.  
Al-Suwailem, S. I. (2001). Aqd Al-Kali' Bil-Kali'. In M. A.-B. w. Al-Tatweer (Ed.). Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia: Sharikat Al-Rajhi Al-Masrifiya wa Al-Istithmar. 
Al-Suwailem, S. I. (2006). Hedging in Islamic Finance. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research 
and Training Institute. 
Al-Suwailem, S. I. (2007). Al-Tahawuut fi Al-Tamweel Al-Islami. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic 
Research and Training Institute. 
Al-Suwailem, S. I. (2012). Mou’alaga Makhatir As’aar Al-Sarf fi Al-Ta’amoulat Al-Maliya Al-
Islamiya. Paper presented at the The 33rd Al-Baraka Symposium on Islamic 
Economics, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
Al-Zarqa, M. (1998a). Al-Madkhal Al-Fiqhi Al-'Aam. (1st ed. Vol. 1). Damascus, Syria: Dar Al-
Qalam. 
Al-Zarqa, M. (1998b). Al-Madkhal Al-Fiqhi Al-'Aam. (1st ed. Vol. 2). Damascus, Syria: Dar Al-
Qalam. 
Al-Zuhayli, W. (1998). Nazariyah Al-Dhaman. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Fikr Al-Mou'asser. 
Al-Zuhayli, W., & El-Gamal, M. A. (2003). Islamic Jurisprudence and its Proofs: Financial 
Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Fikr. 
Allayannis, G., & Weston, J. P. (2001). The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm 
Market Value. Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 243-276. doi: 
10.1093/rfs/14.1.243 
Amanat, A., & Griffel, F. (2007). Shari'a : Islamic law in the contemporary context. Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Archer, S., & Karim, R. A. A. (2006). On Capital Structure, Risk Sharing and Capital Adequacy 
in Islamic Banks. International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, 9(3), 269-
280.  
Archer, S., & Karim, R. A. A. (2007). Measuring Risk for Capital Adequacy: The Issue of Profit 
Sharing Investment Accounts. In S. Archer & R. A. A. Karim (Eds.), Islamic Finance: 
The Regulatory Challenge. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. 
Arrow, K. J. (1951). Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking 
Situations. Econometrica, 19(4), 404-437.  
Arrow, K. J. (1964). The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 31(2), 91-96.  
Arrow, K. J. (1971). Essays in the Theory of Risk-bearing. Chicago,: Markham Pub. Co. 
Askari, H., Iqbal, Z., Krichene, N., & Mirakhor, A. (2012). Risk Sharing in Finance: The Islamic 
Finance Alternative: Wiley. 
Avicenna, & Marmura, M. E. (2005). The Metaphysics of The Healing : a parallel English-
Arabic text = al-Ilah'iy'at min al-Shif'a'. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press. 
Ayoub, S. (2012a). The Global Financial Crisis, Securitization and Islamic Finance: An 
Opportunity for Inward and Outward Reform. ISRA International Journal of Islamic 
Finance, 4(2).  
Ayoub, S. (2012b). Islamic Finance: A Look into the Past, Present, and Future. Islamic 




Azhar, R. A. (1992). A Theory of Optimal Investment Decisions in an Islamic Economy. In A. 
Ahmad & K. R. Awan (Eds.), Lectures on Islamic Economics (1st ed.). Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
Azzam, M. (1985). Al-Fatawa Al-Shar'iyyah fi Masail Al-Iqtisadiyyah (2nd. ed.). Kuwait: Bayt 
Al-Tamwil Al-Kuwaiti. 
Bacha, O. I. (1999). Derivative Instruments and Islamic Finance: Some Thoughts for 
Reconsideration. International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, 1(1).  
Bacha, O. I. (2004a). Dual Banking Systems and Interest Rate Risk for Islamic Banks. The 
Journal of Accounting, Commerce & Finance - Islamic Perspective, 8(1), 1-42.  
Bacha, O. I. (2004b). Value Preservation through Risk Management - A Shariah Compliant 
Proposal for Equity Risk Management. The European Journal Of Management And 
Public Policy, 3(1), pp. 65-83.  
Bailey, K. D. (1994). Methods of Social Research (4th ed.). New York: The Free Press. 
Basak, S., & Shapiro, A. (2001). Value-at-Risk-Based Risk Management: Optimal Policies and 
Asset Prices. Review of Financial Studies, 14(2), 371-405.  
Berelson, B. (1952). Content Analysis in Communication Research. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
Bernoulli, D. (1954). Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk. 
Econometrica, 22(1), 23-36.  
Bernstein, P. L. (1996). Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Bessembinder, H. (1991). Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and 
Contracting Effects. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26(4), 519-
532.  
Bessembinder, H., & Seguin, P. J. (1993). Price Volatility, Trading Volume, and Market 
Depth: Evidence from Futures Markets. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 28(1), 21-39. doi: 10.2307/2331149 
Bicksler, J., & Chen, A. H. (1986). An Economic Analysis of Interest Rate Swaps. The Journal 
of Finance, 41(3), 645-655.  
Bierstedt, R. (1957). The social order; an introduction to sociology. New York,: McGraw-Hill. 
Binmore, K. G. (1992). Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. Lexington, MA, USA: D.C. 
Heath. 
BIS. (2004). Principles for the Management and Supervision of Interest Rate Risk. In B. C. o. 
B. Supervision (Ed.). Basel: Bank for International Settlements  
Black, F. (1976). The Pricing of Commodity Contracts. Journal of Financial Economics, 
3(1â€“2), 167-179.  
Black, F., & Myron, S. (1973). The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities. Journal of 
Political Economy, 81(3), 637-654.  
Blaikie, N. W. H. (2000). Designing social research : the logic of anticipation. Cambridge, UK 
; Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
Bloom, R., & Cenker, W. J. (2008). Derivatives and Hedging: Accounting vs. Taxation. Journal 
of Accountancy, 206(4), 54-58.  
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism; perspective and method. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
BMB. (2010). Global Islamic Finance Report: BMB Islamic UK Limited. 
Borna, S., & Lowry, J. (1987). Gambling and Speculation. Journal of Business Ethics, 6(3), 
219-224.  
Evidence that Greater Disclosure Lowers the Cost of Equity Capital, 12 C.F.R. (2000). 
Boudoukh, J., Richardson, M., & Whitelaw, R. F. (1997). The Best of Both Worlds: a Hybrid 




Brannen, J. (2005). Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
into the Research Process. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 
8(3), 173 - 184.  
Brennan, M. J. (1991). The Price of Convenience and the Valuation of Commodity 
Contingent Claims. In D. Lund & B. K. Øksendal (Eds.), Stochastic Models and Option 
Values : Applications to Resources, Environment, and Investment Problems (pp. x, 
301 p). Amsterdam ; New York 
New York, NY, U.S.A: North-Holland ; 
Distributors for the United States and Canada Elsevier Science Pub. 
Brenner, R., & Brenner, G. A. (1990). Gambling and Speculation: A Theory, A History, and A 
Future of Some Human Decisions. Cambridge, UK; New York, USA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brodbeck, M. (1968). Readings in the philosophy of the social sciences. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Brown, G. W. (2001). Managing Foreign Exchange Risk with Derivatives. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 60, 401-448.  
Brown, K. C., & Smith, D. J. (1995). Interest Rate and Currency Swaps: A Tutorial: Research 
Foundation of the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts. 
Brown, R. (1963). Explanation in Social Science. Chicago,: Aldine Pub. Co. 
Brunner, K., & Meltzer, A. H. (1971). The Uses of Money: Money in the Theory of an 
Exchange Economy. [Article]. American Economic Review, 61(5), 784.  
Bryman, A. (1988). Quality and Quantity in Social Research. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Bunge, M. (1993). Realism and antirealism in social science. Theory and Decision, 35(3), 
207-235.  
Carruthers, B. G., & Espeland, W. N. (1991). Accounting for Rationality: Double-Entry 
Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality. American Journal of 
Sociology, 97(1), 31-69.  
Catania, P. J., & Alonzi, P. (1997). Commodity Trading Manual. Chicago, Il: Chicago Board of 
Trade. 
Chambers, R. J. (1966). Accounting, Evaluation, and Economic Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.,: Prentice-Hall. 
Chance, D. M., & Brooks, R. E. (2010). An Introduction to Derivatives and Risk Management: 
South-Western Cengage Learning. 
Chancellor, E. (1999). Devil Take The Hindmost : A History of Financial Speculation (1st ed.). 
New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux. 
Chang, E., Chou, R. Y., & Nelling, E. F. (2000). Market Volatility and the Demand for Hedging 
in Stock Index Futures. Journal of Futures Markets, 20(2), 105-125. doi: 
10.1002/(sici)1096-9934(200002)20:2<105::aid-fut1>3.0.co;2-q 
Chapra, M. U. (1996). Monetary Management in an Islamic Economy. Islamic Economic 
Studies, 4(1), 1-34.  
Chapra, M. U., & Khan, T. (2000). Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks (Vol. 3). 
Jeddah: Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
Cicourel, A. V. (1964). Method and measurement in sociology. New York: Free Press of 
Glencoe. 
Cooke, M. (1984). Khaldun and Language: From Linguistic Habit to Philological Craft In B. B. 
Lawrence (Ed.), Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology. Leiden: E.J. Brill. 
Cooper, I. A., & Mello, A. S. (1991). The Default Risk of Swaps. The Journal of Finance, 46(2), 
597-620.  
Cornell, B., & Reinganum, M. R. (1981). Forward and Futures Prices: Evidence from the 




Cox, J. C., Ingersoll, J. E., Jr., & Ross, S. A. (1980). An Analysis of Variable Rate Loan 
Contracts. The Journal of Finance, 35(2), 389-403.  
Cox, J. C., Ingersoll, J. E., & Ross, S. A. (1981). The Relation Between Forward Prices and 
Futures Prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 9(4), 321-346.  
Craig, J. (1964). Craig's rules of historical evidence: Mouton. 
Crotty, M. (1998). The Foundations of Social Research : Meaning and Perspective in the 
Research Process. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Crow, G., Wiles, r., Heath, S., & Charles, V. (2006). Research Ethics and Data Quality: The 
Implications of Informed Consent. International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, 9(2), 83-95.  
Crump, A. (1875). The Theory of Stock Exchange Speculation (4th ed.). London, UK: 
Longmans, Green, and co. 
Culp, C. L. (2004). Risk Transfer : Derivatives in Theory and Practice. Hoboken, N.J.: J. Wiley. 
Dale, A. (2006). Editorial: Quality in Social Research. International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, 9(2), 79-82.  
de Roon, F. A., Nijman, T. E., & Veld, C. (2000). Hedging Pressure Effects in Futures Markets. 
Journal of Finance, 55(3), 1437-1456.  
Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium. New 
York,: Wiley. 
Deloitte. (2010). The Deloitte Islamic Finance Leaders Survey in the Middle East: 
Benchmarking Practices: Deloitte. 
DeMarzo, P. M., & Duffie, D. (1995). Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge 
Accounting. The Review of Financial Studies, 8(3), 743-771.  
Denzin, N. K. (1970). The Research Act in Sociology: A Theoretical Introduction to 
Sociological Methods: Butterworths. 
Devlin, K. J. (2008). The Unfinished Game: Pascal, Fermat, and the Seventeenth-Century 
Letter That Made the World Modern. New York, NY, USA: Basic Books. 
Dey, I. (1993). Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-friendly Guide for Social Scientists. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
Dilthey, W., Makkreel, R. A., & Rodi, F. (1989). Introduction to the Human Sciences. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Dowd, K. (1998). Beyond Value at Risk: The New Science of Risk Management. Chichester, 
UK ;New York, NY, SUA: John Wiley and Sons. 
Dowd, K. (2005). Measuring Market Risk (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Droysen, J. G., & Hübner, R. (1937). Historik; Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und 
Methodologie der Geschichte. München, Berlin,: R. Oldenbourg. 
Duffle, D., & Pan, J. (1997). An Overview of Value at Risk. Journal of Derivatives, 4(3), 7-49.  
Dusuki, A. W. (2009). Shariah Parameters on Islamic Foreign Exchange Swap as Hedging 
Mechanism in Islamic Finance. Paper presented at the International Conference on 
Islamic Perspectives on Management and Finance, University of Leicester, UK.  
E&Y. (2011). The World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2011-2012. Dubai, UAE. 
Ederington, L. H. (1979). The Hedging Performance of the New Futures Markets. The 
Journal of Finance, 34(1), 157-170.  
El-Ashkar, A. A. F. (1995). Towards an Islamic Stock Exchange in a Transitional Stage. Islamic 
Economic Studies, 3(1), 79-112.  
El-Gamal, M. A. (2001). An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Gharar in Classical 
Islamic Jurisprudence. Islamic Economic Studies, 8(2), 29-58.  





El-Gamal, M. A. (2008). Incoherence of Contract-based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence in 
the Age of Financial Engineering. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 25, 605.  
El-Gari, M. A. (1993). Towards an Islamic Stock Market. Islamic Economic Studies, 1(1), 1-20.  
El-Gari, M. A. (2010). Ethical Dimensions of Islamic Finance: Lessons From the Financial 
Crisis. Paper presented at the 5th IDB Forum on Islamic Finance, Baku, Azerbaijan.  
Emery, H. C. (1896). Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States. 
New York, NY, USA: Columbia University. 
Emery, H. C. (1900). The Place of the Speculator in the Theory of Distribution. Publications 
of the American Economic Association, 1(1), 103-122.  
Emm, E. E., Gay, G. D., & Chen-Miao, L. (2007). Choices and Best Practice in Corporate Risk 
Management Disclosure. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(4), 82-93. doi: 
10.1111/j.1745-6622.2007.00162.x 
Finch, G. B. (1896). A Selection of Cases on the English Law of Contract (2d ed.). Cambridge: 
Eng. University Press. 
Fisher, I. (1906). The Nature of Capital and Income. New York, 
London,: The Macmillan Company; 
Macmillan & Co., ltd. 
Freeman, F. N. (1907). The Ethics of Gambling. International Journal of Ethics, 18(1), 76-91.  
Fridson, M. S. (1993). Exactly What Do You Mean by Speculation? Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 20(1), 29-39.  
Friedman, M., & Savage, L. J. (1948). The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk. Journal of 
Political Economy, 56(4), 279-304. doi: 10.2307/1826045 
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1993). Risk Management: Coordinating 
Corporate Investment and Financing Policies. The Journal of Finance, 48(5), 1629-
1658.  
G30. (1993). Derivatives: Practices and Principles. In G. D. S. Group (Ed.). Washington, D.C. 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1989). Truth and Method (2nd ed.). New York: Crossroad. 
Gärdenfors, P., & Sahlin, N.-E. (1988). Decision, Probability, and Utility: Selected Readings. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Gastineau, G. L., Smith, D. J., & Todd, R. (2001). Risk Management, Derivatives, and 
Financial Analysis under SFAS: The Research Foundation of AIMR. 
Geczy, C., Minton, B. A., & Schrand, C. (1997). Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives. The 
Journal of Finance, 52(4), 1323-1354.  
Gintis, H. (2009). Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling 
Strategic Interaction (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. 
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago, Ill.: Aldine Pub. Co. 
Glaser, M., & Weber, M. (2009). Which Past Returns Affect Trading Volume? Journal of 
Financial Markets, 12(1), 1-31.  
Goldthorpe, J. H. (1991). The Uses of History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent 
Tendencies. The British Journal of Sociology, 42(2), 211-230.  
Gorard, S. (2002). Ethics and Quality: Pursuing the Perspective of Non-Participants (Vol. 39). 
Social Research Update: University of Surrey, Department of Sociology. 
Graham, B., & Dodd, D. L. (1934). Security Analysis. New York, NY, USA: Whittlesey house, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, inc. 
Graham, J. R., & Smith, C. W., Jr. (1999). Tax Incentives to Hedge. Journal of Finance, 54(6), 
2241-2262. doi: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1082 





Haggerty, K. D. (2004). Ethics Creep: Governing Social Science Research in the Name of 
Ethics. Qualitative Sociology, 27(4), 391-414.  
Halliday, J., & Fuller, P. (1975). The Psychology of Gambling. New York: Harper & Row. 
Hammad, N. (1986). Bay' Al-Kali Bil-Kali fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami. In M. A. A.-I. Al-Islami (Ed.). 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Jami'at Al-Malik 'Abd Al-Aziz. 
Haque, N. U., & Mirakhor, A. (1999). The Design of Instruments for Government Finance in 
an Islamic Economy. Islamic Economic Studies, 6(2), 27-43.  
Hardy, C. O. (1999). Risk and Risk-bearing. 
Haroun, A. S. M. (1953). Al-Maysir wa Al-Azlam (1st ed.). Cairo, Egypt: Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi. 
Harrington, J. (2009). Games, Strategies and Decision Making. New York, NY, USA: Worth 
Publishers. 
Harsany, J. C. (1977). On the Rationale of the Bayesian Approach: Comments on Professor 
Watkin’s Paper. In R. E. Butts & J. Hintikka (Eds.), Foundational Problems in the 
Special Sciences (Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, 
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada, 1975 pt 2 ed.). 
Dordrecht ; Boston: D. Reidel. 
Hassan, H. H. (1994). Jurisprudence of Maslaha and its Contemporary Applications (1st. ed.). 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
Hassan, H. H. (2012). Mou’alaga Makhatir As’aar Al-Sarf wa Al-Ta’amul Khilal Al-Mouhla Al-
Masrafiya. Paper presented at the The 33rd Al-Baraka Symposium on Islamic 
Economics, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
Hassan, K., & Mahlknecht, M. (2011). Islamic Capital Markets: Products and Strategies. 
Chichester, West Sussex, U.K: Wiley. 
Haushalter, G. D. (2000). Financing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from 
Oil and Gas Producers. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 107-152.  
Heffernan, S. A. (1996). Modern Banking in Theory and Practice. Chichester: Wiley. 
Herak, A. A.-M. (1988). Al-Bonouk Al-Islamiya Malaha wa Ma'alayha. Cairo: Dar Al-Sahwa. 
Hesse, M. (1978). Habermas' Consensus Theory of Truth. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial 
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1978, 373-396.  
Hicks, J. (1971). The Social Framework: An Introduction to Economics (4th ed.). Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Hicks, J. R. (1931). The Theory of Uncertainty and Profit. Economica(32), 170-189.  
Hilliard, J. E., & Reis, J. (1998). Valuation of Commodity Futures and Options Under 
Stochastic Convenience Yields, Interest Rates, and Jump Diffusions in the Spot. The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33(1), 61-86.  
Hobson, J. A. (1905). The Ethics of Gambling. International Journal of Ethics, 15(2), 135-148.  
Hopkin, P. (2012). Fundamentals of Risk Management: Understanding Evaluating and 
Implementing Effective Risk Management (2nd ed.). London, UK; Philadelphia, PA, 
USA: Kogan Page. 
Horcher, K. A. (2005). Essentials of Financial Risk Management. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley. 
How, J. C. V., Karim, M. A., & Verhoeven, P. (2005). Islamic Financing and Bank Risks: The 
Case of Malaysia. Thunderbird International Business Review, 47(1), 75-94.  
Hull, J. (2009). Options, Futures and other Derivatives (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
Hull, J. (2010). OTC Derivatives and Central Clearing: Can All Transactions Be Cleared? 
Financial Stability Review, 14, 71.  
Hussain, K., & Mehboob, F. (2008). Hedging Market Risk in Islamic Finance. World 
Commerce Review, 2(3), 20-25.  




Ibn Al-Qayyim. (1955). I'lam Al-Muwaqqin 'an Rabb Al-Alamein (Vol. 2nd). Cairo, Egypt: 
Maktabah al-Sa'adah. 
Ibn Al-Qayyim. (1991). I'lam Al-Muwaqqin 'an Rabb Al-Alamein (Vol. 3). Beirut, Lebanon: 
Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmiyah. 
Ibn Khaldun, Rosenthal, F., & Dawood, N. J. (1969). The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to 
History. [Princeton, N.J.]: Princeton University Press. 
Ibn Rushd. (1998). Bidayat al-Mujtahid (Vol. 2nd). Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Ma'rifah. 
Ibn Taymiyyah, T. A. (1899). Nazariyyah Al-'Aqd. Beurit: Dar Al-Ma'arifah. 
Ibn Taymiyyah, T. A. (1963). Majmua'ah Fatawa Shiekh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (Vol. 29). 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Matabi' Al-Riyadh. 
Ibn Taymiyyah, T. A., & Al-Qasim, A. R. (1978). Majmua'ah Fatawa Shiekh Al-Islam Ibn 
Taymiyyah. Beirut: Mu'assah Al-Risalah. 
IFSB. (2005). Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (other than insurance 
institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial Services. In I. F. S. Board (Ed.). Kuala 
Lumpur: IFSB. 
Introduction to ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement and its Significance as a 
Framework Document,  (2010). 
Iqbal, Z. (1999). Financial Engineering in Islamic Finance. Thunderbird International Business 
Review, 41(4/5), 541-559.  
Iqbal, Z., & Mirakhor, A. (2007). An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice. 
Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia). 
IRTI. (2000). Resolutions and Recommendations of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy 
1985-2000. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Research and Training Institute  
Islahi, A. A. (2005). Contributions of Muslim Scholars to Economic Thought and Analysis : 
(11-905 A.H.-632-1500 A.D.) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Scientific Publishing Centre, King 
Abdulaziz University. 
Jacque, L. L. (1981). Management of Foreign Exchange Risk: A Review Article. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 12(1), 81-101.  
James, W. (1907). Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York, NY, 
USA: Longmans, Green, and Co. 
James, W. (1909). The meaning of truth, a sequel to "Pragmatism,". New York [etc.]: 
Longmans, Green, and Co. 
James, W., & Kuklick, B. (1981). Pragmatism. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. 
Jarrow, R. A., & Oldfield, G. S. (1981). Forward Contracts and Futures Contracts. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 9(4), 373-382.  
Jobst, A., & Sole, J. (2012). Operative Principles of Islamic Derivatives: Towards a Coherent 
Theory. IMF Working Papers: 12/63, from  
 
Jobst, A. A. (2007, August 27-29, 2007). Derivatives in Islamic Finance. Paper presented at 
the International Conference on Islamic Capital Markets Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Jorion, P., & Khoury, S. J. (1996). Financial risk management: Domestic and International 
Dimensions: Blackwell Publishers. 
Jundi, M. A.-S. (1988). Mu'amalat Al-Bursa fi Al-Shariah Al-Islamiyah. Cairo: Dar Al-Nahda 
Al-Arabiya. 
Kahf, M. (2006). Innovation and Risk Management in Islamic Finance. Paper presented at 
the Seventh Harvard International Forum on Islamic Finance, Cambridge, MA.  
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk. 
[Article]. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.  





Kamali, M. H. (1997). Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Options. American Journal of 
Islamic Studies, 14(3).  
Kamali, M. H. (2000a). Islamic Commercial Law : An Analysis of Futures and Options. 
Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society. 
Kamali, M. H. (2000b). Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Futures and Options 
Cambridge : Islamic Texts Society. 
Kamali, M. H. (2003). Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (3rd rev. and enl. ed.). Cambridge, 
UK: Islamic Texts Society. 
Kamali, M. H. (2007). Commodity Futures: An Islamic Legal Analysis. Thunderbird 
International Business Review, 49(3), 309-339.  
Kane, E. J. (1980). Market Incompleteness and Divergences Between Forward and Futures 
Interest Rates. The Journal of Finance, 35(2), 221-234. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-
6261.1980.tb02150.x 
Kasri, R. A., & Kassim, S. H. (2009). Empirical Determinants of Saving in the Islamic Banks: 
Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, 
22(2), 181.  
Kearney, R. (1991). The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers. 
Oxford: Routledge. 
Keynes, J. M. (1937). The General Theory of Employment. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 51(2), 209-223. doi: 10.2307/1882087 
KFH. (2012). Al-Fatawa Al-Shari'iyya Fi Al-Masa'il Al-Iqtisadiya. Fatwa Number 18. Bayt Al-
Tamwil Al-Kuwaiti.  Retrieved 18/4/2012, from Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institutions Infrormation System, Islamic Research and Training Institute 
Khan, M., & Mirakhor, A. (1994). Monetary Management in an Islamic Economy [Journal 
article]. Journal of King Abdulaziz University : Islamic Economics, 6(1), 3.  
Khan, M. A. (1988). Commodity Exchange and Stock Exchange in an Islamic Economy. 
Journal of Islamic Economics, 1(2), 31-55.  
Khan, M. F. (1991). Time Value of Money and Discounting in Islamic Perspective. Review of 
Islamic Economics, 1(2), 35-45.  
Khan, M. F. (1997). Islamic Futures and their Markets : With Special Reference to their Role 
in Developing Rural Financial Market (1st ed.). Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic 
Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank. 
Khan, T., & Ahmed, H. (2001). Risk Management: An Analysis of Issues in Islamic Financial 
Industry: Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
Kindleberger, C. P., & Aliber, R. Z. (2005). Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial 
Crises (5th ed.). Hoboken, N.J., USA: John Wiley & Sons. 
Kirkham, R. L. (1992). Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston and New York. 
Kreitner, R. (2000). Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and 
Learned to Love Risk. Columbia Law Review, 100(4), 1096-1138.  
Kreitner, R. (2007). Calculating Promises: The Emergence of Modern American Contract 
Doctrine. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2d ed.). Chicago,: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Kunhibava, S. (2011). Reasons on the Similarity of Objections with Regards to Gambling and 
Speculation in Islamic Finance and Conventional Finance. Journal of Gambling 
Studies, 27, 1-13.  
Kuprianov, A. (1994). The Role of Interest Rate Swaps in Corporate Finance. Federal Reserve 




Lamberton, D. M. (1965). The Theory of Profit. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Langlois, C. V., Seignobos, C., & Berry, G. G. (1898). Introduction to the study of history. 
London,: Duckworth & co. 
Lavington, F. (1968). The English Capital Market (1st ed.). London: Cass. 
Laylor, R. E. (1956). Luca Pacioli. In A. C. Littleton & B. S. Yamey (Eds.), Studies in the History 
of Accounting. Homewood, Ill.,: R. D. Irwin. 
Lessard, D. R. (1991). Global Competition and Corporate Finance in the 1990s Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 3(4), 59-72.  
Levy, J. I. (2006). Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity 
Exchange in the United States, 1875-1905. American Historical Review, 111(2).  
LiPuma, E., & Lee, B. (2005). Financial Derivatives and the Rise of Circulation. Economy and 
Society, 34(3), 404-427.  
Littleton, A. C., & Zimmerman, V. K. (1962). Accounting Theory: Continuity and Change. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall. 
Litzenberger, R. H. (1992). Swaps: Plain and Fanciful. The Journal of Finance, 47(3), 831-850.  
Macdonald, K., & Tipton, C. (1993). Researching Social Life (Chapter 10: Using Documents): 
SAGE. 
MacNeil, I. R. (1974). The Many Futures of Contracts. Southern California Law Review, 47(3), 
691-816.  
Markowitz, H. (1952). Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Finance, 7(1), 77-91.  
Markowitz, H. (1959). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments. New York: 
Wiley. 
Marshall, A. (1910). Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume (6th ed.). London: 
Macmillan and Co. 
Marshall, A. (1923). Money, Credit, and Commerce. London: Macmillan. 
Marshall, J. F., & Kapner, K. R. (1993). Understanding Swaps. New York: Wiley. 
Mello, A. S., & Parsons, J. E. (2000). Hedging and Liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 
13(1), 127-153.  
Merton, R. C. (1973). Theory of Rational Option Pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 4(1), 141-183.  
Mill, J. S. (1848). Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Applications to Social 
Philosophy. London: J. W. Parker. 
Miller, M. H. (1986). Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next. Journal of 
Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 21(4), 459-471.  
Mills, C. W. (1959). The Sociological Imagination. New York,: Oxford University Press. 
Minton, B. A. (1997). An Empirical Examination of Basic Valuation Models for Plain Vanilla 
U.S. Interest Rate Swaps. Journal of Financial Economics, 44(2), 251-277.  
Moody's. (2010 ). Derivatives in Islamic Finance: Examining the Role of Innovation in the 
Industry. Paris: Moody's, Global Corporate Finance. 
Murphy, D. (2012). The Systemic Risks of OTC Derivatives Central Clearing. Journal of Risk 
Management in Financial Institutions, 5(3), 319-334.  
Newman, J. R. (1956). The World of Mathematics I (Vol. 1). New York, NY, USA: Simon and 
Schuster. 
Obaidullah, M. (1998). Financial Engineering with Islamic Options. Islamic Economic Studies, 
6(1), 73-103.  
Obaidullah, M. (2002). Islamic Risk Management: Towards Greater Ethics and Efficiency. 
International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, 3(4).  
Obaidullah, M. (2005). Islamic Financial Services    
OIC. (1992). Majallah Majma' Al-Fiqh Al-Islami (Vol. Seventh, First Part). Jeddah, Saudi 




Opwis, F. (2007). Islamic Law and Legal Change: The Concept of Maslaha in Classical and 
Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory. In A. Amanat & F. Griffel (Eds.), Shari'a : Islamic 
law in the contemporary context (pp. viii, 249 p.). Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. 
Parker, M. (2010, 12 September, 2010). Bank Negara Says No Fee for Wa'd Currency 
Hedging, Arab News. Retrieved from 
http://arabnews.com/economy/islamicfinance/article135853.ece 
Patterson, E. W. (1918). Insurable Interest in Life. Columbia Law Review, 18(5), 381-421.  
Patterson, E. W. (1931). Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges. The Yale Law 
Journal, 40(6), 843-884.  
Peirce, C. S. (1934). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Vol. V). Cambridge,: Harvard 
University Press. 
Platt, J. ( 1981). Evidence and Proof In Documentary Research : Some Specific Problems of 
Documentary Research Sociological Review, Vol 29( No. 1).  
Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York,: Basic Books. 
Popper, K. R. (1969). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (3rd 
ed.). London,: Routledge & K. Paul. 
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 32(1), 122-136.  
PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2005). International Financial Reporting Standards IAS 39 - 
Achieving Hedge Accounting in Practice. 
Promisel. (1992). Recent Developments in International Interbank Relations Report 
Prepared by a Working Group Established by the Central Banks of the Group of Ten 
Countries. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
Raines, J. P., & Leathers, C. G. (1994). Financial Derivative Instruments and Social Ethics. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 13(3), 197 - 204.  
Ramaswamy, K., & Sundaresan, S. M. (1986). The Valuation of Floating-rate Instruments: 
Theory and Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 17(2), 251-272.  
Richard, S. F., & Sundaresan, M. (1981). A Continuous Time Equilibrium Model of Forward 
Prices and Futures Prices in a Multigood Economy. Journal of Financial Economics, 
9(4), 347-371.  
Ricoeur, P. (1973). The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text. New 
Literary History, 5(1), 91-117.  
Ritchie, J., & Lewis, J. (2003). Qualitative research practice : a guide for social science 
students and researchers. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Robbins, L. R. (2007). An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. London: 
Macmillan & Co., Limited  
Rosenthal, F. (1975). Gambling in Islam. Leiden: Brill. 
Rosly, S. A. (1999). Al-Bay' Bithaman Ajil Financing: Impacts on Islamic Banking 
Performance. Thunderbird International Business Review, 41(4/5), 461-480.  
Salamon, H. (2000). Speculation in the Stock market from an Islamic Perspective Review of 
Islamic Economics, 9(1), 103-126.  
Samuelson, P. A. (1976). Economics (10th ed.). New York, NY, USA: McGraw Hill. 
Samuelson, P. A. (1998). Economics: An Introductory Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc. 
Saussure, F. d., Bally, C., Sechehaye, A., & Riedlinger, A. (1986). Course in General 
Linguistics. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court. 
Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. New York, NY, USA: John Wiley & Sons  




Schumpeter, J. A. (1939). Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis 
of the Capitalist Process (1st ed.). New York, NY, USA; London, UK: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, inc. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3rd Edition ed.). New York, 
NY: Harper. 
Scott, J. (1990). A Matter of Record : Documentary Sources in Social Research. Cambridge, 
MA: Polity Press ; B. Blackwell. 
Selltiz, e. a. (1976). Research Methods in Social Relations (3d ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. 
Shalabi, M. M. (1982). Al-Fiqh Al-Islami Bayn Mithaliyyah wa Al-Waqi'yah: Dar Al-Jami'yyah. 
Shapiro, A., & Titman, S. (1986). An Integrated Approach to Corporate Risk Management. In 
J. M. Stern & D. H. Chew (Eds.), The Revolution in Corporate Finance. Oxford, UK ; 
New York, NY, USA: Blackwell. 
Siddiqi, M. N. (1982). Islamic Approach to Money, Banking and Monetary Policy – A Review. 
In M. Ariff (Ed.), Money and Fiscal Economics in Islam. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: 
International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics: King Abdul Aziz University. 
Simmel, G., & Frisby, D. (2004). The Philosophy of Money (3rd enl. ed.). London ; New York: 
Routledge. 
Simonson, D. G. (1972). The Speculative Behavior of Mutual Funds. Journal of Finance, 
27(2), 381-391.  
Smith, A. (1778). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (2nd ed.). 
London, UK: Printed for W. Strahan; and T. Cadell. 
Smith, C. W., Smithson, C. W., & Wakeman, L. M. (1988). The Market for Interest Rate 
Swaps. Financial Management 17(4), 34-44.  
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies. The Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20(4), 391-405.  
Sombart, W., & Epstein, M. (1967). The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History 
and Psychology of the Modern Business Man. New York: H. Fertig. 
Stanford. (2002). Correspondence Theory of Truth Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy(Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#1 
as viewed on 25/3/2011.).  
Stanford. (2007). Jurgen Habermas. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Available at: 
(<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/> as viewed on 25/3/2011)).  
Stevens, A. C. (1887). "Futures" in the Wheat Market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
2(1), 37-63.  
Stewart, D. W., & Kamins, M. A. (1993). Secondary Research: Information Sources and 
Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Stout, L. A. (1999). Why The Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the 
Market for OTC Derivatives. Duke Law Journal, 48(4), 701-786.  
Strauss, A. L., & Corbin, J. M. (1998). Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and 
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Sun, T.-s., Sundaresan, S., & Wang, C. (1993). Interest Rate Swaps: An Empirical 
Investigation. Journal of Financial Economics, 34(1), 77-99.  
Teweles, R. J., Jones, F. J., & Warwick, B. (1999). The Futures Game : Who Wins? Who 
Loses? And Why? (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Thornton, D. L. (2000). Money in a Theory of Exchange. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, 82(1), 35-60. doi: http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/ 
Tobin, J. (1956). The Interest-Elasticity of Transactions Demand For Cash. The Review of 




Tobin, J. (1965). Money and Economic Growth. Econometrica, 33(4), 671-684.  
Tredgett, R., & Uberoi, P. (2008). Islamic Derivatives Case Study: Allen & Overy. 
Tredgett, R., Uberoi, P., & Evans, N. (2008). Cross Currency Swap: Allen & Overy. 
Tumpel-Gugerell, G. (2003). The Volatility of Financial Markets. Paper presented at the 
Third Encuentro Financiero Internacional, Madrid, Spain.  
Turnbull, S. M. (1987). Swaps: A Zero-sum Game? Financial Management, 16(1), 15-21.  
Turner, B. A. (1981). Some Practical Aspects of Qualitative Data Analysis: One Way of 
Organizing The Cognitive Process Associated with the Generation of Grounded 
Theory. Quality & Quantity, 15(3), 225.  
Turner, J. H. (1991). The Structure of Sociological Theory (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Pub. Co. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. The 
Journal of Business, 59(4), S251-S278.  
Uberoi, P., & Evans, N. (2008). Islamic Finance: Profit Rate Swap: Allen and Overy. 
Usmani, M. T. (1999). What Shariah Experts Say: Futures, Options, and Swaps. International 
Journal of Islamic Financial Services, 1(1).  
Usmani, M. T. (2002). An Introduction to Islamic Finance Hague ; New York Kluwer Law 
International. 
Usmani, M. T. (2010). Post Crisis Reforms: Some Points to Ponder. Islamic Finance News. 
Visvanathan, G., & Schrand, C. M. (1998). Who Uses Interest Rate Swaps? A Cross-sectional 
Analysis. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 13(3), 173-205.  
Vogel, F. E., & Hayes, S. L. (1998). Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return 
Boston, Mass: Kluwer Law International. 
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1953). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior ([3d 
ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Wall, L. D., & Pringle, J. J. (1989). Alternative Explanations of Interest-Rate Swaps - a 
Theoretical and Empirical-Analysis. Financial Management, 18(2), 59-73.  
Wang, C. Y. (2003). The Behavior and Performance of Major Types of Futures Traders. 
Journal of Futures Markets, 23(1), 1-31.  
Weber, M. (1981). General Economic History. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books. 
Weber, M., Roth, G., & Wittich, C. (1978). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Weiss, C. H. (1978). Improving the Linkage Between Social Research and Public Policy. In J. 
Laurence E. Lynn (Ed.), Knowledge and Policy: The Uncertain Connection (Vol. 5). 
Washington, DC.: National Acadamy of Sciences. 
Wells, R. S. (1958). De Sausure's System of Linguistics. In M. Joos (Ed.), Readings in 
Linguistics: The Development of Descriptive Linguistics in America since 1925 (pp. 
421 p.). Washington,: American Council of Learned Societies. 
Whittaker, J. G. (1987). Interest rate Swaps : Risk and Regulation. Economic Review, 72(3), 
3-13.  
Willer, D. (1967). Scientific Sociology : Theory and Method. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall. 
Working, H. (1953). Futures Trading and Hedging. American Economic Review, 43(3), 314.  
Yamey, B. S. (1956). Introduction. In A. C. Littleton & B. S. Yamey (Eds.), Studies in the 
History of Accounting. Homewood, Ill.,: R. D. Irwin. 
Zarqa, M. A. (1983). An Islamic Perspective on the Economics of Discounting in Project 
Evaluation In Z. Ahmed, M. Iqbal & M. Fahim Khan (Eds.), Fiscal Policy and Resource 
Allocation in Islam. Islamabad; Jeddah: Institute of Policy Studies; International 
Centre for Research in Islamic Economics: King Abdul Aziz University. 
 
